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Transliteration, Arabic nuances and sources 
When dealing with the Middle East or Arab studies in general one is faced with the 
problem of transliteration. There are elaborate systems devised by scholars to give accurate 
scientific English representations of the Arabic letter. At the same time informal transliteration 
methods have been popularly devised and used globally especially due to the effects of social 
media. In addition, there is a difference between the spoken Arabic and classical Arabic. The 
former is commonly referred to by the name of the country (Lebanese, Syrian, Palestinian, 
Moroccan etc.), or region in the country (Shami, Baalbaki, Nasrawi) and is usually a nuanced 
accent (soft or hard nuances, depending on the country) stemming from the classical Arabic 
language.   
 
At present, there is a growing problem concerning what is referred to as “facebook/social 
media Arabic”, “chat Arabic”, or “Arabizi1” (Yaghan, 2008) that all Arabs have used in one way 
or another. The issue is important enough to raise flags within the national education system in 
Lebanon specifically in the teaching of classical Arabic grammar and dictation, as youth find the 
Arabic letter in its original font less relevant. (In addition we are witnessing a decline in the level 
of Arabic literature taught in schools; the frequent use of two or three languages in one sentence 
exacerbates the problem)2. The gap between scientific or linguistic transliteration and popular 
transliteration can be significant. The phrase !"#$%& م) for example literally means “he is following 
us”. In chat Lebanese and Syrian (although pronunciation is discernable) it could read: 3am 
yel7a’na, or 3m yilhakna, while in IJMES it would read: ʿm yilḥaqna. A rural Palestinian chat 
version could read ga3ed bel7agna. In classical Arabic, IJMES transliteration it would read: Innahu 
yulāḥiqunā (as such it would be heard and understood in the same way in all countries). In this 
thesis, I follow the IJMES transliteration system loosely, whether for classical or country accents 
as per the interview or quote. I have made exceptions for words that are familiar or have been 
popularised, especially proper nouns.  
 
Furthermore, I have chosen to keep some of the literal transcriptions of the phrases when 
possible. While it might seem grammatically wrong to do so, I feel that as long as the general 
meaning is clear, the literal translation reflects a local reality and the authenticity of the interview. 
For example, one of my interviewees said: “  وأ ن&-&./وا و12 نو34 و-ا ،م!ظ"4!7 س)د4ا ت$; ن&د)!#4ا ل;1 و-ا
و;%=”. I have chosen to transcribe this phrase as: “they came here after being trampled on by the 
regime, and inhaled oxygen ou felto (and they went loose)”, while the meaning of the phrase can 
be relayed as “they arrived from where they had been oppressed for decades, and they felt a burst 
of freedom”.  
 
Because this thesis deals with contemporary events, it relies on a variety of sources. Many 
of them are online social media sources which have been utilised as secondary oral sources with 
reservations. Unless otherwise stated, all translations and photos are produced by the author, and 
all the names of the interviewees have been changed.    
                                                 
1 A combination of the words ʿarabi (Arabic) and enǧlizi (English) 
2 “Hi, kifak, ça va?” is today a symbolic phrase referring to the Lebanese language, portrayed in popular literature and art 
such as the song by Charbel Rouhana with the same title. 
Reference maps 
 
 
 
Figure 0.1 - Reference Map, Lebanon. Source: (LCRP, 2019) 
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Figure 0.2: Distribution of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon  
As of April 30, 2014, just over one million refugees became registered in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2014). 
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General 
introduction  
Figure 0.3: Pedestrian bridge at the entrance of the Bourj el-Barajneh camp, Beirut. 
Sketch: Ziad Moutran, 2019, Colour: Raphaëlle Cottereau 
In the early evening, every day, a successive flow of servees3  cars and vans drop off workers on the 
sidewalk across from the Bourj el-Barajneh camp’s main entrance on the Old Airport road. Hundreds of 
men are returning from a day’s work in the center of Beirut. The vehicles stop momentarily and groups of 
men descend from each one. They take the stairs and cross a physical and symbolic pedestrian bridge, 
linking the southern suburb of the capital with the Palestinian camp. Many of these men are Syrian 
refugees. In their quest to access the city they have taken up residence in one its most affordable 
neighbourhoods. Many do not exist on paper: their rent and salary are off the record, and they do not 
have legal residency. They are for all intents and purposes outlaws, prone to arrest or assault at anytime, 
with little or no recourse to legal protection. Their over-visibility has made them invisible. In Lebanon’s 
cities they have found interstices to exist in within the overwhelming social, urban and political 
informalities surrounding them. All they can do is continue to negotiate a place for themselves, moving 
between gaps while they wait in transit mode - for an unknown future to unfold 
  
                                                 
3 Shared taxi, commonly used in Lebanon as a quasi-public transportation method 
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I started working on this thesis three years after the Syrian refugee crisis began. For the 
last five years, when asked about my work, I used a combination of four keywords in my reply 
that guaranteed immediate interest from the person facing me: “Syrian,” “refugee,” “city,” and 
“Lebanon”. One of the longest, bloodiest wars in modern history erupted in Syria in 2011 and 
has produced millions of refugees in record time; a large part of the world has come face-to-face 
with their plight. The crisis was especially visible in Lebanon, because of its proximity to Syria 
and the influx of refugees, whose number reached a quarter4 of the population in the country.  
It is a major challenge for any society to accommodate an extra quarter of its population 
in a matter of three years. To address this process, my thesis investigates how this perceived 
impossibility came to be in the cities of Lebanon. In the many urban spaces where refugees 
tended to concentrate, how have Syrian and Lebanese dwellers and state and civil society agencies 
referred to, contested, and more generally addressed the challenge? With 173 refugees per 1,000 
inhabitants,5 Lebanon has the highest refugee density in the world by far, followed by Jordan at 
89 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants. To quantitatively compare the magnitude of over one and a 
half a million refugees coming to Lebanon, one must imagine close to seventeen million refugees 
reaching France in a few years. 
Because the country continued to function, it can only be assumed that there are lessons 
to be learned from this experience. My aim is to understand why this is a reality, due to which 
factors, and through what kind of combined processes. Several actors were involved in the 
production of this phenomenon. At the smallest scale, refugees and hosts on the front line were 
faced with the obligation to share and negotiate urban space. From the outset, Syrian refugees 
arriving to Lebanon settled in the cities, like other migrants. They had the flexibility and access to 
rent shelter and use urban spaces until 2015. With the increased strain on an already weak and 
degraded urban infrastructure, the influx of refugees multiplied instances of conflict in the cities 
and heightened tensions between communities that struggled to cope. 
One scale above are internal politics, or the different institutional and individual players 
managing the situation. The consociational political structure in Lebanon divides power between 
eighteen religious groups. A complicated electoral system, based on “a plurality list-based 
majority system within districts of a manageable size”(Salamey, 2009, p. 84), has solidified the 
strength of religious groups’ elites in their respective areas and in the country. They have the 
                                                 
4 The exact percentage is difficult to discern, as will be discussed in Part 1 of this dissertation. In principle, the number of 
refugees reached at least a quarter of the population. 
5 This number only includes registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon and does not include refugees from other nationalities, 
like Palestinians. It is furthermore an underestimate, as not all refugees are registered due to reasons discussed in this 
dissertation. 
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opportunity and access to divide public services among themselves, while increasing their spatial 
influence. “The main consequence [being] that low priority is given to overcoming the common 
and pressing reform issues that [challenge] the entire country, such as the need for economic 
growth, public accountability, and the rule of law” (Salamey, 2009, p. 84).  
A third scale is the overarching Middle Eastern power struggles that play a significant role 
in Lebanon’s internal affairs. Even during its inception, the Republic of Lebanon required foreign 
intervention to separate its minority communities from the larger regional communities, at the 
initial dismay of a significant part of its dwellers. Christian–Muslim tensions at the regional level 
lay at the root of a fifteen-year civil war, with Christian–Christian tensions crystallising during 
that war. Today, regional Muslim - Muslim tensions are mirrored in cities in Lebanon - notably in 
Tripoli, where for decades Alawis and Sunnis have engaged in physical violence, most recently 
echoing the conflict in Syria between the Alawi regime and the Sunni majority. Moreover, the 
Israeli occupation of Palestine south of Lebanon also had direct implications for the country’s 
political and urban stability. Two major invasions - in 1982 and in 2006 - have severely damaged 
infrastructure and left hundreds of thousands displaced, contributing to demographic changes 
that create tensions in certain areas. 
 
Cities in Lebanon, or Lebanese cities? 
The different order of these words may at first glance look like a nuance, but there is a 
choice behind this precise wording that is based on two reasons. First, as I develop in some detail 
in Part 1, there exists a peculiar social and political climate in Lebanon. It stems from the very 
ethos of the creation of the nation in the early 1900s and the formula for power-sharing between 
its confessional communities. This formula renders its largely urban territories6—and even the 
neighbourhoods within its cities—acutely different from one another. Of course it can be argued 
that differences between cities are a pretty typical phenomenon and that no two cities are alike, 
but cities within the same nation usually follow a significant number of common social codes that 
render their identity comparable to a large degree. In Lebanon, the differences between cities 
exist at every level—social, urban, cultural, political, etc.—so much so that since the 1950s, 
geographers have described the various Lebanese communities as “actual nations”7 (Lacoste, 
                                                 
6 Lebanon is at least 90 percent urban (Verdeil, Faour, & Velut, 2007). 
7 Original, extended citation: “Déjà, en 1955, avant la tourmente, le géographe E. de Vaumas concluait son étude sur la 
répartition confessionnelle au Liban et l’équilibre de l’Etat libanais par ces mots: ‘Les communautés libanaises sont, en fait, 
de véritables nations.’” 
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1983, p. 14). More importantly, because Lebanon’s civil law is not universally applied, each 
religious community - which usually claims one or more cities as its own - is bound by a specific 
personal code of law enforced by a religious court, rendering even the most basic of common 
codes, such as inheritance, different between cities. While I do not argue that this fact makes it 
futile to have a national identity (to the contrary), I believe that because of the drastically diverse 
nature of communities within neighbourhoods and cities, the more appropriate wording is “cities 
in Lebanon” rather than “Lebanese cities.” This distinctive nature renders a geographical 
approach to the study of the cities valuable. 
Second, there are currently twelve Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon that were 
created after 1948, one of which is a case study in this dissertation. These camps are “spaces of 
exception” (Hanafi, 2008) and while they physically lie within the boundaries of Lebanon, they 
are in fact not considered Lebanese. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) defines a camp as “a plot of land placed at the disposal of 
UNRWA by the host government to accommodate Palestine refugees and set up facilities to 
cater to their needs.”8 In fact, the land plots that camps are built on are “either state land or, in 
most cases, land leased by the host government from local landowners … refugees in camps do 
not ‘own’ the land … but have the right to ‘use’ the land for a residence”. The camps are 
governed in practice by UNRWA and Palestinian factions. While the Lebanese army has the legal 
right to enter the camps and while it guards their entrances at varying security levels, it does not 
enter the camps except in rare and extreme cases.9 
Cities in Lebanon are therefore fragmented, both socially and spatially. The question of 
political structure is central to this fragmentation as well. The fact that this structure thrives on 
division has a direct impact on how Syrians have settled in the different cities. As such, each 
space responds differently to disturbances. As a major episode that culminated in significant 
demographic and urban change in a short period, the Syrian refugee influx was received with 
some common but mainly varying reactions, depending on the spaces refugees arrived to. In the 
absence of a national strategy under which all spaces and communities in Lebanon could 
formulate a concerted reaction, the different responses of local authorities and communities 
created socio-urban gaps in which Syrians were able to slide and make a place for themselves. 
Incidentally, it is these same processes and gaps that allowed for the chaotic and quiet 
encroachment of the influx to occur. This encroachment, which Asef Bayat describes as a “silent, 
protracted, but pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied, powerful, or the 
                                                 
8 https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees. 
9 The army intervened heavily in the Nahr el-Bared camp conflict of 2007. See Long and Hanafi (2010). 
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public, in order to survive and improve their lives” (Bayat, 2010, p. 56), necessitates significant 
socio-urban informality, which is provided by the status quo in Lebanon. Albert Piette (1990) 
suggests three types of gaps, or interstices that could describe the spaces of migrants in a host 
city: the full gap, in which an established community accepts contact with an outsider community 
but keeps the latter at a distance; the empty gap, in which the established and outsider 
communities share no collective communication or space; and the transparent gap, in which the 
established and outsider communities render valuable their differences and share their spaces 
(Piette, 1990, p. 74). Mainly due to their large numbers, Syrian refugees could not fully fall into 
the empty gap—they are present in the majority of the territory and therefore it is unreasonable 
to imagine an empty gap. The transparent gap is also hard to find, with the exception of some 
neighbourhoods where a very specific niche of the population dwells (educated youth and artists 
for example). In general, refugees have found their place in the full gap: in contact with the 
established society but kept at a distance. 
But while these gaps, along with the Established-Outsider theory first introduced by Elias 
Norbert in 1965, can be relevant for understanding local urban conflict between different 
communities, they “cannot be studied in isolation. They are shaped by developments at other 
spatial scales” (Hogenstijn, van Middelkoop, & Terlouw, 2008, p. 150). Here, the concept of scale 
moves beyond the order of magnitudes to express levels of scales and the relations between those 
levels and to look at how the “national scale is made up of several local or regional scales and is 
influenced by these smaller scales while at the same time the national scale is influencing the 
‘smaller’ scales” (Hogenstijn et al., 2008, p. 150). 
What factors or mechanisms involved in the production of cities in Lebanon have 
allowed them to take in the Syrian refugees? In what ways and to what extent have the Lebanese 
shared their dwelling spaces? How have the refugees been able to negotiate a place—even though 
they were unwanted—in the cities? What urban, social, and legal frameworks have accompanied 
them? Even with the challenges that consociationalism poses at the political level, were there any 
national urban and legal directives that accompanied the settlement of refugees over the years? 
How have these served or not served their potential integration? What mechanisms have refugees 
employed to cope with the crisis and what mechanisms have they introduced to the functioning 
of the city? This dissertation provides keys to answer these questions. In this introduction, I will 
first discuss concepts and define terms that can serve as a basis on which to read this work. I will 
then provide a brief overview of the methodology and relevance of the research, and finally 
present the structure of the dissertation that follows. 
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Urban resilience, or spatial justice? 
During the first phase of this research, I considered the concept of resilience, understood 
in its social and/or urban dimension, as a central analytical key for approaching these questions. 
This is reflected in the title of my master’s thesis: Syrian refugees in Lebanon: Between resilience 
and resistance.10 I considered the massive influx of refugees into Lebanon a shock to the city, 
which prompted me to look into the ways in which the latter “bounced back.” The question 
following that was: “bounce back to what?” International organisations approached their relief 
efforts from the resilience angle as well, doing so in the rhetoric and performative aspect through 
which the concept has been disseminated (EU, 2018; ILO, 2014). In general, three key actors 
tend to address the situation in Lebanon in terms of resilience: the collective response from the 
United Nations (UN) and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to the impact of the 
Syria crisis was dubbed the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (UNHCR, 2017b). From their 
side, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) set up local community kitchens and 
other cash-for-work schemes to “strengthen the resilience of the community” in Beb el-
Tebbeneh (ICRC, 2015). Finally, there are the various urban cash and livelihood programmes of 
the International Rescue Committee (IRC), whose objective has been to “build long-term 
recovery and resilience” in Lebanon and Jordan (Saliba, 2016). 
While in all these cases, the general connotation of the process is positive, the multitude 
of definitions of the term resilience and the disciplines that have adopted it render it vague 
enough to be used by different actors who might not necessarily agree on a common meaning. In 
a volume dedicated to “Governing for Urban Resilience,” authors contributing to a special issue 
of the journal Urban Studies cautioned that 
without careful attention to power and structural realities, resilience can easily be co-
opted by the powerful and reaffirm a ‘business as usual’ norm, even in the face of 
social-ecological devastation (Hurricane Katrina) or socio-economic degradation 
affecting social-ecological outcomes (Wilkinson, Parnell, & Beilin, 2015, p. 1209) 
Since “either by design or inadvertent omission, the potential spatial and temporal 
variability in resilience can lead to inequalities in outcomes” (Cutter, 2016, p. 110), it is important 
to question the concept and the usefulness of its application and to avoid its generic use as a label 
with which the “good,” resilient urban spaces can be differentiated from the “bad,” vulnerable 
ones. In his Critique de la résilience pure, Samuel Rufat extensively explains the ways in which the 
concept may not be adequate for studies on cities and concludes by arguing that “the main 
                                                 
10 El Khouri, D. (2014). Les réfugiés syriens au Liban: entre résiliences et résistances (Masters in Social Geography, Phd 
research project). Université de Caen Normandie, France, 60 pages. 
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problem with resilience is knowing who employs resilience, which resilience and why?11” (Rufat, 
2012, p. 16). Indeed, resilience can be deceptive if used in the context of informal 
neighbourhoods, for example. If the concept invites city systems to return to a pre-crisis state 
without major structural transformation, what would slums “bounce back” to? Is the ability to 
adapt to dire and degrading conditions a desirable state, as the positively viewed “resilience” of 
poor neighbourhoods may seem to indicate? In addition, against which criteria would this be 
measured? 
Meerow, Newell, and Stults have attempted to formulate an inclusive definition of urban 
resilience in their comprehensive review of the concept. If such a definition were to be a useful 
analytical tool, however, I believe it implicitly requires an acceptable baseline: 
Urban resilience refers to the ability of an urban system—and all its constituent 
socio-ecological and socio-technical networks across temporal and spatial scales—
to maintain or rapidly return to desired functions in the face of a disturbance, to 
adapt to change, and to quickly transform systems that limit current or future 
adaptive capacity (Meerow, Newell, & Stults, 2016). 
 
The potential misuses of urban resilience in the context of underdeveloped urban areas 
must be highlighted. Resilience must be clearly differentiated from vulnerability and current 
societal change. I am wary of labelling phenomena or systems resilient, lest this obscure or blur a 
more profound truth. The settlement of Syrian refugees in cities in Lebanon is not propelled by a 
perceived resilience—in the sense of elasticity—of the host society. In fact, Lebanon is the 
country that was “least hospitable to Palestine refugees” (Peretz, 1993, p. 61) in the past. Since 
the first years of the refugee crisis, research found “significant social discrimination and an 
unwillingness or inability—at the local level—to help Syrians with basic health and education 
needs” (Chatty, 2015, p. 5). Rather, remarkable injustices in cities in Lebanon by far predate the 
Syrian crisis that allowed for this challenging settlement. These injustices have internalised and 
more dangerously normalised society’s capacity to organise the exploitation of poor migrants and 
allowed for them to settle. Paradoxically, this situation presented an opportunity for Syrian 
refugees to settle in Lebanon while paying the price in terms of injustice. 
This conception builds on the following statement made by Wilkinson, Parnell, and 
Beilin: “Urban resilience begins with the ordinary business of telling stories, creating networks, 
revisiting initiatives—and these reinforce the everyday and the ordinary capacities of people” 
                                                 
11 Original, extended citation: “Le problème clé de la résilience est de savoir qui dit la résilience, quelle résilience et pourquoi. 
Elle apparaît d’abord comme une mise en récit incantatoire de l’après catastrophe visant à imposer la ‘bonne’ ville à ses 
habitants en brandissant la menace des catastrophes.” 
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(Wilkinson et al., 2015, p. 1214). In that sense, this research and dissertation have at least served 
the purpose of promoting what could be an effective form of urban resilience. But rather than 
adhere to the concept of urban resilience, this dissertation may also be seen as an investigation 
into spatial justice—as clarified in 2009 by the authors of the Annales de Géographie in the 
volume dedicated to the notion: 
Working particularly in the context of large cities where forms of social injustice are 
especially visible in space, [Anglo-Saxon and French geographers including David 
Harvey, Edward Soja, Alain Reynaud, and Bernard Bret] characterized “structural” 
spatial justice by the equal access of all city dwellers to urban resources, the 
provision of services to disadvantaged neighbourhoods, or the development of 
adapted transport for the access of inhabitants of peripheral districts to central urban 
facilities, for example. … they often tend to favor the idea of a “procedural” justice, 
defined and negotiated between several stakeholders (and particularly the 
beneficiaries of public redistributive intervention), rather than imposed by “the top”12 
(Gervais-Lambony & Dufaux, 2009, p. 7). 
Indeed, “it is crucial in theory and in practice,” as Edward Soja insists, “to emphasize 
explicitly the spatiality of justice and injustice, not just in the city but at all geographical scales, 
from the local to the global” (Soja, 2010, p. 1). The multiplicity of geopolitical configurations in 
cities is better served therefore from a spatial justice point of view than from a resilience point of 
view. 
Migrants, displaced, or refugees? 
Being officially recognised by qualified authorities as “someone who is unable or 
unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political 
opinion” (UNHCR, 1951), a refugee is in a broader sense a person in need of protection. While 
in theory the term is neutral and does not connote positive or negative attributes, the reality is 
that today, a refugee is often viewed negatively by many societies. Lebanese communities have an 
especially complicated relationship with the term. As detailed in Part 1, the presence of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon and the role it played in the beginning of 
                                                 
12 Original, extended citation: “Travaillant notamment dans le cadre des grandes métropoles où les formes d’injustice sociale 
sont particulièrement visibles dans l’espace, ils ont caractérisé la justice spatiale ‘structurelle’ par l’égal accès de tous les 
citadins aux ressources urbaines, qu’il passe par l’équipement en services des quartiers défavorisés, ou par le 
développement de transports adaptés pour l’accès des habitants des quartiers périphériques aux équipements urbains 
centraux, par exemple. En effet, ces auteurs ne nient pas l’existence d’inégalités socio-spatiales quantifiables qu’il est 
nécessaire de réduire dans l’absolu par des politiques urbaines d’équipement public. Toutefois, ils tendent souvent à 
privilégier l’idée d’une justice « procédurale », définie et négociée entre plusieurs acteurs parties prenantes (et notamment 
les bénéficiaires de l’intervention publique redistributive), plutôt qu’imposée par ‘le haut’.” 
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the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 cast Palestinian refugees and refugees in general in a strong 
negative light. In addition, the Lebanese, like many other societies, also have a complicated 
relationship with poor foreign migrants and with Syrians in general, especially after the thirty-year 
occupation of Lebanon by the Syrian regime. For many Lebanese, Syrian refugees symbolise civil 
unrest, poverty, political domination, and the combination of these three ideas, which evidently 
put the refugees in a bind once it became clear that their stay in Lebanon would be protracted. 
Politically, the label and all asylum terminology caused a dilemma, and from the onset there were 
debates on how to label them. The fact that Lebanon is not a signatory to the Convention and 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees strengthens the reluctance of the government to call 
them refugees. 
The [Lebanese] government had an obsession with swapping out this terminology 
for different words in all official documents and communications. The most obvious 
example of this is the replacement of the word laji’ (refugee) with nazih, despite the 
clear difference in meaning. The nazih is a person who leaves one region for 
another within the borders of a single state (i.e. a “displaced person” or what is 
conventionally known as a muhajer in Lebanon), while a true laji’ is someone who 
crosses state borders and decamps from one country to another, which is the case 
with Syria’s refugees (Saghieh & Frangieh, 2014, p. 2). 
 
For many of the Syrians themselves, the term “refugee” is pejorative as well and they 
avoid or even reject it. Nevertheless, except for a small minority, returning to Syria at the time of 
writing represents real risk and danger for most.13 In line with Saghieh and Frangieh’s discourse, I 
refer to Syrians in Lebanon today as refugees, with a few exceptions. I choose to do so even 
though they are treated, for all intents and purposes, as economic migrants—against international 
law and human rights—and are placed ipso facto in a position of second-class dwellers in 
Lebanon’s cities. This is also “a deliberate position against the ongoing criminalisation of refugee 
presence in Lebanon and elsewhere” (Fawaz, Gharbieh, Harb, & Salamé, 2018, p. 6). 
 
What “negotiating space” signifies in this work 
In its most straightforward definition, negotiation is a “discussion aimed at reaching an 
agreement.”14 Because reaching an agreement implies compromise, effective negotiation requires 
a certain equality between the negotiating parties’ positions. Bernard Rougier suggests that: 
                                                 
13 In addition to the danger to their lives, they risk conscription, persecution, and imprisonment. National security in Syria still 
unclear; they also risk the inability to secure an education or livelihood or even to prove ownership of their property. 
14 Negotiation. 2019. In Oxforddictionaries.com. Retrieved from: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/negotiation 
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Negotiation is a relation of power. It is part of a context that determines its form and 
nature. In this sense, negotiation is an “empty concept” and it is impossible to 
describe its characteristics in abstracto without knowing the configuration of the 
social relations within which it lies. Since conflict (latent or manifest) and tension are 
the original characteristics of a negotiation, the latter must be thought of as an 
interaction in which the actors both seek to influence each other in a manner 
favourable to their interests, relying alternatively or simultaneously on threats and on 
promises15 (Rougier, 2014, p. 86). 
Rougier goes on to describe three types of negotiation: (1) that which accompanies a 
process, such as the process of decolonisation; (2) that which creates a process, such as a peace 
treaty; and last, (3) negotiation that blocks a social process, such as a political system that relies on 
maintaining a flawed status quo in order to survive (Rougier, 2014, p. 86). He suggests that these 
three types are not mutually exclusive but can be present in a situation all at once 
In this dissertation, space is added to the concept of negotiation. Building on Rougier’s 
three types, I add three scales of analysis and apply them specifically to the Syrian refugee crisis. 
The first type can be described as negotiating space on the international level, creating a space 
sharing social process. This is the case when the construction of camps is agreed upon before the 
arrival of refugees. In this case, agreement on how space is divided between hosts and refugees is 
predefined and physically clarified. This is what happened in Jordan and Turkey in response to 
the Syrian refugee crisis. The second type I propose is negotiating space at the national level, 
accompanying a space sharing social situation: this is embodied in the changing policies and 
actions of the Lebanese government vis-à-vis the Syrian urban refugees, such as forced evictions, 
changed residency requirements, or curfews that are introduced sporadically to regulate 
settlement conditions. 
 
The third type is the continuous cycle of negotiating space at the local level, largely 
blocking a social process. Here the negotiation of space takes place at the finest, mundane level, 
illustrated in the tension and conflict, or the activism and resistance against this tension, between 
different microcommunities in the cities. These three types are not mutually exclusive either and 
affect each other. The empirical observations undertaken for this dissertation focus on this last 
type of negotiation, while the first two are mobilised in the analyses, discussions, and conclusions. 
                                                 
15 Original citation: “La négociation est une relation de pouvoir. Elle s’inscrit dans un contexte qui en détermine la forme et la 
nature. En ce sens, la négociation est un ‘concept vide’ et il est impossible d’en décrire les caractéristiques in abstracto, 
sans connaître la configuration des relations sociales dans laquelle elle s’inscrit. Le conflit (latent ou manifeste) et la tension 
étant les caractéristiques originelles d’une négociation, cette dernière doit donc se penser comme une interaction où les 
acteurs cherchent mutuellement à s’influencer dans un sens favorable à leurs intérêts, en ayant alternativement ou 
simultanément recours aux menaces et aux promesses.” 
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For Rougier, negotiation as creating and negotiation as accompanying a social process 
tend to be positive in that they seek to avoid violence, while negotiation blocking a social process 
tends to be negative in that it denies the advancement of society by disregarding major elements. 
This thesis argues that while Syrian refugees may have found a place in the cities in Lebanon and 
today have a role in making these cities (Fawaz et al., 2018), their negotiation of space at all levels 
tends to yield rather unfavourable results for them—the root of this being the unequal balance of 
power between the actors at each level. 
 
An overview on the Syrian refugee situation in the region 
This dissertation focuses on the refugee situation in Lebanon and does not delve into the 
push factor, the Syrian conflict, that has produced the refugee influx, even though it touches on 
the regional geopolitical effects on Lebanon. Neither does this dissertation provide an in-depth 
comparison between the situation in Lebanon and that in Jordan and Turkey, the two other 
countries in immediate proximity to Syria that also host significant numbers of refugees. Rather, 
this dissertation focuses on the negotiations between refugees and the host society in urban 
spaces in Lebanon, in a unique socio-political context. The following brief highlight of the 
humanitarian situation of Syrian refugees in general will show Lebanon’s position in the region as 
a host country and will shed broader light on the humanitarian disaster that is the Syrian refugee 
reality since 2011. 
For the past seven years, Syrians have been fleeing from an armed conflict whose 
protagonists are numerous. Both international and local actors played a role in the conflict, 
resulting in alliances that could resemble a global war. The renowned French paper Le Monde 
represented these alliances in Figure  0-1, reflecting the complexity of the situation. It represents 
the local forces and alliances that have a role on the ground and the various regional and 
international coalitions supporting them.16 
 
                                                 
16 For a brief overview of the Syrian crisis since 2011, see Baczko, Dorronsoro, and Quesnay (2016); Sallon, Camus, and 
Alouti (2019). 
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Figure  0-1: Diagram representing alliances in the Syrian conflict Grandin & Papin (2015). 
 
As a direct consequence of this conflict, half the population of Syria has been displaced, 
adding up to almost eleven million people. Of those, over 5.5 million have crossed the borders, 
mostly to Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan (Figure  0-2), but also beyond.  
 
 
Figure  0-2: Distribution of Syrian refugees in Middle Eastern countries  
Source: UNHCR data portal, 2019 
There was a regional total of 5,663,876 registered Syrian refugees in neighbouring host 
countries on December 31, 2018. However, the total number of Syrians that reflects host 
government estimates (including registered Syrian refugees, unregistered Syrian refugees, and 
Syrians residing in host countries under alternative legal frameworks) is significantly, higher at 
7,245,754 (UNHCR, 2018a, p. 2). In the case of Lebanon, and as will be developed in Chapter 3, 
the number of refugees that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
reports is lower than the real number of refugees in the country, for political and social reasons. 
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In terms of funding, the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)17 reported in 2018 that only 
62 percent of the total requirements of the plan were funded. In the case of Lebanon specifically, 
only 48 percent of the required $2.68 billion was funded (UNHCR, 2017b, p. 3). 
Two aspects of the Syrian environmental and political climate before 2011 are especially 
useful to partly understand the demographic of the Syrian refugee population. The first aspect is 
the dictatorial regime, which has been in place since 1971. Power in Syria is in the hands of the 
second largest religious group, the Alawis, who in 1943 made up 11.3 percent of the population. 
The largest religious group, Sunnis, made up 68.9 percent18 (Hourani, 1947, p. 76). The second 
aspect is environmental: “four years of devastating drought beginning in 2006 caused at least 
800,000 farmers to lose their entire livelihood and about 200,000 simply abandoned their lands” 
(Polk, 2013). These two aspects show that, even before they came to Lebanon as refugees, a large 
section of the Syrian population had already reached a place where they were extremely poor, 
with no real prospects for advancing their livelihood and little support from their government. 
 
Method, choice of case studies, and relevance of the research 
This dissertation brings internal politics, migration, and refugee studies together in a 
socio-urban geographical analysis. It particularly emphasises urban and social relationships in the 
city as producers of social and spatial change, based mainly on qualitative ethnographic research. 
The ethnographic approach is necessary for two reasons. First, because of the complexity of 
scales, the local variability of the phenomenon, and the data expressing this process so partially 
and inaccurately. Therefore, proceeding to a quantitative analysis would be unrealistic and yield 
skewed results. As will be detailed throughout this work, the urban and social features of 
Lebanon’s cities vary according to numerous delicate, complex, and entangled factors. They 
include religious group and political party affiliations, class structure, and debates on identities, 
which all materialise in the form of negotiations on space. Studying them requires an 
understanding of the historical and political context and of the spatial expressions of society’s 
and territories’ social and cultural divisions. The second reason is the serious lack of 
comprehensive, reliable quantitative data related to urban space in general. A proper population 
survey, which could help to locate the Syrian influx within the demography of the country, does 
                                                 
17 As per its website: “The UN and NGO response to the impact of the Syria Crisis in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and 
Iraq, in support of national efforts.” Retrieved from http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/. 
18 This figure comes from the last survey that took into consideration religious affiliation in 1943. Since then, surveys do not 
include a question on religion, but it is safe to say and commonly known that the ratios still stand to a large degree. 
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not exist. For general demographic, housing, and economic realities, researchers and 
organisations have to rely mostly on estimations. These are as scientific as possible, but they 
remain educated guesses. Because of this context, ethnographic research is the starting point in 
this thesis and forms the basis of the fieldwork. It is complemented by secondary sources: 
observations, commented urban walks with dwellers, social media analyses, photographic 
imagery, a wide number of informal chats with taxi drivers, coffee kiosk vendors, etc., and a 
review of a plethora of reports produced by the leading and local NGOs working on the Syrian 
refugee crisis. Three lenses are then utilised to analyse this socio-urban data. 
First, an urban lens which seeks to understand the intricate power relations between the 
different communities. This is mainly used in the fieldwork to collect data on urban contestations 
and social relations. I look at actors in the field and the power relations between them to gather 
elements for analysis. These observations and data are then complemented by a national social 
lens. Using this lens, I look at the elements that directly and indirectly affect the situations 
observed at the micro-urban scale. These elements include the history of Lebanon and its 
relationship with Syria, the dire economic reality, and the complicated ethnic-religious makeup of 
the Lebanese communities. The third lens is geopolitical and has to do with the broader, 
overarching elements that speak for the very ethos of Lebanon. The roots of the east–west 
identity debates, allegiances to religious groups’ leadership, and the degree of international 
influence such as international aid are all examples. Urban observations as such tend to be at the 
crossroads of spatial, social, and political processes that are revealed in the cities. 
The case study neighbourhoods are chosen due to several factors that make them similar 
and very different at the same time. All three are extremely dense and poor neighbourhoods 
located on the peripheries of the Beirut (Bourj el-Barajneh, El-Nab’a) and Tripoli (Tebbeneh)19, 
the largest cities in Lebanon, and all three have received significant numbers of refugees since 
2011. At the same time, the social mix in each of the neighbourhoods is unique. Both Tebbeneh 
and the Bourj el-Barajneh camp are composed mainly of Sunni Muslim populations. While 
Tebbeneh’s residents are Lebanese, the area is one of the most conservative in the country and 
follows largely tribal modes of life. El-Nab’a is the neighbourhood that is the most mixed of the 
three. It has received various waves of poor migrants over the years that have shaped its current 
urban character. It is also the only neighbourhood that includes a mixture of religious groups, 
having a significant presence of Christian communities. Bourj el-Barajneh is a Palestinian refugee 
camp and therefore has few or no Lebanese dwellers in it. However, the Palestinian refugees 
dwelling there today are generally second-, third-, and even fourth-generation refugees. They do 
                                                 
19 For their geographical locations and context, see Chapter 4. 
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not hold Lebanese citizenship and are excluded from various social and urban rights, but my 
interviews have indicated reactions to the new influx of Syrian refugees similar to their Lebanese 
counterparts in the other two neighbourhoods. 
 
Dissertation structure 
The first part of this dissertation provides an extensive description of the main features 
that characterise Lebanon’s cities; places where refugees tend to converge. It seeks to present the 
main aspects and context of Lebanon’s urban landscape before 2011 and the arrival of Syrian 
refugees. Chapter 1 includes a socio-political and urban description of cities in Lebanon, with a 
section dedicated to the historical relations between Lebanon and Syria. These relations have 
current repercussions for both the Syrian and Lebanese societies and are crucial for 
understanding the tensions between them. Chapter 2 goes on to present the social structure in 
the cities, including the fragmented nature of societies, urban governance, and the rights of 
dwellers. The chapter provides the context underpinning the varied reactions to refugee 
populations in the different cities. 
The second part presents the theoretical framework and justification of the case studies 
selected. Chapter 3 develops the approach, guiding questions, the position of the researcher, and 
the methodology. It marks social events that had an effect on the fieldwork and discusses the 
difficulties involved in working with unreliable statistics, which characterise the situation in 
Lebanon. This chapter lays out the challenges and opportunities that the fieldwork presented and 
clearly points out the personal background of the researcher in an effort to “[render objective] 
the subjective relation to the object which, far from leading to a relativistic and more-or-less anti 
scientific subjectivism, is one of the conditions of genuine scientific objectivity” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992, p. 282). Chapter 4 highlights the personal aspects of fieldwork and goes on to 
describe the three selected case studies, justifying their selection and providing elements of 
comparison. 
In its final part, the dissertation culminates in a discussion on negotiating space as 
presented in this introduction. It elaborates on how space has been utilised as a tool for co-
optation and exploitation on the local, national, and regional levels. Negotiating space is not only 
seen as a binary relation between the refugees and the host community, but also as a mechanism 
that produces and reproduces inequality at different scales. The four chapters of this part place 
the refugees on the social, urban, and physical map. It traces their journey from their arrival to 
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Lebanon to their social and urban conditions of settlement and describes the reactions of the 
host communities to these settlement conditions. 
Due to its subject matter and methodology, this thesis contributes to the socio-urban 
understanding of cities in Lebanon and more generally to urban studies in their political 
dimension. It utilises a multiscalar approach to discern a complex phenomenon that would be 
difficult to reduce to one specific area. It is furthermore a committed contribution to social 
geography, conscious of the turmoil in spaces and societies of the world. At a time when cities 
are facing age-old challenges that continue to present struggles on the global scale, this thesis 
questions the ways in which it is possible, necessary, and desirable to respond to the challenge of 
coexistence in the city and the nation in a world in perpetual movement. 
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before the rapid influx of Syrian 
refugees 
 
  
20 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction to Part 1 
 
Lebanon is a young country with a rich and complex history. It was born out of a desire 
for independence from regional influence under the pretext of the protection of minority 
religious groups. Today, Lebanon is trapped in a gridlock of socio-urban and political webs that is 
difficult to move on from. This is even more so because the keepers of this gridlock, the religious 
groups’ elites that have gained in influence and authority over the decades, are the very actors 
that benefit from it. As such, they block any attempts at negotiating long-term solutions. This 
reality dates back to the period before the arrival of the Syrian refugees to Lebanon’s cities. Since 
the end of the Lebanese Civil War, these cities have been permeated with memories of war and 
violence, dire economic conditions, and regional influence on their internal politics. 
The main objective of this first part is to present a picture of Lebanon’s cities in the wake 
of the arrival of the Syrian refugees. It seeks to place the situation in the larger context of 
international relations between Lebanon and Syria since their inception. The first chapter 
presents the social and political climate in the country and sheds light on the presence of Syrian 
migrants in the cities before 2011. Then, after an overview of urban refuge and its implications, 
the chapter delves into the several sources of tension between Lebanese and Syrian communities 
since the early 1900s. The second chapter focuses on the political structure and local governance 
and pays special attention to the nature of coexistence between different Lebanese communities 
and between Lebanese and dwellers of other nationalities, especially poor migrants. 
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2. Chapter 1: Syrian 
migrants in the city: 
Historic context 
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1. The social and political climate in Lebanon 
1.1 Uncertainty, inequality, and socio-spatial division: Three 
challenges that burden cities in Lebanon 
Uncertainty 
Lebanon could be referred to as a country of uncertainty and inequality. The first 
uncertainty that precedes and affects all research on Lebanon is the fact that there is no recent 
population census, with the last official survey dating back to 1932.20 All subsequent population 
figures are estimates and vary from one source to another.21 Éric Verdeil explains this fact well, in 
his Atlas of Lebanon, stating that without possible verification, the latest, most precise figures are 
those published by the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) in 1997, estimating the 
population at four million (Verdeil, Faour, & Velut, 2007). The French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ profile of Lebanon places the population at 4.6 million in 201622 (including Palestinian 
but excluding Syrian refugees23) and the United Nations Population Fund UNFPA places it at 6.1 
million in 2017, with no mention of whether Syrian refugees are included (UNFPA, 2017). Due 
to this statistical imprecision, all other quantitative factors become equally imprecise, including 
urban density overall, gross national income per capita, and social/demographic data that would 
be indispensable in analysing socio-spatial divisions. Working with these uncertainties requires 
moving beyond the limits of quantification and addressing this aspect along with its possible 
meanings. In an ironic tone, Professor of Urban Planning Mona Fawaz shared with international 
media outlets: “In Lebanon we don’t like numbers…, we prefer what they call ‘creative 
mathematics’” (quoted in Gustafsson, 2016). The base of this imprecision could lie in the very 
process of the formation of the Lebanese nation and its power-sharing formula; as such it may 
not be in any political-religious party’s best interest to update the statistics. Should a census be 
undertaken in 2018, it would probably show that the Christian percentage of the population is 
much lower than what legitimises a Christian presidency and that Shiites account for over 60 
percent of the population, according to estimations. Counter-intuitively, Shiites would not want 
complete government control. They already have over a third of the seats in parliament, and by 
virtue of their militia status they can continue their resistance efforts against Israël and support 
the Syrian regime with more flexibility and efficiency than from a non-governmental position. 
                                                 
20 Even this census is contested, because of unclear and irregular data collection processes (Maktabi, 1999; Jaulin, 2014) 
21 See Chapter 3, section 4.1: Unreliability of quantitative data 
22 This is the population estimate I have chosen to use in my research. 
23 France Diplomatie. (2018). Présentation du Liban [Governmental]. Available at https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-
pays/liban/presentation-du-liban/. 
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Uncertainty is not exclusive to population and demographic statistics and is not caused by 
technical challenges or a lack of human capacity. Rather, the difficulties stem from an intentional 
lack of political will to counter it. There is no official register for the number of Syrians in 
Lebanon over the years. In reality, Syrians have been part of the labour market in Lebanon in 
significant numbers and since the independence of the two countries.24 Some economists have 
evoked the non-confirmed number of one million workers in the last decade, before Syrians 
sought refuge in Lebanon (Chalcraft, 2009; Verdeil et al., 2007). The basic difference between the 
workers and refugees lies in the nature of their residency, with the former’s stays being mostly 
cyclical, transitional, and short term and the latter’s protracted and anchored at many levels. 
Inequality 
Moreover, Lebanon is a country of profound economic inequality. The income of the top 
two percent accounts for a level of income comparable to that of the bottom 60 percent and 
Lebanon ranks 129th of 141 countries in terms of income equality (E. Saliba, Sayegh, & Salman, 
2017); low compared to Jordan (111) and Turkey (58) (Index Mundi, 2011). In Lebanon’s cities, 
economic inequality is highly visible; for example, uninhabited but highly maintained high-rise 
buildings tower over old, run-down houses suffocating their residents for lack of air Figure  2-1. 
Informal settlements and camps are a short drive away from the posh, cosmopolitan Beirut city 
centre. Land and housing speculation are generating a situation of high pressure on the socially 
most vulnerable, who have seen for a few decades now the growing privatisation of urban lands. 
Aside from private residencies, public space is also increasingly reflecting such exclusivity, 
expressed mainly by general restrictions on access. A major expression of this phenomenon is the 
case of the Lebanese coastline that has been privatised to a large extent, and accessible only to the 
privileged few (Dictaphone Group, 2013; Makhzoumi, 2011). 
                                                 
24 See Chapter 1, Section 1.3: The change in the type and profile of Syrian migrants since 1948 
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Figure  2-1: Old house in Beirut  
An old Lebanese house stands among modern building and a construction site on Beirut’s 
Corniche. October 2015. Photo Patrick Baz/AFP 
Inequality in Lebanon is not limited to economics. Gender, religious, social, racial, and 
cultural inequalities and contradictions exist and are visible as well. Pictures of churches and 
mosques fill tourism websites, but they do not reflect the loud competition of their calls to 
prayer. Pictures of women in bikinis next to veiled women on the boardwalks also fill the 
Internet, but do not reflect that all these women are inferior their male counterparts with regard 
to their civil rights.25 Should one of these women be a foreign domestic worker or nanny, she 
would not be allowed in the swimming pool next to Lebanese children; she would only be 
permitted to ensure their safety while dressed in her uniform in the heat. Racial inequality is 
pronounced and institutionalised; government policies and practices governing the issue are 
highly contested, both from within Lebanon and on the international level (OHCHR, 2016, pp. 
2–7). 
 
Socio-spatial division 
                                                 
25 In fact, women have different civil and cultural rights, depending on their religious group affiliation. Some inequalities 
however exist across the board. For example, no Lebanese woman can pass down her nationality to her spouse or children. 
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There are eighteen official religious groups that share and divide the land politically, 
culturally, legally, and even spatially. Even without physical borders, the majority of areas in 
Lebanon are easily identifiable in terms of religious identity. Churches and mosques are the first 
but not the only identifying element. Material expressions like clothing (such as, but not 
exclusively, the veil or sherweil26), wearing religious symbols, wall graffiti, and publicity banners are 
relatively easily identifiable—especially for locals—and reflect the sociocultural and religious 
identities of a place. Importantly, the religious groups all own substantial areas of land, known as 
waqef or awqaf in plural.27 These territories are frozen by law to the benefit owners who legally 
keep all profits from them. The awqaf serve as an example of the weight that religious institutions 
hold over urban land. In addition to providing religious communities with significant and visible 
wealth and power, they also reinforce the religious facets of different places. 
The cultural tendencies of religious groups largely vary and are expressed in numerous 
nuances. Essentially independent from social class, those tendencies can be roughly placed on a 
spectrum. On one end, there is the “extreme East” tendency, where those who identify with an 
Arab nationalist identity are located. On the other end, there is the “extreme West,” where those 
who reject any Arab affiliation are found. The latter identify themselves as descendants of the 
Canaanites and prefer to be referred to as “Phoenicians” (AFP, 2010; “Middle East, Lebanon,” 
2018). This represents perhaps the most significant division. The majority of the population lies 
somewhere in between these two extremes, and make Lebanon a country where both Eastern 
and Western values and cultural attitudes are sometimes simultaneously embraced. While there 
are exceptions, it is generally believed that the Christian (and specifically Maronite) population in 
Lebanon tends to embrace the “Phoenician” label while the Muslim population tends to embrace 
the “Arab” one (AFP, 2010). For example, in order to prove this spirit of openness and attract 
western tourists, Broumana (a well-known touristic village) chose to employ young female traffic 
officers in 2018 with hot pants for uniforms (Les Observateurs, 2018). This act invited some 
approval but also significant public disapproval both locally and worldwide. Still, it reflects the 
distorted understanding of “openness” in some Lebanese circles. At the same time, a mere 
twenty-minute drive from Broumana one finds cities that are more conservative, with women 
generally veiled on the streets. It is important to keep this dichotomy in mind when analysing the 
social context of the cities in Lebanon that Syrian refugees arrive to. 
 
                                                 
26 Traditional trousers worn by the Druze communities 
27 For more information, see (Sakr, 2018) 
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1.2 The Lebanese political climate and its implications for Syrian 
refugees 
International influence on Lebanese politics 
East–West tensions are very present in Lebanese politics. Political parties are funded 
and/or supported by different international forces, from the East (e.g. Iran) and the West (e.g. 
France). International influence on Lebanon’s interior political scene lies at the core of the 
stagnation and impotence of the government. Politicians’ allegiances are not only to the nation; 
they forge different agreements and alliances with other regional and international players which 
dictate their actions and positions in Lebanon. One example among innumerable others is the 
message Saudi Arabia sent to Iran via Lebanese Prime Minister Saad el-Hariri28 and his sudden 
and shocking resignation from his position via a televised broadcast from Saudi Arabia. It is 
known that the Hariri family is closely allied to Saudi Arabia, where the late Rafik el-Hariri 
accumulated his wealth in the 1960s and early 1970s. The Hariris remain Saudi Arabia’s political 
arm in Lebanon, much like the Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s. Wanting to send a message across 
the region generally but to Iran specifically, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia summoned el-
Hariri from Beirut to Riyadh in November 2017 and forced him “to resign … and publicly blame 
Iran, as if he were an employee and not a sovereign leader” (Barnard & Abi-Habib, 2017). The 
act shook Lebanese politics and stability for a month, and rumours of an imminent war raged on 
the streets. Regardless of its ultimate success or failure, this episode shows the reach of 
international players’ control of Lebanese politics. 
Lebanon saw a violent and protracted civil war that raged for fifteen years. It came to an 
end not with a winner and a loser, but thanks to a regionally coordinated agreement known as the 
Ta’ef  Accord. This laid out the foundation of a government of Tawafoq al-Watani (National 
Accord).29 After fifteen years of fighting, no side had prevailed and the solution was to give each 
party/religious group a share in power.30 The agreement included the distribution of government 
positions among certain factions that took part in the conflict. It also institutionalised the 
religious group power-sharing formula and allowed the Syrian Ba’thist regime to obtain a quasi-
                                                 
28 The son of Rafik el-Hariri, assassinated former Prime Minister of Lebanon 
29 The Lebanese Civil War broke out in 1975 and ended in 1990 (see more details in Chapter 2, Section 2).With the backing 
of the League of Arab States, a tripartite committee composed of Algeria, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia presided at the signing 
of the agreement that officially ended the war: Ta’ef  (22 October 1989). In this Saudi city, the protagonists of the civil war 
approved a seven-point deal. In addition to forging a sectarian consensus that has brought entire Lebanese political society 
to deadlock since, this agreement gave the Syrian regime a quasi-protectorate over Lebanon, along with a military 
occupation that lasted until 2005 (Chalcraft, 2006b). 
30 The previous Lebanese Civil War of 1958 was also brought to an end via a compromise proposed by the United States at 
the time. No side had prevailed, and a moderate Christian President was proposed by the Americans. 
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protectorate over Lebanon, accompanied by a military occupation that would last another fifteen 
years, until 2005. Logically, no real political change or decision can be reached in such a setting. 
Each parliamentary block pushes and pulls towards a certain side, often depending on 
international interests in the country and in the area. This has become more tense considering the 
importance of Lebanon’s situation vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict. It is in this pre-existing context of 
incertitude, inequality, and division that Syrians refugees started arriving to Lebanon. It set the 
scene for a plethora of reactions to the arrival of the Syrians, and for each reaction, a complex set 
of reasoning, affiliations, and allegiances were involved that can only be observed on the finest 
level. 
Syrian refugees’ settlement conditions were dictated and complicated by the historical and 
geopolitical context in which refugees had arrived. Their presence in Lebanon is often cast in 
terms of the history of the Palestinian refugee settlement that played a role in the outbreak of the 
Lebanese Civil War. In addition, many Lebanese individuals see the presence of this large 
population as a continuation of the history of Lebanese-Syrian relations, during which the current 
Syrian regime dominated local and international politics for extended periods. It was understood 
in Lebanon that as a consequence, the country’s economic and social life were dominated by 
Syria. It was widely said for example that “a flood of unwanted Syrian workers [was imposed] on 
the country” (Chalcraft, 2006b, p. 81). 
The Lebanese government is in many ways not functional because of the fragility and 
inflexibility of its confessional power-sharing nature as dictated in the Ta’ef Accord. The 
dysfunctionality of the government has translated into the tardy and chaotic policies implemented 
in relation to the Syrian refugee crisis. No religious or political group took immediate action 
between 2011 and 2015, opting instead to dissociate from the conflict and stay neutral. With no 
national strategy, matters were left in the hands of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and a myriad of under-resourced and over-stretched local municipalities. 
A status of illegality imposed on Syrians that is difficult to circumvent 
Syrians in Lebanon live under pressure, which has three main causes. First and foremost, 
there is the kafala framework (detailed below), which has led to placing 74 percent of refugees 
outside the law (Frelick, Khawaja, Fakih, & Van Esveld, 2018, p. 13). The kafala limits the 
mobility of Syrians and makes them prone to arrest and interrogation. Second, there are the 
evacuations of settlements; for example, between January 2018 and April 2018, four thousand 
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refugees were forcibly evacuated31. Third, there are local authority actions such as arbitrary home 
searches by the army, random arrests, and evictions that have placed immense pressure on the 
refugees. By not according refugees the same treatment that is “accorded to [its own] citizens” 
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Loescher, Long, Sigona, & Goodwin-Gill, 2014, p. 5), and by not facilitating 
and even complicating refugees’ residency status, the mentioned pressure strategies constitute 
indirect refoulement.32 Even though Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (UNHCR, 1951), “today, the principle of non-refoulement is not only the 
essential foundation for international refugee law, but also an integral part of human rights 
protection, implicit in the subject matter of many such rights, and a rule of customary 
international law” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014, p. 5). 
The legal status of refugees is important for maintaining their livelihoods (Bailey, 2004). 
The added difficulties that Syrian refugees have experienced since 2015 have contributed to the 
deterioration of their living conditions and increased their feelings of both insecurity and tension 
(Ayoub, 2017; Barjas, 2016; Bobseine, 2016; Saghieh, 2015). The Lebanese government refers to 
the Syrian refugees in Lebanon as neizheen (displaced) for three reasons: (1) its dissociation from 
the conflict politically makes it difficult to admit that the latter produces refugees; (2) the fact that 
Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 protocol for refugees and therefore does not provide 
them with any rights; and (3) the desire not to repeat the experience with the Palestinian refugees 
and to avoid the construction of refugee camps that could become cities within cities, ultimately 
posing a security threat to the country. Between 2011 and 2014, refugees’ entry and residence 
were regulated as per the bilateral agreements between Lebanon and Syria reached during the 
early 1990s, “allowing reciprocal freedom of movement, residence, and property ownership” 
(Betts, Ali, & Memi, 2017, p. 15). The government, having opted to dissociate itself from the 
Syrian conflict in 2012, did not review or change the open-door policy and the refugees settled in 
their historic capacity as temporary migrants. Without having planned ahead and reactively rather 
than proactively, the government changed its policy in 2015, and refugees were now placed in the 
same category as unskilled economic migrants under the framework of the kafala. At the same 
time, they were required to notarise their agreement not to work, pushing the large majority of 
                                                 
31 According to Human Rights Watch: “At least 3,664 Syrian nationals have been evicted from at least thirteen municipalities 
from the beginning of 2016 through the first quarter of 2018, with the qualification that this is their best estimate based on 
cases reported to them…. UNHCR estimated that another 42,000 Syrian were at risk of eviction in 2017.”(Frelick, Khawaja, 
Fakih, & Van Esveld, 2018, p. 58) 
32 “The word refoulement derives from the French refouler, which means to drive back or to repel. The idea that a state ought 
not to return persons to other states in certain circumstances was first referred to in Article 3 of the 1933 Convention Relating 
to the International Status of Refugees. It was not widely ratified, but a new era began with the General Assembly’s 1946 
endorsement of the principle that refugees with valid objections should not be compelled to return to their country of origin” 
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Loescher, Long, Sigona, & Goodwin-Gill, 2014, p. 5). 
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refugees outside the law and outside its protection (Saghieh & Frangieh, 2014). When the 
Lebanese General Security applied these restrictions, Syrian refugees could not seek legal 
protection because of their fear of legal prosecution and were placed in a situation of legal 
precarity. 
Access to legal services, when they seek it, appears to be a difficult task. The large 
majority who cannot secure legal residency do not have the protection of the law and would not 
report wrongdoing to avoid being arrested or evicted. They use invisibility as one among other 
strategies to avoid situations of conflict and thus the need for legal support. When “the right to 
legal counsel is one of the most important rights that a refugee can have” (Fiddian, 2006, p. 313), 
the impact of this specific difficulty becomes all the more significant. As a matter of fact, Syrian 
refugees do not trust the Lebanese judicial system or are afraid of it, and are reluctant to face the 
authorities33. They also worry about costs related to accessing legal services including their 
transportation needs or the need to produce notarised documentation. 
The kafala: General framework, origins in Lebanon, and present application to Syrian 
refugees 
To understand the social and legal implications of the application of the kafala system to 
the Syrian population in Lebanon since 2015, one must first understand its initial application and 
role in the management of the population and its social perception. I will briefly introduce the 
kafala system in Lebanon from the 1970s onwards, as it has mainly been used in the case of 
female domestic workers,34 and move on to explain the way in which it has been adopted for the 
Syrian population. 
Nizam al-kafala (the kafala framework) is used in Lebanon35 to regulate the residency of 
low- or unskilled (mostly female) migrant domestic workers. While the more appropriate 
translation of the term kafala is “guardianship,” because of the extent of influence, control, and 
responsibility accorded to the kafeel (guarantor), the system is widely known and referred to as the 
sponsorship system, and the kafeel as a sponsor. The framework ensures that foreign migrants’ 
residency is legally bound to the guarantee of their employer. The employer is therefore the legal 
guardian of the person under kafala (known as makfoul), responsible for the latter’s well-being and 
                                                 
33 This issue came up numerous times during my interviews for this thesis. Syrian refugees have often opted to lose in a 
verbal disagreement and to avoid confrontation for fear of legal repercussions—it is one of the negative coping techniques I 
will detail In Chapter 3, Section 1.1: On coping mechanisms and economic competition. 
34 Even though the kafala is meant to regulate the residency of all low-skilled migrants, it has almost exclusively been applied 
to female domestic workers. 
35 While the kafala system originated in the Gulf States in the 1950s, Jordan and Lebanon apply it as a regulatory framework 
as well. 
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adherence to the rule of law. 
It is under this pretence of caring for another’s well-being and making sure they adhere to 
the law that most exploitative aspects of the kafala are socially justified. For example, an employer 
would not want the makfoul to get in trouble (pregnancy is a form of what is considered serious 
trouble) and therefore the makfoul may not have a day off, lest she participate in any illegal 
practice (including sexual activity, which could in addition bring back diseases to the home of the 
employer). 
The kafala system in Lebanon is not a legal system that can be found in one specific 
law and there is no exclusive, comprehensive legal document comprising all relevant 
regulations regarding the sponsorship system as such. Instead, the kafala 
comprises various customary practices, administrative rules, and legal regulations 
that tie a migrant domestic worker’s residence permit to one specific sponsor in the 
country…. the kafala system consists of a set of guidelines administered and 
regulated by the Lebanese General Directorate for General Security with some 
requirements from the Ministry of Labour. This implies that migrant workers’ 
immigration status within Lebanon is treated as a security matter rather than a 
labour one (Abou Jaoudeh, 2017, p. 39). 
The system is highly contested and has been labelled inhuman, racist, and illegal by civil 
society groups in general due to the exploitation of migrants that it allows for (Abou Jaoudeh, 
2017; Migrant Rights, n.d.; Saghieh, 2018). While reform occurred in 2009 in the form of a 
unified labour contract (Migrant Forum in Asia, 2012), this has had little effect on the exploitative 
practices related to the system. Nizar Saghieh36 details “three features of this system of 
sponsorship and privilege” (Saghieh, 2018, p. 3) that are invaluable to explaining the trap that the 
kafala sets for its subjects: 
Firstly, a worker’s legal residency is tied to the employment relationship. In other 
words, the worker’s status becomes illegal if this relationship ends for any reason, 
even if the employer failed to pay the worker’s wages or sexually assaulted her. 
Secondly, the sponsor cannot be changed, which means that the worker’s status 
cannot be regularized without the sponsor’s permission. Thirdly, General Security 
usually combines deportation orders with another order banning the worker from re-
entering Lebanon for a period, usually three years. This closes the circle by making 
it impossible for the worker to circumvent the sponsorship system by leaving 
Lebanon without regularizing her status with her first sponsor and returning under a 
new sponsor’s name (Saghieh, 2018, p. 3). 
These features of the kafala essentially bind the makfoul to the kafeel, with little or no 
                                                 
36 A prominent Lebanese lawyer. 
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leeway to contest forms of exploitation. In addition, it is important to note that even when a 
makfoul decides to leave the guardianship (flee the guardian’s home and reside elsewhere for 
instance), corrupt practices take place in order to keep the migrants in check. For example, kafeels 
are encouraged (by their social network and by the security forces) to report a (fake) theft or 
other criminal offence of the makfoul in order to facilitate their capture and legal prosecution. 
 
Encadré  2-1: Statistics on the relationship beteen kafeel and female domestic workers 
Saghieh cites the results of a survey conducted in Lebanon with 1200 employers or kafeels on their 
approach to the relationship between them and their domestic workers. He notes that the answers 
that employers are willing to provide are most probably the best-case scenario, meaning that the 
reality is more extreme, and cites the most dangerous of statistics produced: 
Approximately 38 percent stated that the monthly wage is less than $200, and approximately 80 
percent stated that it is less than $300.37 
Approximately 40 percent stated that they do not pay the worker’s wages at the end of each month. 
Approximately 94 percent stated that they retain the worker’s passport. 
More than 57 percent stated that the worker works seven days a week. 
More than 11 percent stated that the worker works for more than ten hours a day (3 percent stated 
that she works for more than twelve), whereas more than 53 percent stated that the worker works 
for more than eight. 
No more than 25 percent stated that they allow the worker to go out alone on her weekly day off. 
Approximately 23 percent stated that they lock the worker in the house, though 100 percent deny 
the worker’s right to a private life on the basis that she came to Lebanon for the purpose of serving 
them. 
 
 
These statistics show that the makfoul in Lebanon is regarded as a product or an 
investment rather than as a human being, a citizen, a dweller. kafala controls the socio-spatial 
mobility (Dahdah, 2015, p. 95) of its subjects and places them in a legally, socially, and politically 
inferior position. 
 
                                                 
37 The minimum wage in Lebanon since 2012 is $450 or €400. 
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Figure  2-2: Human trafficking on social media 
Social media announcement: “Maid for sale due to travel reasons” Date: 9 March 2019. Source: 
Facebook 
In Lebanon today, female domestic workers are not considered as part of the urban fabric 
and do not have a choice in where to dwell. They are also not allowed to form unions and have 
resorted to secret and informal networks of support in order to free themselves, in the few 
instances that they succeed (Hall, 2018). The Lebanese have interiorised the idea of a makfoul as 
being an investment rather than a worker with rights to the extent that it is now normal to speak 
of them as such in most circles. So endemic is the issue that even the voices of those who find it 
abhorrent (both individuals and organisations) and actively seek change are largely stifled by the 
main current. Figure  2-2 illustrates a recent and by no means unique incident. On a Facebook 
page dedicated to private classified advertisements, one employer posted: “Ethiopian maid for 
sale for reason of travel. Arrived in Lebanon three months ago and has a valid residency. Her 
work is excellent and she speaks Arabic. Those interested call 76xx.” The post was picked up by 
an outraged individual and reposted with the comment “What kind of disaster is this? To what 
court should [the person who posted it] be taken … [contrary to posts criticising 
political/religious leaders or authorities], this post does not bother authorities.38 I place this post 
in the hands of whomever it concerns, especially the Minister of Labour.” What ensued was an 
intervention by the newly appointed Minister of Labour, Camille Abousleiman, and the 
                                                 
38 While it is not mentioned in the post, this phrase probably refers to a wave of charges against and interrogations of 
activists who post comments criticising politicians or corrupt government practices. 
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subsequent interrogation of the owner of the post that ended in an apology because “it wasn’t 
meant in that way.” 
With this short background on the socio-urban implications of the kafala in Lebanon and 
all the negative connotations attached to it, one can better understand the significance of the 
adoption of the system to regulate the Syrian population’s residency in Lebanon since January 
2015. It is more than a matter of legalising entry or residence status like a number of other 
countries apply (many countries require an invitation letter from a local resident and even proof 
of financial support when applying for visas, such as the European Union countries). Placing 
Syrians under kafala in Lebanon is placing them ipso facto in a second-class dweller status. Their 
dependence on a Lebanese guarantor restricts not only their mobility but their choices in general. 
Most importantly, the kafala for Syrians was implemented with one further restriction: that of the 
right to work, forcing them to work informally and illegally. To secure a legal residency permit 
therefore, a Syrian would have to find a kafeel, pay a hefty price to produce documentation and 
certification,39 and officially certify that s/he would not seek any employment in Lebanon. Above 
all, in the kafala system, the status of the Syrian refugee no longer falls under public policy but 
becomes a contractual agreement between private individuals. This contract, however, protects 
every right of the kafeel and leaves the makfoul with no rights and no possible recourse to justice. 
Debate on refugees’ status in Lebanon used for political gain 
The subject of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is used in political discourse as a political card 
to influence elections or cabinet formation or to sway public opinion. In fact, the issue of how to 
deal with refugees was one of the top five if not top three challenges that candidates were asked 
about during the parliamentary elections of 2018 (Ajroudi & Chughtai, 2018). Even as early in the 
crisis as 2013, politicians turned to this challenge as a key element in their discourse and in the 
stability of the country. In a 2013 radio interview, four high-profile Lebanese politicians at the 
time40 discussed the issues of infrastructure, unemployment, and the Syrian crisis. They 
“reiterated Lebanese requests for international funding assistance in absorbing the country’s new 
refugee burden … dealing with the humanitarian situation is the best way to preserve Lebanon’s 
stability” (Hamdan, Baroud, Chatah, & Rayess, 2013). In this case, the presence of refugees was 
used as a pressure tool to attract international aid, while insinuating the dangers that the refugees 
pose to the country’s stability. The application of the kafala and its effects and inconveniences is 
                                                 
39 International aid organisations have reported that the fees and cost of preparing a residency application come to €60–70 
per person, and the application fee is €180. 
40 Ziad Baroud, former Minister of Interior and Municipalities; Mohamad Chatah, senior advisor to Prime Minister Saad el-
Hariri and former Minister of Finance; Ali Hamdan, head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of Lebanon’s Amal Movement; and 
Rami Rayess, spokesman of the Progressive Socialist Party and media advisor to Walid Jumblatt. 
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not highlighted in instances such as radio interviews, while the aspects of the burden are put 
forward as a bargaining chip. 
Stances on the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon change depending on the situation 
(conference, local press meeting, private conversation, etc.) and location, both within the country 
and internationally. One position treats them as a purely humanitarian subject, especially when 
organisations or politicians are seeking funding, to the extent that the regional political context 
and the national socio-urban context are disregarded. Some have even viewed and presented the 
refugee crisis as an opportunity for Lebanon to build its infrastructure through attracting funding 
to indirectly support refugees by improving their living conditions. A second position is the 
purely political one, where the humanitarian aspect is largely disregarded. This is reflected in 
instances where refugees are referred to as displaced immigrants or when they are portrayed as a 
threat to Lebanon’s demography. It is within this context that the strongly contested calls for 
return are placed and where Syrians are portrayed as the cause of all socio-urban problems in 
Lebanon (poverty, infrastructure and economic challenges, etc.).41 
Lebanese government struggles to position itself vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict and the refugee 
presence in its territories 
Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the Lebanese government feared a spill 
over. This was the main reason behind the neutrality towards, or dissociation from, the conflict. 
Dissociating from the Syrian conflict also meant dissociating from the refugees arriving to 
Lebanese as a consequence. No refugee camps were constructed and no formal national political 
(or local) strategy was put in place to properly deal with the influx. This dissociation lasted until 
mid-2013, when Hezbollah (the local actor for Iran42) announced its public and open support of 
the Syrian regime and Bashar al-Assad (Betts et al., 2017). Hezbollah saw a direct threat to its 
own existence in the defeat of the Syrian regime and by extension a threat to its mission of 
resistance against Israel (Al-Amine, 2013), and could therefore not remain neutral. It positioned 
itself as a protector of minorities and in 2013 had “received delegations from a considerable 
number of Druze, Christian, and Shiite movements who [believed] that their minority 
communities [were] seriously threatened … and gave them the means to prevent their 
displacement” (Al-Amine, 2013). 
When dissociation ended, the predominantly Sunni Syrian refugees became a political 
                                                 
41 An anecdotal example that received satirical feedback is Lebanese television station MTV’s report in September 2018 on 
the “increasing infections caused by the presence of Syrian refugees … they bring dangerous bacteria that cause diseases” 
(MTV, 2018). 
42 See Chapter 2, Section 1: Governance of cities in Lebanon 
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threat to the fragile demographic Lebanese construct. In 2014, Lebanon witnessed real security 
threats, such as the assassination attempt on the Shiite Head of General Security. The Lebanese 
Army became involved in fights with armed groups in towns along the Lebanese-Syrian border. 
Armed conflicts increased and the Lebanese government was forced to react. These events led to 
the adoption of a policy paper outlining several conditions to be applied to the regulation of the 
presence of refugees in Lebanon, in October 2014 (PCM, 2014). Its goal was to severely restrict 
the entry of new refugees into Lebanon and encourage, by any means, those inside the country to 
leave. It authorised local municipalities to take any action they deemed fit in order to achieve this 
goal. 
Yet in order for the refugees to actually return to Syria, relations with the Syrian regime 
must be normalised through open communication. The Sunni Future Movement is against this, 
while Hezbollah and the president’s Tayyar movement43 are spearheading the calls for return. In 
parallel, Syrian authorities have passed several laws, such as “Law 10,” that render return 
difficult.44 
Generally, Sunni political parties tolerate the presence of the refugees and are against 
normalising relations with the Syrian regime to return them. Christian political parties have mixed 
reactions, with some parties supporting the Sunni argument against normalising relations and 
others wary of the important presence of the demographic group. Shiite political parties are 
security-driven in their dealing with the refugees and obviously support coordinating with the 
Syrian regime in order to facilitate their return (Betts et al., 2017). Applying pressure on the 
international community to support the return of the refugees, in April 2018 the Lebanese 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Gebran Bassil45 ordered a “freeze on residency applications submitted 
by the United Nations” (Nehme & McDowall, 2018). As mentioned earlier, policies put in place 
to directly or indirectly pressure refugees to return to the country they fled from is refoulement. 
Therefore, any policy pushing or pressuring refugees to leave or creating an atmosphere of high 
tension which eventually induces refugees to leave is illegal in the eyes of international law. The 
decision to freeze UNHCR residencies comes almost immediately after the Lebanese government 
has come under heavy criticism for a recent naturalisation decree, which naturalised four hundred 
individuals of Syrian and other nationalities (MEMO, 2018). It has been rumoured that those 
naturalised Syrians are in close connection with the regime and have paid in exchange for the 
                                                 
43 The Tayyar movement, while inclusive to a certain extent, remains mainly composed of Christian groups and specifically 
Maronites. 
44 The law implies that any Syrian who cannot prove ownership of land or residence within thirty days starting April 1, 2018, 
will automatically lose claim to any such property (Human Rights Watch, 2018). 
45 Gebran Bassil is also the leader of the Tayyar al Watani (Free Patriotic Movement) founded by current President Michel 
Aoun and his son-in-law. 
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Lebanese nationality (AFP, 2018; Domat, 2018; Moubayed, 2018; Moukalled, 2018; The Daily 
Star, 2018c). By acquiring Lebanese nationality and using Lebanese instead of Syrian banks for 
their financial transactions, these individuals can evade international sanctions (Jokhdar, 2018). 
Minister Bassil is also directly involved in the passing of the decree. Acquiring nationality 
furthermore significantly increases their rights in the city46: Lebanese nationals have access to all 
job clusters and may own property, two elements that are not always accessible to foreigners. 
1.3 The change in the type and profile of Syrian migrants since 1948 
The arrival of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is not an isolated event. The image of one-and-
a-half million people with no networks or resources flooding a country unknown to them in a 
matter of months is false. It is true though that the registration of refugees with the UNHCR 
peaked at more than one refugee per minute in April 2014 (UNHCR, 2014b) as the events in 
Syria intensified. This continuity can be explained by the fact that Syrians have always resided in 
Lebanon in different capacities. Actually, an estimated half a million to one million Syrians 
resided in the country just before the Syrian crisis in 2011 (Das, Davidson, & Fleming-Farrell, 
2011, p. 42). Even before the Lebanese Civil War and since the establishment of the two 
countries,47 unskilled Syrian male labourers were present in Lebanon, where an estimated 400,000 
workers resided in Lebanon in 1972 (Chalcraft, 2006a, 2009), working in agriculture, cleaning 
services, and construction: industries in which they made up 90 percent of the labour force 
(Chalcraft, 2009). These numbers are only estimates because of the open border policy (Pax 
Syriana) and, before January 2015, the flexibility that allowed Syrians to work as unskilled 
labourers in Lebanon without work permits. In fact, “in 1995 the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) estimated Syrians to number around 450,000. Yet in that same year the 
Lebanese Central Administration for Statistics showed the number of work permits issued to 
Syrians as only 1,056” (Jureidini, 2002). John Chalcraft, an expert on Syrian migration to 
Lebanon, asserts that the most convincing estimates are “200,000 Syrian workers in 1992; 
450,000 to 700,000 in 1995–96, and 225,000 to 450,000 in 2000” (Chalcraft, 2009, p. 148). These 
estimates have been further validated by others, who have also quoted the number of one million 
“at certain times in the past decade”48 (Verdeil et al., 2007). Even in 2015, at the height of the 
refugee crisis, the Lebanese Contractors Syndicate estimated that 350,000 Syrian workers were 
                                                 
46 See Encadré  2-2: The ambiguous and contested (tawteen) naturalisation decree of 1994. 
47 Lebanon and Syria’s borders were drawn by colonial forces in 1929 and both countries remained under French mandate 
until their independence in 1943 and 1946 respectively. 
48 Original citation: “De nombreuses incertitudes entourent le nombre de travailleurs syriens dans le pays, qui n’étaient 
officiellement, selon les permis de travail de 2003, qu’au nombre de 500, mais que certains analystes estimaient à un million 
à certains moments de la décennie passée” (Verdeil et al, 2007). 
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employed in the sector (Manisera, 2015). This in itself leads to the question: who qualifies as a 
refugee?49 The label in itself lays the basis for a debate on the motive and validity of the presence 
of Syrians in Lebanon.50 
There are conflicting points of view as to why Syrian migrants have had such a significant 
presence over the years. Pro-Syrian analysts argue that the Lebanese economy could not remain 
standing without cheap labour and that Lebanon keeps the border open for economic gains. Pro-
Lebanese analysts argue that Syrian political domination over Lebanon has forced the labourers 
on the country (Chalcraft, 2006a). Irrespective of viewpoint, the fact remains that Syrian workers 
have been present in Lebanon since the independence of the two republics, in different but 
substantial numbers at different times (Fawaz & Peillen, 2003). Their position in Lebanese society 
has mainly been one of disempowerment and subalternity (Chalcraft, 2006a). 
Actually, the lack of regulation of foreign unskilled labour in general and Syrians in 
specific has encouraged dominant attitudes towards poor migrants. Syrians have been placed in a 
submissive position for decades, at the service of the Lebanese population who use them to 
secure cheap luxury services. They usually resided in immediate proximity to urban centres where 
they could find work or inside their workplace, such as on constructions sites, in a room in a 
petrol station, etc. The open border policy51 allowed for migrants to work for low wages, without 
rights or social security benefits. The Lebanese population profits directly and indirectly from the 
situation of Syrians in spite of the harsh discourse against their presence. They buy their products 
from the cheaper albeit illegal Syrian stores, they rent out their apartments to Syrians instead of 
Lebanese when it is more profitable. In fact, many Lebanese have recently found it more 
profitable and less complicated to rent out apartments to Syrians than Lebanese. Syrians will 
always find a way to pay rent for fear of eviction, they comply with the requests of owners 
without contestation, and importantly it is easier for the Lebanese owner to ask them to leave 
when needed. The Lebanese authorities facilitate this by allowing and even reinforcing difficult 
living conditions for Syrians among other poor migrants. By placing various restrictions on the 
Syrian population in Lebanon, the government has solidified their inferior and exploitable 
position vis-à-vis the Lebanese population. 
The profiles of Syrians in Lebanon have therefore differed throughout the years. During 
the Civil War (1975–1990), and in addition to the male workers, there were between 30,000 and 
40,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon (who remained in a protectorate capacity until 2005). At the 
                                                 
49 The estimate was made public in reaction to the kafala regulations that demanded the regularisation of all workers’ 
residency permits, a move that would cost the sector millions of dollars in paper regularisation. 
50 See Chapter 5, Section 5.3: A debatable identity? Who are the Syrians in Lebanon?   
51 As allowed by the bilateral agreements between Lebanon and Syria in 1991 and 1993. 
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time, Syrians represented the occupying forces that were mostly feared and resented by the 
Lebanese. The human rights trespasses they committed reverberate to this today, notably the 
disappearance of at least 17,000 Lebanese citizens during the war, part of whom who are said to 
have been detained, tortured, and killed in Syrian prisons (Khawaja, 2018). The Lebanese have 
failed to deal with this past (Smaira & Cassehgari, 2014) and it is therefore very much present in 
the collective memory of the population. “The question of Lebanese nationals who were forcibly 
disappeared in Syria is particularly contentious in light of Syria’s influence in Lebanon and 
resulting domestic divisions. Syrian officials repeatedly deny that they are detaining any 
Lebanese” (Smaira & Cassehgari, 2014, p. 16). 
In March 2005 and in direct reaction to the assassination of Rafik el-Hariri,52 hundreds of 
thousands of Lebanese came together in a series of demonstrations in Beirut which became 
known as the Cedar Revolution. They successfully called for the withdrawal of all Syrian forces 
(BBC News, 2005; Dameli, 2005; NY Times, 2005). The last Syrian troops retreated from 
Lebanon in April 2005. This affected the presence of Syrian workers by leaving them politically 
and physically unprotected. Their presence without the cover of the Syrian regime certainly 
affected the way they were perceived and treated, especially in the immediate aftermath. With 
several violent repercussions that ensued the withdrawal of the Syrian troops (assassinations, 
bombings),53 tensions grew and in some areas, resentment from the Lebanese population 
translated into individual instances of violence directed at Syrian migrants (Chadi, elected member of 
the Tripoli Municipality, personal interview, 2014) 
The arrival of Syrian refugees in 2011 is therefore but a new phase of their presence in 
cities in Lebanon, and estimates of their number are new political cards in play. The first refugee 
arrivals comprised mainly families of the workers already residing in the poorest cities. The open 
border policy along with the presence of an immediate or extended family member made 
Lebanon a desired destination for refugees. As the violence escalated, so did the refugee influx 
until late 2014, steadily. The number of registrations increased exponentially in 2012–2013. In 
coming to Lebanon, Syrian refugees had the perceived flexibility that urban refugees have: to 
integrate into the cities would offer more opportunities in terms of mobility, economic prospects, 
and personal freedom (UNHCR, 2018b). In their other immediate options (Jordan or Turkey) 
they would most probably have to reside in camps in a more traditional refugee situation, with 
more restrictions and less opportunities. The seemingly and realistically chaotic situation in 
Lebanon left enough leeway for Syrians to imagine better navigating and even surpassing their 
                                                 
52 Popularly believed to have been carried out by Syrian forces or their allies 
53 For a timeline of assassinations see: (DeFraia, 2012) 
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exile than in other countries. This situation simultaneously left Syrians more vulnerable and 
exposed to exploitation. 
2. Urban refugees in developing countries in general and in Lebanon in 
specific 
2.1 From an international to a national perspective 
A glance at south–south urban refuge 
The experience of urban refuge has only relatively recently been addressed in the 
academic field. It was not officially considered a distinct category by the United Nations (UN) 
until around 2009 (UNHCR press office, 2009). Although there is a wealth of research on classic 
refugee situations, it is not until the late 1980s that scholars started to study the “growing 
problem of urban refugees and nature and impacts of repatriation of refugees” (Rogge & Akol, 
1989). Literature on urban refugees focuses mostly on the African continent, where most of the 
world’s refugees reside, since the early 2000s (Easton-Calabria, 2016; Fabos & Kibreab, 2007; 
Fiddian, 2006; Jacobsen, 2006; Landau, 2004). 
More recent studies have shown some commonalities that would explain the choice for a 
city over a camp for a refugee, starting with the case of urban dwellers in their place of origin 
who would logically opt for remaining in an urban setting (Crisp, Janz, & Riera, 2009; Marfleet, 
2007). Other reasons include the perceived opportunities refugees would access in cities, 
anonymity, access to education and healthcare, and freedom of mobility (Fabos & Kibreab, 
2007). This sought-after anonymity turns into exclusion in the cases where urban refugees are 
excluded from formal urban life (Vivet, 2012). Refugees also choose cities over camps in efforts 
to join family members already living there (Landau & Jacobsen, 2004; Pavanello, Elhawary, & 
Pantuliano, 2010). Perhaps this delay in studies on urban refugees lies in the methodological 
difficulties, as Loren B. Landau suggests: 
Despite forced migrants’ long-standing presence in the world’s cities, there are 
surprisingly few studies focusing exclusively on displaced persons’ experiences in 
and effects on the urban environment. This oversight is rooted at least partially in the 
methodological challenges associated with studying refugees in urban environments 
as well as thematic and conceptual biases within ‘refugee studies’. (Landau, 2004, 
p. 2) 
The UNHCR revised its policies in 2009 to highlight the rights of urban refugees and 
include their assistance in their programmes (UNHCR, 2009). On the one hand, urban refugees 
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have less access to assistance, which is usually insufficient to start with. On the other hand, by 
opting to seek refuge in a city, refugees exercise some independence and face less restrictions 
than those usually prevalent in camps (Campbell, 2006; Jacobsen, 2006; Landau & Jacobsen, 
2004). Urban refugees also risk security problems and difficult coping possibilities due to 
perceptions from host communities (Jacobsen, 2006) and their protection remains a major 
challenge (Guterres, 2010; Zetter & Deikun, 2010). Their employment is predominantly informal 
and highly prone to discrimination and exploitation, especially in the countries that have not 
signed the 1951 Convention of the UN securing the rights of refugees (Campbell, 2006; Chatty, 
2015; Crisp et al., 2009; Landau & Jacobsen, 2004; Vivet, 2012). 
Syrian urban refuge in Lebanon 
The above raises the question of a positively differential right to the city for urban 
refugees. When they are concentrated in specific areas such as camps and therefore visible to aid 
organisations, they have better access to aid but their status as refugees is highlighted. On the 
other hand, their non-sensational urban settlement (such as in cities in Lebanon) banalises the 
refugee label but limits positive discriminations in terms of access to aid. Their presence in the 
city allows them to seek an ordinary urban life and avoid the pejorative stereotype of destitute 
refugees living in tents. In Lebanon though, the significant number of urban refugees limits their 
anonymity. They therefore do not have access to the positive discrimination of international aid 
organisations that their counterparts in the informal settlements54 do, nor do they have real 
potential to navigate the city as unknown dwellers. A multiplicity of situations and interactions 
between Lebanese hosts and Syrian refugees needs to be observed in order to obtain an 
understanding of such a complex phenomenon. The paradoxical junction between positive 
discrimination and insignificance, between spaces dedicated to migration and ordinary spaces, 
makes the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon even more special. 
Once in the city, urban refugees fall into the discourse cycle surrounding their 
employment. When they are employed, they are blamed for competing with the local community. 
When they are not employed, they become, in the words of some Lebanese, a “burden”, 
“beggars”, “prone to crime”, etc. (Jacobsen, 2006). Another challenge for urban refugees is their 
inability to access financial services through official channels, since they cannot open bank 
accounts for example. Such a barrier and this severely affects their economic prospects (Landau 
& Jacobsen, 2004) and positions them in vulnerable situations with owners, employers, etc. 
                                                 
54 Around 250,000 Syrian refugees out of the one million refugees registered in Lebanon in 2017 lived in informal settlements 
in the cities closest to the Lebanese-Syrian borders (UNHCR, 2017) 
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Today, over 60 percent of the world’s refugees live in urban areas (Liu, 2016; O’Loughlin 
& Benali, 2017). Syrians representing 6.3 million (UNHCR, 2018a), constitute the third-largest 
refugee population worldwide. Of the Syrians residing in the three neighbouring countries 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, over 4 million are urban refugees, with an estimated 750,000 of 
those in Lebanon alone. 
While I have focused on refugees’ experiences in the urban environment in Lebanon, this 
thesis does not fall exclusively within the scope of refugee studies.55 Rather, it falls into a broader 
scope of interdisciplinary studies. As I detail in Chapter 3, Section 3, I have approached the 
subject from three disciplinary lenses, encompassing three scales of reflection: first, the regional 
geopolitical, then the national socio-political, and last the local urban levels. 
2.2 An overview of refugees in Lebanon in 2018 
Since Lebanon’s independence in 1943, there have been two major instances of refugee 
migration to the country: Palestinian (1948, 1967) and Syrian (2011). Iraqi refugees also sought 
refuge in Lebanon in 2003, and while they number into the tens of thousands, this does not 
compare with the hundreds of thousands and more Palestinians and Syrians. The United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and UNHCR are 
the two UN bodies that manage the needs of all refugees in Lebanon. As mentioned earlier, the 
Lebanese government is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and therefore does not take part in the management or support of refugees in 
the country. 
When the first Palestinian refugees arrived in Lebanon in 1948, they settled in makeshift 
tents in camps in the peripheries of cities across the country. With rapid urban sprawl that 
transformed the country especially after the end of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990, the camps 
have come to be in immediate proximity to or completely inside the cities. Furthermore, 
“[e]conomic activities, daily mobility, presence of new international migrants, strong political and 
cultural significance for the Palestinian refugees, are the different elements that characterize the 
refugee camps today as urban settlements” (Doraï, 2010, p. 19). Their residents are by extension 
urban refugees. Today, UNRWA manage some half million Palestinian refugees’ needs in twelve 
camps across Lebanon (Figure  2-3). 
                                                 
55 Some of the most renowned research in forced migration studies in the Middle East is published by the Refugee Studies 
Centre at Oxford University by authors such as Dawn Chatty, Roger Zetter, and Elena Fiddian-Qasmieh 
(https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/research); the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, with notable 
publications from Nasser Yassin, and more recently by The Project on Middle East Political Science, POMEPS, run by Marc 
Lynch. 
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Operating in Lebanon during the last five decades, the UNHCR served “a few thousand 
refugees and asylum seekers annually”. In 2010 it declared to have  “met the needs of around 
10,000 mostly Iraqi refugees” (UNHCR, 2018a). Iraqi and Syrian refugees in a country that is 90 
percent urbanised (Verdeil et al., 2007) are therefore in 2018 mainly urban dwellers. This goes 
somewhat against the norm observed in developing countries, where refugees are not usually 
allowed into urban settings, and when they do settle in urban areas it is “in violation of the host 
country policy” (Bailey, 2004). With no framework, directives, strategies, or policies, the 
settlement of these refugees went ahead informally, creating a situation whereby refugees weighed 
heavily on the failing urban infrastructure. It is therefore accurate to assume that poor (forced) 
migrants would choose the most affordable settings for their settlement, initially at least. This is 
the case worldwide, even when referring to rural–urban migration within the same country. Poor 
migrants in general accept to settle in precarious conditions hoping that their presence in the city 
and the potential opportunities it may provide would help elevate their social status with time. 
This is also the case for refugees, who remain attentive to any possibility to enhance their 
network and seek better conditions. Not long after their arrival in Lebanon, Syrian refugees 
found themselves in a hostile environment where the prospect of integration was and remains 
highly unlikely and assistance from the UNHCR and other organisations insufficient. They 
therefore “balance risks and costs of marginalization to advance their livelihoods” (Grabska, 
2006, p. 289). 
In a spatial perspective, Syrians are present in every region of the country and its 
peripheries Figure  2-3. This map reflects the extent of the challenges in relation to managing the 
influx by showing the presence of refugees in literally every region. The largest concentration of 
refugees is in the region of the Bekaa, one of the first points of entry from the east. While it is 
has densely populated cities and towns, the Bekaa mainly comprises rural and agricultural areas. It 
harbours most of the informal settlements of Syrians and, even though the latter have settled in 
the cities of the region, their overarching presence is less urban and more classic in terms of 
refugee situations. The Beirut and North governorates are today home to more than half the 
refugee population.  
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Figure  2-3: Distribution of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 
The distribution of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon that are registered with the UNHCR as of June 
30, 2018. UNHCR Data portal. (UNHCR, n.d.)  
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Figure  2-4: Syrian refugees in t
The distribution of Syrian refugees
Source: UNHCR Data portal. (UNH
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Figure  2-6: Curfew banner 
Banner in a Mount Lebanon village. Translation: “You Syrian: we will cut off the hand that 
threatens our livelihood. [signed] The village workers.” Source: Facebook 
 
In addition to political discourse and local authorities’ actions that affected Syrians’ access 
to the cities in the first three years, another issue played a major role. In the poorer areas, where 
Lebanese communities are vulnerable and poverty is prevalent, international aid for the Syrians 
strongly increased tensions between the communities. Refugees’ negative coping strategies drove 
them to accept very low wages, increasing economic competition, especially in these areas. 
Vulnerable Lebanese communities complained of what they saw as Syrians stealing their jobs and 
receiving assistance on top of it. In the first few years of the crisis, international aid was more 
significant than it is today and refugees received both cash and in-kind support (Anderson, 2014; 
EU, 2015; UNHCR, 2012b, 2013, 2014a). Poverty and apprehension about the other coupled 
with feelings of injustice strongly increased tension in these areas. UNHCR was thus faced with 
the issue of providing fair treatment for all vulnerable communities. By providing much-needed 
basic humanitarian assistance to refugees, the aid created a sense of increased inequality in the 
poorest areas. 
Dire conditions were further exacerbated as of January 2015, after the Council of 
Ministers passed the decision to restrict Syrian refugees’ entry into Lebanon and encourage those 
already present to leave by all means (PCM, 2014). Since then, it has become virtually impossible 
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for Syrians to legally enter Lebanon (El-Khouri, 2018, p. 102). A changing regulatory regime, 
which extended the kafala system to all Syrians for a period, has made it particularly difficult for 
refugees to work legally. The system reinforced Syrians’ dependence and vulnerability vis-à-vis 
the local population. In addition, the kafala system was not clearly communicated to the public 
nor properly enforced. Regulations changed regularly and frequently, different documentation 
was requested from different individuals. The kafala reinforced the illegal and informal working 
conditions of refugees and increased their vulnerability and precarity. The label refugee, which is 
a largely pejorative term in Lebanon, places Syrian refugees instantly in a dominated position. The 
kafala reinforced this position: illegal from an international law point of view—and ultimately 
ruled illegal even in Lebanon (Saghieh & Frangieh, 2018)—it placed refugees further “outside the 
law and outside its protection” (Frangieh, 2017). Both in theory and in the observed reality, they 
are second-class dwellers. They regularly see insulting street markings and graffiti targeting them 
(Figure  2-7). They have experienced direct and indirect rejection, including people refusing to 
serve them and being denied access to, or asked to leave, public places. 
Adding a layer to these violent social instances, the procedures to renew residency papers 
is difficult and humiliating, referred to as punishment by the refugees.57 Like other migrants 
claiming official recognition by the authorities of their host country, they wait outside the official 
instances in charge of immigration – the General Security Offices in this case – for hours with no 
assurance that they will get to apply on that day. For their first visit or for any special requests, 
the Lebanese kafeel must be present and it is officially the latter who must submit the paperwork, 
including the identity card or passport. In June 2018 and at the time of writing this dissertation, 
the Lebanese government has introduced yet another level of difficulty into the cycle that 
regulates the settlement of registered Syrian refugees: it has halted the renewal of residency 
permits for all UNHCR staff. The Lebanese government accused UNHCR of not doing enough 
to encourage Syrians to return and on the contrary advising them not to by turning their attention 
to the various risks associated with premature return. The freezing of residency permits is an 
effort to coerce the UNHCR into encouraging Syrians to leave the country and cease to 
“facilitate Syrian refugees’ stay” (Nehme & McDowall, 2018; The Daily Star, 2018b). 
                                                 
57 This was a recurring subject during both interviews and informal discussions with refugees. Source: Field notes, 2016–
2018. 
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Figure  2-7: Graffiti hostile to Syrian refugees 
Graffiti hostile to Syrian refugees in Beirut reads: “To every Syrian bastard: leave,” later modified 
to: “to every racist bastard: leave.” Bottom: “Leave, leave you Syrian, beware your enemy, the 
Syrian is your enemy.” Source: Campaign in support of Syrians in the face of racism (Facebook 
page). 
 
Unregulated, random restrictions on Syrians’ use of public spaces 
The presence of Syrians in public spaces is generally not tolerated. That said, it is 
important to note the different factors that may impact this tolerance, including the social class of 
the Syrians (the wealthy for example have little trouble moving around), their religion, and 
political stances. In addition to the clearly outlined curfews mentioned above, other random and 
informally applied restrictive measures are numerous. In Figure  2-8 one Syrian woman describes 
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her experience in a public garden, illustrating the different forms and levels of tolerance towards 
different groups of Syrians. She recounts that while she was with her daughter in a public garden 
in Beirut, she witnessed a security officer asking “a mother wearing a headscarf and obviously a 
Syrian refugee” to leave the garden, because the space was supposed to be accessible to locals 
only, while this was not mentioned anywhere. She came to the mother’s defence and confronted 
the officer with the fact that two French ladies were on the seats beside her, which prompted the 
officer to say “it is prohibited for Syrians only.” At this point, having heard her Syrian accent, the 
officer asked her to leave as well and waited to check that she had indeed exited the garden. She 
had not been approached initially, as it seems her appearance did not raise suspicions: she is not 
veiled and probably belongs to the middle classes. Whether it was her accent or her action that 
provoked the officer is unknown: would the officer have asked her to leave, even having heard 
her accent, had she not defended her less wealthy countrywoman? And had she defied the order, 
what would have been the consequences? This instance gained some traction on social media, 
and there were statements of support and indignation by individuals and organisations, notably 
by the independent political movement Beirut Madinati.58 While ultimately not tolerating the 
presence of either Syrian woman in the public space, the security officer acted differently with 
each due to a set of presuppositions he made based on their appearance. 
Many Lebanese groups are uncomfortable when seeing refugees in public areas and 
express their despondency at being “deprived of taking a walk” because of this presence of 
foreigners.59 As a consequence, refugees have been denied use of the public beach and asked to 
leave private pool areas in several regions. This sort of recurrent example illustrates the 
randomness surrounding the treatment of Syrians by Lebanese locals and authorities, which is 
generally dependent on social status, religion, and political stance (van Vliet & Hourani, 2014). 
While this reveals the significance of an ethnographic study in the field, in order to understand 
the subtleties of Lebanese-Syrian relations in all these aspects, it seems therefore important to 
consider the recent history of the Middle East.  
                                                 
58 An independent political movement that ran for Beirut’s municipal elections in 2016 
59 Interview with a Lebanese dweller in Tebbeneh. Source: Field notes November 2015 
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3. Tension within Lebanon and between Lebanon and Syria rooted in the 
division of the Levant by colonial powers 
3.1 An overview of Lebanese-Syrian diplomatic relations since the 
beginning of the twentieth century 
With immediate geographic proximity and a common colonial past, the Lebanese, Syrian, 
and Palestinian populations have much in common. One hundred years ago, these countries did 
not exist in their current borders. The area of the modern Middle East was administratively 
divided into Ottoman vileyets (provinces) until the First World War and then into zones under 
different degrees of French and English colonial rule until the mid-1900s. Up to that point, 
populations in all these areas had been free to move and settle within the Levant. 
In 1916, the French and British divided the territories under their mandate into five 
states, including Greater Lebanon, which today is the Republic of Lebanon. These borders of 
Greater Lebanon were not completely arbitrary, as the delineated area included a significant 
Christian community, favourable to France’s presence. In fact, to be understood correctly, the 
current Lebanese-Syrian relations and both countries’ relations with Palestine and Israel need to 
be traced back to this era. In 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Great Britain and France 
proposed a division of the Middle East into two sub-regions. Figure  2-9 and Figure  2-10 show 
these divisions as per correspondence between the French and British ambassadors at the time. 
The hand-drawn borders divide the Middle East into five zones: one under French authority, 
another under British authority, two zones under French and British mandates respectively, and 
one internationally controlled zone. The region in which Lebanon lies submitted as such to 
French authority and was considered strategic due to its geographic position as an entry point to 
the entire region. The Sykes-Picot agreement makes no reference to Lebanon as a separate entity; 
it is part of the blue region “A.”60 The borders between the French and British “zones” later 
became the borders between Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. The Sykes-Picot Agreement is often cited as 
a cause of the warfare, violence, and extremism in the Middle East, due to the largely arbitrary 
borders that forced disparate ethnic and religious groups together (Fisher, 2015). 
It is a longstanding theory that the French created two countries but not two nations 
when they drew the Syrian-Lebanese borders (Salibi, 1988). To ensure the survival of the 
minorities, a constitution based on the division of powers between the different religious groups 
                                                 
60 There is broad research on the details and reasons behind the divisions of these territories, including the role of the 
production of oil. Among other references, see France’s Middle Eastern Ambitions, the Sykes-Picot Negotiations, and the Oil 
Fields of Mosul, 1915-1918 by Edward Peter Fitzgerald. 
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was elaborated, basing the proportions on the demography at the time. This system continues to 
be in place to date, as a Christian Maronite heads the Lebanese government and eighteen 
religious groups each have a specific power seat(s) in government (Nahas, 1980). By seeking a 
distinct nationality and aligning themselves with colonial forces, the Maronites and their allies 
broke the unspoken Arab alliance and specifically their Arab connection with Syria, to the 
discontent of their neighbour: 
the Lebanese have always lacked a common vision of their past. Muslims and 
Christians fundamentally disagree over the country’s historical legitimacy as an 
independent entity. Christians in general affirm this distinct identity while Muslims 
emphasise Lebanon’s place in the broader Arab history (Salibi, 1988). 
The Lebanese Constitution was published in 1926. It gave religious communities the right 
to be a part of the governing political structure. In its article 7,61 equality between all Lebanese 
citizens is confirmed, but article 95 contradicts this by stipulating the sharing of power between 
religious groups and recommending that the “Chamber of Deputies [must] take the appropriate 
measures to eliminate political sectarianism,62 according to an interim plan” (Lebanon’s 
Constitution of 1926 with Amendments through 2004, 1926). In the Greater Syria region in the 
1920s, “pan-Arabism rapidly replaced pan-Islamism as the prime political loyalty commanding 
Muslim as well as Christian allegiance among the Arabs, the Maronites in Lebanon being the 
principal exception” (Salibi, 1988). For Muslims, however, the idea of Arabism was blended with 
Islam, which was not the case for the Christians of the area, who saw it as a “purely secular 
national identity which was separate and distinct from Islam as the traditional basis of Arab 
political life” (Salibi, 1988). Salibi argues that while Christians and Muslims in the Arab region 
supported a pan-Arab national identity, Muslims still viewed Arabism as somehow linked with 
Islam, which was not acceptable for Christians in general. The Maronites in Lebanon were the 
most vocal in contesting this pan-Arabism. It is from this conflict that the most basic identity 
controversy in Lebanon stems. Christians (Maronites specifically) have always pressed for an 
identity separate from the larger Muslim Arabism to which the Muslims in Lebanon mainly 
adhered. Maronites in Lebanon feared that the presence of a significant number of Sunni Syrian 
refugees directly threatens to tip the balance strongly towards pan-Arab thought and away from a 
Lebanese identity distinct from its Arab neighbours. 
 
                                                 
61 Article 7 of the Lebanese Constitution: “All Lebanese are equal before the law. They equally enjoy civil and political rights, 
and assume obligations and public duties without any distinction among them” (Lebanon’s Constitution of 1926 with 
Amendments through 2004, 1926) 
62 The word “sect” is widely used as a synonym for religious group or confession. 
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positions, according to the population census of 1932. It states that the Republic will always be 
organised around an equilibrium of religious representatives, thus balancing power at the head of 
the state: the Lebanese Presidency will be occupied by a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister 
will be a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shiite Muslim. By way of a series of 
laws—including the electoral law—the constitutional text, and the unwritten National Pact, fixed 
positions in the different government services and political institutions are also attributed to each 
religious group (Nahas, 1980). These laws include the electoral law of the parliament, which was 
updated in 2018 under the pretence of alleviating some of the confessional divisions. 
Importantly,  
the state officially recognizes 18 religious communities in Lebanon. Each has its own 
courts and laws … On the other hand, the Lebanese legislation that recognizes 18 
religious groups also states that whoever does not follow one of them can follow a 
civil code that will be developed for personal statis. The civil personal status code, 
however, was never developed (Zalzal, 1997, p. 37).  
In essence, not developing a civil code under which all citizens would be equal with equal 
access to social, urban, and political rights meant that ipso facto religious communities are 
categorised differently and have different rights. 
Moreover, during the 1940s, Lebanon’s southern neighbour63 was facing a political crisis 
of their own, one that would have an immeasurable and protracted political, social, and urban 
impact on the entire region. The declaration of the state of Israel in 1948 (following the British 
Balfour promise to the Zionists) marked the date of the Palestinian Nakba (catastrophe), or the 
expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their homeland to neighbouring Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Syria. Of these three countries, “Lebanon was the least hospitable to Palestine 
refugees” (Peretz, 1993, p. 61), with the exception of the wealthy Christian non-registered 
refugees, who received better treatment and who were given Lebanese nationality in the 1950s 
(Peretz, 1993). In Jordan, the Palestinians initially found the most appropriate atmosphere to 
resist Israel. As such, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that was founded in 1964, 
with the mission to liberate Palestine through al-jihad al-mokaddas (holy war) (Palestine National 
Charter, 1964), operated from Jordan at first. 
Christian–Muslim tensions in Lebanon were evident in the 1958 crisis (known as a short 
civil war) when Muslim Lebanese contested Lebanese-Western relations and sought to strengthen 
Lebanese-Arab relations. By aligning with Egypt’s Jamal Abdel Nasser, a close ally of Syria at the 
time, they sought to create a United Arab Republic, with strong support from leftist groups and 
                                                 
63 Under British and international mandate. 
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especially Muslims in the two countries and beyond. Neither side prevailed, and after the military 
and political intervention of the United States, moderate Maronite President Fuad Shehab was 
elected, leaving things in Lebanon unresolved. At the time, Palestinian refugees were present in 
Lebanon, who numbered around one hundred thousand but were not armed and had no role in 
the conflict. Syrian workers were also present in Lebanon at the time, although there are no clear 
estimates of their numbers. In 1947, for example, they made up 25 percent of the workers on 
building sites (Chami, 2002). 
In the late 1960s, the relationship of the PLO with Jordanian authorities became 
increasingly strained and in 1970—following tensions with the Jordanian authorities, specifically 
the events known as Black September—the PLO was expelled from Jordan and came to 
Lebanon, eventually setting up its operations in the south of the country, mainly in the refugee 
camps. These events, coupled with the first Palestinian commando crossing from Lebanon into 
Israel, shifted the political balance between Palestinians and Lebanon profoundly. While the 
Lebanese political system was beginning its slide into crisis once again, the Palestinian resistance 
movement was growing in popularity and gaining power in the Lebanese territories. 
In 1975, the Lebanese Civil War broke out. Like in 1958, Christian–Muslim tensions and 
the profound disagreement of these communities on the identity of the country played a role. 
This time though, there were more stakes and more players involved, including the Palestinian 
resistance—in coalition with Lebanese leftist and Muslim groups. An Ain al-Remmeneh church 
shooting on April 13, which killed two Maronite figures, followed by a retaliation massacre of 
thirty Palestinian civilians on a bus in the same area were the two events that started the war, with 
a succession of massacres and the destruction of the downtown area in Beirut. This time around, 
Christian authorities called on Syria for backup, and Syrian troops entered the country to support 
the authorities against upheaval of the Muslim coalition and ultimately stayed on in Lebanon until 
200564. The Lebanese Civil War is still present in the political and urban life in Lebanon. The 
Ta’ef Accord that ended the war is still the basis of the shaky political structure and its physical 
effects on the cities are still seen in the form of buildings and infrastructure in the areas that have 
not been reconstructed Figure  2-11. Most importantly though, no Lebanese side has ever 
prevailed and urban life is an enduring negotiation between religious communities over space and 
power. 
                                                 
64 This date span, 1976–2005, is regarded as a thirty-year occupation by Syria, with between thirty to forty thousand troops 
continually stationed in Lebanon over the years 
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Figure  2-11: Beit Beirut 
Emblematic war-damaged building in Sodeco, Beirut—and in the background, Sama Beirut, one of 
the highest skyscrapers in the country Photo: Toufik Khreich 
In 2005 and after a national movement calling for the end of the Syrian military presence, 
Syrian troops retreated entirely, leaving behind the migrant workers, who faced a violent backlash 
from Lebanese communities as they were perceived to have lost their protection. This phase did 
not last long and Syrian workers remained in Lebanon in different unskilled jobs, as was the case 
before 1975. In 2011, the Syrian crisis began. 
Understanding the turbulent nature of Lebanese-Syrian relations along with the 
contradictory representations of the Syrian population for Lebanese communities permits a 
better vision of the more recent events and consequences of the Syrian conflict for cities in 
Lebanon. On the one hand, there is the figure or profile of the unskilled, second-class Syrian 
migrant dweller continuously present in Lebanon since the 1950s. On the other hand, there is the 
direct and significant influence that the Syrian government has had on Lebanese politics and 
internal affairs, especially since 1975.  
In this section, I give an overview of the different stages of Syria’s official involvement in 
Lebanon since the establishment of both countries. This is relevant because, as mentioned earlier, 
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the relations between the host Lebanese and Syrian refugees cannot be separated from the socio-
political history of the two countries. 
 “When it rains in Syria, the Lebanese should hold up their umbrellas,” or so goes the 
saying. Syrian-Lebanese relationships are complex to say the least, with family and economic ties 
dating back to the early 1900s, when the entire Levant area was under colonial rule. Both Syria 
and Lebanon comprise numerous religious groups, and both countries have a shared border with 
Israel. Syrian leadership has played a big-brother role in neighbouring Lebanon ever since these 
colonial divisions in the early 1900s took shape and the political relations between the two 
countries have always been tense. Conversely, Lebanese historians have stated:  
Lebanon has always been the entry point for any intervention in Syria’s internal 
affairs. During the past 40 years we got used to hearing people criticising the Syrian 
intervention in Lebanese affairs but the truth is all the coups that took place in Syria 
between 1949 and 1970 had been planned in Beirut. Beirut was the starting point for 
the planning and support of every coup in Syria” (Rafei, 2013). 
 
A new phase in Lebanese-Syrian political relationships began in 1970, when Hafez al-
Assad (Minister of Defence at the time) took over Syria’s leadership. The year 1976 saw a specific 
turn of events which directly and for a long time since has affected these relations. Lebanese 
President Suleiman Franjieh, backed by other Christian leaders, called on al-Assad for military 
support in the Lebanese Civil War in which the PLO65 was implicated. Political parties in 
Lebanon were in conflict over a central question: the legitimacy of the presence of the PLO in 
Lebanon as an active arm of resistance against Israel. This eventually led to the fifteen-year Civil 
War.66 
Towards the end of the 1970s, Christian leaders called for the Syrian intervention to end. 
Syrian forces were strongly implicated in Lebanese internal affairs (and different political parties’ 
affairs) at that point. They had gained a stronger hold over Lebanese territories and were an 
active and serious player in the Civil War, qualifying them in effect as an occupying power. 
Tensions kept rising and Syria’s control of the Lebanese territory kept getting stronger until 1988, 
when army general commander Michel Aoun declared the Liberation War against the Syrian army 
in Lebanon. On 13 October 1990, Syrian forces took over the presidential headquarters in 
Baabda. This meant the defeat of Michel Aoun, his subsequent exile to France,67 and the end of 
the war. 
                                                 
65 Established in Lebanon in 1970 after Black September and their expulsion from Jordan. 
66 For a detailed account of the Lebanese Civil War, see (Picard, 2012). 
67 Aoun returned to Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution and the retreat of all Syrian troops from the country, in May 2005. 
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A year earlier, in October 1989, the Ta’ef Accord was signed by different regional actors 
and the surviving 1972 Lebanese parliamentary members. It was designed to bring an end to the 
Civil War. Two major political directions were laid out in this agreement. First, it shifted some 
political weight from the Maronite Christians’ side to the Sunni Muslims’ side by giving more 
power to the Sunni Prime Minister. Second, it officially placed Syria in a position of acting as a 
protector over Lebanon. As such, the Accord confirmed Syrian political domination. It was 
charged with the complete supervision of the situation in Lebanon. In one part, the Ta’ef Accord 
reads: 
Considering that the objective of the State of Lebanon is to spread its authority over 
all the Lebanese territories through its own forces, represented primarily by the 
Internal Security Forces, and in view of the fraternal relations binding Syria to 
Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the Lebanese 
legitimacy to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no 
more than two years, beginning with the ratification of the National Accord 
document, the election of a President of the Republic, the formation of the National 
Accord Cabinet, and the constitutional approval of the political reforms (The Ta’ef  
Accord, 1989) 
In 1991, the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents signed the Treaty of Brotherhood, 
Cooperation, and Coordination, justifying the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon beyond the 
two years outlined in the Ta’ef Agreement. This treaty legitimised the Syrian presence in and 
domination of Lebanon for the next fourteen years. Hafez al-Assad, Syrian President at the time, 
famously used the phrase “one people in two countries” in his speech, a phrase that still echoes 
the inferior political Lebanese position at the time. Linking the Lebanese to their neighbouring 
Syrians in this phrase, Hafez al-Assad insisted on the Arab face of Lebanon and the Lebanese, 
thus provoking the significant part of the population that resists these ties and insists on a 
separate Lebanese character. 
Over the years, Syrian intelligence services gained a reputation of cruelty. Until today, 
almost thirty years since the end of the Civil War, Lebanese families are demanding to know the 
fate of their relatives who disappeared during the war. In fact, the fate of 17,000 Lebanese—
including almost 650 who were confirmed to have been imprisoned in Syria—is still unknown 
(IRIN, 2007a). The politics of terror used by the Syrian army and intelligence earned them the 
contempt of the Lebanese population. Until today, the kaak (Levantine bagel) vendor is jokingly 
referred to as a Syrian moukhabarat (intelligence officer) in the Lebanese street.68 These officers 
evoked fear and silenced dwellers in public areas. 
                                                 
68 It was widely known that undercover intelligence officers would be disguised as kaak vendors. 
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Encadré  2-2: The ambiguous and contested (tawteen) naturalisation decree of 1994 
In 1994, under the prevailing pro-Syrian government, a non-transparent naturalisation decree was 
approved (Frangieh, 2016; Malik, 1996). Neither the exact number of those naturalised nor the 
conditions and criteria for their selection was made public. Christian groups in the form of the 
Maronite League challenged the decree, considering it a “dangerous process of demographic and 
social change” (Frangieh, 2016), as reports claimed a significant number of those naturalised were 
Sunni Muslims. Citizenship and by extension naturalisation in Lebanon has always been a political 
tool that serves to maintain Lebanon’s distorted confessional democracy. In fact, researchers have 
argued that “Lebanese confessional democracy does not consist of a simple system of proportional 
communal representation. It is characterized by the primacy of communal over individual rights and 
by the subversion of the principle of equality among individuals by citizenship status” (Jaulin, 2014, p. 
252). Even the only Lebanese official population census of 1932, on which the distribution of political 
power is based until today, has been contested. It is suggested that the Christian demographic 
majority was fabricated through a politicised selection of which parts of the residing population 
received nationality and through using emigrants, immigrants, and nomads as trump cards as needed 
(Jaulin, 2014; Maktabi, 1999). In 2018, Lebanese women still cannot pass their nationality to their 
spouses or children. It is practically impossible for immigrants to apply for citizenship, especially since 
the process, regulations, and laws concerning naturalisation are vague where mentioned. This places 
all migrants, especially poor migrants, in an inferior position vis-à-vis Lebanese nationals, with 
significantly less of a role in their urban surroundings. 
 
The significance of naturalisation for a city 
In his brief overview “Space, citizenship, and the right to the city,” Eugene McCann 
notes the “political importance of understanding the spaces that lie out there … as both 
reflections of contemporary political economic conditions and as sites through which identity 
politics, citizenship, and alternative political agendas are articulated and struggled over” (McCann, 
2002). His arguments (like many geographers who are interested in urban politics) build on the 
body of work proposed by Henri Lefebvre in the 1960s and 1970s on the “Right to the City.” 
For Lefebvre, “the right to the oeuvre, to participation and appropriation (distinct from the right 
to property), are implied in the right to the city” (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 174). Therefore, he 
introduced the idea that citizenship is more than a legal right bestowed by a nation-state on 
dwellers who fit a set of criteria. Rather, he argues that citizenship belongs to the inhabitants, the 
urban dwellers, including the nation-state’s citizens. The right to the city is by definition inclusive 
and does not take into consideration sub-group differences. 
These rights are explicitly spatialized in Lefebvre’s perspective. Achieving them, 
“depends … upon an essential quality of urban space: centrality. Here and 
elsewhere we assert that there is no urban reality without a center, without a 
gathering together of all that can be born in space and can be produced in it, without 
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an encounter, actual or possible, of all ‘objects’ and ‘subjects’” (McCann, 2002, p. 
78). 
Almost twenty years after Lefebvre’s arguments, “[m]ost agree that it is the everyday 
experience of inhabiting the city that entitles one to a right to the city, rather than one’s nation-
state citizenship” (Purcell, 2014, p. 142). It follows that most also “emphasize the importance of 
the use value of urban space over and above its exchange value” (Purcell, 2014, p. 142). This is 
not the reality in most cities in the world today—dwellers do not all have rights to appropriate (in 
Lefebvre’s sense of use, not ownership) the city and sometimes they have no rights at all. This is 
where the struggle for nation-state citizenship originates. Almost everywhere, becoming a citizen 
gives dwellers more urban access. Becoming a citizen would allow the Palestinian refugees—who 
have been in Lebanon since 1948—to own property, for example.69 It is useful to note here that 
“what determines the composition of rights and obligations [of citizens] that pertains to a given 
nation-state depends on its historical trajectory” (Isin, 2000, p. 4) and therefore differs from one 
nation-state to the other. Isin shows that “[m]odern citizenship rights that draw from the nation-
state typically include civil rights, political rights, and social rights” (Isin, 2000, p. 3) and that 
democratic states usually “uphold a combination of citizenship rights and obligations.” 
The criteria for naturalisation70 as a nation-state citizen are complicated in modern 
societies, and the more political and urban privileges it provides for the person naturalised, the 
more complicated it becomes. It instantly elevates the individual to the group of urban owners 
rather than urban users (regardless of whether the person actually owns property). This is what 
Lefebvre argued against, imagining “the right to the city entirely differently: as a cry that initiated 
a radical struggle to move beyond both the state and capitalism” (Purcell, 2014, p. 142). 
The year 2005 as a turning point in Lebanese-Syrian relations 
On 14 February 2005, then Prime Minister Rafik el-Hariri was assassinated in a major car 
explosion just outside the Saint George Yacht Club, the owner of which is the loudest opponent 
of Solidere, the Hariri-owned company responsible of the reconstruction of Beirut after the Civil 
War (1975–1990). It was widely rumoured that the Syrian regime was behind the assassination, 
but no official ruling was made. While opposition to the Syrian presence had begun to rise in 
Lebanon in the early 2000s, it was the assassination that escalated public opinion. In the months 
immediately following the event, the streets of Beirut saw continuous and large manifestations, 
                                                 
69 In 2000, the Lebanese government prohibited Palestinian refugees from buying property, increasing their precariousness 
and dependency on Lebanese counterparts 
70 Bestowing citizenship on a person not born to individuals who have that citizenship, or not born in the territory (rules differ 
from country to country) 
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some calling for the retreat of Syrian troops and others thanking the Syrian regime for its support 
of Lebanon throughout the years. The Cedar Revolution, a “grassroots movement of some 1.5 
million Lebanese from all walks of life demanding meaningful sovereignty, democracy, and an 
end to foreign meddling” (Bayat, 2010, p. 6) brought together Christians and Sunnis along with 
several leftist parties and resulted in the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005. 
These demonstrations were different in that no party banners were held up; only the Lebanese 
flag. It had rarely if ever happened that masses in Lebanon showed allegiance to the flag without 
also showing it to a political party or religious confession. Demonstrators chanted huriyye, siyedeh, 
istiqlel (freedom, sovereignty, independence), calling for the complete retreat of Syrian troops 
from Lebanon and the ousting of all pro-Syrian government officials. 
Encadré  2-3: Example of short lived experiences of national allegiance 
Instances of such allegiance to the country and not to a religious group or party are few and 
short lived. Another example of such an instance was the demonstrations on the issue of 
waste management in 2015,71 which were quickly politicised. The Tul’et Rihitkun (You 
Stink)72 movement, which was born during these demonstrations, carried national youth 
slogans free of any political party allegiance. For a short while, it gained strong political 
traction, which threatened the ruling parties. Soon after, allegations of corruption of the 
movement started to fill popular discourse, questioning the real motivations behind it, its 
governance, and its funding. Some demonstrators—or infiltrators—subsequently tried to 
instigate violence during the manifestations, harming the unified secular front the 
movement aspired to. Political parties then tried to co-opt it, “dragging both the language 
and practical concerns of the movement into the political mainstream”73 (Massih, 2016). 
 
The controversy [surrounding the YouStink movement] provides a case study in how 
Lebanon’s political system short-circuits reform efforts. The country’s state 
institutions may not command much respect, but its diverse political parties are 
legitimate in the eyes of their supporters and are ruthlessly efficient at playing on 
their members’ fears (Kenner, 2015, p. 3). 
The assassination of Rafik el-Hariri revealed the profound divisions between supporters 
and opponents of the Syrian regime. Less than a month after the Cedar Revolution, on 8 March 
2005, a massive counter demonstration took place to thank the Syrian government for their role 
in Lebanon, throughout the Civil War and beyond. By organising this demonstration in its telling 
size, Hezbollah sent the message that anti-Syrian movements did not dominate the political 
                                                 
71 See Encadré 3-3 
72 For more information, see https://www.facebook.com/YouStinkLebanon/ and The Daily Star. (2018, June 3). Civil society 
coalition slams landfill expansion plans. The Daily Star. 
73 Quoting Carmen Geha. 
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debate and were not representative of the majority of Lebanese.74 It turned into a debate on 
numbers and the response came on 14 March, with another massive demonstration of the anti-
Syrian coalition. Thirteen years later, in 2018, the political divide in Lebanon is still referred to as 
the March 8–March 14 divide, symbolising pro- and anti-Syrian alliances. The composition of 
these alliances has changed since 2005. One of the main instigators of the Cedar Revolution, the 
Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) led by then-exiled General Michel Aoun, switched sides in 2006. 
The FPM claimed that this shift was possible because their initial demands for Syria’s withdrawal 
were fulfilled and because Lebanon was no longer under Syrian occupation. This eventually 
secured the Presidency of the Republic for the leader of the movement, Michel Aoun. 
The retreat of the Syrian troops did not mean that Syrian workers left Lebanon. In the 
immediate aftermath of the retreat, they became the target of violence, more so than ever before 
(Chalcraft, 2009, p. 202; IRIN, 2007b, 2009; IWPR, 2008). Those who had been protected, 
presumably and/or realistically, by the Syrian political presence in Lebanon were no longer 
protected. Most Lebanese communities, including Shiites (Chalcraft, 2009, p. 201), expressed 
hostility towards the Syrian workers, although detailed narratives or statistical evidence of 
violence are difficult to find. 
In 2008 and for the first time ever, diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria were 
established. From 2011 onwards, however, the conflict in Syria almost immediately infiltrated 
cities in Lebanon, adding a new political challenge for the two countries. The sudden influx of 
Syrians escaping the war rapidly generated localised clashes between Sunni and Shiite Muslims in 
Tripoli (Amrieh, 2011; BBC, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2013) and spontaneous protests in 
Beirut (Dhumieres, 2011; Sherlok, 2012; The Daily Star, 2011a, 2011b, 2014), among other 
incidents. These clashes accompanied the beginning of the arrival of Syrian refugees. 
  
 
Encadré  2-4: Have you forgotten what they did? 
On a Friday night in July 2018, municipal authorities in Kehalé, a town located on the main highway 
between Beirut and Damascus, evicted over one hundred Syrian refugees, who had no residency 
permits, from their apartments. They were awakened at two in the morning by members of the 
municipality and some men from the town. A report of local TV station Al Jadeed said the men were 
handcuffed, asked to leave their apartments half naked, and chased in the streets while the Lebanese 
men shouted profanities at them. The reporter also noted that the municipality was contacted for 
comment, with no response (Chamseddine, 2018). 
On Facebook, the televised report was shared by a Lebanese resident of Kehalé with the caption: “Ya 
khayyeh (brother), we are racists and we don’t welcome everyone. We don’t welcome those who 
                                                 
74 The Alawi confessional group (which are the ruling minority in Syria) is a branch of Shiite Islam (Hezbollah). 
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[expletively] hit on us and physically assault our men. We don’t welcome those who speak the 
language of knives” (Figure  2-12, top). The comments that followed included people doubting the 
accounts of the Syrians and insulting the integrity of the journalist and the network. One comment in 
specific (Figure  2-12, bottom) reflects how the Syrian remains an intruder, occupier, in the memory 
of the Lebanese, specifically those who grew up during the Civil War. This kind of description of 
Syrians remains very much alive in the collective memory of the Lebanese and it is commonly 
brought up in discussions on the refugee crisis, as I have seen in my interviews for this dissertation. 
If Al Jadeed has forgotten what the Syrians did to Kehalé when they came into our 
houses with their guns and bullets and the smell of the gunpowder, to rob us and kill 
our men and scare our women and to suffocate our children with the smell of their 
gunpowder and the rockets, and confiscated so many houses and didn’t leave one 
hanging boxer unstolen and didn’t leave a piece of gold unstolen, we haven’t 
forgotten and we will not forget. We will not forget when we were young children 
walking on the streets afraid of the dirty Syrian who might follow us and hurt us and 
until today we are wary of them, we will not forget when we would be walking to 
school and the Syrians would be training between the houses and block our way 
and delay us. Until today, we look at our ceilings and see the remains of the bullets, 
until today, the blood of Kehalé’s martyrs is not dry; we still [remember] and we 
won’t be able to forget what they and others did and they should thank their lord that 
we hosted them and on top of all this they want to act like gangsters and apply the 
rule of the jungle, which is the only way they know. And anyway I wonder how there 
still is one Syrian in Kehalé, they should have been thrown out long ago, these are 
insolent dirty people and nothing else works with them and they have been 
oppressed in their country all their lives and now they want to be the strong ones 
here, by the way those who like them a lot and are afraid for them better host them 
we don’t want them. :) 
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before 2005, welcomed these efforts. Eventually, with the significant increase in numbers and no 
foreseeable end to the crisis, the Lebanese hosts’ tolerance decreased; identity politics, along with 
a strong political discourse, played a major role in this. Foreign aid efforts also played a role, as 
they fuelled perceptions of inequality from the side of vulnerable Lebanese communities. 
With no real statistics or quantified effects of the weight of the Syrians’ presence, the 
different religious and political groups’ discourses in Lebanon—dictated by their individual gains 
and needs—have been at the core of the violent rejection of the presence of Syrians. Political 
discourse against Syrians has exaggerated the already large numbers of refugees to sometimes 
their double (The Daily Star, 2017). Indeed, the numbers reported by UNHCR are 
underestimates, but with no documentation on to which extent. The political discourse has also 
exaggerated the economic competition that those refugees have posed. They have attributed the 
deterioration of the Lebanese economy singularly to the presence of Syrians in the country. In 
reality, experts have produced data that shows the extent of spending of Syrians in Lebanon 
(Bajec, 2017; Bonnet, 2013; Yassin, 2018) and its positive impact on the economy, mainly in 
terms of consumption and rent. This data refutes many of the popular arguments against Syrian 
refugees. 
These negative portrayals have affected the way Lebanese groups and local authorities 
have dealt with Syrian refugees and their humanitarian, developmental needs. Syrian refugees 
have been portrayed as wanting to stay in Lebanon for economic gain. The truth is that over 70 
percent of them live below the poverty line76 (W. Polk, 2017). In the discourse of leaders, Syrian 
refugees have been referred to as a “ticking time bomb” (Osseiran & Solomon, 2017; The Daily 
Star, 2017). Accordingly, discriminative policies have been implemented against Syrians by local 
authorities in all regions and in almost all cities at different levels, pertaining to their mobility and 
residence. These instances of collective punishment have limited refugees’ rights to the city77 and 
have transformed the latter. Henri Lefebvre has forwarded the following argument: 
the city’s transformations are not the passive outcomes of changes in the social 
whole. The city also depends as essentially on relations of immediacy, of direct 
relations between persons and groups which make up society (families, organized 
bodies, crafts and guilds, etc.). Furthermore, it is not reduced to the organization of 
these immediate and direct relations, nor its metamorphoses to their changes. It is 
situated at an interface, halfway between what is called the near order (relations of 
individuals in groups of variable size, more or less organized and structured and the 
relations of these groups among themselves), and the far order, that of society, 
                                                 
76 Under $4 per day 
77 See more details on these practices in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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regulated by large and powerful institutions (Church and State), by a legal code 
formalized or not, by a “culture” and significant ensembles endowed with powers, by 
which the far order projects itself at this “higher” level and imposes itself. (Lefebvre, 
1996, p. 101). 
In cities in Lebanon, the far order that may be represented by local authorities’ policies 
forced on the refugee population has indeed imposed itself on the near order, which we may 
consider to be those relations between host communities and the refugees. The cities are as such 
transformed in response to these dialectics between the institutional and the individual levels. 
They are also being re-transformed at a fast pace, considering the changing framework of the far 
order. 
Living in close proximity, the populations of Lebanon and Syria have gained an 
understanding of each other over the decades. One of the most predominant negative stereotypes 
is that Syrians are taking the jobs of the Lebanese. But there are no exhaustive statistics that can 
prove or refute such claims.78 As is the case for any proposed research, policy, or strategy for 
Lebanon on a national scale, data and statistics are lacking. What can be done are limited case 
studies in an area where certain indicators can be quantified over a limited period of time. Still, 
there will be limitations to the findings and they will not be representative of the entire situation. 
Then there is the issue of the mainly unregulated Lebanese labour market. Some policies 
have been put in place in favour of Lebanese employment but those go unenforced, intentionally 
or because of a lack of resources, depending on the employer and the gravity of the situation. 
Since 2015, Syrian refugees’ prospects for even informal work have been restricted by their 
obligation to produce a notarised declaration not to work, should they want to renew their 
residency. This has not significantly changed the tone of the media or politicians in their claims 
that Syrians continue to take Lebanese jobs. In any case, Syrians have worked informally in 
Lebanon for decades. In the specific case of Syrian workers replacing Lebanese workers as 
waiters, cashiers, cooks, or similar, one can argue that it is actually the Lebanese employers who 
are affecting such replacements. This means that ultimately, the profits go back to the Lebanese. 
Syrian refugees in that sense supply cheap services to Lebanese employers informally as they have 
historically done. 
When the Syrian refugee crisis spilled into Lebanon in the form of poor refugees entering 
in large numbers, it had substantial effects on the already fragile socio-economic and urban fabric 
and revealed the reality of poverty in cities in Lebanon. This added pressure and revealed a reality 
that had been actively hidden in Lebanon, consciously or unconsciously, since the end of the 
                                                 
78 See Chapter 3, Section 4: Unreliability of quantitative data 
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Civil War. The tourism sector is important for Lebanon’s economy, along with banking and 
services, which form 70 percent of the economy (“Presidency of the Lebanese Republic,” 2018). 
The Lebanese pride themselves on being the perfect hosts: a country where one can ski and swim 
on the same day, a trilingual population, good food, historic and religious sites, relaxing 
mountains, lively cities, and a soaring nightlife are among the country’s attractions. 
3.3 The arrival of Syrian refugees highlighted a dire economic and 
urban reality 
The prominent businessman and then Prime Minister Rafik el-Hariri sought to restore 
Lebanon’s image as the swissra al-sharq (Switzerland of the East) after the destruction caused by 
the Civil War (1975–1990). Foreign investments poured into reconstruction projects, the most 
important of which was Solidere,79 a contested project that privatised public space in the city 
centre (Delage, 2004; Ragab, 2011; Salaam, 1994; Schmid, 2006). Solidere was not the only effort 
to beautify the country though. Construction projects, commercial spaces, restaurants, etc. were 
established to highlight the attractiveness of the country and literally hide its poverty. For 
example, a wall was built on the main airport road leading into Beirut that hid the poor suburbs, 
so tourists would not see poverty at their arrival. Between the end of the Civil War and 2011, 
Lebanon was starting to gain its place as a tourist attraction for Arab communities and 
Westerners alike, but several violent clashes and continued political instability marked real 
setbacks.80 In reality, almost 30 percent of the Lebanese population has lived in poverty and 
extreme poverty since the end of the Civil War. There were little or no efforts made by the 
government to strengthen sectors such as agriculture or industry. Public urban services have 
remained drastically debilitated and insufficient. Human development projects are purely funded 
by the civil society or international donors. One report shows: 
nearly 28 per cent of the Lebanese population can be considered poor and eight per 
cent can be considered extremely poor. However, the most important finding of the 
report is that regional disparities are striking. For example, whereas poverty rates 
are insignificant in the capital, Beirut, they are very high in the Northern city of Akkar. 
In general, the North governorate has been lagging behind the rest of the country 
and thus its poverty rate has become high (Laithy, Abu Ismael, & Hamdan, 2008). 
With the presence of Syrian refugees (Figure  2-13), poverty levels rose to new heights. 
                                                 
79 Société Libanaise Pour le Développement et la Réconstruction. Solidere continues to be the corporation responsible for 
maintaining the downtown area of Beirut. It was created and led by Rafik el-Hariri in the early nineties and today is 
synonymous with the luxurious Beirut Central District. In the heart of Beirut, the public spaces of Solidere are highly guarded 
and not accessible to all dwellers. 
80 Namely a string of assassinations in 2005, the Israeli bombardments in 2006, the Hezbollah/government clashes in 2008. 
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Beggars, mostly women and children (Meaker, 2017), lined the streets of major cities all day and 
most of the night. The already fragile urban infrastructure worsened, with traffic to and from the 
capital becoming suffocating and electricity and water shortages increasing throughout the 
country. Initially, public schools could not take in Syrian children. International funding was 
subsequently made available for afternoon shifts for Syrians. This meant more traffic for longer 
hours. The crisis confirmed what the Lebanese had known but turned a blind eye to since 200581 
and even before: the political class’s dysfunctionality and inability to manage the country and its 
different cities. In addition, these political parties that reflect the different religious groups 
continually seek to geopolitically position themselves favourably with their allies (which differ 
from one party to the other). While political parties continually seek to strengthen their presence 
and allegiances in specific cities and might make efforts to develop these areas on social and 
urban levels, they are less concerned with the development of the country as a whole. 
In immediate reaction to the refugee influx in 2011 and early 2012, the Lebanese 
government focused on terminology (should they be called refugees or displaced?) and whether 
camps should be built, rather than on dealing with the crisis. Consensus on even the most basic 
question of building camps for the refugees was not evident. While a number of politicians 
backed the idea of aiding the refugees, others vehemently disagreed. In this general atmosphere 
of non-agreement, the only possible policy was a non-policy. The government did not have a 
clear strategy regarding the refugees and it did not have the relevant data or political will and 
consistency required to deal with the issue. 
The presence of Syrian refugees made visible what had been invisible in the cities in 
Lebanon: the reality of poverty in Lebanon and the lack of political will or strategy to alleviate it 
since the Civil War. Das, Davidson, and Fleming-Farrell expressed it as such in their report on 
Profiles of Poverty in Lebanon in 2011, just before the Syrian refugees began arriving to 
Lebanon: 
Poverty in a middle-income country like Lebanon is often ignored as the country as a 
whole is not poor. Many within the country even see [poverty] as an embarrassment 
and actively try to cover it up, though most are not even aware of its extent, much 
less understand its causes and dynamics (Das et al., 2011, p. 429). 
In fact, while Lebanon’s economy relies mainly on services such as banking and tourism, 
both highly depended on political stability and peace. As such, the economy has suffered due to 
the consecutive episodes of conflict and protracted, continuous political crises. There are no 
significant manufacturing or agricultural activities and the government has made little efforts to 
                                                 
81 The assassination of Rafik el-Hariri and the consequent complete retreat of Syrian troops from Lebanon 
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develop them. “High access to education, [fair] health indicators in terms of maternal and child 
mortality rates as well as morbidity rates [in addition to] little food insecurity” (Das et al., 2011, p. 
429) have before 2011 hidden the gravity of the situation in the poverty pockets throughout the 
country. The lack of a holistic government strategy targeting poverty makes it difficult for poor 
communities to break the cycle of poverty, and while NGO efforts have been aimed at alleviating 
poverty, those remain restricted and short term. 
 
 
 
Figure  2-13: Syran refugee beggars, Hamra 
Beggars dot the streets of Beirut. Photo: Peter Harrison. See (Meaker, 2017) 
Conclusion to Chapter 1 
The presence of Syrians in Lebanon can be traced back to many causes, not the least the 
need for unskilled labour that the Lebanese have historically not carried out. The politics of the 
conscious and consensual open-border policy between the two countries until 2015, even after 
the retreat of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005, shows at least that Lebanese authorities 
profited from this labour. In addition, and before the start of the crisis in Syria, reports have 
shown extremely high levels of poverty and inequalities (Das et al., 2011), affecting almost 30 
percent of the Lebanese population even at the height of the substantial economic growth 
indicators, according to World Bank statistics82 (Laithy et al., 2008; World Bank, 2018). In fact, 
the arrival of Syrian refugees has made these realities visible and did not create them. It did so 
first because of the high number of refugees registered, who weighed on the fragile urban 
infrastructure and heightened inter-religious group tensions because the majority of them were 
Sunni Muslims. The familiar relations with the Lebanese along with historic familial networks 
                                                 
82 Statistics to be read indicatively as there are no real population estimates or other statistical data available. 
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caused Syrians to flee to Lebanon as a priority refuge country. The confessional and urban 
fragmentation has allowed the refugees to negotiate their place in the cities, notwithstanding this 
being a second-class place for second-class dwellers. 
In this chapter, I presented a broad overview of the urban political dimensions that 
govern the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Syrians in Lebanon are not a new 
phenomenon. The fact is that they have always been present in Lebanon. In the above, I focused 
on the general urban presence of Syrian dwellers in Lebanon over the years. This was important 
because the current refugee crisis is not a distinct event but is in continuity with the historic 
narrative of the two countries since their inception. 
I have shown above how Lebanese communities have accumulated lasting negative ideas 
on Syrians, mostly because of the latter’s direct and protracted involvement in the Lebanese Civil 
War (1975–1990). Lebanon and the Lebanese communities still feel the effects of the war on the 
political, socio-economic, and urban levels. To a certain extent, Lebanese were able to make do 
with a 30 percent poverty rate in 2010, by ignoring or being ignorant of it, actively trying to hide 
it in order to build on the tourism and service sectors that could boost the economy. While this 
may have been possible before 2011, the sudden realisation of the imminent long-term residence 
of poor Sunni refugees in every region and practically every city and locality was less acceptable. 
The immediate and initial reactions to the refugees were positive, but the economic and 
urban strain on the micro–local level quickly became too heavy a burden on the already 
vulnerable Lebanese poor. The realities of the dysfunctional political status quo along with the 
extremely difficult socio-economic situation came strongly to the forefront and could not remain 
invisible any longer. The Syrians made visible the difficult reality in Lebanon—communities were 
forced to face the fact that a democracy based on religious group divisions, with a flawed 
democratic formula, does not work. 
In the following chapter, I will discuss contextual elements of an urban nature that exist 
in cities in Lebanon. I start by answering the deeply complex question: “who governs Lebanon 
and its cities?”, then move to describing the status quo of what I see as the spatialised 
fragmentation of the city in Lebanon, to finally touch on the rights of dwellers in them 
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1. Governance of cities in Lebanon: the national and local scales 
1.1 A complex political structure 
Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic (“Presidency of the Lebanese Republic,” 
2018). While in its constitution the country is said to be a secular democracy, it functions in 
reality as a confessional, consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1969) - based on power sharing 
between religious minorities. Religious confessional groups are popularly referred to as sects and 
therefore the democracy is also commonly known as a sectarian system.     
The eighteen recognized religious groups are all represented in the 128-seat parliament, 
with 64 seats attributed to Christians and 64 seats attributed to Muslims. Three religious groups 
that make up the largest parts in parliament namely the Maronite Christians (34 seats), the Sunni 
and the Shiite Muslims (27 seats each). In 2018, two main political blocs controlled the 
parliament. The March 8 are pro-Syria allies including Hezbollah and the Christian Free Patriotic 
Movement party. The March 14 bloc are Western-backed and include the Sunni Muslim Future 
Movement (led by Saad el-Hariri, son of assassinated Rafiq el-Hariri) and two nationalist 
Christian parties, the Lebanese Forces (led by Samir Geagea) and the Phalangists (led by Sami 
Gemayel).  
In 2017 the parliamentary elections law was changed and provides an example that can 
illustrate the complications that arise from the political power sharing formula. Instead of 
elections based on majority votes in 26 districts, now citizens would vote based on proportional 
representation across 15 electoral districts (Figure  3-1). This new law is put in place, in theory, to 
allow for more just representation of minority groups. In each district a certain number of seats 
are allocated according to confessional distribution.  
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Figure  3-1: Electoral districts in Lebanon 
Electoral districts and their religious representation in the 2018 parliamentary elections. Source: 
The Daily Star, 2018 
Voters are no longer permitted to choose individual candidates but have to vote for one 
complete list in the district where they are registered and not where they live83. Each list would 
win a certain number of seats according to its results. To bypass the new law, coalitions between 
the political parties were formed separately and not in accordance with party values. This led to a 
complex web of inter-party coalitions within and outside of the main party lines. In Figure  3-2, 
the two main clusters represent the alliances of parties with the same political direction. The 
cluster to the left of the figure includes the Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah and Amal who 
are pro-Syrian regime and comprise of Christian and Shiite communities. The cluster to the right 
includes the Future Movement, the Lebanese Forces and the Phalangists who have historically 
been and continue to be anti-Syrian regime; it comprises of Christian and Sunni communities. 
The last cluster to the bottom right includes the independent lists, or those that were popularly 
named the civil society lists. Not attached to any existing political party, they are the most diverse 
in terms of religious community mix even though they are not comparable in numbers. The 
attitude and nature of affiliation or dissociation towards Syria is an important factor among 
several others that influence and condition the Lebanese political structure. 
                                                 
83 See Chapter 2 section 2.1 
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Figure  3-2: Party coalitions in 2018 elections 
Party coalitions in the 2018 Parliamentary election lists Date: 2018. Source: the Lebanese Center 
for Policy Studies (LCPS) 
 
Figure  3-3: Coalitions of the Free Patriotic Movement 2018 
Coalitions of the Free Patriotic Movement party in the 2018 Parliamentary election lists Adapted 
from: Nadim Nader and Megaphone Group, Date: March 28, 2018  
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Figure  3-3 is a representation of the coalitions of the Free Patriotic Movements across the 
15 districts. Parliamentary candidates for the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) ran on the same list 
with Future Movement (FM) candidates in 4 of the 15 districts. The FPM ran on lists competing 
with the FM in 7 of the fifteen districts. Supposedly, those two parties are in stark disagreement 
over some basic political directions, the most obvious of which is that the FPM is a strong ally of 
Hezbollah, non-aligned with the FM. It is evident therefore that attitudes of municipal authorities 
vary from place to place and cannot be reduced to the sole factor of acceptance or rejection of 
the presence of Syrian refugees but are affected by various other intermediary factors.    
Ultimately, the outcome of the last elections showed little change in the status quo 
(McDowall, 2018) - with the Hezbollah and its allies - including the Free Patriotic Movement or 
the President’s party - taking the lead (Ajroudi, 2018; Chulov, 2018) and largely keeping their 
political weight in the government. The numerous independent lists and coalitions formed of 
new faces made little or no impact on the process and the results. 
The parliament has difficulty agreeing on legislation. In fact between 2009 and 2018 the 
parliament illegally prolonged its four year mandate twice, and there was a presidential vacuum 
between May 2014 and October 2016 because of non agreement within the parliament84. The 
vacancy of the head of state constrains the parliament from passing legislation and holding 
elections. It also creates a space of political insecurity within which state institutions 
underperform and the general economic cycle slows down. For instance, a major waste 
management crisis began in July 201585, in the midst of the presidential vacuum and has still not 
been completely solved in 2018. In a certain manner the only continuously functioning authority 
remains at the municipal level, legislative and executive powers are less legitimate due to the 
election processes, changing coalitions, illegal mandate extensions, and corruption.   
Another recurring event that illustrates the translation of the political power-sharing 
complexity to all matters of daily urban life is the process of nomination of civil servants. In late 
2001 for example, the nomination process for administrative appointments to the Electricité du 
Liban and Ogero (the telephone maintenance company) stood pending for several months.  
Initially, the possibility of passing Ogero’s chairmanship from the Sunni community 
to the [Christian] Orthodox community in exchange for the presidency of Tripoli port 
was contemplated. But the suggestion sparked the protests of Deputy Prime 
Minister Issam Fares, who insisted that the Tripoli port should remain in the hands of 
                                                 
84 Since the end of the Civil War, one other presidential vacuum took place for 5 months in 2007-2008 further to a political 
feud between the government and Hezbollah. It ended in May 2008 after violent clashes between Sunnis (pro-government) 
and Shiites (opposition factions) mainly in Beirut and Tripoli but also in other areas such as Aley.   
85 See Encadré  3-3: The waste management crisis of 2015 
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the Orthodox. With the reported agreement to appoint Hamdan, a Sunni, as the 
head of Ogero, the Tripoli port question would also be settled, as it is likely to remain 
in the hands of the Orthodox community. (Abu Rizk, 2001) 
The journalist Abu Rizk continues to report that “there was no conflict over potential 
candidates for the various posts”, asserting that these names “had not even been discussed 
among top leaders”, indicating that the competence of the candidates was not in question, rather 
the “principles of appointments”. The importance of an agreement on the “whole package” was 
paramount as “the last name could spoil everything” (Abu Rizk, 2001).  
 
1.2 Local authorities in Lebanon: their mandate and shaky role as 
regulators of the refugee influx 
In terms of local governance, Lebanon is divided into eight Mouhafazat (governorates) 
representing the central government (Figure  3-4). Governorates are divided into 26 aqdiyeh 
(districts, singular qada’). Every town with more than 300 inhabitants is authorised to form a 
baladiyyeh (municipality) and those number over 1108 in the country. Municipality councils are 
locally elected by all individuals registered in the area. Each council elects a mayor and vice mayor 
and assigns other executive positions. When referring to local authorities in this dissertation I am 
referring to the municipalities.  
The 1977 Law of Municipalities and its amendments govern the current system. 
Each municipality has jurisdiction over all matters of public interest and work in its 
boundaries. This includes setting and balancing the budget, collecting fees and 
taxes, managing properties, and establishing or maintaining a range of public utilities 
and infrastructure such as health, sanitation, water, lighting, local transportation, 
streets and gardens. However, many of these functions are subject to various 
degrees of supervision by the [...] governor or minister of interior. Furthermore, a 
lack of adequate administrative and fiscal capacity characterizes many 
municipalities. Such dynamics are a function of the laws governing public 
employment, municipal taxes and fees, and the transfer of municipal funds from the 
central government. 
Voters elect municipal councils for a six-year term in a bloc-vote list (as opposed to 
a proportional-vote) system. Each municipality is a single unified voting district. In 
contrast to the parliament, there are no sectarian quotas. Each voter casts a single 
list with up to as many names as available spots (Abu-Rish, 2016). 
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Figure  3-4: Eight districts in Lebanon 
The eight Mouhafazat (districts), including Baalbak-Hermel and Akkar that were created in 2003. 
Source: (E. Verdeil, 2005) 
Encadré  3-1: On the definitions and translations of administrative divisions 
There seems to be no consensus on the translation of urban terms to English. For example, the 
Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) that states “The Mouhafazat (district) in the capital (or chief 
place) of which all public services are present under the authority of the mouhafez” (CAS, 2018). The 
UN-Habitat translates the term differently: “At the intermediate administrative level, the Mohafazat 
council (Governorate) was created as an application of de-concentration” (UN-Habitat, 2008, p. 7). 
Furthermore, while the Mouhafazat administrative borders were revised in 2003 to form eight rather 
than six official Mouhafazat, “various public administrations (including CAS) still adopt the six 
Mouhafazats division” (CAS, 2018). The United Nations equally adopt the six Mouhafazat division 
and have registered the Syrian refugees accordingly. The numbers of Syrian refugees registered in 
the two governorates of Bekaa and Baalbak-Hermel are aggregated in the statistics. There are no 
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strict definitions on what a madineh (city) versus a day’a, baldeh (village) are. Commonly, the larger 
municipalities are referred to as cities while the smaller ones are referred to as villages. A hayy 
(neighbourhood) is the term that describes a part of a municipality that usually has a distinctive 
aspect, mostly related to its history (such as the families who historically inhabited it, or an urban 
element like a water well as in the case of hayy El-Nab’a (neighbourhood of the water source).    
 
The number of municipalities rose from 120 in 193286 to over a thousand in the mid 
1960s. This growth was due to various reasons including residents of certain areas seeking some 
autonomy either from the central government or from other communities (Abu-Rish, 2016). In 
1977 the government passed a Law of Municipalities which remains the basic guideline for 
Municipalities today, and since there has been little change in the number of municipalities across 
the country. Therefore municipality urban boundaries that are in use today date back to 197787. In 
2018’s largely urban Lebanon88 it has become difficult therefore to address certain urban issues on 
that municipal scale when the boundaries between urban areas are blurry if existent (Fawaz, 
2017a). A year or so after the Syrian refugees began arriving to Lebanon, 50+ “Unions of 
Municipalities (UoM)”89 bringing together almost 700 municipalities were activated in order to 
better consolidate efforts being undertaken by local authorities, and to facilitate international 
funding procedures90. The “decisions taken by the Federation Council91 are binding for member 
municipalities” (Localiban, 2009). These unions were authorised in the 1977 law of municipalities 
but they were not always active. They are authorised to  
Discuss projects of common interest to municipalities in the federation; develop 
plans, prepare specifications and decide on expropriation necessary for the 
implementation of projects of common interest to municipalities in the federation, 
Establish the budget for the federation, Decide on vacant posts in the federation and 
decide on the general urban plan of the federation” (Localiban, 2009) 
Furthermore, 251 localities were identified by the UN-Habitat as the most vulnerable 
(Figure  3-5) in order to prioritize the areas where they would work in response to the refugee 
crisis. Those are multi-deprived in terms of access to Health services, income levels, access to 
                                                 
86 Also the year of the last official population census 
87 “The closing months of [1977] represented a particular juncture in which political elites, local laypersons and foreign 
observers incorrectly (though understandably) predicted the war’s end. [...] municipal reform and elections were one of the 
major items on the agenda of state elites in the aftermath of the “two-year war.” Yet it would not be until after the Civil War 
ended in 1990, and in a very different context, that the reforming of the municipal elections and holding of elections would 
once again serve as a focus of elite and popular mobilizations” (Abu-Rish, 2016) 
88 Mona Fawaz argues that “ Lebanon is 100 percent urban since its entire national economy and organisation is actually 
pegged to urban centers…” (Fawaz, 2017) 
89 UoMs can be compared to the French intercommunalités   
90 As per interviews with UN-Habitat, 2015 
91 Also known as the Union of Municipalities 
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education services, access to water and sanitation services and housing conditions. 
 
 
Figure  3-5: Most vulnerable localities in Lebanon 
Map of the most vulnerable localities in Lebanon Source: Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 
UNHCR. Data is based on estimations that the UN uses in its operation in Lebanon. Date: March 
2015  
Municipalities in Lebanon enjoy a broad mandate, and they are authorised to implement 
projects in infrastructure among others. Municipalities have two main sources of funding: direct 
funding from residents of the municipality in the form of fees for certain individual services 
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(building permits for instance), and indirect funding from the central government in the form of 
an Independent Municipal Fund (IMF), the government distributes this fund according to a set 
of criteria including the number of residents. As such, municipalities that include coastal lands are 
wealthy, due to the amount of direct taxes on these lands – regardless of their number of 
residents or voters. In reality they are under-resourced in terms of funding and human resources 
(UN-Habitat, 2008). Around 400 municipalities operate with one employee (LCPS, 2015b). 
Municipalities have shown different degrees of tolerance to the Syrian refugee crisis and have 
each acted accordingly. Municipalities act as the local arm of the central government in the 
different regions, having to deal with a lot of red tape. The Ta’ef  Accord of 1989 proposed 
eventual decentralisation, but other than a proposed bill in 2014 (Abou Jaoude, 2014) and 
conferences on the issue (DRI, 2018), no legal changes have come about. 
Since 2011 “municipalities have been forced to shoulder an ever growing share of 
responsibility [...] to deliver services to both Lebanese residents and refugees” (LCPS, 2016). But 
municipalities face major administrative and financial challenges that hinder their potential to 
deliver these services (Atallah, 2016). Municipal Funding is unfairly distributed amongst the 
1000+ municipalities (Figure  3-6) across the country and it makes up a mere six percent of the 
government budget, largely below the international average of 27 percent (Atallah, 2016).   
 
 
 
Figure  3-6: Lebanese government hierarchy 
Representation of hierarchy government bodies from the central government to the municipality 
level Source: (LCPS, 2015a) 
 
While “the Municipalities Law does not have any reference as to whether this body has 
powers to regulate the labour market, or restrict the right of any individual to work” (Ayoub, 
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2017), municipalities have taken direct action to evict or close Syrian-led shops or businesses 
within their boundaries, confirming their “jurisdiction in this regard” (Ayoub, 2017). Rather, it is 
the Ministry of Labour that issues yearly decisions regarding the restriction of access to certain 
professions to Lebanese citizens. In this regard, municipalities are acting at the request of the 
Ministry of Labour but it is not clear whether or not the channels and processes are 
communicated and applied in the different cities. It is noteworthy to mention that even Syrians 
(and other foreign workers) married to, or sons/daughters of Lebanese women are not 
exceptions. Cases of evictions or forced closures of several businesses of immediate family 
members of Lebanese women have been documented. 
Another case documented [...] is about a young man born to a Lebanese mother. He 
has worked for an organization in Beirut for years, yet the Furn El Chebbak 
municipality gave him a warning to regularize his status; otherwise he would be 
subject to expulsion from work. The municipality’s police officer signed the warning 
which included the phrase: “at the request of the minister of labour” (Ayoub, 2017).  
Encadré  3-2: An example of urban governance in Lebanon (governorate to neighbourhood 
levels) 
The city of Tripoli is the capital and one of the six Qada’s (districts) of the North governorate 
Figure  3-7). In all the governorate includes 141 municipalities, four of which (Tripoli, Mina, 
Qalamoun and Beddaoui) form the Fayḥa’ Union of Municipalities (UoM). Only three of these 
form the Tripoli urban area, which comprises of 17 cadastres, 12 of which are in Tripoli (Figure 
 3-8). The currently elected mayor of Tripoli also serves as the head of the Fayḥa’ UoM. Cadastres 
are territorial units that serve for land registration and related information. These may 
correspond to municipality limits, include several municipalities or be one of several comprising a 
municipality. They are not presided over by an elected or assigned official, and largely vary in 
area. In the case of Tripoli, demographic information available is at the cadastre level. Then there 
are neighbourhoods: those are not officially recognised, but the UNHCR has identified 58 
neighbourhoods further to surveys with residents and municipality officials (there is no 
comprehensive physical boundary available for all neighbourhoods at the time of writing). At 
another hierarchy there are 69 elected Moẖtars (village representatives) in the Tripoli urban area, 
51 of which serve Tripoli’s neighbourhoods. Moẖtars receive wages by the Ministry of Interior for 
notary-type administrative work. Informally, religious bodies (Islamic entities in the case of 
Tripoli) are active at political and security levels, and play an important role in social governance. 
(adapted from (Maguire, Saad, Saad, Khalil, & Schinder, 2016)  
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Figure  3-7: The qada’s of the North Governorate 
The six qada’s of the North Governorate including Tripoli. (Maguire et al., 2016) 
 
 
Figure  3-8: Cadastres by municipality 
Cadastres by municipality, number 11 on the map corresponds to Tebbeneh. (Maguire et al., 
2016) 
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1.3 Policing the streets: public and private security providers in 
Lebanon 
Several types of armed men (and a few women) can be seen on the streets in Lebanon. 
The legal national forces include: the jeish (army), the darak (Internal Security Officers) and the 
(shorta) municipality police. Quasi-legal forces including the Indibat officers (Hezbollah police) can 
also be seen, and Palestinian faction youth are very present in the camps. There are also 
numerous illegal arms in the possession of the population, be it via illegal factions or militias or 
even at the level of the individuals. By law, the Internal Security Forces or the darak are 
responsible of preserving order, communal peace, protecting publics and properties and 
preserving freedoms92.  
In reality, political and religious factions also play roles in maintaining security in the cities 
and it is not uncommon to hear about clashes in different areas that were disseminated further to 
political party interference. “In fact, In Lebanon the state’s ability to project its authority is highly 
limited, particularly in the realm of security provision, where myriad private actors, often 
motivated by political or sectarian competition, dominate this sphere” (Belhadj et al., 2015, p. 4).  
While this is true for the majority of Lebanese regions, studies on state and non-state 
security providers in Lebanon has focused on Beirut. The city presents an interesting case study 
because it “has a fragmented, overlapping, and contested security system where the definition of 
what constitutes a threat is constantly negotiated and therefore changing, the monopoly of state 
agencies on security is openly challenged, and the boundaries between the public and private 
identities of public agents blurred” (Fawaz, Harb, & Gharbieh, 2012, p. 174).  
In their case study on the capital, Belhadj “analyzed the dynamics of convergence and 
divergence between the interests of the state, political parties and other actors with regards to the 
provision of security” (Belhadj et al., 2015, p. 4). They identified, in addition to the official 
national security actors: (1) political parties that have organized militants and stand-alone party 
security apparatuses, (2) commercial private security companies (PSCs) that are visible 
throughout Beirut and include the local arms of international security firms, and (3) in Palestinian 
camps, popular committees (often operating in conjunction with armed Palestinian political 
factions) that fulfill similar functions to neighbourhood committees. (4) local neighbourhood 
committees that have auto-organized to protect the community, mostly male self-appointed local 
residents patrolling sectarian territories (Belhadj et al., 2015). Fawaz, Harb and Gharbieh describe 
the last type as 
                                                 
92 See Internal Security Forces website: http://www.isf.gov.lb/en/about 
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marked by “observation” stations, a cluster of chairs at street corners often The 
“threatening public” population to be profiled and/or stopped is hence dependent on 
profiling which is generally tainted by sectarian, national, and class stereotypes 
garnered by the traditional water pipe (arguileh) that men smoke while passing the 
time and chatting. In times of tensions, following fiery political speeches, young men 
are seen patrolling neighbourhoods until late at night or organizing night watches 
with scheduled shifts (Fawaz et al., 2012, p. 181). 
Non-state security providers are usually more effective and efficient as they need to 
comply with less bureaucratic rules, often at the micro local level - and are more popular because 
of it. However, they also have less of an obligation to comply with human rights and impartiality 
seeing that their very nature in some cases is local and confessional. “By restricting the mobility 
of Syrians, certain municipalities effectively enforced a second class status on the refugees” (El-
Khouri, 2018, p. 101). In fact, scholars have looked at the “impact of the security apparatus on 
the city, both from the perspective of urban practices and economic development [and have 
found that] vulnerable groups often avoid policed public spaces because of the harassment with 
which they generally associate policing” (Fawaz et al., 2012, pp. 176–177) 
Similarly to other urban services therefore, security in Lebanon is also partially privatised.  
The city is an increasingly important site for tackling this dilemma [of non-state 
security providers]. A global trend in urban migration is concentrating more of the 
world’s population in metropolises. Chaotic or rapid influxes can quickly overwhelm 
the service capacity of cities, particularly in states already challenged by 
underdevelopment, conflict, or fragility. Because local governments seldom have 
direct control over state security providers, they are often compelled to use other 
policy levers (spatial planning, mobility, housing policy, and so on) to impact citizen 
safety and security (Belhadj et al., 2015, p. 5). 
Experiences of security have important effects on urban practices of dwellers and 
especially vulnerable groups like refugees in Lebanon. It does so mainly by adding a layer of fear 
of mobility even outside curfews, and by increasing social exclusion in the sense that refugees 
begin to regard any Lebanese as a potential non-state security enforcer and therefore dominant 
again.  
2. The difficult coexistence of different groups in fragmented cities in 
Lebanon 
“Lakom loubnanoukom wa li Loubnani” (To you, your Lebanon; and to me, mine), is the title 
of a Gebran Khalil Gebran poem from the early 1920s (Gebran, 1923). There are many 
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Lebanons, politically, culturally, socially etc. with different aspirations and outlooks, different 
allegiances and identities. This has been the case since the country’s inception further to colonial 
power divisions. The country is divided proportionally amongst eighteen officially recognized 
religious groups, each group bound by the other but not aligned with it, each group careful to 
keep the fragile power balance as is in order to insure its continuity.  
The Lebanese context has rendered possible the urban settlement of over a million 
Syrians in less than four years in Lebanon. The  
sectarian legacy of its process of nation building, the religious divisions of its society 
(including access to and control of land), the very liberal public sector that was 
created in this country […], as well as the recurrent Civil Wars that have marked its 
recent history (1958, 1975–1990) (Traboulsi, 1993)” (Fawaz, 2008, p. 568)  
have left the cities in fragments. This context has allowed for the gaps in which Syrians 
have been able to slide in their attempt to overcome their refugee status.   
 
2.1 Religion, conflict, and money: three elements that fragment 
cities in Lebanon 
The metaphor of a fragmentation “suggests and emphasis, an increase of pre-existing 
differences between socio-economic and / or national or ethnic groups. These differences are 
mainly marked in regards to income, wages, employment conditions and work”93 (Rhein & 
Elissalde, 2004, p. 115). While it may be presumed that spatial proximity between different 
groups would reinforce positive social relations, the opposite is also probable (Chamboredon & 
Lemaire, 1970). The sociologist Françoise Navez-Bouchahine largely details the origins and 
different definitions of the notion on fragmentation (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002). Under socio-
spatial fragmentation she explores the two ideas of the “vertical” fragmentation rooted in socio-
economic classes and the “horizontal” fragmentation rooted in cultural differences. While both 
these notions have certain limitations, this work is mainly concerned with fragmentation on the 
basis of culture.  
What can generate these alienations or identity affirmations that take shape in 
specific urban territories is however a "culture" understood in its broad sense: race, 
ethnicity, religion, region, sexual preference, lifestyle... are indeed identified as 
                                                 
93 This metaphor suggests an accentuation, an increase of pre-existing differences between socio-economic and / or national 
or ethnic groups. These differences are mainly marked with regard to income, wages, conditions of employment and work 
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capable of generating this socio-spatial fragmentation94 (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002, 
p. 69) 
Fragmentation in this thesis is seen as the spatial expression of the tensions and divisions 
between the different dweller groups, in the sense of negotiations over space, rather than in the 
strict planning sense in which fragmented spatial organisation is a study of urban management 
and planning, as can be seen in the work of Marcello Balbo (Balbo, 1993). As the society in 
Lebanon is of extreme diversity on the ethnic, religious, and economic levels, fragmentation here 
does not refer to physical differences between spaces but rather to the spatial dimension of this 
complex social fabric, segregated to a large extent. This notion of social segregation has been 
studied in depth in sociology especially since the 1970s within the school of Chicago, after the 
massive societal changes that affected the city at the time - with seminal works on the subject by 
Nels Anderson, Robert E Park, Louis Wirth among others. Urban fragmentation may be seen as 
the spatial dimension of this social segregation - a difficult to coin reflection in space of complex 
social relations between extremely mixed social groups, such as the case is in Lebanon today. 
Religion, conflict, and money are three elements that fragment cities in Lebanon. Religion 
has been omnipresent as a raison d’être in Lebanon since the borders of the Republic were drawn 
by colonial powers in 1920. In 2018, it would suffice to take a short walk in El-Nab’a, a dense 
neighbourhood in the suburbs of Beirut, to notice the religious borders that divide the spaces. 
Marked with religious symbolism and different political faces and slogans decorating the walls of 
the building and the chaotic electric cable hovering over the streets, the divisions are clear - a 
person cannot pass from the Christian side to the Shiite side without knowing it (Figure  3-9: 
Street El-Nab'aFigure  3-9). 
 
                                                 
94 This can generate withdrawal or identity affirmations taking shape in specific urban territories is however a "culture" 
understood in the extensive sense: race, ethnicity, religion, region, sexual preference, style of life ... These are indeed 
identified as capable of generating this socio-spatial fragmentation 
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Figure  3-9: Street El-Nab'a 
A large hanging cross marks the Christian part to of El-Nab’a Photo: Pierre Bergel Date: June, 2017 
 
 
Figure  3-10: Tebbeneh general view 
Signs of violence reminiscent of war and violent clashes in the area. Date: November, 2015 
The second factor of fragmentation is conflict and violence. The two Civil Wars (1958, 
1975) also left their mark, so did the conditions which brought them forth and the direct and 
indirect consequences of each. A walk in Beb el-Tebbeneh takes a person back to the years of the 
war. Syria Street in the neighbourhood divides the Alawi and Sunni communities that have been 
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in conflict for decades, and violent clashes between them still erupt every couple of years95 
(Figure  3-10). The army checkpoint at the entrance of a Palestinian refugee camp, or on the 
highway linking Mount Lebanon to the North reflects the same divisions96.  
The conflicts have left other traces as well, such as the situation of the Internally 
Displaced Persons. “Lebanon’s Civil War caused the violent fragmentation of a pluralistic society 
into fairly distinct sectarian areas. [...] Many of the displaced, particularly from the south, settled 
in Beirut. Internally displaced persons in Lebanon include those from the internal conflict and 
Civil War, which broke Lebanon into sectarian districts, and those displaced by the Israëli 
invasions of 1978 and 1982.” (Global IDP Database, 2004). Even ten years after the end of the 
Civil War, some 450,000 IDPs had not yet returned. (Assaf & El-Fil, 2000).  This condition of 
fragmentation of the society and the cities is paradoxically what made possible the insertion of 
the Syrian refugees. Indeed, the foundation of the Lebanese nation is not solid enough to face a 
challenge as substantial as the important influx of refugees. 
 
The third layer of fragmentation comes in consequence to the liberal public sector. With 
practically zero government social aid, dwellers are left to fend for themselves, and privatisation 
is one of the government’s solutions for urban matters97. Often the government will not react to 
a growing problem until it is too complicated to solve, and opt for an emergency solution. Urban 
infrastructure services to dwellers are at the forefront of this issue, with the services of electricity, 
waste management, telecommunications, and water privatised (Figure  3-11) - either at the 
national or the local levels. In 2000, the High Council for Privatisation and PPP (Public Private 
Partnernship)98 was mandated by the government to oversee all relevant projects, and today it 
runs a multitude of projects ranging water dams to expressways to many more. One example 
illustrates the process leading to the partial privatisation of an urban service in Lebanon: the 
energy sector.  
 
Figure  3-11: Privatised sectors in Lebanon 
Partially or fully privatised sectors in Lebanon as per the website of the High Council of 
Privatisation and PPP.  Source: https://hcp.gov.lb/hcp.gov.lb/ks_ohh4f.html 
                                                 
95 See Chapter 3 section 5.1 
96 For security reasons, it is not possible to take photos of army checkpoints. 
97 It is also through privatisation that the political ruling class profit the most - as most privatised urban structures are owned 
or co-owned by political leaders. 
98 https://hcp.gov.lb/hcp.gov.lb 
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The electricity service in Lebanon and the progression towards its looming privatization 
Lebanon has had an electric power crisis since the Civil War. More than two decades after 
the war, in some areas power outages reach 12-13 hours per day. Even the best served city, the 
capital Beirut, is currently rationed at three hours per day. Dwellers have privately dealt with this 
issue since the war, managing differently from region to region depending on the number of 
rationing hours they are faced with. This urban infrastructure deficiency increases inequalities 
between the cities. As Figure  3-12 illustrates, Beirut is privileged with much less need for private 
electricity providers than other regions. The most affected region is the Bekaa, where households 
get around ten hours of public electricity per day and almost 80 percent supplement this with 
private electricity.   
In fact during the war and in the immediate aftermath, most apartments had small private 
generators (usually with the capacity to produce 5 amperes of electricity and installed on a 
balcony) which would power the fridge, a television and a lamp. With time and while the 
government lagged behind on providing real solutions, these small generators were replaced with 
bigger and collective ones. It was not uncommon in the late 1990s for buildings to have a 
generator in the basement, one that would provide for the needs of all the tenants and that would 
be maintained collectively. Eventually, these generators were replaced with neighbourhood 
generators run by private individuals. The private ventures developed to a point where in 2018 
they have employees who make rounds in the neighbourhoods to collect a monthly bill that is at 
least double or triple the amount of public electricity bill. Private generator owners charge a flat 
rate as per an ampere level subscription, be it consumed or not consumed - and many times the 
number of hours they operated during the month is factored in the formula. In recent years they 
have installed small lights on public electricity posts to indicate whether the electricity provided is 
that of the government or the generator (Figure  3-13). 
Due to their informal nature, these private electricity providers (commonly referred to as 
the electricity mafia) are irreproachable and their prices are non-negotiable. In 2009 the World 
Bank reported that an estimated “third of all electricity generated in Lebanon comes from private 
generators” (Akkaya, Junge, & Mansour, 2009). The government was aware of the growing issue, 
both of the deficiency of the Electricité du Liban, and of the informality of the growing private 
generator business. Even though it has tried several short term solutions, such as renting 
electricity ships, not much advancement has been achieved, 28 years after the end of the Civil 
War.  
Today it seems as though the government has decided to take action by attempting to 
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regulate the informal generator supply. It has mandated the providers to place electricity counters 
for each apartment, to unify the rate and to charge for electricity used, not a flat rate. This action 
which is not yet in place comes 10 years after the Minister of Finance announced: “Electricity is 
the mother of all problems in Lebanon. The size of the problem is beginning to pose a danger to 
public finances’’Mohammad Chatah quoted in (Akkaya et al., 2009, p. 4). 
 
 
Figure  3-12: Use of generators vs electricity rationing 
The share of households using generators is inversely proportional to the number of hours of EDL 
service provided to an area. Source: World Bank SIA survey 2008 (Akkaya et al., 2009) 
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Figure  3-13: Private Generator signals 
Light bulbs are installed on street lamp poles and on the sides of buildings to indicate whether the 
power is public or private at the time. Photo Toufik Khreich, 2019 
Housing is also unregulated, social housing non-existent, and laws that govern the rent 
market are outdated. The “old rent agreement” places owners and tenants of an estimated 
180,000 residences in direct conflict (Marsi, 2017). The law protects tenants from eviction but 
does not account for any incremental increase of rent99, creating a deadlock situation.  Public 
water, waste collection, and internet in every region do not suffice and need to be complemented 
through private initiatives similar to that of the private generators.  
Such social segmentation, highly materialized in the city, has produced profound 
inequalities and injustices for the dwellers, be they Lebanese or not. Still, the “Other” dwellers 
have less of a right to the city. It is these pre-existing conditions that have systematically placed 
poor migrants in positions of inferiority. And it is not different in the case of the settlement of 
the Syrian refugees since 2011 whose largest numbers have settles in the poorest areas. With 
under-resourced municipalities at the local level, Syrians were let in the cities without any 
regulation and were placed in exploitable positions. Paradoxically, it is these same conditions 
which have allowed the settlement of the Syrian urban refugees. In a sense cities in Lebanon have 
been hospitable and violent at the same time; it was their hospitability due to their pre-existing 
                                                 
99 Rental rates remain unchanged from before the start of the Civil War in 1975. 
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violence and violence in consequence to their hospitability of the Syrians since 2011. Indeed, 
“Lebanon is a place which is simultaneously accessible and impenetrable, welcoming and 
incomprehensibly unyielding” (Robert Fisk, cited in Moghnieh, 2017, p. 26). 
The memory of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) is still visible in cities in Lebanon in 
different ways. At one extreme, some areas in major cities have been largely reconstructed, most 
obviously the Beirut city centre but other major areas as well such as the airport and the road 
from the airport leading to Beirut. At the other extreme there are areas which have not been 
formally reconstructed or developed since the end of the Civil War in 1990, the peripheries of 
Beirut such as Bourj Hammoud, Dora, the surroundings of the Shatila and Bourj Palestinian 
camps, and most of the poorer cities outside Beirut including Sidon, Tripoli, and Nabatieh.  
Traces of conflict are present abundantly. Even in the most developed of areas today the 
presence of checkpoints and heavy security is very visible. The public spaces in the city centre are 
not accessible to the population at large and every entry into the city’s core public space Se7et le 
Nejmeh (Place de l’Etoile) is controlled (Figure  3-15). In the poorer areas conflict is further visible 
with traces of heavy gunfire still appear on buildings that are inhabited. Other buildings stand in 
their state of immediate aftermath of clashes, uninhabited for the most part (Figure  3-16, Figure 
 2-11). Entire streets and blocks reflect the war and the presence of armed military and/or 
Internal Security Forces in many of these areas further accentuates the state of tension. What is 
furthermore noteworthy is that there is no monopoly over legal violence in Lebanon, neither on 
the government level nor on the citizen level. The army, the Internal Security Forces, and the 
municipal police are all present in the public sphere and armed with two main exceptions. The 
first exception is the Palestinian refugee camps which are auto-governed in theory, with illegal 
arms held by the different governing factions. The second exception is the Hezbollah governed 
cities, where all security and urban services is assured by the party with their own arms.  
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Encadré  3-3: The waste management crisis of 2015 
During the second half of 2015, Beirut (and other areas in Lebanon as well), saw a major waste 
management crisis. Garbage piled up on the streets, with no apparent solutions in sight (Figure  3-14).  
The reasons behind this crisis can be traced back to the end of the civil war, when the government 
was not capable of insuring garbage collection and street cleanliness, and contracted a private 
company, Sukleen, for the job. The starting contract was for $3.6 million in 1994, and grew to $150 
million in 2015, and “the contracting [with Sukleen] was devoid of any competitive bidding and the 
details of the contract remain confidential. Consequently, Lebanese pay one of the highest costs per 
ton for garbage collection in the world” (Atallah, 2015). During the summer of 2015, Beirut saw 
major protests and the formation of the “you stink” campaign, denouncing the government and 
demanding solutions. Many points can be deduced from the waste crisis, the most relevant to this 
research are two: 
1- Sukleen’s owner has ties to the Hariri family, and has monopolised the waste management 
industry in Lebanon since 1994. This is a clear example of how politics, privatisation, and 
political elitism prioritise private gain over sustainable urban planning.  
2- During over twenty years during which Sukleen was contracted, little has been done to treat 
garbage, or to prepare a sustainable plan for waste collection on the long term. In fact, the 
crisis in 2015 started with the closure of the biggest landfill100. For years, it had been taking in 
three times the amound it was designed for. This ties into the incapability / or resistance of 
the government to make long term decisions. Like the solutions to most urban matters, the 
government allows a problem to get to a high emergency level, and then short term 
solutions that are highly profitable to the elite, are proposed, with little recourse to longer 
term, sustainable solutions.  
 
Figure  3-14: River of garbage, 2015 
After months of build up, the waste crisis in Lebanon culminated in garbage piling up in the 
streets of the city. Photo: Associated Press, Bilal Hussein  
                                                 
100 The Naameh landfill was set up in 1997 as an emergency solution for garbage dumping, and has since taken over half the 
garbage of Beirut and Mount Lebanon.  
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Figure  3-15: Security in the  Beirut Central District, Solidere 
Beirut Central District, Solidere. An army soldier guards one of the entrances toward the Place de 
l’étoile. Photo: Per Huttner. Date: December 2012. Source: (Giannini & Al-Rajji, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
Figure  3-16: Holiday Inn Hotel, Beirut 
Former Holiday Inn Hotel destroyed in the Civil War in Beirut, Lebanon. Date: October 9; 2005 
Source: dpa - Alamy Stock Photo 
Cities are also largely divided according to their religious identity. There is little need for a 
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guide or a map to reveal the religion of an area - as religious icons, signs and graffiti dot the 
streets (Figure  3-17) and key roundabouts while the sounds of places of worship rise high to 
invite the pious to prayer. Perhaps not instinctively to a foreign eye, but locals can surely discern 
the specific religious group of an area by the type of icon, the architecture of a church or mosque, 
the clothes of the people on the streets. Syrian refugees upon their arrival have also had to learn 
to discern these specific codes to negotiate their place in those diverse cities and have learned 
that this also plays a role in their pursuit.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  3-17: El-Nab'a water tower 
Religious markings of different groups on a street commonly known as Ghilan in Nab’a. In the 
image a cross, an icon of Saint Joseph, a banner reads “Oh ye, Hussein”, and the image of Nabih 
Berri, the leader of the Amal Movement, donated by a resident of the area. Date: October 2018 
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Encadré  3-4: Electoral laws reinforce urban fragmentation 
The religious urban divisions mirror these intricate political allocations. For example, according to the 
new electoral system of 2018, the country was divided into fifteen different electoral districts and 
candidates were asked to form lists with seat allocations complying with the confessional 
distribution. Voters would choose a complete list and select a preferred candidate from the specific 
qadaa (district) they are registered in (not the qadaa where they reside). In Lebanon a person is 
always registered and vote in their place of familial origin. In theory a person can change this to the 
area of residence but this it is not accessible to most (Abu Rish, 2016). This fact makes religious 
divides between cities more difficult to change or overcome. It also fixes the spatial divisions 
between the religious groups.  
This means that most Lebanese who have moved to the larger cities for work or other purposes still 
vote in their family’s hometown, preserving as such the religious aspect of the places where their 
family spatially belongs, and maintaining the religious outlines of the urban fabric. For instance, a 
long standing Christian resident of Beirut would still vote in his father’s town or village of origin101 - 
which could be a town he barely knows but where his civil status is registered along with his wife and 
children102. The weight of his religious vote will therefore always count for a town he does not dwell 
in (Christian in this example), and at the same time he does not have political weight in the city 
where he resides103. This means that elections are flawed from the source and elected individuals are 
not representative in many cases. By definition democracy is not attainable. In theory a person may 
change their place of residence but in practice this is a difficult procedure and rarely done. In terms 
of election politics, Eric Verdeil has differentiated a “legal Lebanon” from a “real Lebanon”, referring 
to the distortions created by the registration of individuals at their village of origin regardless of their 
actual village or city of residence (Verdeil, 2005).  
The Lebanese government has therefore always been weak and more or less illegitimate as a unit - in 
the existing electoral process a representative government is fundamentally weak. Religious 
communities have formed quasi proto-states competing with the central government in different 
scales and temporalities. The leaders of these communities are usually members of one historically 
prominent family. During the Civil War for example, the Phalangists had started executing a plan to 
officially declare East Beirut along with Mount Lebanon a separate country, complete with a central 
bank and airport. In 2018, the Hezbollah operate another proto-state complete with armed security 
forces, private schools etc. Of course, the families that head these religious communities, along with 
the religious leaders to a large extent, profit personally from these divisions via private business 
initiatives within or outside the legal frame.  
 
 
                                                 
101 These villages of origin were essentially fixed during the French mandate and specifically in 1932 during the first and only 
official census of the population. (Maktabi, 1999) 
102 The fact that a woman’s place of residence changes after marriage cements her inferior position in the society. 
103 In many towns, there are quasi-ruling families. Those are wealthy and have a long history of local political power. The 
communities pay tribute to these families on special occasions, and may even ask for favors, resources or other kinds of 
support. (access to education or job opportunities, access to healthcare, facilitation of legal procedures etc.). Examples 
include the Frangieh family in Zgharta (North), the Gemayel family in Bekfaya (Mount Lebanon), the Hariri family in Beirut, 
etc.    
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2.2 Difficult coexistence for dwellers amidst discerning negotiations 
on space 
The transversal question of who can claim Lebanese citizenship is controversial, perhaps 
at the core of all other controversies. It is mainly but not only controversial because religion plays 
a part in the Lebanese raison d’être and its political construction both in terms of legal 
framework and social values. In fact the borders of the Republic of Lebanon were drawn by 
colonial forces in 1920 further to local pressure and with religion in mind. The Doustour 
(constitution) of 1926 (Lebanon’s Constitution of 1926 with Amendments through 2004, 1926) is 
complemented by the unwritten Mithaq al Watani (National Pact) of 1943, agreed upon by the 
President and Prime Minister at the time, just before the independence of the republic. The 
constitution guarantees equality of all citizens and their freedom of religious practices and the 
National Pact divides powers amongst not only religions but religious groups, or sects, as well. 
The idea of al 3aïsh al moushtarak (common living, co-existence) between the different religious 
groups is particularly rooted in political discourse and is presented as the basic principle for the 
success of the Lebanese nation. Tripoli is a city of Sunni Muslim character and majority, and 
Christians live in the towns and villages of its peripheries. Byblos, a mere 30-minute drive south 
of Tripoli, is a city of Christian character and majority, and Muslims live in and around the center 
as well. Neighbourhoods tend to be divided as well; with exceptions, certain blocks or buildings 
are known to be inhabited by a certain religious group. In general, a building of Christian tenants 
will not appreciate renting out (or selling) to a Muslim and vice versa - the agreement is not 
official in most cases but it is the societal norm.  
The following example though extreme and not representative of the majority of 
localities, shows the extent of divisions between religious groups in the cities and reflects an 
unwritten community practice in numerous cities and villages104. In 2010, the Ḥadath105 
municipality elections were won by the candidates with the slogan mā tbyʿ ārḍak, el baladiyyeh mā 
raḥ temḍylak  (don’t sell your house, the municipality will not sign106). The message meant that the 
Christians in Ḥadath, a city in immediate proximity with the Shiite Daḥieh in south-east Beirut, 
should not sell their lands or apartments to non-Christians and specifically Shiites. Banners with 
                                                 
104 It is common for communities to come together to convince property owners wishing to sell to individuals of different 
religious groups to reconsider. It is also a common practice to search for an alternate, acceptable, buyer in that case, and 
possibly pressure the seller to reduce the price in favor of the desired buyer.  
105 A city in immediate proximity with the Shiite Daḥieh in south-east Beirut 
106 While municipalities do not have the legal right to forbid a sale, it has the means and authority to delay and hinder the 
process and to place pressure. Without validation from the municipality no upgrades to the construction can be undertaken, 
for example. Municipalities can also cut water supplies, keep a manhole open at the entrance of the building, harass the 
owners and tenants etc. or in other words make a situation intolerable.   
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the slogan could be seen in the streets (Figure  3-18). By doing so the municipality shifted what is 
usually an implicit spatial understanding into an institutionalised local policy. To defend the 
policy the Head of the Municipality noted a decrease in Christian ownership in his municipality 
from over 95 percent in the 1990s to 40 percent in 2010 (Nakhleh, 2015), with the majority of 
property sold to Shiites. The municipality defends the policy on its website in a blog post quoting 
several Christian leaders, including a Maronite Cardinal: “the balance in Lebanon would be lost if 
one of the religious groups bought land from another, because the transfer of lands may lead to 
immigration [for those who sell]” (Municipality of Hadath, 2018). It goes on to state: “For the 
past seven years this decision has been implemented without a single exception [...] what was a 
shy start has developed into a tangible reality in the increase of private initiatives by Christian 
investors to re-buy lands and properties”. (Municipality of Hadath, 2018)   
 
Figure  3-18: Banner in Hadath 
Banner in Hadath reads “Hadath Municipality. Don’t sell your house, don’t sell your land, the 
municipality will not sign off”. Source: (IM Lebanon, 2017). 
 
While spatial and social distance are logically correlated, spatial proximity and social 
distance are not mutually exclusive. The generalisation that social distance is strongly correlated 
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to spatial distance was contested by French sociologists Chamboredon and Lemaire in their study 
of the large neighbourhoods in the peripheries of Paris in the 1960s. Their results showed that 
the relative social mixture did not in fact rule out social distance (Chamboredon & Lemaire, 
1970). They argue against other sociological studies that could “reduce coexistence to the act of 
speaking or getting to know one’s neighbours”107 (Chamboredon & Lemaire, 1970, p. 13). 
Instead, they propose that it is only by analysing the specific mundane behaviours and by taking 
into consideration the numerous sub-categories that real coexistence can be evaluated. American 
sociologist Linton Freeman later argued that dominant groups could impose spatial segregation 
to maintain their higher status vis-à-vis lower status persons by keeping the latter spatially 
isolated. But he added that “it is also possible that limitations on interaction, whether they 
involve spatial separation or not, may be built with the support or even at the initiative of less 
powerful persons” (Freeman, 1978, p. 413). Individuals with no power to impose spatial 
segregation can still practice social distancing between themselves and those undesired others. He 
suggested that “any social device that results in restrictions on some form of social contact 
between persons who possess different socially relevant characteristics fosters segregation and at 
the most fundamental level” (Freeman, 1978). Freeman’s definition complements Chamboredon 
and Lemaire in that perspective, inviting researchers to look beyond proximity or neighbouring in 
order to understand social distancing. Indeed, social domination may in some cases rely on spatial 
proximity where poor migrants in cities provide services for rich dwellers. The political right in 
England for example claims to be tough on immigration, while it  
promotes a business model that depends on a constant churn of workers to carry 
out jobs that are underpaid and insecure at best, and all too often dirty, dangerous, 
and degrading. It requires not just immigration, but immigration without end, since 
only the newly arrived, the desperate and the vulnerable will tolerate the conditions 
that have been created (Lawrence, 2015). 
 
The process is well illustrated in the initial placement of Palestinian refugee camps in 
Lebanon. In 1948 when the first massive influx of Palestinian refugees arrived to Lebanon, they 
were “viewed by the Lebanese ruling establishment as a threat to internal political and social 
stability” (Peretz, 1993, p. 61) and they were “deliberately put [by the Lebanese] near urban areas 
and not on the frontiers, in response to the wishes of businessmen for cheap labour” (Petran, 
1987, p. 74). Indeed, they were “often exploited as cheap labour during periods when Lebanon’s 
                                                 
107 Original citation: “On croirait, à lire certaines études, que les conduites de sociabilité n’engagent rien d’autre qu’une 
disposition particulière à l’échange et que, efflorescences de la vie sociale, elles ne se relient à la situation sociale que de 
façon très lâche, en sorte que la sociologie pourrait ici se limiter à l’étude d’un homoloquens défini par la faculté de parler et 
de lier connaissance avec ses voisins” 
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economy was booming” (Peretz, 1993, p. 61), without being given basic urban services such as 
water, electricity, drainage etc.  
While idealistically it may seem desirable to have a social mix of ethnicities and races 
cohabiting in a sort of a melting pot of culture, studies have shown that “segregation and 
aggregation are two faces of the same reality” (Avenel, 2005)108. It can also be said that 
aggregation between communities of different social classes facilitates the exploitation of the 
dominated. There are therefore different scales of separation and proximity to be considered. In 
Lebanon communities live side by side and apart simultaneously. While in some settings 
Lebanese communities tend to coexist amongst themselves (on the surface at least), such as in 
universities or places of work, investigation into inter-religious group relations tells a different 
story. In 2010, a study based on a psycho-social survey designed to describe Lebanese youth 
found that “a third of participants expressed negative emotions towards, and low acceptance of, 
other sects (hostile prejudice)” and that “two thirds of the youth would not consider marrying 
someone from a difference sect” (Harb, 2010, p. 17).  In fact in 1971, just some years before the 
Lebanese Civil War, the Lebanon Family Planning Association (LFPA) survey found that 
“Interfaith marriages are negligible in number in Lebanon; only about one percent of the couples 
had married outside their faith” (cited in Chamie, 1980). 
Since 1948 there have also been other cities inside the cities in Lebanon: the Palestinian 
camps. Today these camps count as an integral part of the city in Lebanon’s urban fabric - even 
though they are not concerned with al 3aïsh al moushtarak. To protect their Haqq al ‘awda (Right of 
Return to Palestine), Arab nations to which Palestinian refugees fled in 1948 do not naturalise 
them, and this is considered part of the resistance to Israël. As such, Palestinians are not 
encouraged to integrate with the host society, and various policies are put in place to ensure their 
inferior position as non-citizens109. The Palestinians’ situation is an exception in the urban 
immigrants’ landscape but they are not the only migrants who have come to the city in Lebanon. 
Iraqi, Armenian, Somali, Egyptian, Ethiopian, Sri Lankan and Syrian migrants have also resided 
for protracted periods in the cities in different capacities, with different stories and imprints. 
These diverse waves of immigration add a complex layer to the diverse nature of the city in 
Lebanon and character. In all these cases except for the Armenians110, the migrants have not been 
                                                 
108 Original citation: “Dans des études classiques sur la formation des villes, la sociologie a pu montrer une dimension 
essentielle: la ségrégation et l'agrégation sont les deux faces d’une même réalité.  La mise à distance de l’autre a pour 
contrepartie la recherche de l’“entre-soi” (Avenel, 2005, p. 63) 
109 For example, Palestinians are banned from over 80 job categories (doctors, engineers…). They are not allowed to own 
property, and at different security levels their mobility between the camp and the city is restricted.  
110 Armenian refugees were granted citizenship soon after the proclamation of the Republic in 1924, there is evidence of their 
inclusion in the 1932 census. (Maktabi, 1999) 
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treated as equal dwellers in the cities, and have not been included in the ‘aïsh al moushtarak 
principle. 
The Lebanese society is segmented despite its coexistence. The most recent wave of 
Syrian forced migration is not the only cause that has bearing on the present day urban situation 
and the everyday practices of many neighbourhoods in the cities in Lebanon. The pre-crisis urban 
situation should not be overlooked, and it is indeed the condition that made possible this crisis. 
 
3. Rights of dwellers in cities in Lebanon 
3.1 Insufficient and ineffective urban services are for dwellers in 
Lebanon 
In describing the pre-crisis housing challenges in Lebanon, the World Bank reported two 
main statements: First that “Lebanon has been facing a housing crisis for the past three decades”. 
They note that the majority of the low and middle-income population could not afford adequate 
housing before 2011. There is moreover and “absence of appropriate spatial, regulatory and fiscal 
policies” (Le Borgne, Sayed, Beides, & Arshad, 2013, p. 116). The World Bank also reported that 
“escalating land prices and the absence of affordable housing has led to the development of 
marginalized poverty pockets and informal areas”(Le Borgne et al., 2013, p. 116). These areas 
with poor housing conditions can be found inside and in the peripheries of cities alike, except in 
the areas which were highly developed in the aftermath of the Civil War such as the Beirut 
Central District. When housing is adequate it is not affordable for all city dwellers in Lebanon. It 
accounts for the largest share of spending for households, reaching 45 percent for the lowest 
income groups (as per survey in 2004). This is 15 percent above the international norm of 30 
percent (Fawaz, Saghiyeh, & Nammour, 2014). 
Limited in scope and strategic vision, national planning efforts in Lebanon produce 
inequality. In fact, there are four different government players that have key roles in “urban 
planning”, and those can be supplemented by non-governmental key players including political 
parties and religious institutions. First, the Directorate General of Urban Planning (DGUP) falls 
under the Ministry or Public Works and Transport, and mainly defines urban master plans and 
issues building permits in areas where municipalities are too small or under-resourced. Then there 
is the Higher Council for Urban Planning (HCUP), under the DGUP, that is constituted of 
representatives from several ministries and specialists, with the role of making recommendations 
mainly on large-scale development projects. The third actor is the Council for Development and 
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Reconstruction (CDR), established in 1977 (after the first two years of the Lebanese civil war) to 
oversee reconstruction and rehabilitation. The CDR reports directly to the Council of Ministers. 
The fourth and last governmental player are the municipalities, that implement urban follow up 
on cleanliness and public health issues, water works, public transport. While the four entities do 
have linkages with each other, planning efforts are not clearly defined at the national level. In her 
recently published book, Hiba Bou Akar introduces other key players that have significant 
influence on urban planning. “With unclear state structures and outsourced public processes”, 
she argues, “urban planning [in Beirut] has instead become a contest between religious-political 
organizations and profit-seeking developers. Neighbourhoods reproduce poverty, displacement, 
and urban violence” (Abou Akar, 2018). A study by Public Works Studio found that up to 85 
percent of Lebanese territories are unregulated, neglected and subject to a myriad of  illegal 
decisions, allowing misuse of power by local authorities (Public Works Studio, 2018).  
Discussions about a “comprehensive development plan” began in the mid 1950s 
with the establishment of the Ministry of Planning. However this ministry was closed 
down in 1977 and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) was 
instead established, with the central mission to develop the development plan. It was 
not until half a century later when the plan was developed, and it was reduced to 
one chapter related to the land-use titled “Comprehensive Plan for the Arrangement 
of Lebanese Lands”. Issued in a decree in 2009 and not yet put into practice, it 
remains a mere guideline for individuals. In parallel, the ministries of "Housing and 
Cooperatives" and "Municipal and Rural affairs" were dissolved in 2000 ending as 
such any official talk about the rights to housing and balanced development 
(Basbous, Bekdache, & Saksouk, 2017)  
In fact, the government has not adopted a formal urban policy (Fawaz, 2017b). At 
present adequate housing is not affordable. There is no public transportation. There are few 
green spaces and public spaces, and those are not accessible to all dwellers. The majority of the 
coast in Beirut is privatised (Dictaphone Group, 2013), and there are well over a thousand illegal 
structures on the Lebanese coast (Saidi, 2015). Waste management was privatised between the 
1990s and 2015 and has since been an increasingly urban and environmental crisis (The Daily 
Star, 2018a). Public electricity is largely insufficient (Westall, 2015) with some areas receiving less 
than 12 hours per day. The same goes for water services and there is no clean drinkable water 
available publicly. “[cities] are increasingly segregated, economically exclusive, and marred with 
growing inequalities and environmental degradation.” (Fawaz, 2017b). Privatisation has been an 
easy and profitable solution for politicians. In fact, in 2018 there are no less than six basic urban 
services that are partially or fully privatised in Lebanon, through formal and informal practice. 
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Electricity as mentioned the first example, but also water, waste management, 
telecommunications, civil aviation, and infrastructure development are privatised in full or part as 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) endorsed by the government.  
The Lebanese government created a High Council for privatisation and PPP in 2000, 
overseen by a ministerial committee including the Prime Minister, Minister of Justice, Minister of 
Economy and Trade, Minister of Labour permanently, along with other minister as per project 
needs (HCP, 2018). It is mandated with “initiating, preparing and implementing privatisation 
programs and public private partnership projects”, as well as proposing general privatisation 
policies and subsequently issuing all necessary decisions and recommendations. The council (run 
by a Sunni Muslim) currently oversees the privatisation the telecommunications company 
Organisme de Gestion et d’Exploitation de l’ex Radio Orient (OGERO), and introduces on its website 
“calls for unbundling of generation transmission and distribution activities [of the Electricité du 
Liban (EDL)] through their incorporation into separate companies [...] would be joint stock 
companies governed by the provisions of the Commercial Code” (HCP, 2018).  
The national government has done little to proactively face the urban infrastructure 
problems, and usually lets matters get too complicated before turning to short term, emergency 
solutions. In the case of waste management for example, warning signs had been brought up well 
before, and not only in Beirut. To give but one example, a waste crisis broke out in Sidon, south 
of Beirut in 2011. There, as well, it was lack of political will that delayed dealing with the problem 
until 2015 when the waste crisis became a national one. Speaking of the refugee crisis, a report 
from Heinrich Boëll notes: “Lebanon takes a relaxed approach to problems, either denying they 
exist or playing them down, only to draw up policies once reality hits home and the problem has 
reached crisis point” (Saghieh & Frangieh, 2014). When things get to “crisis” levels before the 
problems go away, it becomes easier for the government to seek the quick fixes which ultimately 
generate more opportunities for shady private entrepreneurial ventures.  
 It is also echoed in the electricity problem. During and in the immediate 
aftermath of the Civil War, dwellers had mostly faced the electricity shortages by securing small 
personal electricity generators. Slowly, private, non regulated111 initiatives of community 
generators started to develop in all the regions. In 2018 these initiatives are organised (though still 
not-regulated) with professional network technicians and even bill collectors who perform door-
to-door collections. In many regions these generators provide more electricity than the 
government. This issue causes regular outcry from dwellers, but little alternatives are possible. In 
                                                 
111 There is no regulation on safety measures, amount of electricity sold or on pricing.  
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the spring of 2018, the government has launched an attempt to regulate the issue, by imposing 
certain safety measures and counters to be placed on all houses being serviced, and by imposing a 
price on each ampere sold.  
3.2 Poor migrants regarded as second class dwellers in Lebanon 
            
 
Figure  3-19: Private security on Beirut streets 
A private security officer asks a Syrian child beggar to get off of the sidewalk in Beirut City Center. 
Photo: Nicolas Bautès, August 2018 
In the city in Lebanon the intruder is tolerated without being accepted, the Other even 
draws hostility. Nationality is one main factor in placing a person on the class spectrum and it 
dictates how that person is seen and treated. The only thing that could trump a person’s 
inferiority-by-nationality is money. A poor person of the wrong nationality is in the most 
vulnerable position. In 2001, renowned Architect and Urbanist Assem Salam said in a round table 
discussion on who controls the country: “the most powerful force controlling Lebanon is 
money” (F. Traboulsi, 2014).  
This hostility towards the other is socially acceptable and there is ample evidence to prove 
it. For instance, at their arrival to the Lebanese International airport, dozens of foreign female 
migrants coming to serve as domestic servants are bundled up in the waiting area. They wait for 
their kafeel (guarantor) to arrive and claim them by receiving their passport directly from the 
security officers. Many of them continue to work in dire conditions and face physical assault, 
rape, 15+ hour working days, no day off etc. In fact in 2008 the Human Rights Watch reported 
that domestic workers die at a rate of more than one per week. (Human Rights Watch, 2008). 
Placing an entire migrant population under kafala is giving monetary value to the movement of 
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this population. It fixes a price on individual liberty. A person under kafala is ipso facto inferior, 
dominated, exploitable and ultimately generates profit for the dominant.   
Another example is how Palestinians, Syrians among other non-Lebanese individuals are 
systematically asked to vacate public gardens because “foreigners are not allowed”. In 2018, a 
Kenyan woman was beaten in public, for no apparent reason than being on the street, for over 
half an hour with little or no help from passers-by. In consequence she was arrested and 
ultimately deported, and her main aggressor sentenced to minimal time in jail. These violations of 
human rights are so common to the extent of mundanity. The issue is more appalling given that 
“Today, according to most estimations, around half of the labour force is non-Lebanese” 
(Longuenesse & Tabar, 2014). 
In Figure  3-19 a security officer is asking a Syrian beggar to move off the sidewalk in the 
Beirut City Center. The Beirut City Center saw tremendous reconstruction after the end of the 
Civil War. An estimated $1.65 billion went into its physical reconstruction, but not a minute 
fraction went into any efforts or “activities that could address cultural and inter-communal 
aspects of post-conflict rehabilitation” (Yassin, 2012). It is an exclusive public space, and security 
officers are authorized to take action in order to protect its privacy - including actions such as the 
one seen in this picture.   
Even though the poor migrant non-Lebanese is almost always considered and placed in 
an inferior position, it must also be noted that the other is not always the foreigner. Religious 
group affiliation, education, second “better” nationality, wealth, and power also affect how 
Lebanese view each other. Dwellers of the city in Lebanon are categorized according to their 
access to urban services.  Because the basic urban services are not available to all dwellers, those 
who access them are superior in the city.  
At this stage of the development, and before addressing more specific issues, background 
information about the two populations seems relevant. I will first give a brief history of the 
Palestinian refugees who have also become hosts for the Syrian refugees since 2011. I will then 
move to the most recent episode of forced migration of Syrians into Lebanon.  
3.3 The Palestinians in Lebanon: both refugees and refugee hosts 
As previously mentioned, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon has had extreme 
significance on both the regional geopolitical position of the country and the local urban fabric. 
Two specific reasons make including Palestinians and the camps they live in an important part of 
this study. First, Palestinians are the largest refugee population to come to Lebanon before the 
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Syrian influx starting 2011 and the experience of Palestinian refuge in Lebanon has directly 
influenced the reaction of the Lebanese individuals and authorities towards the Syrian refugees. 
Second, both Syrian refugees, and Palestinian refugees from Syria have come to the country since 
2011 and have been settling inside the Palestinian camps. This is due to the proximity of the 
camps with the major cities, to the high informality, and affordability, that makes them more 
accessible to refugees.  
Between “April and August 1948 more than 700,000 Palestine refugees [were] displaced 
as a result of the Arab-Israëli War”112. This Nakba (catastrophe) accompanied the independence 
of the state of Israël and the start of a decades-long refugee status for the exiled Palestinians. In 
1950 there were 127,600 UNRWA-registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (Amnesty 
International, 2007). In 2014 those numbered shy of 450,000113, half of whom resided in 12 
official camps (UNRWA, 2018). However, due mainly to migration “unofficial estimates put the 
real number closer to 250,000” (Elsayed-Ali, 2006, p. 14). Today those twelve camps (Figure 
 3-20) are a part of Lebanon’s largely urbanised territories inside the cities, or in direct proximity 
with them. The refugees in these camps are in the unique situation of being camp dwellers, but 
also urban refugees, especially their immediate proximity and social interactions with the host 
society (K. Doraï, 2010).   
 
                                                 
112 According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency .https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are  
113 Due to natural population increase 
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Figure  3-20: Palestinian camps in Lebanon 
The distribution of the Palestinian population in Lebanon and the position of the camps (Verdeil 
et al., 2007) 
In 1948 the Palestinian refugee camps were a collection of tents placed in selected areas 
near urban centers. Eventually those were replaced by concrete houses built by the refugees 
themselves. Growing in population but legally not allowed to grow in area, the camps grew in 
density, and exponentially so since the Syrian refugees started to arrive. In 1995 Rosemary Sayigh 
summed up in simple words the harsh political reality facing the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.  
the Palestinians of Lebanon stand virtually no chance of returning either to their 
places of origin or to the areas that will come under Palestinian control. At the same 
time, opposition to their settlement in Lebanon is one of the few issues that unites 
the Lebanese government and public opinion across most of the sectarian 
communities (Sayigh, 1995, p. 37) 
Simple and condemning, her statement reflects the state of political and social limbo that 
Palestinians in Lebanon face as refugees. The state of limbo is twofold, first with respect to their 
Haq al Awda (right of return) to Palestine, and second with respect to the different views that 
Lebanese communities have of them. On one hand, Palestinian “lack of a stable, overarching 
governing system could only lead to erratic and undisciplined behaviour” (Hudson, 1997, p. 247). 
On the other hand, the Lebanese “divide between Christians and Muslims [...] created a certain 
political schizophrenia, with the Christians generally looking toward the West and the Muslims 
toward the Arab East” (Hudson, 1997, p. 247). These profound and difficult political realities of 
the two nations make a complex matter more complicated, as there is no single opinion of 
Lebanese on Palestinians and no single opinion of Palestinians on the Lebanese. While the vast 
majority of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are those who are in the camps today, there still are 
some Palestinians who had a different experience integrating into Lebanese society. Indeed, non-
registered refugees, especially if they were Christian, received better treatment, and some 3,000 
“mostly wealthy, Christian Palestinians” were given Lebanese citizenship between 1952 and 1958 
(Peretz, 1993, p. 61). 
From the time of their arrival, as was the case in other hosting countries, their right of 
return has been at the centre of all arguments on the quality of their residence. Until today, 
second, third and even fourth generation Palestinians who have been born and raised in the 
country have no claim to citizenship and do not enjoy all the social or urban rights of their 
Lebanese counterparts. Living in cities within cities, they face systemic discrimination (Amnesty 
International, 2007). (1) Their rights to residency, travel, and freedom of movement are 
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contingent on the political atmosphere of the moment, with rules changing sporadically and with 
no room for appeal or reaction. (2) Currently, they are banned from seeking employment in 50 
jobs, trades and independent or private sector professions - and when they do manage to find a 
job and secure legal work permits, they are not eligible for social security benefits. (3) In 2001, the 
Lebanese parliament passed a law to prohibit Palestinians from owning and inheriting property. 
The law not only prevented Palestinians from acquiring property from then on but it also 
prevented them from inheriting real-estate which had been bought previously, increasing their 
spatial confinement to the camps. (4) Their rights to education and to health are severely 
restricted. Palestinians do not have access to state hospitals but have access to health services 
provided by UNRWA. The latter also provides education for the refugees, as the access allowed 
to the Lebanese public school and university system is minimal (J. Suleiman, 2010). 
Furthermore, not all camps are treated equally by the authorities who do not have legal 
jurisdiction inside the camps. Depending on the area where the camp lies and on the political 
atmosphere, different kinds of restrictions are placed. For example, the entrances of the Ein el 
Helwe camp in the South of Lebanon and with the Nahr el Bared camp in the north (which is 
still under reconstruction further to its complete destruction in 2008) are strictly controlled by the 
Lebanese army. The Bourj el-Barajneh and Shatila camps, which are under the control of the 
UNRWA and different Palestinian factions, in Beirut have, at the time of writing, less strict 
checkpoints at their entrances (Figure  3-21: Entrance to the Bourj el-Barajneh camp 
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Figure  3-21: Entrance to the Bourj el-Barajneh camp 
Main entrance to Bourj el-Barajneh camp from the highway looking into the camp (above), and 
from the camp looking to the outside (below), Lebanese army checkpoint visible (below), 
February 2018 
 
The role that Palestinian refugees have played in the recent history of Lebanon was not 
insignificant. The mere spatial existence of the camps has had a major imprint on the cities. In 
fact, those camps are neither traditional in the sense where they are completely independent of 
the city nor are they an integral part of it. They are spaces of exception in which different actors 
have experimented for decades (Sari Hanafi, 2008). While the Palestinian refugees are socially 
excluded in Lebanon, the camps have “become parts of urban areas, as is the case for many 
Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle East” (K. Doraï, 2010, p. 5). The Palestinian refugee 
camps in Lebanon are spaces of extreme precarity and vulnerability. This is due to several factors 
at the base of which lie two grim realities. First the social exclusion of the refugees and the 
“mechanisms that cement their persistent poverty” (S. Hanafi, Chaaban, & Seyfert, 2012), and 
second the successive waves of violence or “ruptures” as Doraï puts it, that have continued to 
add layers of precarity. These include 
the exile comes out following the exodus of 1948 and with the stabilization of the 
Palestinian population in camps and informal gatherings in Lebanon. The second 
rupture was the Israeli invasion of 1982, which destroyed the main part of the 
Palestinian infrastructure and generated a large emigration movement both internal 
and international. The third rupture arose following the Oslo Agreements in 1993114, 
                                                 
114 See Damen, R. (2013). The Price of Oslo. Al Jazeera. “The Oslo Accords marked the first time Israel and the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) formally recognised one another. Many at that time believed this was a step in the right 
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which shifted the focus of the PLO to the Palestinian territories and led to the 
increasing marginalization of the refugees in the Diaspora (M. K. Doraï, 2010, p. 6)   
In political terms, the camps are not independent of Lebanese games of power nor are 
they an integral part of it. They are self-managed and have a follow distinct political order, and at 
the same time, they are confined in their political sphere while affecting the larger Lebanese 
political space. Most significantly it was the presence of the PLO and other armed factions inside 
the camps and their implication in the Lebanese Civil War that has had repercussions for the 
place of Palestinian refugees in the Lebanese urban and political fabric today. The Civil War was 
complicated by the implication of regional powers including Syria, Israël and the PLO from 
inside Lebanon. In what follows I will not go into the details of a fifteen year long, violent and 
politically complex Civil War, but I will briefly list the elements significant to the present situation 
in the cities in Lebanon and this dissertation.  
Two marking regional events in the timeline of their presence in Lebanon and after their 
initial exile in 1948 were the Six-day War115  between the Arabs and Israël and Black September. 
The 1967 war, also known as the Six-day War tarnished Arab political leaders with humiliating 
defeat and radically changed regional politics in Arab world. In its immediate aftermath came a 
second wave of Palestinian refugees to Lebanon, and calls for armed struggle against Israël by the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation, based primarily in Jordan at the time. After September 1970, 
dubbed Black September, which saw violent clashes between the PLO and the Jordanian 
government116, the leader Yasser Arafat was forced to move his operations from Jordan to 
Lebanon. The south of Lebanon became ipso facto the place from which armed resistance 
against Israël was based. The Palestinian refugee camps, under the authority of the PLO and not 
the Lebanese government, became ipso facto places of armed resistance, especially in the south 
of Lebanon.  
By 1975 popular opinion was divided in support of two main coalitions. On one side 
there were the supporters of the Lebanese National Movement who advocated solidarity with the 
Palestinians and the PLO among other political objectives such as the elimination of political and 
administrative divisions according to religious groups (Khalidi, 1983). Those opposed, on the 
other side, the Lebanese Forces, the right Christian (mainly Maronite) groups that were in control 
                                                                                                                                                        
direction. But what followed over the next 20 years of negotiations reveals that Israel merely used the agreements to justify 
the further expansion of illegal settlements in the territories it occupied in 1967” (Damen, 2013) 
115 Analysing the war over five decades later, Dimitrios Macharias writes: “It undoubtedly brought significant change in the 
strategic outlook of the region—and especially Israël’s security situation, eliminating threats and creating new ones—as well 
as within the Israëli and Arab societies, fomenting fundamentalism and extremism. It was a decisive moment which, in 
hindsight, seemingly determined, to a certain extent, the long-term winners of the power struggle in the region, both on the 
local and international level, establishing Israël and the US as the primary arbiters of its fate (Machairas, 2017 p. 7). 
116 In 1970, the PLO was planning to operate its armed resistance efforts against Israël from Jordan.   
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of the country as per the existing (since the end of French colonial rule) confessional system of 
government and that opposed any reforms that would benefit the Muslims. Tensions rose to high 
levels and culminated in the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War after a series of violent clashes 
and massacres that occurred on April 13, 1975, namely the Bus Massacre in Ain el Remmeneh, 
when 28 civilian Palestinians were massacred by Phalangists117.  
Seven years into the war, in 1982, Israël launched a wide invasion of Lebanon to 
dismantle the PLO’s military arm. The latter were concentrated in the Palestinian refugee camps 
in Beirut. This brought both physical and moral devastation and increased tensions as it was 
accompanied by massacres, most notably the Sabra and Chatila camp massacre.  
Among other events that have deeply affected the refugees were the 1982 expulsion 
of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from the country118, which was 
quickly followed by a massacre of Palestinian refugees, as well as Lebanese 
residents, in the Sabra and Chatila camps, and the 1984 “war of the camps” in which 
hundreds of Palestinians were killed and thousands faced starvation. In addition, the 
Gulf War of 1990 slashed remittances sent home to their families by Palestinians 
working in the Gulf states. Attacks by Israëli forces during the July-August 2006 
conflict with Hezbollah destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure and economy, 
and littered with cluster bombs, land on which some Palestinians had worked. 
(Amnesty International, 2007) 
The issue of Palestinian refugees has driven public debate for decades, as will the issue of 
the Syrian refugees for decades to come. Politically elaborate conspiracy theories arise regularly, 
and fears of tawteen (nationalising) are always in the forefront, with the demographic balance 
always at heart. Being predominantly Sunni Muslims, hypothetically naturalising hundreds of 
thousands of Palestinians would tip the demographic balance to the side of the Sunnis over the 
Shiites, and make the Christians more of a minority than they already are. Further to my 
interviews, even the Sunni Muslims in Lebanon are not prone to the idea of nationalising the 
Palestinian, or the Syrian refugees. The initial and continuing Lebanese government’s stance 
against building official refugee camps for the Syrian refugees ties directly to the Lebanese 
experience with Palestinian refugees. Similarly, the initial and continuing fears that the Lebanese 
express in relation to the Syrian refugees tie directly to the experiences surrounding the presence 
                                                 
117 Phalangist ideology focuses on the primacy of preserving the Lebanese nation, but with a "Phoenician" identity, distinct 
from its Arab, Muslim neighbours. Party policies have been uniformly anti-communist and anti-Palestinian and have allowed 
no place for pan-Arab ideals.(Abu Khalil, 2018).  
The party borrowed its name from the Spanish Falangist party created in 1933, a fascist party that adopted the following 
principles among others: the abolition of political parties, the establishment of a nationalist dictatorship led by the party, the 
use of violence in regenerating Spain, the development of Spanish imperial power, the recognition and support of 
Catholicism as the official religion of Spain but rejection of any clerical influence in government 
118 As an immediate consequence of the 1982 Israëli invasion of Lebanon 
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of Palestinian refugees. 
They are swallowing our country. Soon, there won’t be much room for us here,” said 
George while sipping a quick espresso in a nice coffee shop in Saifi, near the port of 
Beirut, as he rushes to make another delivery for his small business. “It is a 
conspiracy I tell you, to have us Lebanese leave town so they can settle the 
refugees.” “Like in 1982, remember?” added an older man. “They tried settling the 
Palestinians then. But we aren’t going anywhere. This ship is not sailing. Lebanon is 
our homeland.” Jamal, who needs a quick bite before he goes back to his family so 
his son Tony, ‘can take the boat out one last time in this beautiful November 
weather’, chimed in: “You might not have much of a homeland soon. The ship is 
sinking; can’t you see? The president said so himself: Our very existence is at 
stake.“ Back in September, Lebanon’s president Michel Suleiman spoke of the crisis 
in his country, addressing the United Nations General Assembly in New York, and 
said it had an “existential dimension (Katkhouda, 2013, p. 47). 
Third and fourth generation Palestinian refugees still reside in Lebanon’s camps. 
Although marginalised and discriminated against, Lebanon is the only country they know. The 
camps are their only homeland. Indeed, when young Palestinian refugees are asked where they 
are from the answer is usually the name of the camp where they reside. It is neither Palestine nor 
Lebanon (Haddad, 2018). They are literally “cut off from Palestine and squeezed in Lebanon” 
(Haddad, 2018) and many aspire to emigrate. 
Since 2011, Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon host both Syrian refugees and 
Palestinian refugees from Syria in the official camps, in addition to the resident Palestinian 
refugees. At the end of 2015, the UNRWA estimated that “half of the more than 42,000 Palestine 
refugees from Syria present in Lebanon were living in one of the 12 recognized Palestine refugee 
camps in Lebanon, with the other half living outside of camps” (UNHCR, 2016, p. 12). Those 
make up less than 4 percent of the total population in the camps. Since the influx of Syrian 
refugees into Lebanon, the camps have generally doubled in population. UN reports place the 
percentages of the three groups of refugees across the camps in Lebanon as such: Syrian refugees 
at 47.9 percent of the total population inside the camp), Palestinian refugees from Syria at 3.7 
percent and Palestine refugees at 44.8 percent (OCHA, 2018, p. 3).  
Conclusion to Part 1  
The French channel M6 aired a documentary on Lebanon in November 2018 within its 
famed Enquête Exclusive. In it, the mayor of Ḥadath recounted the story of an outdoor 
vegetable stall that was “returned” to a Lebanese manager after being “taken back” from a Syrian 
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family that had been running it. No details were given as to how the venture was started or by 
whom, nor as to who owned the business or the land, and the process by which it was taken 
over. The new Lebanese owner expressed her happiness and gratitude to have this opportunity 
because according to him, “the Syrians took whatever they could from Lebanon and sent 
everything back to Syria”. The camera then moved to film a young boy, not older than ten119, 
working at the stall who turns out to be Syrian. When asked about the boy, his laborious tasks, 
and his obvious absence from school the manager said: “it’s not my problem, it’s his country that 
should look after him… I don’t know” (de La Villardière, 2018).  
It is a simple example that reflects a difficult reality: the manager believes the space and 
the opportunity were rightly returned to her, as a more deserving dweller than the Syrian. At the 
same time, she hires a Syrian boy instead of a Lebanese (boy or worker) - this time not minding 
the former’s less deserving status, as it is almost surely more profitable to her business. By doing 
so, she placed her business profit ahead of the question of nationality, in stark contradiction to 
her initial argument. She also facilitated his (and his family’s) dwelling in Lebanon albeit in 
precarious conditions. The Syrian in this example was not tolerated as a profit making 
entrepreneur, and returned to his tolerated place as the informal employee, at risk of exploitation 
on the whim of his employer. It is these gaps that Syrians and poor migrants fill in Lebanon; the 
gaps that lie within the inconsistencies in how the Lebanese hosts deal with the Syrian refugees 
and that are emulated across regions and socio-political classes. Inconsistencies are in turn 
sustained by a lack of formal, national governance of migration in the country. These 
inconsistencies have allowed for a space in which this sort of illegal and informal work 
contributes to the economy. The same inconsistencies can also be observed in other areas. For 
instance in the housing trends of Syrians in the cities, Lebanese landlords actually prefer to rent 
out to Syrians because it is more profitable and controllable, and at the same time complain about 
their tenants habits such as cooking smells, clothing styles etc. 
In the first two chapters, I have provided the reader with some elements of context that 
in different ways affect the presence of Syrians in Lebanon since 2011. Surely, the polemic of 
identity amongst Lebanese communities and religious groups in relation to their past has pre-
conditioned the spaces in the cities to be tense. The nature of the fragmented cities and diversity 
of Lebanese religious communities that coexist in them lays the grounds for complex relations 
with the unwanted “other”, and especially an “other” refugee who is reminiscent of the 
Palestinian refugee.  
                                                 
119 The minimum working age in Lebanon according to the ILO Convention 138, ratified in June 2003, is fourteen.  
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The history of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is long and bloody, and has become an 
ideal type phenomenon, as Max Weber describes it, in hosting refugees for the Lebanese. 
Regardless of the sequence of events and politics that led up to the Lebanese Civil War of 1975, 
Palestinian armed factions played a major role in it. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon became the 
representatives of that role - and paid a high price for it. Invited by Lebanese leaders at the time 
to support against the Palestinian arms, the Syrian military overstayed its welcome and occupied 
Lebanon for the next three decades. The poorly simplified version of this correlation is vivid for 
many Lebanese groups: the Palestinians caused the war and the Syrian occupation that followed. 
The version does not consider the pre-existing identity tensions within the Lebanese 
communities and the profound differences in the way the different religious groups understand 
their country and its future. The socio-spatial inequalities here deviate somewhat from the 
explanatory model of the right to the city that highlights solely class inequalities in accessing the 
latter, without necessarily taking into consideration national identity. The dissymmetry between 
the Lebanese and the Syrians is due to the geopolitical context since 1920 and the situation of 
refugees is due to the questionable nationalism.  
Each of these groups, the Syrian migrants, the Syrian army, the Palestinian factions and 
the Palestinian refugees have left their mark on the cities in Lebanon over the last decades. The 
arrival of the Syrian refugees in 2011 should rather be seen as a continuity of the Syrian presence 
in the country120, even though perceived differently throughout the years due to the role that 
Syria played in the Civil War. Their current large number weighed heavily on the fragile political 
and urban fabric. The cities in Lebanon today are home to many different groups of dwellers, but 
some dwellers are more equal than others121, so to speak.    
The Lebanese government is found wanting: its different bodies lack the capacity for 
regulation and are laden with strong corruptive relations that obstruct any authority, be it at the 
central government level or at local authorities level to offer a secure environment or basic urban 
infrastructure to city dwellers. The only official position during seven years of crisis has been the 
decision to regulate the residency of Syrian refugees. It did this by prohibiting the UNHCR from 
registering any more refugees in 2015122, and the enforcement of the kafala system - which was 
                                                 
120 See Part 3 Chapter 1: “Who is a refugee” for details on the quality of Syrians in Lebanon and their changing urban labels 
and status.  
121 The phrase “some are more equal than others” originates from George Orwell’s 1945 Animal farm : a fairy-tale story. The 
original extended sentence is: “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others”. In the book it appears 
as one of two commandments proclaimed by the ruling pigs of a farm. With it, the author points out the hypocrisy of 
governments that claim equality but actually centralize power with an elite few.   
122 On their data portal, the UNHCR note: “As of 6 May 2015, UNHCR Lebanon has temporarily suspended new registration 
as per Government of Lebanon's instructions. Accordingly, individuals awaiting to be registered are no longer included.” 
(UNHCR, 2018) 
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ultimately deemed illegal as a regulation in 2018 (Saghieh & Frangieh, 2018). Unable or unwilling 
to take a stance vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict, and haunted by the experience of the Palestinian 
refugee camps, the Lebanese government left it up to international organisations and the civil 
society in Lebanon to deal with the influx as best they could - coordinating with the only 
Lebanese authorities they could: the terribly understaffed and under-resourced local 
municipalities. With no national strategy or action plan, individual reactions to the influx began to 
arise. That, along with the reality of a fragmented city created legal, social and most importantly 
urban gaps in which the Syrian refugees could pretend to slide into to access the city and its 
resources. In the example in this conclusion, the Syrian boy and his family have been able to 
penetrate the interstices created by the need for cheap, precarious service. Such a condition gave 
them hope of relative anonymity, economic stability and opportunity, while it ultimately created 
space for increased exploitation. Similartly to what Rosemary Sayigh wrote of the Palestinian 
refugees as quoted earlier in this part, opposition to the settlement of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 
is one of the few issues that unites the Lebanese government and public opinion across most of 
the religious groups.  
Largely supported by political and religious leader discourse, the Syrian refugees have 
become the scapegoats for the causes of all Lebanese national and local troubles (Ayoub, 2017). 
Their presence invokes multiple hostilities and obliges the Lebanese to face their particularly 
painful past (Mink & Neumayer, 2007) 
  
  121 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 2: Dissertation approach: 
Posing an analytical framework 
in a fast-changing field 
 
 
  
  122 
 
 
 
 
 
Never let yourself be diverted either by what you wish to believe or by what you 
think could have beneficent social effects if it were believed. Look only and surely 
at ‘what are the facts’. (Bertrand Russell - Face to Face Interview, BBC, 1959) 
 
Introduction to Part 2   
After posing the context of the cities in Lebanon before the influx of Syrian refugees in 
2011 this part lays out the analytical framework, the methodology and tools utilised, then presents 
and justifies the selected case studies. After discussing the hypothetical questions and 
interrogations about the situation, and in a somewhat linear fashion, several elements that forged 
the field investigation mechanisms are laid out. Examples of these elements encompass the type 
or urban interaction that was observed, choosing to include a refugee camp among the case 
studies, and looking at the refugee situation as a continuation of a migration history rather than 
an event in itself.  It goes on to enumerate three events that took place between 2014 and 2015 
that had significant effects on the situation as a whole and consequently the field research.  
Chapter three places a special emphasis on the position of the researcher with respect to 
the study and the pre-existing relation between the researcher and field. This to “[render 
objective] the subjective relation to the object which, far from leading to a relativistic and more-
or-less anti scientific subjectivism, is one of the conditions of genuine scientific objectivity” 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 282). From here, the chapter focuses on the three lenses used in 
the analysis of this work, then details the methodological tools used in data collection and the 
categories of actors approached.  
Chapter four is mostly dedicated to the three case study neighbourhoods. It presents an 
overview of the geographic uniqueness of each one of them, followed by its main socio political 
characteristics. The chapter ends on a section on informal settlements, reasoning being that  
while this study looks exclusively at the situation of the urban refugees, it was important to point 
out some details on the settlements and their specificity, and to clearly differentiate the 
experiences in them from those of the urban refugees.  
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1. Preparing for fieldwork : some preliminary thoughts 
When starting out this research, I described my work as the “study of the resilience and 
resistance of Syrian refugees in cities in Lebanon”. I wanted to know how the refugees were 
facing their exile, and to understand their challenges. The line of thought changed with time as I 
looked more into the role of the refugees in the cities rather than solely their reactions to it. The 
accounts I documented in the field were often those of sadness, frustration, distress, violence, 
and fear - from most of the dwellers I interacted with. In what is developing into one of the more 
complicated and protracted situations of forced displacement, notably due to its close articulation 
with complex and multiscale political games, I seek to understand the urban experiences of 
Syrians’ settlement in three neighbourhoods in city peripheries in Lebanon, and the role that the 
history of the peoples cohabiting them plays in forming those experiences. I see this study as a 
way of addressing and drawing from the “urban experiences” of the refugees in Lebanon. As I 
advanced in my investigations, I understood that the lens was too restrictive. While refugees 
would share with me their struggles to secure residency and how they would devise certain 
mechanisms to face government restrictions on their residency, it was essential to also understand 
how, by whom, and why the restrictions on residency were introduced, in their specific spatiality 
and temporality, in the first place. This necessitated understanding the functioning of the 
government and local authorities from a national policy lens or rather the politics behind their 
action, or inaction. While some researchers have suggested that “‘doing nothing’ is at heart a 
political activity and it should be examined as such” (McConnell & t’ Hart, 2014, p. 12), the non-
policy in the case of the Lebanese government vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis has been described as 
“disastrous” (El Mufti, 2014). It has “played a major role in structuring the responses that did 
emerge, both “below” and “above” the state, that is namely by local authorities and international 
agencies” (Mourad, 2017, p. 49) and “[enabled] the emergence of alternative actors, whose 
actions were ultimately bounded and structured by the context created by these inactions” 
(Mourad, 2017, p. 55). To understand how it was possible for Lebanese authorities and citizens to 
host a refugee population equal to a quarter of its own, for better or for worse, I needed to use 
geopolitical, sociological and spatial lenses.   
With time, I began to describe my work as rather the “study of inequalities and power 
struggles in the cities in Lebanon in light of the presence of the large number of Syrian refugees”. 
The city, the urban dimension, is the entry point for this study. I would begin by observing the 
material urban processes in order to analyse the way the society was being constantly reshaped. 
Still, it was lacking I could not observe the Syrian refugees’ from an urban perspective without 
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considering first the socio-urban context in which they arrived. Furthermore the historical 
geopolitical context in Lebanon, a young and weak nation-state, presents implications on the 
urban experience of dwellers - how do they make the cities they are in? (Fawaz et al., 2018). From 
within the very difficult conditions of residency at a legal and economic level, the refugees live, 
work and interact in the city and consequently become part of its making. It fuels the constant 
need of the different communities to negotiate their place, and it brings to the forefront another 
urban reality that is not secondary: the continuous presence of the other poor migrants in the city 
in Lebanon.  
The more I observed, the more I understood that the situation in the city in Lebanon 
today cannot be analysed solely from the point of view of the refugees nor solely from the point 
of view of the hosts, it is the analogies and differences between the two viewpoints that matter. 
No single lens or point of view suffices to study the societal change in cities in Lebanon today; it 
can only be observed as a continuum and as a combination of factors that are perceptible in the 
urban experience. Indeed, the present situation in the city in Lebanon is not one where over a 
million refugees have settled and are changing the society. Rather, it is the latest phase of a 
continuing socio-urban crisis, particularly observed at the local scale, but underlined by profound 
national and regional political intricacies, that affects the micro scale urban experiences of 
dwellers.  
I used three lenses to approach the subject. Social geography, geopolitics on the regional 
and local levels and finally the urban lens for the micro perspective, where the negotiation over 
space is most visible. It is only by superimposing these three viewpoints and highlighting their 
simultaneous effects that a comprehensive idea of the reality in cities in Lebanon today can be 
formed.  
Geopoliticians have underlined the strong relation between international geopolitics and 
the local geopolitics, stressing for example that “most often, there is no “barrier” or “separation” 
between international geopolitical realities and the internal realities of states. What we observe is 
“permeability,” interweaving, and multiple and often decisive interactions.” (Subra, 2012, p. 48). 
Subra argues that geopolitical conflict has “as such become a fundamentally multidisciplinary 
research object”, while specifying that geopolitics does not only refer to the international conflict, 
it is also concerned with power struggles on the local territorial level. He proposes that 
geopolitics is the  “study [of] power rivalries over territory [that] concern local issues (planning, 
local political power, environmental protection, immigration issues, the suburban segregation and 
relations between ethnic communities) and mainly mobilize local actors” (Subra, 2012, p. 53). 
This is largely in line with Yves Lacoste’s view of the internal geopolitics and the discipline. 
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Béatrice Giblin defines it as “the study of territorial rivalries between various political forces 
within the same state” (Giblin, 2012, p. 1)123, that she started to study by looking into the 
geography of elections in France, specifically the territorial strategies used by political parties to 
maintain control over certain areas (Giblin, 2012, p. 2).  
In fact, geographic territory is essential in geopolitics. However, this refers not only 
to territory as such, with its surface area, topography, and resources, but also the 
men and women who live there and the authorities they accept and those they fight 
against because of the historical narratives they rightly or wrongly tell themselves 
and the fears and representations they have of their distant or recent past and their 
distant or near future (Lacoste, 2012, p. 15). 
Such a vision is useful for approaching the case of cities in Lebanon in which all the 
issues mentioned are relevant. I add to those the historical dimension and the national identity 
weaknesses that exacerbate local rivalries between populations in the cities in Lebanon. This 
study could not move forward without reflections on identity and belonging. These abstract but 
engulfing terms underlie the very definition of the word Lebanese and in relation to it: the other. 
The relations between this Lebanese and the other affect the presence, the conditions of 
settlement of Syrians in cities in Lebanon, as well as the ways they access economic, social, or 
urban resources.  
The social geography lens serves as the compass of this study and centers on questions 
about the right to the city that “can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to 
urban life” (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 158). Most significantly as Peter Marcuse puts it: “whose right(s)? 
In what city?”  
Lefebvre’s right is both a cry and a demand, a cry out of necessity and a demand for 
something more. Those are two separate things. I would reformulate them to be an 
exigent demand by those deprived of basic material and legal rights, and an 
aspiration for the future by those discontented with life as they see it around them 
and perceived as limiting their potentials for growth and creativity (Marcuse, 2012, p. 
37) 
Indeed recurring, the question of who has a claim to social justice in the city in Lebanon. 
especially since 2011. is not easily answered. On the one hand, economically vulnerable Lebanese 
populations have been the most affected by the massive influx of Syrian refugees, who mostly 
arrived economically, but also socially and politically vulnerable, and were made legally vulnerable 
in 2015. Palestinian populations in Lebanon since the mid 1950s are also economically, 
                                                 
123 Original extended citation: La géopolitique interne signifie donc l’étude des rivalités sur du territoire entre diverses forces 
politiques à l’intérieur d’un même État. 
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socially,politically, and legally vulnerable and have also been faced with the new influx of 
refugees. If the right to the city is both a “cry and a demand”, then the demand comes from 
“those directly in want, directly oppressed, those for whom even their most immediate needs are 
not fulfilled: the homeless, the hungry, the imprisoned, the persecuted on gender, religious, racial 
grounds” (Marcuse, 2012, p. 37). In the case of the city in Lebanon, must one find the most 
oppressed? the most persecuted? should their nationality matter? what does the virtue of their 
birth and life in Lebanon count for?  
Social geography at the center 
The seminal work Géographie Sociale - that established the fundamentals of social 
geography in France in 1984 - detailed four explanatory factors of this approach of the discipline 
(Frémont, Hérin, Renard, & Chevalier, 1984). Those are the effects of place, class, culture, and 
mobility, that “exist in constant interference and in permanent inter and retroaction, that 
structure the different societies”124 (Frémont et al., 1984, p. 246). This dissertation follows these 
orientations closely in considering each of these factors throughout the analysis, and in its ethos 
is the “analysis of social relations within spatial systems” (Frémont et al., 1984, p. 379). The study 
of power-relations is thoroughly investigated in social geography that provided the intellectual 
cadre for this dissertation. Whether it be the geography of inequalities as practiced by Robert 
Hérin, the studies on segregation developed, for example, by Pétros Pétsimeris (Petsiméris, 1995), 
or the studies on places by Guy Di Méo (1998), among others, these founding texts have 
structured the approach today. Yves Lacoste’s writings in political geography (related closely to 
social geography), and in extension the journal Hérodote that he spearheads, are also foundations 
for this dissertation.   
What drew me to the field of social geography in the urban space is how questions can be 
studied by looking at the spatial dimension of social relations and social classes at different scales 
and temporalities, to bring the theme of inequality to the forefront. How are inequalities 
distributed and visible in the cities, and what are the processes that feed the continuous increase 
of these inequalities? 
 Furthermore, what rights for the dwellers? Do they go beyond the urban 
“necessities for a decent life” which would include access to decent housing, water, electricity etc. 
or should they be the “right[s] in a political sense [...] The right to the city, not rights to the city… a 
right to social justice, which includes but far exceeds the right to individual justice” (Marcuse, 
                                                 
124 Extended original citation: “Ainsi quatre types d’effets, jouant en constante interférence et en inter et rétroaction 
permanente, structurent les différentes sociétés”. 
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2012, p. 40 stresses by author). In Lebanon in 2018 the demand for the right to the city remains 
elusive. It is the urban rights, those rights necessary for a decent life, that are the revealing 
element for all the other challenges. My observation started here, with the continuing 
negotiations over space at the urban level between dwellers in cities in Lebanon, greatly and 
quickly exaggerated following the arrival of the Syrian refugees. Those are causes and effects at 
the same time. Caused by the larger geopolitical factors and affecting social and geopolitical 
rivalries, in a closed circuit. 
From social geography I also observed the social segregation that “seems to shape the 
city or at least to impregnate many of its localities” (Netto, 2018, p. 17). Restrictions on contact 
are enforced both formally and informally in the cities in Lebanon, and not only between the 
Lebanese and the Others. Rather, restrictions on contact span widely and profoundly between 
the communities. Social restrictions on contact start with family and culturally imposed female-
male relations, community imposed Christian-Muslim relations, Shiite-Sunnite relations, 
Maronite-Druze relations etc. but also between the Lebanese and other nationalities, and between 
social classes amongst the Lebanese and between the religious communities. If “all restrictions on 
interaction, whether they involve physical space or not, are forms of segregation - in social space” 
(Linton Freeman quoted in (Netto, 2018, p. 22), then segregation in Lebanon indeed has specific 
spatial expressions.  
The restriction of social contact and mobility of a certain community cohabiting a space 
minimises the possibilities of encounters, defined as “being co-present [in a space] within a 
distance where focused interaction become possible through facial engagement, gesture and 
verbal communication” (Netto, 2018, p. 38). Less possibilities for encounters leave spatially co-
present communities exposed to rejection and fear of the other, for lack of opportunities of pure 
encounters. These encounters are conditioned by “mobility and income”, that both affect the 
possibility of the spontaneous creation of “urban nodalities” as Edward Soja refers to them, or 
spaces of social life. In a quantitative study on the interplay of forms of mobility and of 
segregation, Netto found that “different levels of mobility lead to distinct networks of movement 
in urban space, which imply different encounter opportunities, homophilic personal networks 
and consequently segregated class networks” (Netto, 2018, p. 41). Indeed in Lebanon the 
different access of different dweller communities to mobility and income, dictated by the dire 
economic situation in the country as well as the legally imposed policies have made the possibility 
of encounter minimal, increasing the potential for segregation. 
The presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is the most recent phase in their long 
history of migration in Lebanon and not as a new, unique phenomenon. The urban dynamics of 
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cities in Lebanon, by virtue of their divisions and political instability have allowed the 
phenomenon of the urban settlement of Syrian refugees making up almost a quarter of the 
population. In turn this important presence has affected the socio-urban fabric of the cities. In 
order to characterise the various dimensions of this process, I will address it on three scales: (1) 
on the urban micro level I ask how it has been received by the host communities and how this is 
reflected in the city, (2) on the national scale I reflect on the weight of the changing stances of the 
Lebanese authorities on the issue, and (3) on a regional scale I look at the history of the migration 
of Syrians in Lebanon.  
 1.1 Analytical framework and hypotheses 
In fact, this work of categorization, i.e., of making-explicit and of classification, is 
performed incessantly, at every moment of ordinary existence, in the struggles in 
which agents clash over the meaning of the social world and of their position within 
it, the meaning of their social identity, through all the forms of benediction or 
malediction, eulogy, praise, congratulations, compliments, or insults, reproaches, 
criticisms, accusations, slanders, etc. (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 729).  
 
My observations focus on the continuous redistribution and negotiation over space due to the 
restructuring of social relations generated by the mass influx of Syrian refugees. Urban space and 
access to urban resources which I join Rafael Soares Gonçalves in defining as “those available in 
the city and that dwellers specifically need to live in the city” (Gonçalves, 2017, p. 1), are 
bargaining tools for both communities (Michel & Ribardière, 2017). Each group is in continuous 
negotiations over its share, presence and legitimacy in the public space, and, as in other contexts, 
in cities of Lebanon, “collective urban services, such as water, electricity,  public transportation 
are being treated more like products than rights for dwellers125” (Gonçalves, 2017, p. 1). “Who” is 
authorised to use a public park and “when” are daily negotiations. In this sense, the spatial 
presence of refugees is often perceived as a threat by host communities, in that - according to 
them - it affects their opportunities in securing a social and spatial place for themselves. In 
Lebanon the urban restrictions (mobility, legal residence, etc.) placed on the Syrian refugees play 
a role in how that community is producing public space. “Refugees nonetheless demonstrate 
political agency by claiming visibility and affirming their right to mobility despite restrictive 
conditions… or again by consolidating their individual and collective presence [...]” (Fawaz et al., 
2018, p. 7). What follows are reflections on the different aspects and questions used to tackle the 
                                                 
125 Original citation: “Les services collectifs, tels que l'eau, l'électricité, les transports sont de plus en plus entendus comme 
des produits de marché plutôt que comme des droits des citadins”.  
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subject. 
On urban interactions 
When I started this research in 2014 the number of Syrian refugees had already reached 
the hundreds of thousands. Two images have remained with me from that time. The first is a 
graffiti calling for the Syrians to leave, widely shared on social media, and second a photograph of 
activists attaching a banner from a bridge over the highway, welcoming refugees and apologising 
for the racism of their countrymen (Figure  4-1) As the months passed the protracted nature of 
the refugee crisis became clearer and everyone started settling into the new reality. The voices of 
those who oppose grew louder as the new political card, the refugees, was played by politicians 
and the media. Four years later, these two opposing reactions still manifest in the cities in 
Lebanon. There are still those who support the stay of Syrian refugees and they are still 
expressing themselves in the same ways. Those who oppose though have become louder and are 
today calling for refoulement.  
 
 
Figure  4-1: Visual expressions towards the refugees 
(left) A banner welcoming refugees reads “Welcome to Syrian workers and refugees in Lebanon, 
sorry for what the racists among us are doing”. (right) A hostile graffiti initially reads “To every 
lousy Syrian: leave” and is modified to read “To every lousy racist: leave”. . Date: 2014  Source: 
($%&'()*ا ,-./ 01%ر.34* $56ا7*ا $458*ا, 2014) 
 
Restrictive practices in the public sphere, curfews and other restrictions by local 
authorities, shortages in urban services such as electricity, water and heavy traffic constitute an 
urban geography viewpoint which has been revelatory of the magnitude of the refugee crisis in 
Lebanon, and to the ways institutions and civil society are responding to it. The Lebanese and 
Syrians specifically in poor or vulnerable areas are forced to co-live to the detriment of both 
communities. Both are struggling to make ends meet, and continuous power struggles with a few 
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instances of solidarity, are apparent in their social spaces. I argue that by analyzing these practices 
and mundane rhythms on the local and urban scales we can draw on how subtle societal changes 
have been incurred by the relatively sudden and significant increase in population. Cities in 
Lebanon have, and continue to be modified due to the refugee crisis. The analysis of the spatially 
and temporally localised situations of domination, conflict and tension; but also of support and 
resilience; adds elements of understanding that are revelatory of social change.  
In their efforts to find normalcy in a complex situation both Lebanese and Syrians have 
had to apply different coping mechanisms - mostly negative. Interdependent to a certain extent, 
the power struggles between the communities seems exposed and implicit at the same time. 
Socially dominant, the Lebanese tend to exploit the Syrian refugee presence and show a 
paradoxical hostility towards it at the same time. On the other hand, the Syrians depend on the 
Lebanese for residency and livelihood while they limit their interactions with them as much as 
possible. The space where the communities co-live is therefore in continuous tension and 
negotiation, the specificities of which constitute an important aspect of this dissertation. 
On including a camp in the study   
The situation of the refugees who have resided in the Palestinian refugee camps is 
different due to the urban status of the camp itself, and due to the nature of their refuge. While 
there are refugees of sole Syrian nationality who sought refuge in the Palestinian camps in 
Lebanon, the majority are Palestinian Refugees from Syria. It is reported that around 12 percent 
of the Palestinian refugees who resided in Syria sought refuge outside the country since 2011, and 
50,000126 of those came to Lebanon (Doraï, 2016, p. 155), the country known to be the “least 
hospitable to Palestine refugees” and which “prevented [the Palestinian refugees] from being 
absorbed” (Peretz, 1993, p. 61). This is due to the various historic and political factors governing 
the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon as discussed in Chapter 2 section 3.1 of this work. While 
one reason behind the choice of the Palestinian camps over the city can be related to the fact that 
the camps offer some of the most affordable and least formal settings for refugees, the 
“dynamics of high mobility processes involving cross-border migration and the existence of well-
established transnational networks” (Doraï, 2016, p. 154) play a major role in the selection of the 
camps - in the least - as the first place of settlement for urban refugees. The camps are internally 
auto-governed by Palestinians127 and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees (UNRWA), but any social or urban relation with the outside (Lebanese territory) lies 
                                                 
126 “these figures should be viewed with caution as they do not come from a specific census of Palestinian Syrian refugees” 
(Doraï, 2016 p. 159) 
127 Palestinian factions mainly govern the camps 
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under Lebanese jurisdiction. The camps were sites for violent clashes during the Civil War (1975-
1990). The PLOs armed resistance had been expelled from Jordan in the early 1970s, and they 
took part in the Lebanese Civil War128.  
Parallels can be drawn between the reactions of the host communities in the camps (the 
Palestinians) and outside the camps (the Lebanese). These parallels are interesting from a social 
geography point of view because the power relations inside and outside the camp are different. 
The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (those still residing inside the camps) have a very specific 
position vis-à-vis the influx of refugees. On one hand they have a deep understanding of the 
situation of Syrian refugees today, and on the other hand they share some of the same discourse 
and reactions that Lebanese hosts have shared. In very similar ways to the mechanisms observed 
outside the Palestinian refugee camps, the Palestinians exploit the Syrian and Palestinian Refugees 
from Syria (PRS) and are simultaneously apprehensive towards them. Indeed we can observe 
some of the same patterns of apprehension towards the newcomers that are recurrent in other 
cities in Lebanon.  
On the refugee situation as the latest phase of the history of Syrian migration into Lebanon 
Since Syrians have continuously been actors in the Lebanese urban fabric since the mid 
1900s, this has had direct effects on the socio-spatial place as urban refugees today: The sole 
factor of their current condition as urban refugees does not encompass the complexity of their 
place in the city. In fact, Syrian migrants numbering at times in the hundreds of thousands have 
worked in Lebanon since the 1950s and before. Today they have become (over) visible due to 
their sheer number, the informal entrepreneurial ventures they are undertaking (kiosks, shops), 
and the fact that women and children have joined the traditional male migrant. Those had 
traditionally worked on construction sites, in agriculture and other unskilled labour jobs with little 
or no resistance from Lebanese workers or employers, and with minimal visibility in the public 
sphere. In their most recent forced, and therefore different type of migration to Lebanon, the 
Syrians’ profiles have changed yet again from the Lebanese communities’ point of view. Both the 
official and popular reactions to this new presence has changed in parallel with the progression of 
events.   
 
On coping mechanisms and economic competition 
Different socio-urban coping mechanisms and different modes of urbanity have been 
                                                 
128 See Chapter 2 Section 2 
CHAPTER 3  134 
 
adopted by Syrian refugees especially in the poor cities. These mechanisms are first unique to the 
situation in relation to their recent forced displacement and their places of arrival, but also 
depend on a variety of social factors including religious and political affiliations and social class. 
The Syrian refugees are in majority of the Muslim Sunni religious group and comprise of a 
minority of Christians and Alawis. Although statistics of the UNHCR do not include religious 
affiliation of the refugees, it is widely known and has also been confirmed throughout my field 
visits that refugees of all three religious groups are present in Lebanon. For a year or less after the 
beginning of the Syrian crisis, the refugees were welcome into the cities in Lebanon in support of 
the revolution (at the time) in Syria. The Syrian Sunnites especially, who were perceived as the 
main opposers to the Syrian regime, were welcomed and supported in the Sunni areas in 
Lebanon. Frequently Lebanese homes were open to them with all the resources that could be 
provided. The Lebanese Sunnites in specific were welcoming in the beginning, as it was perceived 
that overthrowing the Alawi would be quick and Sunnite power in the region would be 
reinforced. This is particularly well reflected in the case of Tripoli, a city with strong and historic 
familial ties with Syrian cities of Homs, Hama and Lattakia. For this second largest city in 
Lebanon the French mandate of 1918129 hit the hardest, and “severely disrupted this complex 
web of social, cultural and political relationships” (Conflict in Cities, 2007) between it and Tartus, 
Homs, and Hama - those cities had all been one province under the Ottoman rule (Figure  4-2). 
Indeed, Tripoli was one of major provinces (vilayets) during the early Ottoman period, and it may 
be considered “representative of non-Lebanese Arab cities” (Gulick, 1967). The “demographic 
composition of the city resembles Syria. Tripoli’s population is in majority Sunni Muslim (80.9 
percent) and includes, in addition to a Christian minority in decline, the largest Alawi community 
in Lebanon (8,9  percent, or 28,525 persons)” (Oktav, Gade, & Osoegawa, 2015, p. 20). 
                                                 
129 See Chapter 1, Section 3 for more details on the French mandate. 
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Figure  4-2: Map showing Ottoman provinces in 1609 
Province of Tripoli including present day Homs, Hama, Lattakia and Tripoli. Date: 1609 Source: 
(Ágoston & Masters, 2009). 
When the Syrian conflict proved to be longer and more complex than expected, refugees 
became more of a burden on the already vulnerable Lebanese communities, who also struggled 
for survival and for decent living conditions in the cities. By this time though, the influx had 
grown exponentially and without strategic vision or management it became an unwanted reality. 
These changing political factors along with the fragile infrastructure and the vulnerability of both 
communities resulted in continually changing power relations. This is spatially reflected for 
example by the restrictions imposed on Syrian refugees’ mobility by the most informal graffiti to 
the formal curfews (Figure  4-3), the implicit acceptance of these curfews by the majority of 
Lebanese groups and the counter reactions of a minority of opposers in favor of the Syrian 
refugees. (Figure  4-4). 
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Not all the forcibly displaced Syrians were in the same position, and the very nature of 
interactions differed according to the places, but the vast majority of the displaced still needed to 
cope with their residence in Lebanon. The term refugee being largely pejorative, Syrians who 
were not in dire need of assistance from the UNHCR have employed the coping mechanism of 
dissociating themselves from the nature of their refuge. For example, it is not uncommon for the 
educated Syrian youth from all religious groups to deny being refugees and correlate that with the 
fact that they have neither registered with the UNHCR nor do they seek any assistance. The 
access they have had to the city in Lebanon has been a main factor in their ability to deny their 
refuge, as they continue to seek normalcy. While the preoccupation of one Syrian I met in Beirut 
in 2016 was to make sure I knew that: “I never registered with the UNHCR, why would I? I’m 
not a refugee”, another Syrian I met in Tebbeneh was not as worried about the label, rather she 
told me: “I am now an expert on fooling [the Lebanese], I dare them to know I’m a Syrian 
without me saying it!”. Syrians have employed different modes of urbanity and have sought to 
alter their habitus in slightly different ways in the different cities. Some of these mechanisms, 
such as assimilation, came to them artificially or forced in the beginning, and they have 
internalised it - to the extent that during the course of a focus group I moderated with Syrian 
refugees in Tebbeneh, one participant said to the other: “will you stop it with that accent yoh 
(you)” as he laughed.   
A central concept in Bourdieu’s work, habitus “designates not only the foundational basis 
of practices but also the analytical objectives of circumventing the impasse of subjectivism versus 
objectivism.” (Navarro, 2006, p. 16). It is the “internalisation of externality and the 
externalisation of internality” according to Bourdieu, developed through  
processes of socialisation and determines a wide range of dispositions that shape 
individuals in a given society. It is not a ‘structure’ but a durable set of dispositions 
that are formed, stored, recorded and exert influence to mould forms of human 
behaviour. It may vary in accordance to the social environment, because unstable 
social domains may produce unstable systems of dispositions that generate irregular 
patterns of action. It does reinforce cohesion but also stimulates change and 
innovation, especially when it does not fit the surrounding social world where it 
evolves (Navarro, 2006, p. 16).  
Be it through changing their accent or vestiemental or behavioral habits, Syrians habitus 
has been influenced by the constraints of living in the city in Lebanon. They have sought to 
experience their behavior in the city with a different set of cultural-specific behaviours.  
 
Securing shelter and livelihood are the foremost struggles for refugees. At the beginning 
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of the crisis the international community, through the United Nations, secured direct in-kind and 
cash support for Syrian refugees130. This had several direct consequences on the situation as a 
whole. On the plus side, it aided refugees in securing a significant if not comprehensive portion 
of their rent (as urban refugees no shelter was provided by the UNHCR directly), along with their 
basic needs. On the negative side, it created a backlash from the vulnerable Lebanese who 
claimed being in the same economic difficulties without any support. Eventually, most 
international aid was deterred from direct aid to Syrian refugees to support for all vulnerable 
communities. As such, Syrian refugees lost their leverage and were treated like their Lebanese 
counterparts, compelling them to employ even more drastic mechanisms to survive.   
Two strategies were largely employed by Syrian refugees to cope. First they shared shelter, 
with up to three families consisting of fourteen or more131 individuals sharing a three-bedroom 
apartment. Second, they accepted to work for less wages and less benefits. In my interviews, the 
first and most common complaint that Lebanese give when talking about Syrian refugees is that 
the latter are “taking [their] jobs” and that they have had a negative effect on the economy. With 
the significant lack of statistics on the employment market though, these claims remain 
unproven, it is difficult if not impossible to estimate a real depreciation of revenues nationally 
generated by the informal economy. First, as mentioned earlier, Syrians have always been part of 
the Lebanese economy; when they are indeed in competition or have replaced Lebanese jobs they 
were hired by Lebanese employers, most of them taking advantage of the vulnerability of the 
Syrians; and second there have been studies that have shown the contrary, that the Syrian refugee 
presence has in fact had positive effects on the local economic development in the country 
especially with the rise in consumption132. In the housing sector for instance, Syrian refugees in 
the country paid 378 million dollars in rent in 2016 (Yassin, 2018, p. 96). Furthermore, not all the 
forced migrants were poor, and in the same year the “value of real estate purchases by Syrians in 
Lebanon [came to] 78 million dollars” (Yassin, 2018, p. 95).  
What has changed therefore, is the visibility of the Syrian worker, and the ratio between 
the new number of dwellers to the infrastructure capacity in the cities. All the residing population 
has  as such been impacted by this refugee and urban crisis.  A spatial analysis of this situation 
provides particular elements of understanding that cannot be found elsewhere. Indeed, before 
2011 the Syrian would have mainly been either on the construction site or in the agricultural field. 
                                                 
130 The sum of $27 per person per month was what the UNHCR provided in the first year or two, to a part of the refugee 
population. This sum gradually decreased. Today there are other projects (community kitchens, community cleaning 
activities etc.) that provide cash support to refugees but those are limited in scope. 
131 In my interviews this was the largest number of people sharing an apartment that I was confronted with. 
132 Notably the works of renowned Economist Jad Chaban and Professor of Policy and Planning, Nasser Yassin 
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Today, the Syrian worker can be a waiter, a salesperson, and most notably the owner / manager 
of a small shop, and exceptionally, Syrians have successfully launched larger businesses133. Even 
those informal entrepreneurial ventures are set up with great risks and are under continuous 
perils of closure by authorities, increasing their precarity.  If economic competition is exaggerated 
due to its increased visibility, then Lebanese tensions as host society stem primarily from socio 
political and religious roots. This competition is mostly manifested in the spaces where all 
communities are struggling.  
Legal restrictions increase segregation 
Between 2011 and 2014 the UN and a few NGOs were the sole managers of the refugee 
crisis and the government took a minimal role even in the management of the day-to-day issues. 
In January 2015, the Lebanese government took its first and only official stance vis-à-vis the 
Syrian refugee crisis. It adopted a policy paper which suggested “decreasing the number of 
refugees in the country by any possible means” (PCM, 2014), translating to the introduction of 
the kafala system. By transferring the already existing and contested kafala system to the Syrian 
refugees, the Lebanese government, under the pretence of controlling the refugee crisis, has 
limited the possibility for refugees to obtain informal employment and considerably limited their 
mobility, increased their spatial insecurity, and placed them outside the law and its protection 
(Saghieh & Frangieh, 2014). The kafala and related policies have placed Syrian refugees in an 
inferior status, legitimizing the social dominance of the Lebanese over the Syrians and 
consequently making any cohabitation efforts almost impossible. In all but name, they became 
second degree dwellers. Lebanese felt empowered to take on control roles over Syrian refugees, 
by personally enforcing curfews for example. Daily power struggles and encounters multiplied 
and extremist discourse against the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon was normalized. 
Putting the Syrian refugees under the kafala umbrella was a very risky move by the Lebanese 
government. Today over 70 percent of the Syrian refugees do not have legal residency due to the 
impossibility of securing a kafeel (guarantor) or the financial resources necessary for the process. 
With this one policy, the Lebanese government instantaneously dubbed close to three quarters of 
a million people illegal and prone to arrest at any time.  
Observing the mundane aspects of urban interactions in places of extreme vulnerability, 
and analysing how local authorities are spatialising their domination, reveal the government’s 
impotence in managing the country and ensuring the rights to the city for its dwellers. In the last 
seven decades but especially between the 1970s and today, Syrians have been alternated being 
                                                 
133 See Chapter 5, Section 2.2 
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tolerated migrant workers, oppressive occupants, undesired workers, and undesired refugees. The 
profile of the Syrian as an occupant seems to be still vivid in the memory of most Lebanese 
groups, and perhaps the most marking due to its violence. It makes the inferior position of the 
Syrian refugee today almost acceptable as a form of revenge that can spatially take place in the 
daily urban life. The city has in a sense become a battlefield and the war revolves around 
entitlement over existence, legitimacy, and space. Furthermore, comparisons with the Palestinian 
refugees and fears associated with that presence increase hostility towards Syrian refugees. 
2. Conducting fieldwork in three cities in Lebanon between 2014 and 2018  
As mentioned by Michel Agier, “to approach a social world in particular, is to often 
witness the extent to which the individuals that compose it are subject to social injustices, cultural 
or racial discriminations, or fight for their dignity, for their acknowledgement, for their right of 
expression, the political right, etc. even if this does not only concern fields of “miserable” or 
vulnerable” populations134” (Agier, 2001, p. 176). The Syrian conflict of 2011 was ongoing 
between 2014 and 2018, during which time I undertook the field trips for this research. Doing 
field research, including in depth interviews with different players, in conflict sites like Lebanon a 
researcher can not avoid encountering and reading violence. “Reading violence in the everyday is 
a practice people in Lebanon engage in and are very much familiar with, as they strive to 
distinguish between the sounds of fireworks and gunshots, between war and a street fight, 
between a life-threatening bomb aimed at sowing random chaos or a bomb with a political 
message targeting a person” (Moghnieh, 2017). Several elements render this a reality in the cities 
in Lebanon - specifically the sites of my research. Those include the invisible divisions following 
conflict, religious, and economic lines as well as site-specific codes that have to be understood 
and respected. While I seldom experienced a sense of fear or threat during my field visits, I did 
take some security precautions, such as informing someone (usually a friend from the area) of my 
whereabouts and how long I estimated remaining there, and parking my car at a secure spot, etc.   
2.1 Several events mark turning points in the field during the 
research period 
The evolving nature of the social and political scene between 2014 and 2018 was not 
without its challenges. When I started this work almost two years after the beginning of the 
                                                 
134 Original citation: “S’approcher d’un monde social en particulier, c’est bien souvent constater à quel point les personnes 
qui le composent font l’objet d’injustices sociales, de discriminations culturelles ou raciales, ou bien luttent pour leur dignité, 
pour leur reconnaissance, pour leur droit d’expression, leur droit politique, etc., même si cela ne concerne pas seulement 
des terrains peuplés de “misérables” ou de “vulnérables”.  
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resistance to Bashar al Assad and the Syrian revolution to a national threat in Lebanon, 
reminiscent of the presence of the Palestinian refugees. In December 2013, Henrich Böll 
Foundation reported 
“They are starting to cause serious social concerns,” said Mustapha Akel, the mayor 
of El-Minieh, a middle/low-income city in North Lebanon. “Besides the volume of 
electrical and water consumption, sewage and garbage disposal problems, the cost 
of infrastructure repairs and the lack of solid waste set-up in the tent settlements, 
housing costs in town are also skyrocketing.” He modestly added: “I want to marry 
my son off, but there are no more houses available. And the Syrian women who 
require much less financial security to be wedded are competing with our girls. Many 
are worried that their daughters will be spinsters! (Katkhouda, 2013, p. 1) 
Conspiracy theories were not scarce, as the Syrian refugee crisis was being compared to 
the Palestinian refugee crisis with all the political implications such claims hold.  
“They are swallowing our country. Soon, there won’t be much room for us here,” 
said George while sipping a quick espresso in a nice coffee shop in Saifi, near the 
port of Beirut, as he rushes to make another delivery for his small business. “It is a 
conspiracy I tell you, to have us Lebanese leave town so they can settle the 
refugees.” “Like in 1982, remember?” added an older man. “They tried settling the 
Palestinians then. But we aren’t going anywhere. This ship is not sailing. Lebanon is 
our homeland.” Jamal, [...] chimed in: “You might not have much of a homeland 
soon. The ship is sinking, can’t you see? The president said so himself: Our very 
existence is at stake” (Katkhouda, 2013, pp. 5–6) 
 
While many Lebanese groups had begun to feel the gravity of the situation when their 
number hit the Million Mark, it was another event in May 2014 that rendered the Syrians’ 
presence a visible, real, and substantial issue: the Syrian presidential election. Just two months 
after the Lebanese were saturated with the news of the quantity of refugees, Syrians “flocked” 
(Lutz, 2014) to embassies across the Arab World to vote (Atassi, 2014; Lutz, 2014; Muir, 2014; 
Taylor, 2014). Turnout in Lebanon was impressive (Figure  4-6) to the extent that the BBC 
reported “the massive turnout for the expatriate Syrian vote at the embassy above Beirut 
produced scenes rarely observed at any embassy or polling station in the world” (Muir, 2014). 
These two almost simultaneous events contributed to a complete shift in popular opinion socially 
and politically. First, the Syrian refugees became over-visible in the cities. Second, the Lebanese 
posed the question: “If the Syrians are not afraid of Bashar al-Assad, if they support the regime, 
why are they afraid to go back and why are they refugees?”  
This line of reasoning also affected opinion on who should be considered a refugee. Did 
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political or religious affiliation matter to determine whether or not a person should be allowed to 
flee? “The scale of turnout at the embassy and the vocal displays of support for President Bashar 
al-Assad angered Assad’s Lebanese opponents, who said any refugee who took part should be 
sent back to Syria” (Evans, 2014). The debate became an additional stressor for the refugees as 
their political beliefs were deployed as social pressure against them 
 
 
 
Figure  4-6: Refugees on the way to the Syrian Embassy to vote for Bashar al-Assad 
Sources: Getty Images for CBS; Joseph Eid, AFP, Getty Images for the Washington Post, Date: May 
28, 2014 
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The Policy Paper of October 2014, another turning point in national politics and local policies  
The event that most directly affected the management and urban experience of refugee 
settlement  in Lebanon was the adoption of the “Policy Paper on Syrian Displacement to 
Lebanon proposed by the Ministerial Committee for Syrian Displaced Persons” (PCM, 2014) in 
October 2014. Its consequences included the application of the kafala system in January 2015 to 
regulate the flow and the residency of the refugees. In an official assembly on October 23, 2014, 
the Presidency of the Council of Ministers approved the Policy Paper proposed by the 
Committee in charge of the Syrian Displaced Persons. It was the first time the Lebanese 
government took an official stance vis-à-vis the refugee influx, and it marked a complete shift in 
policy and a radical change in requirements for Syrians in their access to Lebanon. Before 2015 
they could easily enter the country and acquire a six months renewable residency permit upon 
visiting the General Security Offices. Since 2015 the requirements for entry and residency became 
markedly restrictive, difficult and costly. Although the kafala system is not mentioned in the 
policy, it was apparently independently determined and implemented by the General Directorate 
of General Security as their practical answer to regulating the residency of the Syrians in the 
country (Figure  4-7, See Annex for the list of detailed requirements). 
 
Figure  4-7: From the website of the General Directorate of General Security 
Highlighted sentence: “The Directorate of General Security announces new criteria regulating the 
entry and residency of Syrians into Lebanon as follows”. Source: http://www.general-
security.gov.lb/ar/posts/33.  
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Encadré  4-1: Excerpt from interview with the Lebanese Minister of Labour,  
Saj’an Azzi, in 2016 
Question by the Legal Agenda: Did the measures taken by the General Security in early 2015 affect 
work permits [for Syrians]?  
Minister Azzi: "They legislated illegal work". A person [now] places a significant capital in a bank and 
creates a fake company. Why all this cost? For an annual residency135!  
A contractor employs 3,000 Syrian workers to build a complex on the basis of residency and 
sponsorship without work permits. When we pursue the subject, the contractors argue that there is 
no cost of vacations when submitting offers. (Legal Agenda, 2016) 
The above answer by the Minister of Labour illustrates three points. First that the kafala measures 
were decided upon by the Directorate of General Security and not necessarily with the approval of 
the government, or all the government. Second that the government is well aware of the increase in 
informal and illegal work that the kafala created but do not or can not act upon it. It lastly shows the 
clear inequality between Syrian migrant classes in terms of seeking residency, and how wealthier 
Syrian dwellers have more access to the city in Lebanon.  
 
 
While on one hand the policy seems to seek criteria to qualify, or re-qualify Syrians 
(travelling back to Syria for example would automatically mean the loss of the “displaced person” 
quality), on the other hand it implicitly places most Syrians in Lebanon in a position where 
acquiring legal residency is either not possible or too expensive. Furthermore, it does not give 
clear guidelines on dealing with the crisis and leaves matters up to local authorities to act as they 
see fit in their areas. The policy highly truncates the previous mandate it had given to the 
UNHCR and other international NGOs. It dictates that the UNHCR shall hand over all the 
documents relative to the registration of refugees, and more importantly it dictates that all 
international funding shall be directed towards Lebanese state institutions or the Trust Fund for 
Lebanon managed by the World Bank (World Bank, 2014). Those funds would go to 
strengthening the most vulnerable municipalities’ capacities in order to serve all communities 
within their areas, and not only the Syrian refugees.  
The extreme shift from a complete “open border policy” to a practically “no entry 
policy” in a matter of months could only be qualified as a social shock for the refugees. It 
restricted their local and international mobility, and for the majority placed them outside the law 
and its protection (Saghieh & Frangieh, 2014). While some political voices raised concerns about 
the crisis as early as 2012-2013, the Lebanese government did not take an official position vis-à-
                                                 
135 In the full context of the interview: By illegal work the Minister means working without a permit due to the kafala measures 
taken by the GSO. Also, he refers to fake companies created by wealthy Syrians to secure residency.   
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vis the influx until the end of 2014. Politicians from different party affiliations and ideological 
backgrounds were divided on the issue early on, with Christian leaders warning against the 
political dimensions of the crisis while Muslim leaders stressed the humanitarian side of it.  
MP Michel Aoun recently stated that the “Syrian refugees are a serious danger”, 
while Samir Geagea, the main figure in Lebanon’s Lebanese Forces136, stressed on 
the 30th of August 2013, about “Lebanon’s inability to handle [the Syrian refugee 
crisis] more, and that a viable solution needs to be put in place, and the only solution 
is to establish safe zones within Syria’s borders under international protection.” 
Moreover, Marwan Charbel, Lebanon’s internal security minister declared on 
February 28th 2013 that the “Syrian refugees are threatening the security situation in 
Lebanon”. Other major political forces in Lebanon, like Hizbullah, Amal, Jumblatt's 
PSP (Progressive Socialist Party), and Hariri’s Future Current mostly stressed the 
Humanitarian aspect of the “Syrian refugees Crisis” in Lebanon, but have refrained 
from countering any of the racist and xenophobic discourses, in the political and 
media spheres and even among their base of supporters and cadres. (Chit & Nayel, 
2013) 
These contradictory positions created the deadlock situation within the government and 
as such no national reaction was officially declared, leaving the management of the crisis 
completely in the hands of international NGOs (mainly the UNHCR) between 2011 and 2014. 
During these years, as I will develop in later chapters, the weight of the substantial increase in 
population on the urban infrastructure in Lebanon led to increasing social tensions between the 
various local hosts and refugee communities. In a sense the introduction of the kafala by early 
2015 calmed the tensions on the Lebanese dwellers side because it placed the latter in direct 
position of power over the Syrians. Consciously or not, the government may have attempted to 
secure short term social peace by allowing this power positioning amongst dwellers. While it may 
be so, the medium and longer terms repercussions of the action have not proven successful. The 
kafala in itself only regulates the residency permit acquisition for Syrian refugees, but the policy of 
October 2014 takes matters a step further by providing legal cover for local authority practices 
such as curfews and restrictions on the use of public space.  
Encadré  4-2: Excerpt from the Council of Ministers’ minutes of meeting on October 23, 
2014 (see Annex 5 for original document in Arabic) 
A last point out of thirteen items that were deliberated in that meeting, is the policy which  clearly 
reflects the political attitude and plans of the Lebanese government towards the presence of the 
Syrians in Lebanon and indeed it had a direct effect on the latter’s daily lives. What follows is a 
translation of the text, originally published in Arabic on the website of the Presidency of the Council 
                                                 
136 Christian political party 
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of Ministers:  
Lebanon that has been an outstanding international and unique model in the extent of its adherence 
to humanitarian principles and implementing them towards its neighbours and brothers the people 
of Syria, is today approaching social, economic and security explosions threatening its existence, 
should it not implement - in the interest of the Lebanese and Syrian people - a responsible policy to 
reduce the number of displaced Syrians on its territories and to ensure security for Lebanese and 
Syrians and to reduce the burden on its people and economy. 
Reduction of numbers: 
Stop all displacement at the border with the exception of extreme humanitarian cases, and register 
individuals at the border according to the reasons of their entry to ensure the proper application of 
this regulation, and moreover require the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to stop all 
registration of the displaced individuals except further to approval by the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
Encourage displaced Syrians to return to their country or to other countries by all means possible, 
and insist on the application of Lebanese laws upon their presence, furthermore remove the quality 
of "displaced" from any person who travels back to Syria, and any person who violates Lebanese laws 
and entry requirements. 
Regulate the relationship with international organisations according to Lebanese laws and 
agreements, which necessitates for the state to obtain all information about the registered displaced 
persons in order to study their files and to periodically assess their displacement according to legal 
criteria and ultimately reduce their number(s) and secure the needs of the deserving displaced 
persons. 
Security provisions: 
Authorise Security forces to follow-up on the implementation measures of controlling the 
displacement, and authorise municipalities to perform periodic statistical surveys of the displaced 
within their administrative areas, and provide those municipalities  with the necessary human 
resources to maintain security. 
Reduction of burdens: 
Strictly enforce Lebanese laws on the displaced Syrians in order to protect the Lebanese in all areas 
of work and employment. 
Balance assistance between the displaced and the host community, and provide direct funding to 
Lebanese state institutions through the Multi-Donor Trust-Fund (MDTF) and through special 
programs designed by donor(s) in agreement with the Lebanese administration concerned as 
appropriate. 
Finance international programs aimed at developing the Lebanese economy and activating its 
productive sectors. 
The policy paper regarding Syrian displacement enjoys national consensus and aims to achieve 
Lebanese interests, and holds executive quality which necessitates its continuing implementation 
through all concerned Lebanese ministries and administrations, and through periodic reports to be 
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submitted to the ministerial committee for displaced persons and in turn to the Council of Ministers 
in order to achieve its objectives. (PCM, 2014)137 
 
Entitlement to international aid creates local tensions 
The third factor of continuous change in the social and political scene of refugees in Lebanon is 
the aid offered to refugees mainly by the UNHCR but by other local and international NGOs as 
well. In fact in the very beginning of the crisis in 2011, international aid came directly for the 
refugees. This exasperated the vulnerable Lebanese populations who were for a significant part 
living side by side with the refugees. With time the refugee numbers increased and the crisis 
became less of an emergency and more of a protracted refugee situation. Aid was becoming more 
difficult to attain for the Syrian refugees, and the UNHCR shifted its strategy to accommodate 
“all vulnerable communities”138 and not only the Syrians. This fact is clearly illustrated in the 
UNHCR reports on the situation of refugees in Lebanon since 2012. For example in 2012 the 
yearly report on global activity designates as people of concern “were Syrian refugees who have 
arrived in Lebanon since March 2011 and Iraqi and non-Iraqi refugees who fled conflict in their 
country over the past decade” (UNHCR, 2012a, p. 1). In 2017 the UNHCR reported serving 
1,000,000 “members of impacted host communities who will be directly targeted for assistance 
under the Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP139)” as direct beneficiaries, while the number 
of registered refugees was placed at 954,000 ( 
 
Figure  4-8); implying an equal ratio of support for Syrian and vulnerable Lebanese 
groups. In reality,  
as signs of increased tension among communities became more apparent, 
international aid providers and national authorities “woke up” to the significance of 
ignoring host community needs. As a result, “[while] the pendulum swung 100 
percent to the Syrians in the first two to two and and half years of the response, […] 
when it swung back, it swung back to an extreme level because people wanted to 
compensate for their failures (Mourad, 2016, p. 3) 
                                                 
137 In translating the minutes of meeting I have tried to remain congruent with the arabic sentence structure where possible. 
138 As per field interviews with UN staff, 2015, 2016 
139 The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) is the UN and NGO response to the impact of the Syria Crisis in 
Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, in support of national efforts 
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throughout the communities although not all Syrian refugees received it, and notably in 2015 and 
for a period of over a year, the value of the voucher was halved due to lack of funding (Reuters, 
2015).  
 As a result of this agitation over aid Lebanese and Syrian interviewees often expressed 
the incessant need to prove they were more entitled to aid than the others. On several occasions I 
found it difficult to move beyond that conversation. While interviewing Palestinian refugees in 
the Bourj el-Barajneh camp for example, on two separate occasions interviewees showed me the 
boxes of medication they received from the UNRWA, and insisted I note down the number of 
pills per box and the prices - assuring me that they had felt a real depreciation of aid since the 
arrival of the Syrians to the camp. Syrian refugees in all the three cities where I collected data 
readily showed me, without me asking, different documents that would prove their legitimacy. 
These included intimate records of their registration with the UNHCR, their informal rent 
agreements, their family records etc. A majority invited me into their shelters (those varied from 
garages to shared apartments) and insisted I inspect the state of the place so that I may see how 
they were living140. Even with the shift in strategy of aid organisations to include host 
communities and ensure the inclusion of all vulnerable communities in aid efforts, social tensions 
have persisted due to perceptions of injustice.   
In consequence to each of these events, among others, tensions rose and effects could be 
seen almost immediately in the cities and were reflected in my interviews. Both Syrian and 
Lebanese were under pressure and affected by the political discourse surrounding events. 
Feelings of insecurity amongst both communities were clear. According to a cross-region survey 
conducted by the Université Saint Joseph in 2014141, nine percent of Lebanese had reported 
assaults and fifty-four per cent did not feel safe. On their side, twenty-four percent of Syrians had 
also reported assaults and twenty-six percent did not feel safe (Alsharabati & Nammour, 2017), 
2017). Among their conclusions for the period between 2011 and 2014 “Syrian refugees are 
becoming increasingly vulnerable while worries are rising among Lebanese host communities” 
(Alsharabati & Nammour, 2017).  
  
 
                                                 
140 It was not always possible to ask to take photographs of the interior of shelters, and when I did feel the situation allowed, I 
was not always granted approval 
141 Study included surveys with randomly selected Syrians (1,200) and Lebanese (600) respondents in 120 different 
localities. Sampling details are available in the report. Source: Alsharabati, C., & Nammour, J. (2017). Survey on 
Perceptions of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (p. 48) 
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2.2. Dealing with situations of excessive inequality 
I elaborated earlier in this chapter on my struggle with the fact that I have been privileged 
with opportunities unattainable to most of the persons I interviewed for my research. Some of 
the more difficult moments during my field trips were the shifts between fieldwork and 
family/friend time. As the latter were mostly casual get together in the evenings, my days and 
nights were opposites in most senses. During the day I would be graciously invited into a 
dwelling of a refugee, often with little or no furniture to discuss matters of extreme poverty, 
violence and inequality. In the evening I would be at somewhere in Hamra, Mar Mkhaël, Badaro 
or whatever neighbourhood was trendiest that season, sipping on a $7 drink. In such a situation, 
Paul Routledge suggests that “in our writing, we stage a representation of particular “reality” in 
order to display it. Such a display reflects, at least in part, who we are (or [...] who we think we 
are)” (Routledge, 1996, p. 401).  This aspect then needs to be further addressed. 
2.3 From a third space? 
A metaphor of terror and violence, l-balad ‘ala kaff ‘afrit (the country lays on the palm 
of a devil) is often invoked to indicate the delicately balanced politics of governance 
in Lebanon, contingent on unpredictable terror, and is also a discursive form of 
reading and assessing violence. The metaphor, strategically employed by political 
actors, journalists and laypersons in times of instability and unknowable futures, is 
one form of discursive assessment and reading of terror and risk (Moghnieh, 2017). 
In social sciences, geography included, the position and place of the researcher vis-à-vis 
the subject has received renewed interest in recent years. I did not approach my field with a 
conscious decision of whether my work would be politically-oriented, linked, in one way or 
another with activism or even with the production of an engaged research, as other scholars who 
have placed their scientific production within the domains of radical or critical theories. In a 
sense, when we conduct research in fields of pronounced inequality, the very act of reflecting and 
writing about it is subjective because we have seen the field with our personal, ideological filter142. 
Our interest in understanding certain social events does not stem from a place of neutrality, and 
if it does our human nature and curiosity do not leave us untouched. I tend to agree with Paul 
Routledge when he proposes “a third space” that lies between academia and activism to describe 
a researcher who is simultaneously involved in social action and writes it: “The third space 
implies inappropriate(d) encounters between academia and activism where neither site, role, or 
representation holds sway, where one continually subverts the meaning of the other” (Routledge, 
                                                 
142 See Chapter 3, Section 5 : Submitting to the personal aspects of field investigation 
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1996, p. 400). The researchers work lies somewhere in between the worlds of academia and 
activism, and juxtaposing the two can tend to be problematic for some authors who believe that 
“at the same time intellectual scientifically productive and transmitter socially responsible, seem 
difficult to conciliate” (Bautès & Chirot, 2012). The nature of this work tends to be delicate in 
Lebanese social circles. It is current, significant, and touches all aspects of daily life in Lebanon. 
Indeed, one of the difficulties I faced was trying to explain my research to my Lebanese friends. 
Most sought to place the work: “you’re taking the side of the refugees, are you showing the 
Lebanese point of view?”. A close friend who is a political activist most recently insisted on 
explaining to me how after day-length workshops he runs in border areas with Lebanese and 
Syrians simultaneously, they get to a point where “they understand each other” and where “they 
even sometimes want to work together”. Often, when I evoke the three year delay in the 
government’s reaction to the Syrian refugee influx I would be faced with: “so what did you want 
them to do? close the borders from the start?”.  
My work is not about victimising refugees and vilifying the host community or state. I 
rather seek to identify certain socio-urban elements that drive the relations between actors in the 
city in Lebanon and transform it, and I seek to set these against the overarching cultural and 
political context. Syrian refugees if only by virtue of their numbers and dispersion have been and 
are city-makers in Lebanon (Fawaz et al., 2018). This aspect of the situation seems very important 
to me, that in spite of the tensions surrounding their situation, the legal, mobility, and social 
restrictions, Syrians continue to be makers of the cities in Lebanon by virtue of their urban 
dwelling. This fact cannot be minimized or overlooked regardless of the political question 
surrounding their presence, or return, for “there is a need to acknowledge the transformative 
impact refugees have on the very substance of “urban life”” (Fawaz et al., 2018, p. 5). 
“The Marxist doctrine teaches that the analysis of society is that of the class struggle, 
which can today be translated in a more nuanced manner: the very nature of social dynamics is 
revealed by the conflicts”143, Kayser states (Kayser, 1978, p. 14), and therefore practicing 
ethnography is often navigating social worlds formed by war, political violence, extreme poverty 
and disease. At the level of the individual, it implies getting used to seeing pain, suffering, 
violence and death as aspects of continuity of a space rather than a rupture of everyday social 
life144 (Perdigon, 2010). Why do we do it, then? Is there a higher purpose for probing, deducing 
                                                 
143 Original citation: “L’analyse de la société est celle de la lutte des classes, enseigne le marxisme doctrinaire, ce qui peut 
être traduit aujourd’hui de façon plus nuancée : la dynamique sociale est révélée par les conflits”. 
144 In reference to the following citation: “La pratique de l’ethnographie implique fréquemment, aujourd’hui, d’évoluer dans 
des mondes sociaux façonnés de manière profonde par la guerre, la violence politique, la pauvreté extrême et la maladie. 
Cette pratique implique aussi des efforts pour acquérir et pour cultiver un point de vue local sur ces mondes, par la présence 
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and theorizing and how will that help advance society if it does? “What remains of critical 
thought when it is disconnected from political action?” (Bautès & Chirot, 2012). This is a 
particularly sensitive question. For the better part of the last two decades I had applied all my 
competence, skills and passion in civil society projects aimed at serving underprivileged 
communities. This was through short and long-term projects that would enhance livelihoods. 
During that time when I was met with difficulty in the field I went back to the office and 
brainstormed, with others, if and how we could intervene to fix the situation. It was our way of 
pursuing social and spatial justice, and it was frustrating. Domination is a socio-spatial system not 
a binary confrontation, and dealing with it necessitates a rupture to the system.  With no real 
reach or policy backing up our initiatives, every attempt at effecting change would ultimately fail, 
or fail to persist. Is the ultimate goal, then, to strive to engage with policy makers and forward 
any critical understanding we have of the inequalities in a society, and would that be a justified 
third space in between academia and activism? 
 
3. Using a combination of three types of geographic approaches  
 Urban, social and geopolitical elements interact in this research. The entry points, 
at the center of the study, are the urban observations that contribute to the transformation of 
urban life in the cities. These are directly (locally) and indirectly (nationally, regionally) affected by 
different realities that vary in nature from the urban to the socio-cultural and the political. 
Notwithstanding the different degrees as to which each element affects urban transformation, the 
figure represents how geopolitics may be placed in interaction with urban studies in order to 
understand the city. Urban observations tend to be at the crossroads of spatial, social and 
political processes and are therefore affected by those overarching elements.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
dans la durée, par un éventail d’activités de recherche et, souvent, par des relations personnelles fortes – perspective à 
partir de laquelle il est fréquent pour l’ethnographe de s’habituer à voir la circulation de la douleur, de la souffrance, de la 
violence et de la mort dans ces espaces non pas comme une rupture du quotidien mais plutôt comme un aspect de sa 
continuité” (Perdigon, 2010). 
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Figure  4-9: Three lenses of the study 
Representation of the interaction of the different lenses used in the study. Date: 2018 
This combination is illustrated in the Figure  4-9. At the center are the local observations 
that can be made at the fine scale of the city. For instance a dweller might show frustration or 
dismay at the presence of another in a certain space. He or she feels threatened and decides to 
act. Depending on their social position vis-à-vis the other and the site where the incident is taking 
place, different scenarios may arise. At this point some national elements play a role. Are both 
dwellers of the same religious group? Social class? Are they similarly politically inclined? Do they 
feel protected by a political network or legal cover? A combination of these elements is 
considered and the dwellers will act accordingly. Either a fight might arise, or a person might 
avoid eye contact and leave. In any case, one of the two will abandon the space eventually. The 
person in the inferior position will either physically remove him or herself from the space or 
defer to the other dweller through the use of different coping mechanisms. Or on the contrary, 
the dweller in the superior position may decide to abandon the space for lack of interest in 
interaction.  
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These religious and political elements are dictated by regional affiliations and tensions 
that make in Lebanon a sort of microcosm for debate in the Middle East. Whether that be Sunni-
Shiite tensions reflected in the positions of the population with or against the Syrian regime, or 
east-west tensions embodied in the Lebanese societal contradictions. The three geographic 
approaches described earlier in this chapter may be used to read this situation 
 
4. Method and tools for data collection 
No method is without fallacies, it is a matter of how honestly and openly we 
approach them. Being accountable to the people we study requires us to recognize 
our fallibility and, thus, to wrestle with that fallibility. The methodological dogmatists, 
who declare they have found the flawless method and spend their time condemning 
others for not following the golden trail, are the real menace to our profession 
(Burawoy 2013: 527). 
Indeed, there is no flawless method in social fieldwork, more so when it is based in 
qualitative techniques. An interview with someone who has allowed the researcher the privilege 
of intimacy into his or her realities and thoughts will most probably not go according to a plan or 
a questionnaire, digression and a range of emotions are a part of it. Listening with an open mind 
does not eliminate our subjectivity but it may curve it, making the craft a developing one, clearer 
from one talk to the other. This is our own imperfection that we have to be aware of, and 
ultimately accept. 
Doing fieldwork, for me, was synonymous with going home. I had the privilege of not 
having to spend time figuring out any logistics. Upon landing I would activate my phone and call 
whoever was picking me up. I would go to my parent’s house where I lived for years, use my key, 
and settle in. Doing fieldwork also meant speaking my mother tongue, and using lingo and 
expressions that only people in Lebanon understood. While creating a comfortable field situation 
for me, the challenge was to be able to correctly transmit the totality of this informal expression, 
which for me was at many instances self explanatory. It was also an advantage to have previously 
worked inside or in proximity of the neighbourhoods and areas I had chosen for my case studies. 
What this meant was that the entry points to the field were usually set up before I arrived, and I 
was able to concentrate on moving past that initial entry phase. Doing fieldwork is an organic 
process that can and must change between visits and sites. It has not been a step that I needed to 
pass to go on to the next - it accompanied all the process of the production of this thesis. Doing 
fieldwork is “before everything a manner of being in the world, marked by sensitivity and 
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empathy, before being labelled by the institutional recognition of Science145” (Buire, 2010, p. 10). 
Furthermore it is an extension of a set of theoretical presuppositions for “Indeed, the most 
‘empirical’ technical choices cannot be disentangled from the most ‘theoretical’ choices in the 
construction of the object” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 225). In this section I will describe 
the methodology tools that I used and the various intentional and unintentional practices I 
developed while in the field. The first element of reflection on approaching field was how to 
physically approach it. 
In his work on migrants in the peripheries of Beirut, Assaf Dahdah expressed the value 
of seeing the city at a slow pace. Using a more anthropological approach to his field, he describes 
his choice to live and move around Beirut as a dweller-researcher observing the city while 
participating in producing it (Dahdah, 2015, p. 64)146. He furthermore notes the difficulties that 
non-Lebanese experience in terms of mobility in Beirut (Dahdah, 2015, p. 64), an element that 
has been repeatedly confirmed in my fieldwork, in Beirut and Tripoli specifically but in the 
country in general. In fact, (i) understanding how semi-public147 transportation works and then (ii) 
the difficulties encountered while using it are important elements that the refugees mentioned as 
part of their difficulty in accessing the city. Women specifically but refugees in general have 
expressed real apprehension of using “vans” and “servees” throughout my interviews. Mobility is 
problematic for some Lebanese dwellers as well, although not in the same ways and not with the 
same consequences on their livelihood and access to the city.   
After a first very enthusiastic but ultimately unsuccessful “day 1 of fieldwork”, I 
understood the value of the necessary slow pace to an understanding of a space. A slow pace not 
only in getting to the site physically, but also entering the field with “attention to sensory 
experience” (Al-Masri, 2017), “[attune] to other people’s practices” (Pink, 2008) in an attempt 
towards Bourdieu’s participant objectivation: “objectivizing the subjective relation to the object 
which, far from leading to a relativistic and more-or-less anti-scientific subjectivism, is one of the 
conditions of genuine scientific objectivity” (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 273). In what follows I will 
present the different tools I used in the field including observations, commented walks, 
interviews, and I describe the challenges of unreliable quantitative data for the research.  
                                                 
145 Original citation: “Faire du terrain, c'est avant tout une façon d'être-au-monde, marqué par la sensibilité et l'empathie, 
avant que d'être adoubé par la reconnaissance institutionnelle de la Science.” (Buire, 2012) 
146 Original citation: Résider et me déplacer à Beyrouth consiste donc à être dans la posture du citadin-chercheur qui à la fois 
vit et observe la ville, ses espaces, ses habitants, leur place et leurs mouvements comme autant de « citadins ordinaires » 
[Berrychikhaoui et Deboulet 2000 : 12] qui participent à faire Beyrouth au quotidien. (Dahdah, 2015) 
147 There is no formal public transportation in Lebanon, but some vans, busses and taxis are used collectively and the former 
two follow a preset circuit in the city and between cities. 
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4.1 The unreliability of quantitative data 
In 2013 an advisor at the Ministry of Finance in Lebanon described the challenges of the 
country’s lack of statistics. Searching through stacks of papers, he says many of Lebanon’s 
statistics are unreliable.  
“We have statistics issued in an IMF document showing that…from 2000 to 2005 we 
having cumulative inflation of only 1.5 percent. How can that be possible?” 
Skepticism, he says, is key to understanding Lebanese economic figures. “In 
Lebanon some people collect statistics when they are sitting at home,” he half-jokes 
(Redd, 2013).  
National economic data is not the only insufficient data though. In practically every field 
there are no credible statistics meaning quantitative studies are often futile and unreliable. 
Researchers rely on estimates and educated guesses - basing them on localised studies in 
restricted areas and on projections.  
Data on the population in Lebanon 
Neither the Lebanese nor the exact migrant population among which are the Syrian 
refugees are officially known. All numbers of populations are estimated, or the product of 
educated guesses. The Central Administration of Statistics (CAS), an institution under the 
authority of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers offers population characteristics in 2009 
as their most recent documentation on the Lebanese population.  
For the purposes of this research I chose to rely on the estimation of the total population 
of 6.1 million in 2017 according to United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA, 2017). Excluding 
from this estimation the number of Syrian refugees as registered with the UNHCR (just shy of 1 
million) brings the total population including the Palestinian refugees to almost 5.2 million. For 
comparison purposes, the French Ministry of Foreign affairs estimates the Lebanese population 
in 2016 at 4,6 million including 174,222 Palestinian refugees. They add the 997,905 Syrian 
refugees registered with the UNHCR, and the 50,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria registered 
with the UNRWA (France Diplomatie, 2018). Their estimated total would be 5.65 million. I also 
refer to data and maps published in the Atlas of Lebanon (Verdeil et al., 2007) citing various 
sources and relying mostly on the 1997 Census estimates undertaken by the Lebanese Central 
Administration for Statistics (Figure  4-10). Concerning the statistics on the Syrian refugees, I 
refer mostly to the Operational Data Portal148 provided by the UNHCR in response to the Syria 
Regional Refugee situation (UNHCR, 2011). The portal was regularly updated until January 2015, 
                                                 
148 The Refugees Operational Portal is a Partners coordination tool for Refugee situations provided by UNHCR 
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but much less since then. In fact the UNHCR halted all registration of refugees as of May 2015 at 
the request of the Lebanese government149. The request coincided with the shift of government 
policy regarding the Syrian refugees, and the introduction of restrictive policies on their entry and 
residency in Lebanon, including the kafala. Putting a halt to the registration of the refugees was 
both symbolic and tactical. It meant that refugees could no longer access aid, or register their 
children. For many who could not afford the kafala process, the UNHCR documentation served 
as the only legal proof of their presence in Lebanon.  
 
Figure  4-10: Population and population density in Lebanon 
Population and population density in Lebanon. Source: (É. Verdeil, Faour, & Velut, 2007b).  
 
 
                                                 
149 The portal indicates that “As of 6 May 2015, UNHCR Lebanon has temporarily suspended new registration as per 
Government of Lebanon's instructions. Accordingly, individuals awaiting to be registered are no longer included.” 
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Data on the market economy 
The absence of data concerns other domains and research areas as well. For example, 
there are very few statistics on Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) that make up the 
largest part of the Lebanese market (Building Markets, 2016; Malaeb, 2018). The Ministry of 
Economy’s report states that SMEs “[Comprise] over 90 percent of the Lebanese registered 
enterprises and [affect] the livelihood of some 50 percent of the declared employees” (Ministry of 
Economy and Trade, 2014, p.46). It is of course a statement to be taken at face value, not all 
enterprises are registered, in fact “a large segment of the business population [operates] in the 
informal economy” (Building Markets, 2016, p. 19). Moreover not all employees, even those in 
registered enterprises, are declared: “SME owners tend to resort to freelance contracts, 
underreporting of employees, or other means to lower their fixed costs” (Ministry of Economy 
and Trade, 2014, p. 30). The most recent official report on the Labour Market issued by the 
Central Administration for Statistics dates to 2011 (Yaacoub & Badre, 2011). Published eleven 
years before the time of writing means that it is outdated. Furthermore it does not take the 
informal market into consideration. Although they may be indicative these statistics are therefore 
incomplete and, as such, inadequate to any quantitative analysis.  
Data on the economic competition between Syrians refugees and Lebanese 
Historically, Syrian migrants in Lebanon worked  informally and no work permit was 
required for their seasonal unskilled labour (Chalcraft, 2009). When Syrian refugees in 2011 
sought to gain their livelihood in Lebanon they overwhelmingly did so through the informal job 
market as well. This allowed them to work more hours for less pay. Statistical reliable data on the 
exact jobs they occupied, the wages they received, and the conditions of their place of residence 
and work is practically unavailable. For comparison, in their report on Labour Market 
Implications of the crisis in Jordan and Lebanon, the European Commission elaborate on a 
labour market data graph for Jordan, and only on estimates for Lebanon (Errighi & Griesse, 
2016, p. 17), showing the difficulties International Organisations have in working in Lebanon and 
that there is no statistical proof of economic competition claims, even though the competition 
seems to strongly exist further to qualitative interviews. Discourse on economic competition 
between Syrians and Lebanese is predominantly based on educated guesses, analyses (though 
qualitatively telling and well documented) on limited areas, or snapshots, and qualitative case 
studies on specific areas. In 2013 for example, in an Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees 
in Lebanon and their Employment Profile, the ILO surveys 400 refugee households in four 
regions, a sample they deem “too small to make reliable generalisations about the entire 
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population of Syrian refugees, despite the valuable results the study was able to offer” (Masri & 
Srour, 2013, p. 11). The literature on the Lebanese labour market and the impact of Syrians on it 
systematically confirms the deteriorating socio-economic conditions (M. Harb, Kassem, & Najdi, 
2018, p. 3). Indeed,  
The prevailing perception is that these businesses are competition to the Lebanese 
(selling quality goods or services at lower market prices) leading to violent reactions 
on the part of host communities and municipalities. In recent events, several mayors 
closed down shops operated by Syrians in their localities150, accusing them of taking 
jobs away from the Lebanese. These violent reactions are, however, not 
corroborated by any hard data (M. Harb et al., 2018, p. 4) 
 
In addition, Syrian refugees are not allowed to open bank accounts in Lebanon. This 
means that their transactions are either done through Lebanese networks or in cash, and are also 
not reflected in the national economic statistics. In fact a study has challenged misconceptions on 
the negative role of Syrian refugees on the Lebanese economy showing that “in 2016, refugees 
spent US $378 million as a total amount for renting purposes. This is equivalent to US $1.03 
million a day. Furthermore, 7 percent of Syrian refugee households also cover the costs of their 
accommodation by working for their landlord” (Yassin, 2018). 
Status quo and data on housing   
 Data on housing is also insufficient, and the housing sector in general faces 
challenges not the least being that it is not considered a priority at the policy level. As is the case 
of the official report on the labour market by the CAS, the most recent official report on 
population and housing dates to 2012, and does not include statistics on informal housing. Out 
of an approximate 408,515 buildings in the country in 2005, it reports that half are not connected 
to a sewage system (Yaacoub & Badre, 2011, p. 14)151. Results of its surveys in 2009 suggest 
under occupation of dwellings in Beirut and Mount Lebanon and over occupation mainly in the 
North; and that 71 percent of dwelling are privately owned (Yaacoub & Badre, 2011, p. 14). 
Though indicative, these statistics however tend to reflect the reality of the absence of both 
                                                 
150 Similar to the example in the Conclusion to Part 1  
151 It is noteworthy that both reports by the CAS mentioned in this section were published between October 2011 and April 
2012  as part of a four-report series. They are captioned “prepared within the EU Twinning project to support the Central 
Administration of Statistics in Lebanon” (Yaacoub & Badre, 2011, 2012). The need a footnote number details of the kind of 
support are not mentioned but there are no EU contributors or authors included in the acknowledgements, which suggests 
the support was at least partially financial. There have been no follow up or updated reports since 2012 which in turn 
suggests the support was temporary and not part of a strategic or long-term plan. This trend is also very common in NGO 
partnerships in Lebanon.  It is mainly due to difficulty in cultivating long term relationships with partners in an atmosphere of 
unpredictability and political instability. It contributes to the lack of consistency in such efforts, the lack of follow up, a 
disruptive repetition in community support projects, over-funding in some areas and under-funding in other etc.   
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policy and effort or strategy for housing in Lebanon. The Ministry of Housing was dissolved in 
1996, six years after the official end of the Lebanese Civil War and two years after the 
establishment of Solidère, the company responsible for the reconstruction, development and 
maintenance of the downtown area of Beirut. Different institutions have consequently dealt 
directly with low income housing in Lebanon since then, including governmental and non-
governmental organisations, and religious entities.  
The first national institution is the Public Corporation for Housing (PCH) established in 
1996, and offers long-term housing loans at low interest rates. To be eligible the primary 
applicant or beneficiary must be “Lebanese for more than ten years” among other criteria.  These 
include having a formal job (at least one working member in the family) and the total revenue of 
the family (including active adult children) must not exceed the equivalent of $4,500 (4.000 €) - 
for a residence of a maximal value of $180,000 (160,000 €). The rules automatically exclude 
Palestinian refugees among other long term foreign residents such as the children of Lebanese 
mothers and foreign fathers (Syrian, Palestinian or other) who do not have Lebanese nationality. 
They also exclude vulnerable communities working, when they do, in the informal sector. While 
the institution was initially created with the main objective to “perform studies and housing 
surveys in all Lebanese regions and to facilitate the housing of beneficiaries [...]” (“Public 
Corporation for Housing,” 2018), there are no reports published on their website (Figure  4-11). 
The second national institution that deals with housing is the General Directorate of 
Cooperatives (DGC), under the Ministry of Agriculture, which has “undertaken only a few 
housing related initiatives, yet with limited success” (Fawaz et al., 2014, p. 18).  
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Figure  4-11: Screenshots of the Reports and Statistics pages on the PCH website 
The page includes no reports or statistics since 1996. Source: PCH Website Date: 2018 
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The Ministry of the Displaced was established in 1992 with the mandate to cover “all 
issues of the displaced in all Lebanese regions, to facilitate their return to their areas and villages, 
and to enhance and develop their socio-economic situation and to enable them to settle in their 
area of residence to be able to participate in full in their citizenship rights and duties” (Ministry of 
the Displaced, 2018). Their activities include supporting the reconstruction and resettlement 
issues of individuals displaced as a direct consequence of the Civil War and the July 2006 Israëli 
invasion of Lebanon by facilitating long term loans for those eligible to apply, through a 
Displacement Fund and partnerships with banks across the country. The Displacement Fund has 
“undertaken the rehabilitation of deteriorated neighbourhoods in Beirut and has built one large 
scale low income housing complex in Tripoli. Accusations of corruption have dogged the agency 
in the past” (Fawaz et al., 2014, p. 18). In fact the initial period of activity of the ministry was 
characterised by a “lack of coordination between the Ministry for the Displaced and the 
ministries in charge of infrastructure and social services. Cash payments were made to rebuild 
and restore houses in regions where the infrastructure and social services were inadequate if non-
existent”, while “elsewhere no restoration or reconstruction payments were available” (Assaf & 
El-Fil, 2000, p. 32). 
The non-governmental sector in Lebanon has taken some initiative to address the issue of 
housing as well. While limited in scope and reach, two projects have been realised. In the North, 
in the city of Tripoli, the Khan el Asaker building has been reconstructed and resettled families 
originating from the area, and funded by the World Bank. The other project was a new housing 
project elaborated for the fishermen from Tyr, the Al-Baqaa project (Dubin, 2017). In the case of 
Tripoli, the project was based on collabouration between the World Bank and the Municipality of 
Tripoli as the land is owned by the government, but in the case of Al-Baqaa project, the land was 
donated by the Greek Catholic Archdiocese and the funding came from the Association for the 
Development of Rural Capacities (ADR). The project most likely saw the light due to individual 
motivations and opportunities, as well as what was referred to by the ADR as flexibility of the 
civil society groups. “the clergy, frankly, has more money than the government. There is less 
political interference as well. The clergy also owes a lot to the people” (Dubin, 2017). 
 Lebanese policymakers have not engaged in property regularization and neighbourhood 
upgrading and perceive informal settlements as strictly undesirable, while as in many other 
contexts, they tend to criminalize their population (Fawaz et al., 2014, p. 17). “Even pro poor 
policies – such as rent control introduced in the period preceding the Civil War – have [...] been 
lifted. In 1992, rental agreements were liberalized, allowing rental prices to be set by the market” 
(Fawaz et al., 2014, p. 14). In 2013, the World Bank reported that Lebanon had been in a housing 
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crisis for three decades, and that furthermore 
escalating land prices and the absence of affordable housing has led to the 
development of marginalized poverty pockets and informal areas. These are located 
at the fringes and/or in the deteriorated areas and historic cores of cities in Lebanon. 
Low-income and poor dwellers resort to living in informal areas characterized by 
poor housing conditions and limited access to basic urban services and 
infrastructure. (Le Borgne et al., 2013). 
At the time of writing it is “safe to speak of an ongoing housing crisis, one that forces a 
substantial number of Lebanese citizens, refugees, and migrant workers to dwell in inadequate 
conditions, lacking security and access to basic services” (Fawaz, Salamé, & Serhan, 2017, p. 1).  
The Lebanese housing market is therefore largely dysfunctional and not for lack of 
recommendations or policy briefs. The Syrian refugee arrival and rapid increase in numbers 
added a level of complexity by affecting the rent rates. And as “rents have quickly risen, relatively 
low-cost housing in urban informal settlements increasingly attracts the poorest” (Ford & te 
Lintelo, 2018, p. 1). In their policy briefing, the authors note: 
Rents cause major worries and anxieties for both host and refugee communities, not 
least as forced evictions occur regularly. Additionally, frequent moves in search of 
affordable housing mean that it is hard to maintain social networks that could 
contribute to improved social cohesion and that are important to feelings of inclusion 
and wellbeing (Ford & te Lintelo, 2018, p. 2) 
Rents cause major worries and anxieties for both host and refugee communities, not least 
as forced evictions occur regularly. Additionally, frequent moves in search of affordable housing 
mean that it is hard to maintain social networks that could contribute to improved social 
cohesion and that are important to feelings of inclusion and wellbeing (Ford & te Lintelo, 2018, 
p. 2). 
The challenges of rent in Lebanon do not start with the Syrian refugee influx. Especially 
affecting Beirut as the capital, but across the country as well, the rent-control law enacted in 1944 
and suspended in 1992 is at the heart of a social crisis. Under this law tenants, and their 
descendants, have the right to extend the lease indefinitely at the same rate as long as they occupy 
the rented residence. During the Lebanese Civil War, the Lebanese pound dropped in value from 
an approximate 3 Lebanese Pounds to the Dollar in the early 1980s, to around 1,000 Pounds to 
the Dollar in 1990, to its worst value of around 2,500 Pounds to the Dollar in 1992, and has been 
fixed at an approximate 1,500 Pounds to the Dollar since 1998 (Banque du Liban, 2018). Rent 
control was of course set at a rate in Lebanese Pounds, and this has resulted in around 180,000 
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residences rented at extremely low rates in Beirut ($600 / year, for example). Those residences lie 
in the immediate proximity of apartments free of the rent control law (rented or constructed after 
1992), and have been the subject of heated and controversial debates since the end of the war.  
The Syrian refugee influx has affected rent in Lebanon in two main ways. In areas where 
the rent gap is attractive for investors, or where locals seek to reconstruct or develop their 
housing, it has    
provided a large pool of cheap construction labour, lowering construction costs for 
developers and thus enlarging the amount of potential rent that they can reap. Of 
course these refugees have influenced the housing market as well [Fawaz, 2017b; 
Picascia & Yorke-Smith, 2016; UN-Habitat & UNHCR, 2014]. Therefore, rent gaps in 
Beirut are influenced by civil, sectarian conflict and forced displacement up to this 
day (Krijnen, 2018, p. 1053).  
The refugee influx has thus caused middle class communities who cannot afford the 
potential rent of the residences they had occupied. Second, in the peripheries and areas where 
construction is largely informal and substandard, the influx has caused a rise in rental rates which 
has affected the quality of housing that vulnerable Lebanese communities can afford. 
Data on Syrian refugees between 2011 and 2018 
The increase of number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon was quick and 
substantial. In 2014, the UNHCR reported registering around 2,500 refugees per day, or over one 
per minute. The number grew from 6,000 in January 2012 to 1,000,000 in April 2014, and was 
dubbed a “devastating milestone” for the country (Amin, 2014). At this point Lebanon became 
the country with the “the highest per capita concentration of refugees worldwide” and was 
“struggling to keep pace” (Amin, 2014). The numbers continued to rise (with a fluctuation of 
3,000-5,000) to a high point of 1,185,241 on April 10, 2015 (UNHCR Data Portal, 2018). Since 
then, the number has been steadily decreasing to reach just over 950,000 at the time of writing.   
While these numbers are telling to a certain extent, they are underestimated as not all the 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon are registered with the UNHCR. In fact, several reasons discouraged 
refugees to register since the beginning of the crisis. First there is a politically driven set of 
reasons to avoid registration, or to be refused the possibility.  
There are many Syrians who have refused to register with UN agencies in Lebanon, 
out of fear that their names might be discovered by the Syrian government and that 
they might be accused of being defectors. Those with relatives still trapped in Syria 
often worry that they will be subject to reprisal attacks, or that they themselves will 
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be targeted if they ever return (Macfarlane, 2014). 
Since Lebanon is not a signatory of 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
Syrians who register do so for the humanitarian aid they would aspire for and not for refugee 
rights. Also, “some Syrians [did] not register out of fear. Minority communities and others 
[feared] that registration might bring retribution from other refugees or one of the many ethnic 
and religious groups within Lebanon” (Beals, 2013). Men fearing conscription who would have 
been arrested at an official crossing would also fear registering as refugees. They also include 
individuals who fear being identified by Syrian intelligence at the borders, for having taken part in 
protests or other political activities in Syria.  
The second set of reasons is socially and economically driven. There is a lot of stigma that 
is related to the label of a refugee: they are seen as vulnerable, disenfranchised, victims etc. Those 
refugees who could, or felt they could manage by themselves and did not want the stigma of 
being labeled refugees did not register. Those include the upper class of the Syrian communities, 
and the middle classe(s) who at first did not need assistance but may have struggled at later stages 
and opted to register.  
Within the repertoire of humanitarian concern, refugee now constitutes one of the 
most powerful labels. From the first procedures of status determination - who is a 
refugee? - to the structural determinants of life chances which this identity then 
engenders, labels infuse the world of refugees (Zetter, 1991, p. 39). 
“This has proven particularly true in Lebanon, where a wide array of modes of ordering 
have become central in shaping a Syrian individual’s chances in life” (Janmyr & Mourad, 2018). 
In fact being labeled a refugee in Lebanon is connected to a history of negative perceptions 
related to the Palestinian refugees, their role in the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and to the 
destituteness of their situation.The rejection of the term by the government further added to the 
stigma around it. Fear then, of social rejection or retribution from their own community (in 
Lebanon or in Syria) and from the Lebanese community has made many Syrians opt out of 
registering with the UNHCR. 
The last set of reasons accounting for the ambiguity surrounding the number of refugees 
in Lebanon are organisational and policy related. First, as per a Lebanese government’s decision 
to limit and decrease the number of Syrians in the country, it instructed the UNHCR to stop 
registering refugees, a decision that took effect on May 6, 2015 (Figure  4-12).  
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Figure  4-12: Suspension of registration of refugees 
Screenshot of the UNHCR Data Sharing Portal indicating that the organisation has suspended 
registration of refugees on May 6, 2015. Source: UNHCR Data Sharing Portal Date: 2018 
 
Moreover, the registration of children born to Syrian refugees in Lebanon is a real 
challenge (Figure  4-13). It involves at least three visits to different official entities with the proper 
paperwork (at a cost that could reach over 25€ without transportation cost). Often, certain 
documentation is required which the refugees cannot produce such as a marriage certificate or 
legal residence papers. The UNHCR may intervene in some instances, but the process is still 
difficult. In fact,  
UNHCR has estimated that 83 percent out of the 130,000 children born in Lebanon 
to Syrian refugees since 2011 do not have a legal birth registration. Barriers to 
acquire a civil status registration are many but primarily include a lengthy procedure, 
lack of refugees’ awareness about the requirements for registration as well as a lack 
of proof of marriage or legal stay documents that they usually do not possess after 
being displaced. Registering a child becomes even more difficult after the age of one 
year as late birth registration requires lengthy and expensive court procedures152 
(Yassin, 2018, p. 55) 
                                                 
152 In August 2018, the government started simplifying the court process for the registration of children. The new procedures 
come at a time where refugees have started to return to Syria, and having the correct paperwork is essential to that process. 
Source: Cherri, R. (August 16, 2018). Lebanon eases birth registration rules for Syrian refugees. 
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Figure  4-13: Requirement for birth registration for Syrian refugees 
Summary overview of documentary requirements and fees for each step of the birth registration 
process Source: UNHCR. Q&A on birth registration for Syrian refugees in Lebanon (Information 
flyer) (p. 5). Date: 2018 
These challenges allowed for an extreme margin of estimation on the actual number of 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and politicians used it as need be according to the situation. In 2017, 
the head of the General Security, Major General Abbas Ibrahim said “the number of refugees 
and displaced people exceeds 2.5 million” (The Daily Star, 2017), referring to all refugees 
including Palestinians and other nationalities. It is widely agreed that Palestinian refugees are 
around half a million, and refugees and displaced persons from other nationalities do not amount 
to over the tens of thousands. He therefore implied that there were 2,000,000 Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon of whom just shy of a million were registered with the UNHCR.  
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Other statistical, national data on infrastructure, civil status, crime, security, etc. are 
equally scarce and unreliable. This consistent lack of statistics, coupled with the extremely large 
number of refugees renders quantitative analysis almost always contestable. It also contributes to 
inconsistent information amongst actors, be they refugees or host communities. Generalisations 
like “they are taking all our jobs” or “they are violent”153 become current and increase tensions, 
and are difficult to manage in discussion. At the same time, it is interesting to note that the lack 
of resources could also represent social information in itself and point to certain intentional 
policies or other factors. The lack of statistics therefore allows generalisations on the situation of 
the refugees to go unchallenged. It could be said that in a way, these generalisations, especially 
when used satirically in discourse, are one mechanism that Lebanese use to release their stress in 
relation to the tension created by the situation (Figure  4-14). In her research on urban refugees in 
Maputo, Jeanne Vivet notes that the scarcity of resources should not be reduced to a simple 
methodological difficulty but that it also informs the research and can be an interesting element 
in terms of taboos on the politics surrounding the issue of the war in Mozambique154 (Vivet, 
2012, p. 97). 
 
Figure  4-14: Joke about Syrian refugees 
An example of a joke that circulated on social media regarding the generalisation that Syrians 
have taken over all the jobs. “Not every person who speaks Syrian is necessarily a Syrian….. it may 
well be a Lebanese looking for a job :)” 
                                                 
153 Various field interviews with Lebanese residents in the three case-study sites 2014-2018 
154 Original citation: “La rareté des sources ne saurait être réduite à une simple difficulté méthodologique ; elle renseigne 
aussi, et c'est l’élément le plus intéressant, sur le tabou de la guerre au Mozambique, les enjeux mémoriaux et politiques liés 
au conflit dans la société et les rapports de force qui la traversent” 
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Encadré  4-3: One Syrian for every two Lebanese 
Excerpt from John Chalcraft’s work on Syrian migration into Lebanon  
In July 1995, economist Michel Murqus published an article in the daily newspaper al-Nahar that 
sparked years of heated debate in the Lebanese press about the numbers and social impact of Syrian 
workers in Lebanon. Murqus’ headline stated that “1,435,991 Syrians have stayed in Lebanon since 
1993.” The headline was a bombshell: only in June 1994 the official figure had been 50,000. Murqus 
derived the new statistic by subtracting the number of border exits by Syrians from the number of 
their entries recorded by Lebanese General Security. This method gave the balance of Syrian 
migrants who stayed in Lebanon. If the Lebanese population was about 3 million, wrote Murqus, 
then “one Syrian lives in Lebanon for every two Lebanese.” Murqus’ numbers were developed and 
greatly extended in press organs opposed to the Syrian presence over the ensuing decade. Some 
headlines claimed that Syrians made up about half the population of Lebanon. The authority of this 
oppositional discourse was given a boost in August 1997 when the patriarch of the Maronite Church, 
Nasrallah Sfeir, endorsed a figure of 1.2 million Syrian workers, citing their competition with 
Lebanese workers as one of five “basic problems” facing the country. Numbers like this were later 
backed in certain academic quarters.  
The first major attempt to rebut Michel Murqus’ figures was a 1998 study for the Syrian-Lebanese 
Supreme Council by demographer Roger Sawaya, who claimed that Lebanon hosted no more than 
253,000 Syrian workers. He argued that Murqus’ numbers related to entries and exits, but not 
individuals. The same person could enter and exit 12 times a year, however, greatly inflating the 
gross figures. Further, exits were undercounted as many did not hand in their entry cards on 
departure in order to escape the exit fee from Syria on return. Moreover, Murqus’ calculations 
ignored the fact that many exits and entries registered not workers, but tourists, residents, visitors 
and students. Others picked up the baton, arguing that al-Nahar was biased, that Murqus’ figures 
were against all logic and science, and his estimates for workers by sector greatly exaggerated, his 
figures for remittances wildly inflated and his economics self-contradictory or simply wrong.  
Chalcraft, J. (2005). Of Specters and Disciplined Commodities: Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon. 
Middle East Report, (236), 28. 
 
4.2 Actors in the study and data collection tools 
Categories of actors  
During my fieldwork, I interacted with individuals who could be initially identified  in 
four broad categories : Syrian refugees, Lebanese hosts, Palestinian refugee-hosts and officials 
(including government and NGO staff). The course of my observations led me to nuance this 
first categorization, mobilizing criteria relating to each actor’s discourses to be able to move 
beyond a dichotomy based solely on the condition nationality (Lebanese/Syrian), official social 
status (citizen/refugee) or institutional/political affiliation. For example, I will show here how 
religious group and social class affiliation play an important role in the conditions of dwelling of 
APPROACH AND GUIDING FRAMEWORK  171 
 
both the Lebanese and the Syrians.  
With Syrian refugees in general, uncertainty was the an overwhelmingly present sentiment 
- though not always pronounced. Not having a choice in their present situation but more 
importantly the lack of predictability for their future was difficult for the refugees to understand 
and deal with. This uncertainty often rendered them emotional and highly sensitive. In addition 
there is a feeling of powerlessness that is difficult to manage especially in conversations - as 
certain aspects of their lives, they feel, may be dictated by the state, NGOs and host 
communities. Their daily routines consist either of applying different coping mechanisms to get 
through the day, and therefore when confronted with a researcher such as myself, they did not 
always know how to position themselves. It was very important to me to always explain my 
position and what I was there to do, and no to do. In many instances there was understandable 
reluctance to share their experiences with me, who in the midst of some their most difficult 
human experience, wanted to basically understand what it felt like.   
Lebanese generally shared frustration in the interviews, as the situation seemed unfair to 
most of those I interviewed. In contrast to my interviews with the Syrian refugees, the Lebanese 
in general were much less reluctant to sharing their opinions. Mostly, the frustration stemmed 
from a feeling of loss of ownership, and specifically of the public space, and a perceived loss of 
job opportunities. There was consistent discourse amongst my interviewees around the 
limitations of the country in hosting refugees. In some instances, my interviewees were uneasy - 
and a few times hostile - especially when I wanted to understand the nature of their (economic) 
relations with the refugees.  
With the Palestinians, conversations oscillated between two scopes and moved from: 
“We have been forgotten, the UNHCR does more for the Syrians than the UNRWA for us”, to: 
“we understand it, but we are frustrated”, to “they are actually taking all our opportunities”, to 
“they are refugees as well so we understand”, and almost always ended with “they will always 
have a country to go back to”. This reflected the pending social state in which Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon find themselves in 2018. They tend to have most of the same reactions and 
discourses that the Lebanese hosts have, and at the same time show a deeper understanding of 
the Syrian refugees situation albeit noting their own impossibility of returning to their homeland.  
During each field trip, I had formal and informal conversations with members of each 
group in order to have elements of comparison of the different temporal stages. I also wanted to 
observe and “report on the brutality of daily life which [the researchers / anthropologists] 
routinely witness in their practice, without sensationalizing or trivializing it (Perdigon, 2010, p. 
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973). To do so I avoided being immersed into only refugee discourse, or only host discourse, or 
only official discourse (such as NGOs or government officials).  
Systematic and situated observation 
The sheer number of Syrian refugees in all the sites of my fieldwork meant that there was 
no lack of opportunity to observe. I often started my day with an informal discussion with a 
servees driver and other clients. I followed that up with another informal chat with the owner of 
some random coffee kiosk over a cup of turkish coffee in a small caramel plastic cup. During the 
field trips I then experienced and practiced three types of observation. First, in almost all my field 
visits, I set aside time for the ‘whatever happens or does not’. I would walk around sometimes 
with my camera visible, sometimes taking notes. I paid attention to noise and smell and mostly I 
listened and looked on “passively”. In these instances I planned a pause every two or three hours 
to note down the feel of the place. Second, I would keep the same informal practice of the space 
but I would seek to engage in conversations with people. I kept in mind the “basic ethnographic 
questions [that] persist and guide us: how do city dwellers go about meeting the exigencies of 
their everyday lives; what is their interpretation and ‘definition of the situation’; and how 
ultimately do they make sense of their social worlds?” (Anderson, 2009). During this type of 
observation I began to notice the different ways dwellers engaged with me - some trends started 
to form; some were more open and curious while others were reluctant. The third type of 
observation was the most formal. I would engage in discussion with a person or group whom I 
had pre-identified, I would formally introduce myself and spend a couple of hours, sometimes 
more, with them in a shop or public space. In these instances I would return a second and third 
time - leaving a day or two between visits, to continue to my observation.  
I had some limitations during observation. Occasionally, I would be stopped and asked 
why I was carrying a camera, and rarely I was asked not to linger in a space. This happened in one 
part of El-Nab’a when I was trying to approach people near a mosque, and in Tebbeneh in a 
street off of Syria Street. According to Bourdieu, reflexivity necessitates the deconstruction of a 
researcher’s unconscious knowledge, and a re-examination of the underlying purposes of the 
choice of subject in order to identify and break with the ‘blind spots indicative of her/his own 
vested interests’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 259). A decade later he developed:  
one does not have to choose between participant observation, a necessarily 
fictitious immersion in a foreign milieu, and the objectivism of the ‘gaze from afar’ of 
an observer who remains as remote from himself as from his object. Participant 
objectivation undertakes to explore not the ‘lived experience’ of the knowing subject 
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but the social conditions of possibility – and therefore the effects and limits – of that 
experience and, more precisely, of the act of objectivation itself. It aims at 
objectivizing the subjective relation to the object which, far from leading to a 
relativistic and more-or-less anti scientific subjectivism, is one of the conditions of 
genuine scientific objectivity (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 282) 
A researcher needs to own his or her subjectivity and in doing so objectivize the relation 
with the field and the process of observation. “It is this double truth, objective and subjective, 
which constitutes the whole truth of the social world” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 255).  
Qualitative interviews 
Stories – in particular, migrant stories – have become a favoured way to address the 
interplay of identity and migration (Halfacree and Boyle 1993; Lawson 2000). These 
are not the popular fictionalized stories of migration and identity, but rather the 
stories told by migrants about their migrant lives or the stories told by researchers 
about their direct or indirect encounters with migrants (Gilmartin, 2008). 
In the introduction to this chapter I spoke of my ‘nativeness’ as a researcher in my 
chosen field. Dealing with this was perhaps most evident for me when conducting interviews, 
specifically with the Syrian and Palestinian refugees but also with my Lebanese interviewees in 
different manners. “Even as insiders or partial insiders, in some contexts we are drawn closer, in 
others we are thrust apart. Multiple planes of identification may be most painfully highlighted 
among anthropologists who have identities spanning racial or cultural groups (Abu- Lughod 
1988, 1991; Kondo 1986,1990; Lavie, 1990)” cited in (Narayan, 1993).  
With thousands, or tens of thousands of refugees in each of my three study sites, and 
over a million and a half in the country at one point, a real representative sample of the refugee 
community was an impossibility. I privileged a qualitative approach and an open-ended, 
comprehensive style of interviews155. For the most part, I interviewed my participants in an 
informal place of their choice, or their homes.  
I also conducted focus groups in the offices of two local NGOs in Tebbeneh and 
Zahlé156. In a relatively short amount of time, these collective interviews allowed me to observe 
interaction between members of each group. Indeed, a focus group “can yield quality research 
and it is at the heart of scientific debate because it challenges the researcher to analyse the 
                                                 
155 See Kaufmann, J.-C., & Singly, F. de. (2016). L’entretien compréhensif. Paris: Armand Colin 
156 At the start of the research I had planned to include Zahlé as a site in the study, and had begun research there and in 
Tripoli during the first year. Further to many discussions with my directors we decided to focus on Beirut and Tripoli, as the 
urban milieu of the Beqa’ in general differs from that of the two largest cities of Beirut and Tripoli in that on the whole it is 
more rural and agricultural, and secondly that the overwhelming presence of Syrian refugees in the Beqa’ is in informal 
settlements. We decided instead to focus on the dense neighbourhoods in the peripheries of Beirut and Tripoli.   
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collective and individual dynamics157” (Duchesne & Haegel, 2004, p. 122). Having moderated 
many focus groups in my previous experiences in the civil society, I was aware of some of the 
practical challenges and limitations of this method. For example, the focus group dynamic as well 
as the discussions that ensue are highly affected by the selection of the group members. At the 
same time, it is never easy to insure the presence of members invited to a focus group 
(specifically when it is not paid for). It is therefore a good idea to seek to have 18 invitations to 
end up with 10-15 participants. The information I could get from a focus group could be 
subjective to a certain degree and could be swayed by group dynamics.  
A particular concern with using focus group methodology is the ethical issues 
involved of having more than one research participant at a time. This has two 
implications: ﬁrst people may be uncomfortable with talking about their concerns in a 
group context, whether with strangers or with people they know. Sometimes group 
members may not respond appropriately to other members’ disclosures. (Smithson, 
2007, p. 359). 
 
It could at the same time show a lot of the collective feelings in the community and it 
could definitely connect me with individuals with whom I would go on to have more in depth 
interviews. I sought the support of my network at two NGOs (UTOPIA in Tripoli and NAJDA 
Now in the Bekaa) to set up the groups. I finalised the selection criteria for the participants with 
members of the NGO who were connected with the community members through their job, and 
therefore knew them to a certain extent.  Once everyone was in place, I took permission to film 
and animated the discussions in as much an open way as possible, leaving space for the 
participants to interact and posing an occasional question or remark when I felt the discussion 
started to derail.  
In the case of formal interviews, I would only sit with a willing interviewee after having 
gotten to know them in another setting. I had either met them during my observation, or they 
would have heard about my work and sought me out158, or they would have been referred by 
another person I met at a focus group. I usually had a list of themes in my field notebook which I 
used as my talking points but no defined questions (Figure  4-15). Those themes were nuanced 
                                                 
157 Original citation: “il peut donner lieu à des travaux de qualité et il est au cœur de débats scientifiques stimulants, 
notamment parce qu’il met le chercheur au défi de saisir l’imbrication du collectif et de l’individuel” 
158 Especially in Tebbeneh and Bourj el-Barajneh, less in El-Nab’a, word of mouth travels fast and many people were curious 
about what a female researcher with a camera was doing. Many times people would come up to me and ask about the 
reasons behind my presence. They would especially want to know if I was there to map the area for development purposes 
and with whom I worked, because they would have one or more requests for their individual needs. I was also often mistaken 
for someone from the “Embassy” (any embassy), and they would want to ask about procedures or whether I was seeking 
potential migrants. I disappointed many residents with my real purpose… 
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and developed between interviews and from one field trip to the next. In fact I tried to speak less 
and listen more, and left time for silence. I used a lot of “Ah”s, and “OK”s, followed by “but 
how?” “I did not understand why...” thus inviting my participants to say more.  I started every 
interview with: “tell me about how you got here”, and almost always ended it with: “would you 
be able to tell a Syrian from a Lebanese at a distance? How?”  
 
 
Figure  4-15: Themes to refer to during interviews 
Source: Field notebook 
Many participants were taken aback very suspicious by my type of questions. Many were 
taken aback by the interest I showed to understand ‘why’ they acted the way they did in a certain 
situation. In the case of the Syrian refugees interviewees specifically, I was surprised at the fact 
that they almost all arrived with ‘proof’ on hand. “Here look, my brother has rented the 
apartment since 2007”, they might say, while holding the informal document signed at some 
notary public office but not registered in the correct channels. “Wallah w-raḥmet abi…” (I swear 
by God, on my father’s soul), they would start their account on how much assistance they have 
received from the UNHCR, for example. At night when transcribing or adding notes, and back 
behind my screen, I would resist the urge to (over) interpret using my personal lens, and be true 
to the description of the accounts of my participants. Sometimes, listening to a recording I would 
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Photography and videography  
“Photography is considered a means to simultaneously document social conditions and to 
bear witness to them, in order to instigate actions to counter misery”159 (Raoulx, 2004, p. 125). 
Doing fieldwork in geography necessitates and even invites the use of multiple methods and 
therefore any tool that may add to the ethnographic understanding of a society must be exploited 
to further that knowledge. “Geography as a discipline would benefit greatly from expanding the 
researcher’s toolset to include the consistent use of digital video, especially in ethnographic 
contexts” argued Bradley Garrett in 2011. He explains:   
video is capable of offering an alternative form of representation, something 
inherently different in terms of both production and consumption from text, 
photographs, performance, aural media, etc. (Witmore, 2005). The process of 
making video as part of our research process is [...] both of scholarly value and 
useful for expanding interest in geographic research to wider audiences (Garrett, 
2011). 
However, visual representations as tools are neither new nor innovative for ethnography. 
In fact the first ethnographic film by French physicist Félix‑Louis Regnault dates back to the 
1880s. He used it to study cross-cultural phenomena through film, and “argued for the formation 
of anthropological film archives as early as 1912” (Harper, 2000). Today and with the large access 
we have to high quality digital media, it seems evident that still photography and videos alike 
should find their way into scientific methodology. I used photos and videos throughout my 
observation phases and less during interviews. Although I felt that as a method they could be 
interesting, I could not deny the fact that the moment I proposed using a camera to film and 
more intensely the moment it rolled, there was a new filter and participants were conscious of the 
fact they were being filmed (much more so than with a voice recorder, and even that was 
sometimes undesired by the participants). With time and experience I was able to know at what 
point a participant would be more inclined to accept being filmed, and I would not propose it 
unless I felt a certain value for its later use. For “a video is ‘ethnographic’ when its viewer(s) judge 
that it represents information of ethnographic interest” (Pink, 2007, p. 79). Another challenge 
was the fear of normalising or beautifying marginality and poverty. Instinctively I wanted to take 
“nice” photos and videos. When possible I waited for the right light, I took several pictures of a 
situation or place, thought of the cadre of the photo etc. At the same time my photos were meant 
to provide a certain ethnographic sense and their technical beauty was less relevant. Especially 
                                                 
159 Original citation: “La photographie est désormais considérée comme un moyen à la fois de documenter les conditions 
sociales et d’en témoigner, afin de susciter des actions contre la misère” 
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when filming commented walks, I had trouble keeping the camera fixed. At first it frustrated me 
and I stopped my interviewee or asked them to walk slower for example, but I felt I started to 
lose the spontaneity of the situation and decided to prioritise the rhythm of the walk over the 
quality of the video. It is true that “Filming marginality leads to a difficult position. The 
conditions of directing and articulating could lead to rendering misery exotic, to double social 
distance with the condition of marginality, in a similar manner to colonial imagery160” (Raoulx, 
2004, p. 134). 
An ethnographic film of an interview or a person works differently, almost moving 
backwards, from a written text and may therefore offer different but complementary knowledge. 
In that it is largely more accessible, especially to a wide public, its wager is to “stage a character 
filmed in its present reality, with the desire that the viewer first understands its singularity and 
eventually projects him or herself into it, identifies with it and / or distinguishes him or herself 
from it”161 (Friedmann, 2006, p. 18). Indeed, recently social scientists have used this method to 
“give a voice to the accounts mentioned in the [research]162” (Buire, 2010, p. 11), and to “aspire 
to show that the city - from the intimacy of the home to the street - is not a fixed 
system163”(Dahdah, 2015, p. 82). 
I experimented in ethnographic filmmaking within the “Research and film in Human 
Sciences”164 program in 2016. My colleagues and I focused on the gestures and interactions of 
                                                 
160 Original citation: “Photographier la marginalité, toutefois, conduit à un positionnement difficile. Les conditions de 
réalisation et d'énonciation peuvent mener à exotiser la misère, à redoubler la distance sociale avec la condition de 
marginalité, selon un procédé similaire à l’imagerie coloniale”. 
161 Original extended citation: “La sociologie textuelle des recherches écrites procède de façon symétrique ; elle s’efforce, 
par la construction que Max Weber appelle l’« idéal-type », de concevoir une abstraction rationnelle, irréelle, sans existence 
empirique, et donc idéale, qui va permettre de comprendre non seulement les aspects essentiels d’un phénomène social 
singulier mais aussi en quoi il se distingue d’autres phénomènes sociaux ressemblants, mais antérieurs ou ultérieurs, et 
donc typiques. Le pari documentaire va à rebrousse-poil, il met en scène le personnage pris dans le réel, avec le désir que 
le spectateur en comprenne d’abord la singularité puis éventuellement se projette en lui, s’y identifie et/ou s’en distingue” 
(Friedmann, 2006). 
162 Original citation: “Mais au delà de la description factuelle, la vidéo permet de donner une voix aux discours évoqués dans 
l’article. Après avoir suggéré comment lesquels les chercheurs contribuent à la construction des discours identitaires, je 
voulais redonner la parole à un individu particulier. Ce qui en ressort est surtout la remarquable adéquation entre les fils 
d’explication proposés par Eugene pour décrire son itinéraire et les grands récits historiques construits scientifiquement” 
(Buire, 2010 p.11). 
163 Original citation: “l’analyse de l’image peut être à la fois celle du sujet qui est filmé et celle de l’environnement 
géographique dans lequel se déroule l’action, nous permettant d’étudier les acteurs, leurs pratiques et les temporalités, 
l’espace support et enjeu de l’action. À cet égard, le film peut être une « méthode alternative pour produire de l’information 
géographique » [BROWAEYS 1999 cité par SIMOES 2012 : 2] pour une géographie qui aspire à montrer que la ville – 
depuis l’intimité du logement jusqu’à la rue –, n’est pas un système figé” (Dahdah, 2015 p.82). 
164 Information on the the research workshop. “Film et Recherche en Sciences Humaines" (FRESH) propose de travailler les 
résonances entre cinéma documentaire - et plus globalement des approches documentaires : photographie, notamment- et 
recherche en sciences sociales, dans une optique transdisciplinaire. Ce  programme s’appuie sur un « triangle » entre la 
Maison de la Recherche en Sciences Humaines (MRSH) de l’Université de Caen Basse-Normandie,  la Maison des 
Sciences de l’Homme en Bretagne (MSHB, Rennes) et des  professionnels de l'image (documentaristes). 
http://www.unicaen.fr/recherche/mrsh/fresh 
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illegal migrants in France when managing mundane but necessary logistics. In a video 
ethnographic vignette, we shared excerpts of the routine of migrants in squats in northern 
Europe, and offered viewers a window to their daily struggles, their resilience and resourcefulness 
but also their hardship amid the stresses of an uncertain future165. The program was imagined in 
the “interest of develop[ing] the documentary film as a fully-fledged method of research” as it 
“involves recognizing the role of subjectivity - the gaze - in the construction of awareness, a stage 
which precedes objectivation” (Dickason & Raoulx, 2007, p. 205). This experience prepared me 
for some of the practical aspects of using video in the field. 
Ultimately, I decided on using what I call “snippets” of the videos I recorded. In very 
short time-frames, the videos will portray one or two of the elements that I speak of in this 
thesis; their value will mostly be in representing a holistic vision of the field. Sometimes attention 
will be on the noise level, other times on the infrastructure, or on a specific event of comment 
from one of my interviewees who accepted to be filmed.  
Commented walks 
This method is one I particularly enjoyed during the fieldwork. It is the time my 
interviewees were most at ease, and the discussions were most organic. “Commented walks 
obviously draw on the reflexive capacity of human actors and on their ability to understand, 
describe and interpret the situations in which they find themselves” (Thibaud, 2013, p. 15). 
Rather than answer my questions generally in a closed space, commented walks placed my 
interviewees in the lead - which created a different feel and pace to the discussions. What was 
also interesting for me, beyond their explanations on how they use the space, their mobility 
patterns, etc. was to notice how empowered, or not, they were in certain parts. There were clear 
differences, for example, between the commented walks I took with residents and with refugees 
on the same routes, in their mannerisms, in the elements they pointed out, in the rhythm of their 
walk.   
While on their own “the results obtained from commented walks raise the question of 
whether such naturalistic observation is actually possible” (Thibaud, 2013, p. 16), because of the 
technical difficulties they incur (noise, movement, blur etc) I believe they are effective as a 
complement to a set of observation and data collection tools, and have added value to my 
understanding of the spaces where I worked.  
In general, I did not ask for, or use, any security clearances during my walks (or 
                                                 
165 http://www.unicaen.fr/recherche/mrsh/forge/4415 
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observation). During one of my first interviews in Bourj Hammoud which happened to be with 
the Vice President of the municipality, he insisted on the secure nature of the area in 2015, but he 
also insisted I be accompanied by a member of the municipality security forces at all times while 
doing fieldwork, and asked me to fill out an official request for approval to take photographs, 
detailing my research (Figure  4-17). When I asked him about the need for security he suggested 
that as a female with a camera, I risked being stopped and interrogated about my presence 
“especially in certain streets” (Georges Krikorian, Vice President of Bourj Hammoud Municipality, personal 
interview, 2015). In subsequent field visits I did not abide by the recommendations of the 
municipality, not wanting the presence of a security officer with me for the purposes of the 
research. I was often stopped and asked about my presence (by Lebanese dwellers, not once by 
someone from another nationality), and especially about my camera, and during commented 
walks I would be warned several times to hide my camera in certain streets, and not to take 
photos of certain elements, such as mosques166. It seemed as though the simple act of taking a 
photograph of a building or a street could create tension. At the same time, I was almost never 
denied an interview and my questions were always answered. In fact, those who did stop me to 
ask about my camera allowed me some of my most accessible, and welcome, informal chats.  
  
Figure  4-17: Permission to take photos 
(left) Request of permission to photograph in El-Nab’a (right) Approval of request. Source: 
Personal field documents. Date: 2015. 
Graffiti as social expression   
In 1976, Gonos, Mulkren and Poushinsky argued that graffitists may use their writings to 
manifest content which is otherwise restricted or taboo within their social life, and that it is the 
                                                 
166 I had the same experience in Tebbeneh and Bourj el-Barajneh, where I was often stopped and asked about what I was 
doing, and often requested not to photograph in certain streets. 
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5. Submitting to the personal aspects of field investigation 
It is important for me to further underline some elements related to the context within 
which I undertook this research project in 2014. Pierre Bourdieu has stated: 
I believe that the researcher can and must mobilize his experience, that is, his  past, 
in all his acts of research. But he is entitled to do so only on condition that he 
submits all these returns of the past to rigorous scientific examination. For what has 
to be questioned is not only this reactivated past but one’s entire relation to this past 
which, when it acts outside of the controls of consciousness, may be the source of a 
systematic distortion of evocation and thus of the memories evoked. Only a genuine 
socio-analysis of this relation, profoundly obscure to itself, can enable us to achieve 
the kind of reconciliation of the researcher with himself, and his social properties, 
that a liberating anamnesis produces167 (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 291).  
I was born in Paris to a Palestinian mother and a Syrian father, and spent most of my life 
in Lebanon. I was seven years old when my family moved indefinitely to Bayrut el Shar’iyyeh (East 
Beirut) in Lebanon. It was 1985, at the heart of the Civil War. Before school started I clearly 
remember my mother’s repeated warnings about my pronunciation: “When you are in school, 
you say beib not bab (different pronunciations of the word: door); you say banadoura not bandora 
(different pronunciations of the word: tomato)168. Don’t let anyone know you’re Palestinian, and 
don’t say you’re Syrian either - speak in English whenever you can.” I did not understand why at 
the time, but I grew up afraid anyone would find out what I then considered a secret. Eventually 
my family gained citizenship as part of the 1994 naturalisation decree169. When I graduated as an 
architect in Lebanon, I was shocked and saddened that actually, I was not allowed to be a 
syndicated architect in my country, as I had not been an official Lebanese citizen for ten years... 
Several such anecdotes remain very present in my mind. Perhaps the following one will in a small 
way reflect some Lebanese community perceptions of Syrians, as they became clearer to me in 
my adulthood, and even more precise during this research. Almost two decades after my 
mother’s accent and pronunciation lessons, an incident brought nationality and identity to the 
                                                 
167 Original citation: “je crois profondément que le chercheur peut et doit mobiliser son expérience, c’est-à-dire ce passé, 
dans tous ses actes de recherche. Mais qu’il n’est en droit de le faire qu’à condition de soumettre tous ces retours du passé 
à un examen critique rigoureux. Ce qu’il s’agit de mettre à la question, en effet, ce n’est pas seulement le passé réactivé, 
mais tout le rapport à ce passé qui, lorsqu’il agit inconsciemment, peut être au principe d’une distorsion systématique de 
l’évocation et, par là, des souvenirs évoqués. Seule une véritable socioanalyse de ce rapport, profondément obscur à lui-
même, peut permettre d’accéder à cette sorte de réconciliation du chercheur avec lui-même, et avec ses propriétés sociales, 
que produit une anamnèse libératrice” (Bourdieu, 2003) 
168 The pronunciation of the word ‘tomato’ specifically is very symbolic. It is widely told that at Phalangist checkpoints in 
Beirut during the early years of the war, people were asked to name the tomato and those who named it with a Palestinian 
accent were immediately executed. (Friedman, 2017; Dean, 2016; de Bréadún, 2006; Sirhan, 2014)     
169 See Encadré  
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forefront of my psyche. A colleague/friend whom I had been working with for years literally 
cried when she found out, during casual conversation, that I was of immediate Syrian descent. 
Her initial reaction was of satirical disbelief (echoed by mine) and shock; she thought she was 
being pranked. When eventually she understood that this was a fact, she started apologizing 
profusely - “for the mockery” she said, for the stereotyping, and for the hatred she had shown to 
Syrians. Her reaction was so emotional and organic that it profoundly touched me. She was the 
only one in our team of around fifteen people who did not know about my descent. At that time, 
I had not made efforts to either hide the fact or talk about it openly, the others just knew… We 
had a long discussion after that, in which she explained to me where her hatred for Syrians came 
from, it had stemmed from the years of the war, when her village was occupied by the Syrian 
army. Some time later, she said that the incident had changed her. While it did touch me, the 
incident did not have the same effect for me. I was already used to the idea of difference, identity, 
meeting the unknown other… After all, I grew up a non-Maronite Christian, Palestino-Syrian in 
the ultra-Maronite Mount Lebanon of the 1980s170. Unlike the families of most of my classmates 
at the time, my parents opted to move me to my school’s branch in West-Beirut soon after the 
civil war ended. It was with apprehension that I met Lebanese Muslims for the first time in 1992 
as I discovered a very different kind of city in the country I called home.171 
I am curious about some of the most basic and simple questions about how dwellers are 
experiencing the cities in Lebanon... how they “go about meeting the exigencies of their everyday 
lives [...] and how ultimately they make sense of their social worlds” (Anderson, 2009). But as 
Kirin Narayan points out, every researcher has “threads of a culturally tangled identity to 
demonstrate that a person may have many strands of identification available, strands that may be 
tugged into the open or stuffed out of sight” (Narayan, 1993). Having a mixed background she 
argues “marks one as inauthentic for the label of “native” (Narayan, 1993). In reality I struggle 
with defining myself as a local or native researcher. My being Lebanese is highlighted by the 
diversity of my immediate descent and my cultural and educational backgrounds, and 
complemented by my early years in the UAE and my higher study experience in England.  
My network further to many years of work experience in civil society circles have allowed 
me relatively quick and broad access to the different actors in my field. My fluent knowledge of 
                                                 
170 In these areas especially during the Lebanese Civil War, Palestinians and Syrians, being synonymous with Arabs and 
Muslims were undesired dwellers; I have never resided in Syria or Palestine and my knowledge of both countries stems 
mainly from family stories and touristic visits. 
171 On the first day of school in West Beirut, my physics professor said: “the three kids from Ain Aar, stand up”. (Ain Aar was 
the town where the branch in East Beirut was located). This reflected how exotic the three of us were, some of the first who 
had crossed the east-west line. The school bus driver who was from West Beirut agitatedly exclaimed on the way back to my 
house: “do you live on the moon?”, it was the first time he had been in my area, at 400m above sea level 
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the language and culture, with the accent nuances that come more or less naturally to me in the 
different settings have allowed me to build rapport relatively quickly with people in place. 
Moreover, “being an Arab woman in the field can constitute a vantage point with the potential to 
enable a more nuanced, less gender-biased and less Western-centric take not just on women’s 
worlds but on social realities of the Arab region more generally” (Kanafani & Sawaf, 2017). At 
the same time, during most of my fieldwork I have not been able to ignore the ways in which my 
social background and class has allowed me to bypass many of the social inequalities I witnessed 
during my fieldwork (Narayan, 1993). In that sense I have felt a clear dichotomy in my 
nativeness.  
I approached my field with the belief that by asking the simple questions, the deeper 
issues would spontaneously emerge. To have enough first hand field material and distanced 
analysis in order to reflect on how people are living their everyday lives in an exceedingly 
complex urban and socio-political context, and how this manifests in urban life. My approach is 
essentially qualitative, inspired by urban ethnography methods.  
The fieldwork and consequent reflections which I draw upon for this dissertation are at 
the core of the work, and the essential steps that have led to analysing the different issues and 
perhaps answering some of the questions. For “to understand the reality of a localised social 
group in its globality and complexity, social fieldwork is necessary”172 (Kayser, 1978, p. 11). I have 
used urban ethnography methods as “defined to include those studies which employ participant 
observation and intensive qualitative interviewing 'to convey the inner life and texture of the 
diverse social enclaves and personal circumstances of urban societies'” (Jackson, 1985). Within it 
I seek to understand a snapshot (both temporal and spatial) of the urban life of three different 
neighbourhoods in cities in Lebanon, within the larger social and historical context, and 
continuum of the cohabitation of different populations. As such, this research is an attempt to 
apply interdisciplinary and cross scale lenses at different intervals in order to achieve this 
understanding.  
Privileging the “central place of social interaction in ethnographic fieldwork” (Emerson, 
2009), I spent time observing and discussing instances of social interaction that I witnessed. 
‘How’ the actors interacted, the spatial dimensions of this interaction, and also ‘when’ and 
importantly ‘why’. In many ways, the subject is national and touches every community. As such, 
even upon arriving at the airport, and taking the first taxi, my fieldwork began. Every driver had a 
story and a point of view and these bits and pieces have also fed into my understanding. In this 
                                                 
172 Original citation: "… de découvrir dans sa complexité et sa globalité la réalité d’un sous-système social localisé? Dans ce 
cas, c’est bien de l’enquête qu’il s’agit." 
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way I look at my field trips as “a human experience before anything, made of encounters” (Vivet, 
2012, p. 99). Indeed, “the ethnographer’s ‘states of being’, including the ‘emotions, reactions, and 
experiences that are consistently evoked’ in her (Davies & Spencer, 2010 p:1), are not only 
enabling and conducive to the process of learning fieldwork, but they are also ultimately 
amenable to ethnographic knowledge making.” (Kanafani & Sawaf, 2017). 
Encadré  4-4: Conversations with taxi and servees drivers 
Over the course of four years of field trips I used taxis and servees as my preferred method of 
transportation within the cities when doing field work. It wasn’t difficult to start up a conversation 
with the driver about the situation in Lebanon and specifically the refugees. Although a few times I 
immediately knew the chat would be futile and promptly ended the discussion, I found that many 
times the drivers would shed an interesting light on the situation, and would suggest where or whom 
I should consider interviewing. I have over 24 chats noted in my field journals, some too quickly 
interrupted when a new client hopped in the car and some redundant or quite superficial. 
Specifically, seven of these interviews have found their way into my study and are included in my 
analyses.   
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5. Chapter 4. 
Case studies 
in context 
 
 
 
 
 
251 are the localities in Lebanon where 67 percent of the poorest Lebanese live and 
where 87 percent of Syrian refugees are hosted In Lebanon, the same areas that 
are home to the most impoverished Lebanese are hosting the vast majority of Syrian 
refugees. 87 percent of Syrian refugees and 67 percent of poorest Lebanese are 
living in the 251 most vulnerable cadasters of the country. These areas characterize 
the geography of poverty in Lebanon, and were already marked by poverty, youth 
unemployment, and high demand for basic services prior to the crisis. The Syrian 
crisis has put more strains on these issues especially that public institutions have 
limited capacities to deal with the vulnerabilities of Lebanese and Syrian 
communities alike. For instance, municipalities which are the first responders, main 
service providers, and guardians of security in these disadvantaged areas were 
already overburdened before the crisis and are still struggling to deal with the 
situation. (Yassin, 2012, p. 41) 
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1 The three case study sites: justification and characteristics  
“Social fieldwork [is] inevitably global or encompassing, although applied to a fraction, 
spatialised or otherwise determined, of social structure173” (Kayser, 1978, p. 11). One of the 
founding steps of a research study is choosing sites for fieldwork. Lebanon is at least 80 percent 
urban174 with the largest populations and population densities in the cities of Beirut and Tripoli 
consecutively. In 2008 the UNDP reported that the poverty ratio175 reaches 28.5 percent 
(accounting for about one million Lebanese) including 8 percent extreme poverty176 (Laithy et al., 
2008). The settlement of over a million refugees between 2011 and 2015 in the country has been 
predominantly urban. In fact only thirty percent of the refugees stay in informal settlements in 
the Bekaa and in the North. Their trajectories were most often, at least in the beginning of the 
influx, linked to pre-existing family and community networks within Lebanon. The majority of 
the Syrian refugees are of the Sunni confession. Figure  5-1 reflects the predominant presence of 
the Lebanese Sunni communities in Beirut and its suburbs, and in the North governorate. 
Moreover, the UNDP report of 2008 also showed that “the North has the lowest per capita 
expenditure, it exhibits the highest inequality compared to that in other governorates” (Laithy et 
al., 2008). 
I focused on the poor suburbs of Beirut and the North as sites that could reflect the 
different expressions of the social transformation provoked by this massive migration movement. 
I looked for neighbourhoods which were traditionally diverse - both socially and in terms of 
religious affiliation - and accessible for refugees due mainly to low rent rates. Upon preliminary 
investigation with key informants in those two cities, I started an observation phase in the 
neighbourhoods of Tebbeneh and el-Nab’a. In addition, the specificity of the Palestinian camps 
in Lebanon as hosts to Syrian refugees needed to be addressed. The proximity of Bourj el-
Barajneh with Beirut, in addition to its density made it an interesting place to examine.    
 
                                                 
173 Original citation: “L’enquête sociale, [est] nécessairement globale ou globalisante, quoique appliqué à une fraction, 
spatialisée ou autrement déterminée, de la formation sociale.” (Kayser, 1978 p.11) 
174 While there is no official definition of the term urban in Lebanon, urbanists and the UN-Habitat concur that over 80 percent 
of the population in Lebanon live in urban areas, with some suggesting that Lebanon may be considered 100 percent urban 
(Fawaz, 2017) 
175 Between $ 2.4 and $ 4 per capita per day. (Laithy, Abu Ismael, & Hamdan, 2008) 
176 Under $ 2.4 per capita per day.” (Laithy, Abu Ismael, & Hamdan, 2008) 
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Figure  5-1: Distribution of registered Muslim electors in Lebanon 
Electors do not necessarily reside where they vote, rather where their family roots are registered. 
Date: 2007, Source: Verdeil, É., Faour, G., & Velut, S. (2007). Atlas du Liban: Territoires et société.  
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shows the most vulnerable localities. While these are present all over the country, Mount 
Lebanon has the least number of vulnerable localities or cadastres. Instead those are more heavily 
concentrated around the major cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Tyre, and the border areas in the Bekaa.   
 
Figure  5-3: Vulnerable Cadasters in Lebanon 
Based on the 2004 Multi-Deprivation Index from CAS, UNDP and MoSA, 2002 CDR data on the 
Lebanese population, and UNHCR and UNRWA figures on Syrian refugees (2014), Palestinian 
refugees from Lebanon (2011), and Palestinian refugees from Syria (2014). Source: Atallah, S., & 
Mahdi, D.. Law and Politics of “Safe Zones” and Forced Return to Syria: Refugee Politics in 
Lebanon (Policy Paper) (p. 15). Beirut Date: October 2017 
 
The distribution of the most vulnerable cadaster matches to a large extent that of the 
Syrian refugees, the higher concentrations of refugees are frequently seen in poorer 
neighbourhoods. The datasheet reports that the most vulnerable Union of Municipalities is the 
Fayhaa in the North, and includes the Tebbeneh neighbourhood, a case study in this dissertation. 
In Fayhaa, there were 71,145 registered refugees, making up 22 percent of the Lebanese 
population (close to 259,000), of which 148,000 lived under the poverty line Table 1 : Most 
vulnerable Unions of Municipalities). The UoM also included ten out of the 242 most vulnerable 
localities. In these ten localities the datasheet reports a population (all nationalities) of 270,900 - 
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making up 82 percent of the total population (all nationalities) in the UoM. These details are 
listed for the 20 most vulnerable UoMs, and they include the neighbourhoods studied in this 
thesis as follows: rank 1 (UoM Fayhaa includes Tebbeneh neighbourhood), rank 8 (UoM El 
Dahia El Janoubiya includes the Bourj el-Barajneh camp) and rank 13 (UoM El Maten El 
Chamali El Sahili El Aousat includes the el Nab’a neighbourhood)179. 
 
Table 1 : Most vulnerable Unions of Municipalities 
 
Most vulnerable Unions of Municipalities as ranked by UN-Habitat. Source: Table derived from 
UN-Habitat Data Sheet, Annex X. Unions of Municipalities in Lebanon - Overview and Statistics 
(Data spreadsheet). Beirut: UN-Habitat Date: October 2014 
 
The datasheet also includes population numbers for the 242 most vulnerable localities as 
defined by the UN-Habitat. To situate the three case study neighbourhoods in this dissertation I 
sorted the data from largest to smallest in three consecutive columns. First I sorted in terms of 
Lebanese population living under poverty line (Table 2), then in terms of estimated Lebanese 
population in 2004 (Table 3), then in terms of Syrian refugees as per the October 2014 statistics 
(Table 4). The three neighbourhoods are within the top 30 most vulnerable localities in each of 
these rankings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
179 Although the statistics of the camp itself are not included in the population counts and continue to be estimations with the 
UNRWA and the UNHCR 
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Table 2: Most vulnerable Unions of Municipalities sorted by Lebanese living in poverty 
 
Most vulnerable localities sorted from largest to smallest by “Number of Lebanese living under 
3€/day”. Source: Tables adapted from a UN-Habitat Data Sheet, Annex X. Unions of Municipalities 
in Lebanon - Overview and Statistics (Data spreadsheet). Beirut: UN-Habitat Date: October 2014 
 
Table 3: Most vulnerable Unions of Municipalities sorted by number of Lebanese 
population in 2004 
 
Most vulnerable localities sorted from largest to smallest by “Lebanese population estimate of 
2004”. Source: Tables adapted from a UN-Habitat Data Sheet, Annex X. Unions of Municipalities in 
Lebanon - Overview and Statistics (Data spreadsheet). Beirut: UN-Habitat Date: October 2014 
 
Table 4: Most vulnerable Unions of Municipalities sorted by number of Syrian refugees 
registered with the UNHCR in 2014 
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Most vulnerable localities sorted from largest to smallest by “number of Syrian refugees 
registered with the UNHCR in 2014”. Source: Tables adapted from a UN-Habitat Data Sheet, 
Annex X. Unions of Municipalities in Lebanon - Overview and Statistics (Data spreadsheet). Beirut: 
UN-Habitat Date: October 2014 
 
1.2 The neighbourhood of Tebbeneh, in the periphery of Tripoli 
 
Figure  5-4: The position of Tebbeneh in the periphery of Tripoli.  
Google Maps, 2019 
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Tebbeneh180 is an area formed of several neighbourhoods in Tripoli (Figure  5-4: The 
position of Tebbeneh in the periphery of Tripoli.), the capital of the North governorate and the 
second largest city in Lebanon. Tebbeneh is widely known to be one of the poorest areas in 
Lebanon. It has a complex history of conflict between its main resident Sunni religious groups 
and the neighbouring ‘alawis in Jabal Mohsen and the area has seen armed clashes as recently as 
2015. “The two neighbourhoods have seen a series of tit-for-tat episodes of attacks and violence, 
springing from the large-scale massacre carried out by the Syrian regime in Tebbeneh in 1986. 
The uprising and war in Syria, and Hezbollah’s fighting alongside the ‘Alawi Syrian regime, gave a 
big push to the renewal of sectarian tension and clashes between the two neighbourhoods, to the 
point where suicide attacks began to be used”181 (Abou Mrad, Abou Moussa, Micocci, Moawad, 
& Samaha, 2015).  
The city of Tripoli underwent its major population growth in the 1950s. Sunnis came to 
the city (mainly to Tebbeneh and the souks) from the neighbouring rural areas that are also closer 
to Syria, such as Akkar. Segregation started at that time with the wealthier families moving out of 
the historic centers as the rural populations settled in the Tebbeneh area. With the Civil War 
between 1975 and 1990 came further segregation and the rise of illegal construction throughout 
the city. (Maguire et al., 2016). Its major violent clashes started in the 1980s with the rise of 
extremism and profound religious group conflict, namely between the Sunnites and the ‘Alawis 
of the area182. Tripoli has often been referred to as a microcosm of the Syrian War (Meloni, 2013; 
Strickland, 2015; Vohra, 2017; Workman, 2013). The tellingly named Syria Street divides 
Tebbeneh from Jabal Mohsen and is the scene of violent fighting between the Alawis and the 
Sunnis. (Figure  5-7). 
In 2018 the UN-Habitat reported the Tebbeneh area to be 0.42 square kilometers 
(Maguire, Schinder, Karageozian, & Bergby, 2018). The borders shown in their report do not 
coincide with the administrative borders in their Tripoli City profile report of 2016 (Maguire et 
al., 2016). This is because the methodology used in the former study called for residents to locally 
                                                 
180 Commonly referred to as Tebbeneh or Beb el-Tebbeneh, the latter being one of several neighbourhoods in the wider 
Tebbeneh area such as Dahr el Moghr, Soueika, and others (Map 4.9) 
181 http://www.lb.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/CrisisPreventionRecovery/Publications/Tripoli percent20Eng 
percent20approved percent20for percent20web.pdf 
182 In fact, the Sunnite-’Alawi conflict can be traced to Syrian geopolitics. There, the ‘Alawi minority had been in control of the 
country and its majority Sunnite population since 1970 when Hafez al-Assad took over the presidency in a coup d’état. The 
peaceful demonstrations in Syria in 2011 which led to nationwide conflict started in the Sunnite city of Dar’a. 
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draw their own neighbourhood borders (Figure  5-5). The neighbourhoods not included in the 
Tebbeneh area borders in the report are some of the most informal, such as Dahr el-Mogher and 
Souaika (Figure  5-6). Statistics of the UN-Habitat for the Tebbeneh are only used indicatively for 
the purposes of this research. With eighty seven percent deprivation (Nehmeh, 2015, p. 13), the 
area’s population comprises mainly of Sunni Muslims. Non-Lebanese residents are estimated at a 
minimum of seventeen percent, of whom seventy percent arrived between 2011 and 2014 
(Nehmeh, 2015). This suggests that close to twenty percent of the population in the area in 2018 
are Syrian refugees. 
Socio Political characteristics 
On the national level and in the aftermath of the assassination of Rafik al-Hariri in 2005 
Lebanese political parties were clearly divided into two camps. The March 8 coalition, formed of 
pro-Syrian regime parties (including the Shiite Hezbollah); and March 14, formed of the rest of 
the political parties, against the Syrian regime (including the Sunni Future Movement). In Tripoli 
in general, and in Tebbeneh / Jabal Mohsen specifically, these political divides are clearly 
expressed in the city. In Figure  5-10 the army is being deployed in the area of Tebbeneh after 
violent clashes between Sunnites and ‘Alawis in 2008.  
The heaviest clashes took place in the northern city of Tripoli, where pro-
government supporters in the Tebbeneh (sic) neighbourhood exchanged rocket 
propelled grenades and heavy machine gun fire with opposition followers in Jabal 
Mohsen (sic) [...] The clashes were over by morning when the Lebanese army 
deployed on the streets between the warring factions. One woman was killed in the 
northern violence183 [sic], bringing the toll across the country for the past five days to 
38 – the worst sectarian fighting since Lebanon’s 1975-1990 Civil War. (Mroue, 
2008) 
 
 
                                                 
183 Violence in the North of Lebanon (Tripoli, Tebbeneh) 
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Figure  5-5: Cadastres in Tripoli 
Cadastres by municipality and urban area boundary; area 11 corresponds to Tebbeneh, including 
Jabal Mohsen. Source: (Maguire et al., 2016). 
 
 
Figure  5-6: The different neighbourhoods of Tebbeneh 
Neighbourhoods of Tebbeneh, Qobbé, and Jabal Mohsen Date: 2015, Source: (Abou Mrad et al., 
2015).  
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Figure  5-7: Syria Street, Tripoli
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Figure  5-9: Unclear boundaries of Tebbeneh 
Comparison between administrative borders of Tebbeneh (right) and the neighbourhood borders 
as perceived by residents (left) Source: (Maguire et al., 2016, 2018).  
 
 
Figure  5-10: Army in the streets of Tebbeneh, 2008 
Army intervenes in Tebbeneh to stop community violent clashes Date: May 12, 2008, Source: 
Ramzi Haidar, Getty Images 
 
Figure  5-11: SYmbols of violence at a funderal, Tebbeneh 2013 
Funeral of a sixteen year old boy in Tebbeneh Date: August 13, 2013, Source: (Meloni, 2013) 
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Figure  5-12: Armed street fights, Tebbeneh, 2013 
Sunni fighter from Tebbeneh Date: August 13, 2013, Source: (Meloni, 2013) 
 
“Tripoli is a city marred by neighbourhood conflicts dating to the Lebanese Civil War 
period and occasionally erupting since the 1980s. Political sectarian divides are deeply rooted in 
the history of the city.” (Maguire et al., 2016). Figure  5-10 and Figure  5-11 show reactions in 
Tebbeneh after a bomb attack near a mosque in 2013. “Bombs hit two mosques in the northern 
city in Lebanon of Tripoli on Friday, killing at least 42 people and wounding hundreds, 
intensifying sectarian strife that has spilled over from the Civil War in neighbouring Syria” 
(Holmes & Siddiq, 2013). Like in 2008, the clashes were violent and in relation to the Syrian 
crisis, but also to internal Lebanese politics that place religious communities in direct conflict. 
The Sunni Tebbeneh neighbourhoods against the ‘alawi Jabal Mohsen neighbourhoods in this 
case. Civilians in these areas have access to weapons and they use them in public at certain events 
or conflicts184, the buildings and urban structures still show important signs of the war, and the 
army and official security personnel are a regular site in the streets. Efforts to bring communities 
together and diffuse tensions exist. Just off of Syria Street for example, in the Baal el Darawish 
neighbourhood, a community football field was inaugurated by the army in January 2017, to serve 
youth from Beb el-Tebbeneh and Jabal Mohsen (Figure  5-13). Such public spaces are rare due to 
the high density in the entire area.  
 
 
                                                 
184 In fact, it is common to use guns in funerals and celebrations alike in Lebanon, as reflected in Image 4.5. The 
phenomenon is serious enough for the Permanent Peace Movement (A partner of UNDP), among other NGOs to have 
dedicated campaigns such as Eleguns warning against the dangers of stray bullets. For example, there were 90 deaths due 
to stray bullets in 2017. http://www.eleguns.com/#the-cost 
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Figure  5-13: Football field in Baal al-Darawish 
Built in 2016 through funding from the Danish embassy, this field is meant to bring together youth 
from Jabal Mohsen and Beb el-Tebbeneh, in an effort to build unity 
 
 
 
Figure  5-14: Nasr Street, Dahr el Moghr, Tebbeneh, February 2018 
 
Being of a majority Sunni population, the initial reaction from the Lebanese hosts in 
Tebbeneh was one of extreme welcome to the Sunni majority Syrian refugees. In addition to their 
common religious group there were strong family ties between the communities, dating back to 
the Ottoman era. A year or so after their arrival though, reactions in the host community started 
to harden, and the excessively increased load on urban services along with increased competition 
on work opportunities changed the initial coherence between the refugees and their hosts.  
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1.3 The neighbourhood of El-Nab’a, Bourj Hammoud, in the 
periphery of Beirut 
 
Figure  5-15: The position of Bourj el-Barajneh and El-Nab’a in the periphery of Beirut 
Google Maps, 2019 
 
Bourj Hammoud is an area formed of several neighbourhoods including El Nab’a 
(Mount Lebanon governorate), and is known for being home to migrant workers and refugees of 
all nationalities and ethnicities. In the peripheries of Beirut (Figure  5-16, Figure  5-17), the area 
has been known to house workers in the capital for decades. The word El-Nab’a literally 
translates to “source of water”, pointing to the agricultural history of the area. In fact less than 
one hundred years ago the Bourj Hammoud and its neighbourhood in general was an agricultural 
field (Dagher, 2015). Its rapid population growth was due to three major waves of displacements. 
The first was the Armenian refugee influx after 1915. This population was authorised to stay on 
the fields of Bourj Hammoud in tents after the Armenian genocide. Until today this community 
thrives in Bourj Hammoud and are the large majority of residents. Members of the local 
authorities are mainly Armenian and the language is commonly used in the streets and visible on 
commerce and banners (Figure  5-18). The second wave was that of internal migration of Shiites 
from rural areas in the 1940-50s who sought employment in Beirut and residence in the cheaper 
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peripheries. Those eventually left the area during the Civil War185 and were replaced by Christian 
refugees from other areas. Shiites have since returned to the area, as their owned residences were 
returned to them by the Ministry of the Displaced.  Shiite families also sought refuge in the area 
following the 1982 and 2006 Israeli invasions of Beirut and South Lebanon (Harake et al., 2017). 
 
Figure 
 
5-16: Location of Bourj Hammoud 
Location of Bourj Hammoud., Source: (Harmandayan, 2009) 
 
 
                                                 
185 Bourj Hammoud is on the Eastern side of Beirut. During the Civil War (1975-1990), Muslim populations gradually moved 
to West Beirut and Christians to its East.  
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Figure  5-17: El-Nab’a neighbourhood 
Left: El-Nab’a neighbourhood borders as reported by UN-Habitat in 2017; Right: administrative 
neighbourhood borders. Sources: (Harake et al., 2017; Harmandayan, 2009) 
 
 
Figure  5-18: Bourj Hammoud, general view 
While in the vast majority of the country commerce is indicated in Arabic and English/French, in 
Bourj Hammoud the Armenian language is also used (Byblos Bank’s name is visible in three 
languages) on the main street. Date: June 2017 
 
The population is estimated to have risen from 12,000 residents in 2000 (World Vision, 
2000) to over double in 2014. Close to 26,000 residents are estimated in studies in 2015 (Samaha, 
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2015). Since 2011, El-Nab’a has witnessed a significant increase in Syrian residents. As in the case 
of Tebbeneh in Tripoli, the UN-Habitat released a neighbourhood profile report on El-Nab’a in 
2017. The borders of the neighbourhood they propose do not coincide with the administrative 
borders (Figure  5-17). The area covered in the UN-Habitat report is smaller, and they place the 
population estimates at 14,760, sixty three percent of whom are Syrian refugees (Harake et al., 
2017). This is significantly larger than the Syrian refugee population estimate in the rest of the 
Bourj Hammoud area as per official estimates. In fact the official estimates used place the total 
population of Bourj Hammoud at 75,866 with the Syrian refugee population at 17,927, or almost 
nineteen percent. The reason according to UN-Habitat is possibly that “densification has not 
been possible to the same extent as in other poor neighbourhoods” (Harake et al., 2017). This 
may be due to the very informal social nature of the neighbourhood, it is not uncommon for 
example for a street to be commonly referred to as “Ethiopian street” due to the high number of 
Ethiopian tenants186. It also may possibly be due to the unreliability of quantitative data provided 
by official instances187.   
 Socio Political characteristics:  
In an urban study of the El-Nab’a, Petra Samaha shows how the neighbourhood is 
marginalised physically, institutionally and socially (Samaha, 2015, pp. 61–70). Indeed, its 
specificity with respect to the rest of the Bourj Hammoud and other places in Lebanon is the 
diversity of the ethnicities and religious groups of its population. Streets are dotted with religious 
signs (Figure  5-19) and it is not possible to cross from the Christian to the Shiite area without 
noticing and without being noticed. Since 2011, the large influx of Syrian refugees has caused a 
perceived feeling of insecurity. Tensions are high and street fights are a common occurrence, in 
addition to rampant verbal and sexual harassment. Law enforcement is not always well perceived, 
and any activity that may be considered out of the normal is considered suspicious188.    
 
                                                 
186 Without clear statistics on the matter, it can be assumed that the large majority of Ethiopian workers’ rent agreements are 
informal. Under the kafala system, a worker may only live in her employer's residence. 
187 The El-Nab’a population count is based on a comprehensive and detailed population count by UN-Habitat. (Harake et al., 
2017, P. 4-5) 
188 During my first field trip and upon meeting with the municipality I was officially advised not to take any photos or walk in 
the neighbourhood unaccompanied, and I was asked to fill a form to request permission to take photographs. Though there 
may have been need to avert a researcher to the possible danger in the area, the security process was exaggerated. 
Reasons may have included the intention to portray the difficult management of the area. 
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Figure  5-19: Religious symbols in El-Nab'a 
Left: A cross soars high in a street in El-Nab’a, Right: An icon of the virgin Mary. Date: June 2017 
 
Residents rely on political parties for security. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Section 1, the 
army and security forces are not the only protectors of the population. In fact, allegiances and 
dependence on political party support is quite important (Figure  5-20). In El-Nab’a, this is even 
more pronounced due to the high density and poverty levels. Residents of the area have no say in 
matters concerning their environment because they either are not Lebanese, or Lebanese but 
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mainly registered in other cities or villages189. As such,  
the main political parties (Hezbollah, Haraket Amal, Lebanese Forces, Al Kataeb 
party, Al Taakhi and Tashnag Armenian Movement) play a significant role in the 
support of residents in terms of services and protection against a context of reported 
weakness in municipal and governmental sustenance. (Harake et al., 2017, p. 9) 
 
 
 
Figure  5-20: Adoration for the political leader 
A large banner portraying the leader of the Lebanese Forces190, Samir Geagea, in El-Nab’a. Text 
reads: “you are the leader. El-Nab’a neighbourhood”  Date: June 2017, Photo: Pierre Bergel. 
 
Adding to increasingly high levels of poverty, informality, and marginality, the 
neighbourhood also suffers from significant urban deterioration (Figure  5-21). In fact, according 
to the UN-Habitat neighbourhood profile (Harake et al., 2017), 35 percent of the buildings are 
substandard or necessitate emergency intervention, and those house 38 percent of the 
population. Moreover, 25 percent of the buildings are not connected, or connected with serious 
defects to basic urban services and they house 30 percent of the population. The majority of 
Syrian in El-Nab’a are Sunni Muslims, echoing the case of the entire refugee population.  
 
 
                                                 
189 Electors (for Municipality and Parliament representatives) vote in the place where they are registered, not where they 
reside.  
190 An extreme Christian nationalist right party 
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Figure  5-21: Urban deterioration in EL-Nab'a 
Increased urban deterioration in streets and buildings Date: June 2015 
 
Bourj Hammoud in general is an area with a majority of Lebanese Armenians who arrived 
as refugees after the Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey in the early 1900s. Today the area in 
general, and El-Nab'a neighbourhood specifically, is a highly dense and popular one, including a 
plethora of minority religious and ethnic communities, of Lebanese and foreign nationalities. 
Being in Beirut’s immediate periphery and offering affordable albeit substandard housing, the 
neighbourhood has attracted poor migrants throughout the years. While there are no definitive 
statistics on the origins of Syrian refugees who have settled in El-Nab'a since 2011, it is widely 
acknowledged that Kurdish Syrians made up the majority of Syrians in the neighbourhood. In 
fact, interviewees repeatedly mentioned the presence of Kurdish workers in El-Nab'a from 
before the crisis. Kurdish Syrians predominantly oppose the Syrian regime and have been some 
of its most vocal protagonists. Lebanese Armenians on the other hand predominantly support 
the Syrian regime, in solidarity with Syrian Armenians, who have historically been favored in Syria 
similarly to the other minorities including Christians and Alawis. 
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1.4 The Palestinian refugee camp of Bourj El-Barajneh, in the 
periphery of Beirut 
 
Figure  5-22: Sketch of the entrance to Bourj el-Barajneh 
Sketch: Ziad Moutran, 2019. Color, Raphaëlle Cottereau 
Spaces of transit and waiting, [the camps] are organized like “cities” yet without 
strategic planning as everything is designed not to last. They stabilize and last. A 
spatial organisation and a certain social life develops in a situation of extreme legal 
precariousness, oscillating between no rights and the pure virtuality of international 
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law, between a very far and broad humanitarian law and a local power of those who, 
being closest to the beneficiaries of international aid, control the resources191 (Agier, 
2005, p. 86). 
Moukhayyam (camp) Bourj El-Barajneh is a palestinian refugee camp in the suburbs of 
Beirut. According to UNRWA it is “the most overpopulated camp around Beirut and the living 
conditions are extremely poor” (UNRWA, 2018). In 1948, the Bourj El-Barajneh camp, like all 
other Palestinian camps in Lebanon, started out as a settlement of tents. Eventually those were 
replaced by concrete houses built by the refugees themselves. The population grew from an 
estimated 28,000 in 2011 to an estimated 40,000 in 2018 (Abou-Diwan, 2016)192. Amnesty 
International reported that “Bourj el-Barajneh camp [had] more people per square kilometre than 
Hong Kong or Mumbai” (Amnesty International, 2007, p. 13). The camp grew from within and 
also eventually urbanised, and its residents transformed “from camp dwellers to urban refugees” 
(K. Doraï, 2010). Looking at the urban sprawl of Beirut we can see how the camp transformed 
from a space physically outside the city to a space integral to the city, and central in the (urban) 
periphery (Doraï, Puig, & Ababsa, 2012). In fact,  
Even if they are still marginalized and segregated areas Palestinian refugee camps 
are now part of the major cities in the Middle East. Economic activities, daily 
mobility, the presence of recent international migrants, and strong political and 
cultural significance for the Palestinian refugees, are the different elements that 
characterize the refugee camps today as urban settlements. (Doraï, 2010, p. 19). 
 
 
Since shortly after the Syrian refugees began arriving to the camp, two things have 
happened. First it grew dangerously vertically193 without any regard to structural or environmental 
guidelines The camp is extremely dense in comparison to its immediate surroundings). This is not 
surprising since the camp has continued to grow informally, without planning or structural 
regulation since 1950, while being restricted in surface. And second, the Palestinian urban 
refugees (and dwellers of the city in Lebanon for decades) have now become hosts to Palestinian 
refugees from Syria, and to Syrian refugees alike. This places the Palestinians in a double role, 
                                                 
191 Original citation: “Espaces de transit et d’attente, ils s’organisent comme des « villes » sans être pour autant dotés d’un 
projet urbain dans la mesure où tout est conçu pour ne pas durer. Ils se stabilisent et durent. Une organisation de l’espace et 
une certaine vie sociale se développent dans une situation générale de grande précarité juridique, oscillant entre le vide de 
droit et la pure virtualité du droit international, entre un droit humanitaire très général et lointain et un pouvoir sur la vie 
qu’exercent ceux qui, localement, au plus près des bénéficiaires de l’aide humanitaire, contrôlent les ressources” (Agier, 
2005) 
192 In the camps, like in the cities in Lebanon, statistics on population and most urban services is always estimated, and 
estimates largely vary from one source to another. 
193 In fact the vertical growth of the camp had started when there was no longer the possibility for horizontal expansion. 
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simultaneously inferior to the Lebanese  and superior to the Syrians.   
 
 
Figure  5-23: Pedestrian bridge at the entrance of Bourj el-Barajneh Camp 
A pedestrian bridge, symbolic of the connection between Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian  
communities in Lebanon. , 2018. 
 
Figure  5-23 represents several aspects of the city in Lebanon and its different dwellers. I 
took this photo from a highway leading to the airport (the old airport road as known in Lebanon) 
at around 4pm. The pedestrian bridge is mainly used at this hour by the workers returning to the 
Bourj el-Barajneh camp. Workers coming back from Beirut descend from the red-licensed vans 
(equivalent to public transportation) and cross the bridge to enter the camp (to the left side of the 
picture). To the immediate right is a small gated green area, donated by the Tehran Municipality 
to the “honorable and resisting Lebanese people”, and closed to the public (Figure  5-24). This 
reflects the dependence of Lebanon on foreign aid in all aspects. It is also worthwhile to note 
that such a donation by the Tehran Municipality could not have possibly been found in other 
areas, and this reflects the segmented Lebanese allegiance to external political powers.  
 The bridge itself is branded with an advertisement amongst the many other visual 
brands. To the immediate left is the main entrance of the Bourj camp, guarded by a formal but 
not very visible army checkpoint. In this picture, Palestinians live on one side and Lebanese on 
the other, with Syrian refugees permeating the already fragile balance between the communities. 
Almost certainly in this one picture and one moment there is a Lebanese, a Palestinian, a Syrian 
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refugee and a Palestinian refugee from Syria going about their daily life in the city in Lebanon.    
 
 
Figure  5-24: Garden closed to the public across from the entrance 
To the immediate right of the pedestrian bridge, a gated garden, donated by the Municipality of 
Tehran to the Lebanese people, 2018. 
Socio Political characteristics:  
As Israel refuses to accept responsibility for their exodus from their Palestinian 
homeland – and Lebanon refuses to allow them to resettle – displaced Palestinians 
have to deal with the knowledge that their homes in Lebanon are not really homes, 
while their real homes are not about to be restored to them (Sayigh, 2004) 
Access to the camp from the airport road is minimally guarded. There is only a small 
checkpoint at the main entrance of the camp (Figure  5-25) but the Lebanese army never seem to 
stop anyone from entering194.  The structure of governance of the camp is complex. It can be 
described as self regulated and managed, though it is a complicated system of governance: 
 
There is a web of complex power structures composed of popular committees, a 
                                                 
194 The degree of security varies depending on political stability in Lebanon. At times security is more strict. Also, while 
individuals may enter and exit the camp freely, general materials (especially construction material) are  not easily authorised.  
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security committee, UNRWA camp officers, notables, political factions, the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)’s popular unions and organizations 
(workers, women, engineers, etc), Community Based Organizations (CBOs)195, 
NGOs196 and the Palestinian Scholars’ League (imam [Muslim religious leader] 
coalition close to Islamic Resistant Movement-Hamas). These forces vary in 
importance from camp to camp and from area to area. In each camp, leaders 
impose measures, and these in turn have a habit of changing; a consequence of a 
constantly shifting balance of power between these different groups. The Popular 
Committee, however, stands out as the most important local governing body in 
Lebanon and the Palestinian Territory. What is important to note is that the label 
‘popular’ may be misleading; members to this committee are not elected, rather, the 
title projects the strength of one group or party vis-à-vis others (Sari Hanafi, 2010, p. 
8) 
The camp includes various UNRWA-run urban services within its area of around 0.3 square 
kilometers: a hospital, several mosques, community centres and nurseries, etc. but no schools. 
Electricity is acquired by illegal tapping into the main (Lebanese) city lines. Practically everyone in 
the camp knows how to perform manoeuvres to the lines197. The wiring is chaotic and poses a 
real and present danger to the lives of the residents (Figure  5-27). Other basic urban services are 
also chaotic, scarce and hazardous. No potable water pipes exist, and water in general is scarce 
and extremely salty. The camp was entirely disconnected from the municipal sewer system until 
1995. That year the European Union funded a project to connect the camp to the sewers198, and 
Lebanese garbage collection services, like all other urban services, do not apply. “Apart from 
Palestinians, there are also Lebanese, Syrians, Egyptians and Sri Lankans living in the camp”. 
(Roberts, 2000, p. 5). 
Living in Bourj el-Barajneh and other Palestinian camps is often compared to “like living 
in a prison” (Khoury & Salem, 2017). They are clearly and openly discriminated against in 
Lebanon, “their population is strongly marginalised and segregated” (Doraï, 2007). They are 
“treated as second-class residents, restricted from working in most fields, banned from owning 
property, forced to live in run-down camps and barred from formal education” (Khoury & 
                                                 
195 CBOs are mainly youth, women centres as well as rehabilitation centres for people with disabilities. They were created by 
UNRWA in the 1980s but now are quasi-financially independent having proven effective in establishing links with local and 
international NGOs, attracting more than $3 million in grants and in-kind assistance during 2002-2003 (MTP Relief and 
Social Services Program). (Geneva Donors Conference 2004) (Sari Hanafi, 2010, p. 8) 
196 In many camps, the social role of NGOs is much more important than that of the political factions. However, some of 
these NGOs are connected to the political factions. Interviewees reported a climate of mistrust towards the NGOs. 
Meanwhile, Hamas is increasingly playing a social role in the camps (Sari Hanafi, 2010, p. 8) 
197 Recurrently during my observations and interviews, a side electricity issue would come up and someone (usually a young 
male) would immediately fix it. It ranged from fixing a broken line to adding a new extension altogether. 
198 The grant was only approved by the Lebanese government after an agreement to include the upgrading of the sewerage 
system surrounding the camp. 
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Salem, 2017). Effectively, Palestinians are banned from working in over eighty job categories 
including medicine and engineering199, they are not allowed to enroll in Lebanese public schools 
or universities, and are not allowed to own property200. Inside the camp, opportunities are very 
limited. Working for the UNRWA is considered a life-line in terms of the security it could offer 
the person and his or her family.  
 
Figure  5-25: Entrance to the camp 
Entrance to Bourj el-Barajneh camp. Symbolic checkpoint at the end of the street right side. June 
2017 
 
 
 
                                                 
199 An informally employed Palestinian accountant would have to move from his or her desk and pose as a cleaner when 
outsiders or officials visit. Even when they are registered, their job titles are systematically changed to match the categories 
in which they are allowed to work. 
200 It is a common practice for a Palestinian to buy property in the name of a Lebanese  spouse or partner, and problems 
surrounding ownership arise regularly, further to a divorce for example. 
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selected here first to acknowledge the Palestinian refugees as hosts for Syrian refugees since 2011, 
and second to include the space of the camps as a neighbourhood / city within Lebanon, even 
though it is a political exception, and to attempt to discern some of the heightened difficulties the 
camps have faced since the influx began in 2011.  
 
2. Five forms of injustice across the three sites 
In all three sites the living conditions are dire with little or no planning. No building 
codes are respected, ensuring security is difficult, and informality runs deep at the urban, 
economic and political levels. Syrian refugees have come to all three sites in large numbers, 
mainly but not only due to the affordable shelter available. The concentration of refugees is 
therefore high in all three neighbourhoods in this study. In the three spaces Lebanese security 
forces have limited or no presence as in the case of Bourj el-Barajneh. Tensions between the 
different communities in the three sites is both visible and invisible, changing with the times and 
political discourses. Most notably, the dwellers in the three areas do not have a voice in affecting 
policy, urban or other, concerning their situation. In Tebbeneh and El-Nab’a, the majority of the 
Lebanese dwellers cannot vote due to the fact that they are not originally from the area, and the 
Palestinians of the camp are for all intents and purposes non-citizens and therefore are not 
represented in government or local authorities. The dwellers in the three neighbourhoods are 
some of the most disenfranchised and least empowered in the country. 
In 1991, David Harvey proposed six principles for just planning and policy practices 
(Harvey, 1991), based on five faces of oppression introduced by Iris Marion Young (Young, 
1990). Those are exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, imperialist culture, and violence. In 
using them to define spatial justice, Gervais-Lambony and Dufaux propose that “a situation as 
unfair when a group is the victim of at least one of these forms of oppression (all combinations 
may exist)” (Gervais-Lambony & Dufaux, 2009, p. 5). In fact, each of these forms of oppression 
is present in the three neighbourhoods presented above:  
(1) Exploitation in the workplace, and exploitation of labour in the living space. New 
dwellers compete with old dwellers over already limited work opportunities. Sources of income 
are too precious for workers to let go of, and they accept more and more precarious and 
exploitative measures to hold on to them.  
(2) “Marginals are people the system of labour cannot or will not use” (Young, 1990). 
While the system of labour in Lebanon does use the Syrian refugees, it does so under the 
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condition of precarity and informality. I argue that in the unlikely case that employees are 
compelled to protect Syrian workers under the labour law, the latter would indeed become 
marginalised. It is the nature of their cheap, available, and easily disposable labour that allows 
them to access precarious work. This feeds into the notion that it is the injustices that exist in the 
cities in Lebanon are what have allowed for the Syrians to find a place in the city. Moreover, in 
the case of Bourj el-Barajneh, Palestinian refugees already face marginalisation and are unable to 
access the formal labour market in Lebanon.   
(3) Powerlessness is the most visible form of oppression in the three sites. The dwellers in 
general, and Syrian and Palestinian refugees specifically do not have the channels to express their 
needs or concerns and many, if not most of them do not have the “ability to be listened to with 
respect” (Harvey, 1991, p. 599). In the two neighbourhoods in the Lebanese cities, voting-
dwellers are only considered valuable in the run up to an election, but are otherwise politically 
excluded.  
(4) Cultural Imperialism, that “relates to the ways in which the dominant meanings of a 
society render the particular perspective of one’s own group invisible at the same time as they 
stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other” (Harvey, 1991, p. 599). While Harvey 
suggests that this form of oppression is difficult to identify clearly, I argue that in Lebanon it is 
perhaps the clearest form, as my field research has shown. Syrian refugees have been ‘defined 
from the outside, positioned, placed, by a network of dominant meanings they experience as 
arising from elsewhere, from those with whom they do not identify and who do not identify with 
them” (Harvey, 1991, p. 600).  
(5) Lastly, violence. “It is not the violence itself that constitutes oppression, but the fact 
that it becomes a "social practice" towards certain groups, a practice that may be considered 
acceptable because it is simply a consequence of belonging to [an ethnic] group” (Gervais-
Lambony & Dufaux, 2009, p. 6). As the field research in Part 3 will show, this definition can be 
applied to the Syrian refugee group in Lebanon.  
They Syrian refugees in Lebanon constitute not only a poor group, they are also faced 
with the five forms of social oppression mentioned above. As such and to insist on an idea 
presented in the General Introduction: because their dwelling in Lebanon’s cities is being 
tolerated with difficulty and domination, not accommodated for in a way that may be described 
as resilient - the situation may be better framed from a spatial justice than an urban resilience 
angle. 
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3. Informal settlements: a narrow path for urban negotiation 
In 2017 the UNHCR estimated that approximately 258,601 Syrian refugees in Lebanon 
were sheltered in informal settlements across the country (UNHCR, 2017). The settlements are 
most numerous inside and in the immediate surroundings of the Lebanese-Syrian border cities in 
the Bekaa and the North, and in 2017 comprised some 45,827 tents (Figure  5-28). Being a small 
country and urbanised to a large extent, informal settlements are close proximity with towns and 
cities. Furthermore due to their informal nature they are extremely permeable, making it possible 
for the residents to interact with the neighbouring communities within the mobility restrictions 
placed on all the Syrian population.  
While the entry of new refugees into Lebanon has been largely restricted since 2015, the 
number of refugees living in informal settlements continued to increase between 2015 and 2018. 
Between June 2016 and June 2017 almost 30,000 Syrians left their shelter in urban areas and 
resettled in the informal settlements, an increase in 10 percent of the latter’s global population. 
Between June and December 2017, a further 12,500 individuals moved to the settlements 
(UNHCR, 2017a). Should the criteria and methods of the statistics collected by the UNHCR be 
true, this may reflect the deteriorating circumstances of the refugees who had initially settled in 
urban areas and have had to relocate to the informal settlements. Drawing such conclusions is 
however not easy due to the truly informal situation in the settlements. A number of criteria may 
need to be factored into the statistics and may affect them. This issue is broader than the scope 
of my thesis and may be interesting to look at in further research. In fact, the processes of 
settlement in play in spaces like the informal settlements are different for those that I have 
included in this study. The role of NGO is more significant and the negotiations for space are 
largely on that level, more than between dwellers. Moreover, I am interested in the interstices in 
which Syrians have been able to secure a space in the city, a possibility which is not present in the 
settlements.  
Informal settlements, or more precisely Informal Tented Settlements (ITS) in NGO 
lingo, are a collection of makeshift tents that are constructed in a spontaneous manner by the 
refugees themselves and range in size from two or three tents to several hundred per settlement 
(Figure  5-29, Figure  5-30). There are several criteria that may define an “informal settlement” and 
they differ from one region to the other and from one situation to the other. According to the 
UN-Habitat informal settlements are  
residential areas where 1) inhabitants have no security of tenure vis-à-vis the land or 
dwellings they inhabit, with modalities ranging from squatting to informal rental 
CHAPTER 4  220 
 
housing, 2) the neighbourhoods usually lack, or are cut off from, basic services and 
city infrastructure and 3) the housing may not comply with current planning and 
building regulations, and is often situated in geographically and environmentally 
hazardous areas. [...] Slums are the most deprived and excluded form of informal 
settlements characterized by poverty and large agglomerations of dilapidated 
housing often located in the most hazardous urban land. In addition to tenure 
insecurity, slum dwellers lack formal supply of basic infrastructure and services, 
public space and green areas, and are constantly exposed to eviction, disease and 
violence (UN-Habitat, 2015, p. 1).  
Specifically in the case of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, the different agencies working in 
the country define an informal settlement as a collection of shelters “established in an unplanned 
and unmanaged manner, which means they are generally unrecognized. There may or may not be 
an informal or formal agreement between landlords and residents of the settlement” (HDX, 
2018). These spaces came to be further to the non-encampment stance that the Lebanese 
government took in 2011, and did not admit to the refugee influx, insisting that Syrians who 
arrived be referred to as Displaced Persons.  
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Figure  5-28: Distribution of informal settlements in Lebanon 
Geographic distribution of informal settlements in Lebanon. Source: UNHCR report “In Focus: 
Informal Settlements” Date: June 2017 
 
Settlements are managed locally, and by a number of actors including local authorities, 
international NGOs, landowners and a shaweesh201 (sheriff). Every settlement is set-up on privately 
owned land, and usually the shaweesh negotiates a deal with the landowner, although NGOs have 
sometimes played direct and indirect roles in those negotiations. The relationship between the 
different actors involved in the set-up and management of the informal settlements affect their 
spatial and social situation, and the quality of security for its residents. In fact, “some of them 
were directly and more robustly supported by charitable organizations and international NGOs 
                                                 
201 The shaweesh is a representative for the residents of a settlement. Most shaweesh have a certain personal connection to 
the landowners, either through family kinship or previous work experiences.   
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while others had more limited or fragmented support. Landlords also provide varying degrees of 
support. This extends from physical spaces to infrastructures as well” (Sanyal, 2017, p. 121). The 
tents are all similar and are made from wood panels, fabric, and tarpaulin, and make for 
precarious shelter conditions. In fact, innumerable accounts of dire living conditions have been 
reported from the camps, most dramatic those related to winter weather conditions. For example, 
there have been numerous reports of extreme cold conditions and even deaths due to cold in the 
settlements during winter months throughout the years (BBC, 2015; Gayle, 2013; Kanaan, 2016; 
Lodge, 2018).  
While they make up a quarter of the refugee population in Lebanon, it is these informal 
settlements that come to mind in general when referring to Syrian refugees, and to refugees in 
general, contributing to the stigmatization of the term. Informal settlements are synonymous with  
poverty, poor education, poor sanitation and most other negative perceptions about refugees. 
They are more visible, though, than urban refugees, and   
if we compare them to ‘invisible’ urban settlers (like some refugees living in Nabaa 
hidden behind shops), refugees in ITSs are less vulnerable due to their visibility, as 
they can easily receive aid and protection. However, in some cases, especially in 
small and isolated ITSs, settlements’ visibility stigmatizes refugees and exposes 
them to discrimination and violence, owing to the widespread perception that these 
environments are places of extreme poverty, insalubrity, and crime (Kikano, 2018, p. 
144) 
As in the case for Syrian refugees in urban settings, residents of informal settlements have 
been the target of different degrees of violence that depend on the location of the settlement, its 
size and the reach of NGOs inside it. Especially since early 2017, The Lebanese Army has been 
serving eviction notifications for tens of thousands of refugees at a time. Sometimes those who 
had been evicted would be notified of a new eviction notice in a matter of months (Frelick et al., 
2018, p. 29; Kanso, 2017; Première Urgence, 2018). 
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Figure  5-29: Informal settlement, Jebjennine, Bekaa 
 
 
Figure  5-30: Informal settlement, Jebjennine, Bekaa 
Informal settlement on either side of the road leading to the village of Jeb Jennine (8,000 
residents) - Bekaa valley.  Date: November 2015 
Conclusion to Part 2 
The analysis in this dissertation relies to a large extent on observing and analysing 
relationships between people in an urban space, as society is the foremost influencer on the 
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development of place. One way to study this spatial dimension of societies is to look at the 
different actors in a place and study the power relations between them, their practices of that 
place, and their experiences in it. These are most commonly regulated by economic inequality, 
policy, politics, adherence to social equality standards, and access to the place, the city in this 
dissertation, and to the services the place offers. It is all the more telling to study relation between 
society and place in a raw situation where the norm is increased informality, quasi absence of 
public policy or wealth redistribution, and lacking urban regulations or services, which explains 
the high densities of population(s) in informal areas.  
The three case studies listed above all present a plethora of possible inequalities, in 
varying ways and to varying degrees. Two of the three sites lie in the periphery of the capital and 
largest city Beirut, and the third is in the periphery of the second largest city in Lebanon, Tripoli. 
El-Nab’a has a long history of mixity and migration, with several waves of poor migrants 
choosing it as a place of residence primarily due to its proximity with Beirut and the potential 
economic opportunities that proximity promises. It has developed in a highly informal manner 
with little to no planning efforts. El-Nab’a is known for its juxtapositions in ethnic and religious 
groups as well, with a strong presence of non Arab migrant workers, Lebanese of Armenian 
descent, Christians, Shiites, and Sunnis especially with the arrival of the Syrian refugees. For 
instance, one of is streets is informally dubbed Ethiopia street due to the significant number of 
domestic workers, who are not only Ethiopian natives (undocumented in most cases) who live 
there.   
Bourj el-Barajneh equally has a long history of migration, being initially created as a 
makeshift camp for Palestinian refugees in 1948. In this city within a city today reside tens of 
thousands of forced migrants facing systemised exploitation and exclusion. They fall into three 
categories, the Palestinian refugees of Lebanon (referring to the Palestinians who came directly to 
Lebanon after the nakba), the Palestinian refugees from Syria (those who went to Syria after the 
nakba and have now become second time refugees in Lebanon since the Syrian crisis) and the 
Syrian refugees. The last group is the only one that has a real though complicated option to 
return to a homeland. Both Palestinian refugee groups face a profound identity crisis, and next to 
no hope of ever returning, or belonging anywhere. For the Palestinian refugees, hosting new 
refugee presents not only an urban and logistic challenge but an intellectual and emotional one as 
well. They identify with both sides of the equation, and their discourse matches that of the 
Lebanese hosts but for bursts of moments when they identify strongly with the refugees. Of the 
three groups, the least in number and the most vulnerable are the Palestinian refugees from Syria.     
Of the three sites, Tebbeneh in Tripoli is the one with the strongest Lebanese presence. 
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It’s community is highly patriarchal and conservative, and tribal to a large degree. I found it to be 
the site where the least social research has been done and because of that it was the site where 
people were the most receptive to my presence. The main underlying issue in the area is the 
Sunni-Alawi conflict: it reflects the more regional problems in the middle east. While the three 
sites have common characteristics, they each present a uniqueness in terms of social diversity. I 
saw signs of violence mostly in Bourj el-Barajneh but felt them mostly in the discourse of people 
in Tebbeneh. In el-Nab’a there was always a sense of careful peace. The near to complete lack of 
quantitative data in the three sites made the qualitative approach inevitable and more difficult at 
the same time, in that some the information being given to me with high degrees of confidence 
could never be verified. On the contrary they could be disproven in another confidently 
presented discourse. 
Part 2 began with an analytical framework presented at the beginning of Chapter 3 and 
ended with the case study justifications at the end of Chapter 4, between those parts I discussed 
my own subjectivity along with the challenges and advantages that came with it. I had been away 
for 18 months straight before going on the first field trip for this dissertation, it was the longest 
time I had been away without even a visit home, and I strongly felt the difference of being 
someone looking in from the outside. I have spent some time reflecting on the way subjects in 
social sciences are approached and the effect of the place, not only of the field but also of the 
researcher, and how it affects the analysis. With this said, I will to move to present the major 
features of Syrian refugees in the cities of Lebanon and analyse the ways they interact and 
negotiate their lives in the city. 
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Part 3. The refugee turn, beyond 
border crossings 
 
To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least 
recognized need of the human soul. It is one of the hardest 
to define - Simone Weil (1984, p. 41) 
 
 
 
Introduction to Part 3 
In more ways than one, this quote from the distinguished S. Weil touches on the 
sensitivity and the complexity of the daily struggle faced by the Syrian forced migrants, like others 
before them and many who will come after them, in relating to the places where they have been 
dwelling and striving to make a living. Finding their roots is of course a metaphor to express the 
multitude of meanings this new dwelling represents to them, while never fulfilling their 
aspirations as human beings and citizens. Part three analyses in detail the ways in which refugees 
I interacted with in each of the case study sites devise their own paths in accessing Lebanon’s 
cities and neighbourhoods,  to find jobs, face administrative requirements and resistance from the 
host society - it addresses the ways in which they live their everyday life. 
To address the different aspects of these itineraries, which in the end only speak to 
fragments of the refugees’ lives, this part respectively positions them in the overall national 
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landscape, in the cities where they tend to be concentrated, in their neighbourhoods, and at a 
more intimate scale, in their places of dwelling - be they a shared flat or room. It then addresses 
their relations with the host society, Lebanese citizens, the latter being their employers, their 
neighbours or simply the people they come across in the streets. Even in the cases where there is 
indifference - an absence of reaction from these Lebanese to the presence of the refugees 
presence is hardly insignificant, and needs to be further interpreted. All these scales of co-
presence and social interaction express, to the observer, a complex set of issues generated by the 
presence of Syrian refugees in cities of Lebanon that this part will disentangle, based on empirical 
analysis, and illustrated through the description of specific situations and a selection of narratives. 
In its last chapter, this part culminates in a discussion on negotiating space as presented in 
the general introduction of this dissertation. It elaborates on how space has been utilised as a tool 
for cooptation and exploitation on the local, national and regional levels. Negotiating space is not 
only seen as a binary relation between the refugees and the host community, but also as a 
mechanism that produces and reproduces inequality at different scales.  
Preparing for this discussion, the three chapters which open this third part are largely 
dedicated to the direct results and analyses of the field investigations carried out for this research, 
which invite the discussion proposed in chapter 8. More specifically, Chapter 5 describes the 
journey of the Syrians as they arrive and settle in Lebanon and turn into refugees. It presents 
where they are spatially located and how they arrived there, and furthermore how they are socially 
placed on the map, within the complex territorial fabric in Lebanon.  
Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the same issues from different points of view, and can be seen 
as a conversation between dwellers. Chapter 6 tends to restitute the daily living conditions of the 
refugees in the three case study sites. It details the housing challenges, the stressors of finding 
work and securing basic life needs, their mobility within the legal framework placed by the 
authorities and the access they have to public space. Chapter 7 then presents the four most 
prominent generalisations that Syrian refugees fall under from the Lebanese point of view: 
Syrians steal jobs, they live in overcrowded and precarious conditions that are unacceptable, they 
have taken over public space and are unapproachable, and they abuse international aid. By 
crossing these points of view, this dissertation will have attempted to reveal the perceived and 
lived inequalities of the communities that have been thrown into a situation they both seek to 
overcome.  
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6. Chapter 5.  Situating 
Syrian refugees on 
the Lebanese socio-
spatial map 
  
CHAPTER 5  232 
 
  
SITUATING REFUGEES ON THE SOCI
 
5.1 Places of origin, causes 
Neighbouring Syria on 
destination for Syrians fleeing
requirements in 2011 when the
and business networks between
relocate to. To cross to Lebano
border crossings, and the illegal
porous border regions (Figure 
and goods between the countr
have been denied entry to Leba
frozen on a smuggler route nea
the continuing need for Syrians 
                                        
202 Jordan and Turkey are also in direct 
three countries host over 5.2 million refu
context in which refugees were hosted d
Jordan and Turkey, Syrian refugees h
following two articles by the Refugee Stu
O-SPATIAL MAP  
of migration and choice of refuge 
all but a minor portion of its land borders, Le
 the violence of the crisis202. Not only we
 events started, but there have also always bee
 the two countries, making it relatively easy 
n, Syrians have the legal option to use one o
 option of using the informal points of entry a
 6-1). These routes have historically been used
ies, and Syrians continue to use them three 
non. In January of 2018, ten people including c
r the Masna’ border crossing (number 20 on 
to seek refuge (Al Jazeera News, 2018). 
         
proximity with Syria and have also been first choices for Sy
gees, 92 percent of the total persons of concern in the S
iffer from country to the other, the main difference between 
ave mainly been placed in refugee camps rather than in
dies Center may serve as references to the different situations
233 
city 
banon is a prime 
re there no entry 
n historical familial 
and inexpensive to 
f four official land 
nd the stretches of 
 to smuggle people 
years after refugees 
hildren were found 
the map), reflecting 
 
rian refugees. In fact the 
yria crisis situation. The 
them being that in both 
tegrated the cities. The 
 in these countries. 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Figure  6-1: Crossing points betw
Crossing points of Syrian refugees
Analysis Project. Date: 2014 
 
The migration (season
communities inside Syria and i
there has been no census in e
migration due to the open bord
are a few broad geopolitical, soc
First, governmental opp
Muslim Brotherhood) in Syria l
in these areas. In the norther
marginalized (ex. Assyrians). K
the Assyrians have been in a co
classic transitional stop on th
interview, 2018). The Kurdish min
but political tensions between the
being the second closest countr
Syria and / or refuge in Lebano
Additionally, the late 1
                                        
203 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3 
204 For background on the history of the K
 
 
een Syria and Lebanon 
 along the Lebanese-Syrian border. Source: ACAP
al and long term) and resettlement of S
nto Lebanon has been a reality since before
ither country on the number of migrants an
er policy and pax syriana between the countri
io-economic and environmental reasons that h
ression of certain areas (such as Hama) and 
ed to internal and international displacement o
n regions of Syria, minorities were oppress
urds historically migrated to Lebanon204 as sea
ntinuous cycle of immigration from the region
e way to immigration towards Europe (Mah
orities in Syria live in cities in immediate pro
m and the Turks on one hand, and the Iraqi
y to their cities) made their only options inter
n. 
950s and early 1960s were turbulent in S
         
urdish community in Lebanon see (Meho & Kawtharani, 19
234 
S. Syria Needs 
yrian families and 
 the crisis203. While 
d their reasons for 
es until 2015, there 
ave caused it.  
groups (such as the 
f the communities 
ed (ex. Kurds) or 
sonal workers, and 
 - Lebanon being a 
er Samaan, personal 
ximity with Turkey, 
s on the other (Iraq 
nal displacement in 
yria’s political and 
95) 
SITUATING REFUGEES ON THE SOCIO-SPATIAL MAP  235 
 
economic history. The formation of the United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt, and the 
nationalisation policies that accompanied this union largely impacted the Syrian economy and 
class structure (Ahsan, 1984; Longuenesse, 1979). These years witnessed the immigration of 
money and family business towards Lebanon and other destinations, and Syrians of different 
classes migrated to Lebanon and other countries. Armenians in Syria were especially affected 
during this period and opted to join their peers in Lebanon, as “the emergence of centralizing, 
authoritarian regimes [in Syria] in the 1950s and 1960s severely damaged [their] autonomy and 
cultural diversity” (Migliorino, 2008). 
 While the immediate cause of the refugee influx to Lebanon is the 2011 conflict, “behind 
that is a complex mix of social and political factors both inside and outside the region. One 
fiercely studied and debated driver has been a recent dip into a series of severe droughts starting 
in the late 1990s” (Kahn, 2016). In fact, “the drought that preceded Syria’s Civil War was likely 
the worst in 900 years” (Cook, Anchukaitis, Touchan, Meko, & Cook, 2016; Stokes, 2016); 
Stokes, 2016). It caused 75 percent of Syria's farms to fail and 85 percent of livestock to die 
between 2006 and 2011, according to the United Nations. The collapse in crop yields forced as 
many as 1.5 million Syrians to migrate to urban centers, like Homs and Damascus (Stokes, 2016). 
This means that the movement of Syrians from rural areas may have been caused by more than 
the conflict, as people sought alternative means of livelihood.  
Figure  6-2 depicts the places of origin of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. It shows that in 
December 2014 - when the number of registered refugees was almost at its highest - the largest 
number of Syrians in Lebanon (147,624) had fled from Homs. The third largest city in Syria, it 
was home to Muslim, Alawi and Christian communities alike and the second largest Christian 
community in the country. The second largest number of refugees (128,312) came from the Jabal 
Semaan district that includes Aleppo, the second major city of Syria after Damascus and also 
religiously mixed. The number of refugees from other areas is less than 70,000, and includes 
Idleb and rural Damascus that are less represented in terms of religious groups.  
While these numbers are telling, it is important to note that internal displacement trends 
prior and during the conflict in Syria might have skewed their precision. When the UNHCR 
asked a refugee in Lebanon where they came from and the answer was Raqqa, “it did not 
necessarily mean that the refugee was residing in Raqqa at the time, but that his familial origins 
were from Raqqa, they might have been living in another city for years before 2011” (UNHCR 
project officer, personal interview, 2015). These specificities are difficult to account for, but what is 
important to note is the fact that Damascus, both its urban and rural parts already housed a 
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permanent residents.  
Further to interviews with UNHCR staff and the refugees, I have distinguished five 
broad categories. (1) Syrians who entered Lebanon after 2011 for fear of imminent danger to 
their lives. Those, if they stayed or returned to Syria would either be imprisoned or drafted to the 
army depending on their political activism. They include the young males of Sunni Muslim 
confession, and usually resided in cities (Dar’a, Aleppo, Homs, etc.).  
(2) Some came to Lebanon fleeing the violence but with no fear of imprisonment or 
conscription. Those feared death as collateral, and had almost no means of economic survival in 
Syria. This category of Syrians could still make trips back and forth to some cities in Syria until 
2015205. 
(3) Syrians who are the immediate and extended family members of those Syrians who 
were already in Lebanon. Those include the wives, children and elderly. In fact in December 2017  
“80.9 percent of registered Syrian refugees [in Lebanon] are women and children” (Yassin, 2018, 
p. 23).  
(4) Syrians who were residing in Lebanon before 2011. Those individuals had the options 
to register as refugees with the UNHCR. This is perhaps the most challenging category to 
quantify and qualify.  
(5) Syrians who came to Lebanon from the relatively safe regime-held areas (such as 
Damascus and the coastal cities of Lattakia, Tartous), who were not in immediate fear for their 
lives but fled war conditions. Those include the rich minorities who came to Lebanon to wait out 
the conflict.  
Of all the preceding categories only the first one comprises of individuals who 
categorically could not return to Syria even before 2015.  
                                                 
205 Starting January 2015, any Syrian who crossed from Lebanon to Syria would no longer have the right to enter Lebanon 
under residency rules introduced by the General Security.  
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Figure  6-3: Representation of Syrian refugees’ choice of the city of refuge in Lebanon 
 
In addition to these different categories to which the Syrians may belong to, their position 
vis-à-vis the Syrian regime also plays a role in their choice of city206. Figure  6-3 maps the reasons 
behind refugees’ choice of city. The types of refugees to leave Syria, as detailed above are 
represented in the upper section of the diagram. Although exact statistics for these categories are 
not known, the UNHCR registration trends show that the majority of registered Syrian refugees 
in Lebanon are women and children. The middle section represents the main factors taken into 
consideration by the refugees when choosing a city. The bottom section represents the profile of 
the city or neighbourhood, and why it may be attractive to refugees. Traditionally, poor migrants 
will settle in the peripheries of a city as an easier access point, and move as need be once they 
have started to settle. In any of the sections, one or more of the criteria mentioned may apply. 
For example, a neighbourhood may be attractive due to the type and affordability of housing 
available in it, and also because of the diversity of residents’ nationalities, such as the case of El-
Nab'a. Nabil, a Syrian in his thirties came to El-Nab’a in early 2013 because he had “a lot of 
experience in tiling” and the employers in Sin-el-Fil knew him and could “count on his 
                                                 
206 For example, in the Tebbeneh area of Tripoli, one of the case studies in this dissertation, the neighbourhoods are divided 
along religious and political lines, mainly pro and anti Syrian regime. 
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seriousness”. He told me “I came here because I knew my landlord from before, and I’ve never 
had issues with him, I always pay him on time. He increased the rent this time because of the 
situation, you know…” (Interview with Nabil, Syrian refugee in el Nab’a, 2016) 
The accounts I documented during the field echo those in John Chalcraft’s Invisible Cage 
from well before the Syrian crisis in 2011. It confirms that the choice of cities for the Syrian 
refugees is largely based on personal networks. It is also in line with the literature on urban 
refugees highlighting the importance of these networks in the trajectories of refugees (Landau & 
Jacobsen, 2004; Pavanello et al., 2010). In 2004, one Syrian migrant told John Chalcraft 
I am a Syrian from Tartous. People - mostly christian and Alawi - from Tartous and 
Lattakia, I mean the Syrian coast, are very good workers. I mean they work in 
gypsum, restaurants, clothes shops, or in hotels. While people - mostly Sunni - from 
the inner part of Syria, like Hama or Idlib, they do jobs like digging, carriers and 
porters in Lebanon. While other people from Aleppo, the city, work in trading. People 
from the countryside around Aleppo work in cultivation. People from Masyaf work in 
planting vegetables and fruits. So Syrians from special parts in Syria have their 
special style of work down in Lebanon. People from the coast dress all the time very 
well and they do just specific type of work which is clean and elegant. While people 
from the inner part of Syria… there will be fifteen persons living together in one 
room! (Chalcraft, 2009, p. 182). 
The transcript is in line with responses I have received throughout the years, especially 
from Lebanese dwellers but also from Syrian and Palestinian refugees. also reflects several aspects 
of the Syrian migration history that I will further discuss during this part of the thesis, especially 
the patterns of housing that Syrians adopt.  
5.2 Distribution of Syrian refugees at the national scale 
 
The UNHCR estimates 945,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon at the time of writing. A 
census undertook in 2017 counted just over 250,000207 individuals residing in informal 
settlements208. It can therefore be estimated that at least 700,000 Syrian refugees have resided in 
Lebanese urban areas, and this since 2014, the year when the number of registered refugees 
reached one million. Syrian refugees are settled in all regions, mostly concentrated in the larger 
cities and their peripheries and usually in neighbourhoods where housing is cheap and largely 
                                                 
207 This number does not include individuals living in precarious shelter conditions outside the informal settlements, or in the 
cities.  
208 See Chapter 4 Section 3 
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substandard. The geographic distribution map (Figure  6-4) visually reflects the magnitude of the 
situation as well as its gravity. As can be seen the Syrian refugees are present in every area though 
in different concentrations. This percentage of population increase in a matter of three years is 
unprecedented and presents an “obvious challenge for any people” (El-Khouri, 2018, p. 99).  
 
Figure  6-4: Evolution of Syrian refugee influx 
Based on the statistics of the UNHCR, this map developed for CARTO in 2017 shows the Evolution 
of the influx since 2011 and the spatial distribution in 2017. Source: (Gillette, Faour, & Verdeil, 
2017, p. 17). 
Estimated at hundreds of thousands, Syrian migrants in Lebanon before 2011 were 
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already residing in most cities of the country (Buccianti-Barakat, 2016, p. 263). During the first 
three years of the crisis (2011-2014) their  entry to lebanon took place with no constraints and 
was mostly unregulated. In this context, the choice of installation depended on social networks, 
access to shelter (Fawaz et al., 2014) and potential economic activity. Syrians are present in the 
eight Mouhafazat (governorates) - as per the latest administrative reforms in 2003 (Figure  6-5) and 
there are trends that make some areas more accessible to them, especially living cost, personal 
networks and religious-political affiliation. The least costly shelter is in the informal settlements 
dotting the governorates closest to the Syrian border in the Bekaa and the North. These places 
shelter the most vulnerable and disenfranchised, those who need to rely most on aid. Most 
refugees however prefer the urban setting outside the settlements whenever possible, even when 
shelter conditions outside the settlements they can afford are precarious. “Of course I’m better 
off here, even in this garage. I’m closer to the highway, I can get picked for a day’s construction 
work, I can get to places much faster and easier. It’s very bad in the settlements, they’re dying of 
the cold…” (Wael, Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2016). 
The most consequential numbers of refugees are in the governorates of Bekaa-Baalbak-
Hermel209 that comprise of large agricultural lands and include some of the only spaces in 
Lebanon that can be considered rural. Over 340,000 (36 percent) Syrian refugees are registered in 
these governorates that are bordered by Syria to the East, and include the first cities on the 
trajectory of a Syrian entering Lebanon. By virtue of their seasonal migration to work in 
agricultural fields in the Bekaa (and other industries across Lebanon), they have historically 
worked in these governorates. One refugee, around 50 years old originally from the rural areas of 
Aleppo told me: “The men in my family have worked in cultivation in Lebanon since the 1950s! 
We know our way around, it’s not my first time here you know… but now I can’t find work, 
what can I do?” (Abu Amer, Syrian refugee in Jebjennine, personal interview, 2015). Throughout the 
Syrian crisis, several cities in the Bekaa have been in the forefront of the news.  Examples of such 
are Arsal which ISIS infiltrated in 2014 and that has seen military intervention and numerous 
security events (Obeid, 2016; Perry & al-Khalidi, 2017; A. Suleiman, 2015; The Daily Star, 
2018d), Jebjennine where some of the first informal settlements were set up, or Bar Elias, known 
to be home to more Syrians than Lebanese at present (Kanaan, 2016), among others. 
The South of Lebanon has the least number of registered refugees. Almost 115,000 (12 percent) 
of the refugee population reside in this region in proximity with Israël210. Lebanese residents in 
the south are predominantly Shiite Muslims with the exception of the major city of Saida that 
includes an important percentage of Sunni Muslim residents. The governorates of Beirut and the  
                                                 
209 See Chapter 2, Encadré 2-1 for details on administrative divisions in Lebanon 
210 Almost half of Southern Lebanon was under Israëli occupation between 1982 and 2000 
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North are home to around 250,000 (26 percent) registered refugees each, and are areas with 
significant numbers of Sunni Muslim communities. The governorate of Mount Lebanon is not 
accounted for separately in the UNHCR data, but included and managed for by the Beirut 
offices. Similarly, the governorates of the South and Nabatieh are aggregated in the accounts of 
the UNHCR, due to the relatively low number of Syrian refugees (Interview with UNHCR 
project officer, 2015). 
  
 
 
Figure  6-5: Number of registered refugees 
Total number of registered refugees by area in Lebanon. Source: UNHCR data portal, 2019 
 
Several factors have contributed to such a national distribution. The first was the 
government’s refusal to construct refugee camps (Buccianti-Barakat, 2016, p. 263). In 2011 when 
Syrian refugees began to arrive they would choose a location in an urban environment based on 
personal social networks. In many ways it could have been expected that “a large section of the 
Syrian refugees to capitalize on historical networks of migration and employment” (Fawaz, 2017a, 
p. 100) further t the history of migration of Syrians into Lebanon. Scholars have moreover found 
that refugees tend to prefer the anonymity and opportunity that a city would provide them, in 
contrast to the confinement and dependence on aid that a camp or informal settlement tend to 
present211. According to the UNHCR, they tend to “perceive urban areas as havens of modernity 
and democratic and economic prosperity. They hope to find safety, anonymity and better 
conditions allowing them to improve their livelihoods” (De Vriese, 2006, p. 17). 
 
  
                                                 
211 See Chapter 1 section 2 
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5.3 A debatable identity? Who are the Syrians in Lebanon? 
The present day relationship between Lebanese and Syrian communities draws from two 
factors. First the old stereotypes rooted in historic events and perceptions: for many decades 
before 2011, Syrians were present in Lebanon as low-skilled migrants working primarily in 
agriculture and construction, and over a period of 30 years they were most visible on the streets 
as soldiers, and intelligence officers212.  Second, since 2011 the Syrians have taken in a different 
quality as refugees. It was no longer only the active men who came to work or man the 
checkpoints, now the Syrians include entire families of refugees. The term refugee is also in itself 
complex for the Lebanese considering the history with the Palestinian refugees, still very present 
in cities. The old stereotypes have thus been nuanced in light of the recent and novel situation, 
and combined, they created renewed stereotypes and generalisations about Syrian refugees, four 
of which I will describe in Chapter 6.  
Lebanon has not signed the 1951 UNHCR Convention and Protocol relating to the 
status of refugees. There is furthermore no national legislation dealing with refugees (Janmyr, 
2016). On one hand the Lebanese government has opted against referring to the Syrians in 
Lebanon as refugees and has insisted on naming them nazihoun (displaced)213 in a conscious effort 
not to deal with them as refugees, emphasising the fact that the government does not adhere to 
nor is it willing to recognise any special rights - as intended by the United Nations and 
International laws - for this population. At the same time the term laje’ (refugee) is increasingly 
pejorative, derogatory, and implies an “assumed passivity of individuals and collectivities labelled 
[as such]” (Fawaz et al., 2018, p. 5). For this reason some scholars and Syrians alike reject the 
term refugee, as I have seen repeatedly throughout the fieldwork for this thesis. In fact, 30 
percent of the Syrian refugees I spoke with do not identify with the term or reject it completely: 
“No, I’m not a refugee”, they would tell me, “I don’t need to be”. The other 70 percent, while 
accepting the fact that they were refugees tended to be apologetic about it, and mostly linked 
their refugee status with the need for aid. Those would answer: “I don’t want to be, but what can 
I do?”, “where would I live?”, or  “I need to feed my children”.  
Once assigned, the power of a name is such that the process by which the name 
was selected generally disappears and a series of normative associations, motives 
and characteristics are attached to the named subject. By naming, this subject 
becomes known in a manner which may permit certain forms of inquiry and 
                                                 
212 See Chapter 1, Section 3 
213 In reality this is not the case, as “displaced” persons are those who do not cross borders but are displaced in their own 
country due to conflict or other reasons. according to UN definitions 
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engagement, while forbidding or excluding others. No doubt such simplifications 
allow people to both engage with and understand a complex world. However, the 
need for simplicity can be rapidly appropriated and taken advantage of by those with 
their own political agenda (Bhatia, 2005, p. 8). 
 
Indeed the term refugee in Lebanon has become synonymous with extreme poverty and 
the need for aid, reflecting a status of extreme dependency and the reactions of the refugees I 
met over the years varied from disliking the term to rejecting it completely. Typically, when 
Syrians are not registered with the UNHCR, or when they do not seek aid, they use that as 
justification to reject the label. “Let me tell you something, whatever money I made while I was 
here, I made from international parties214. I have not taken a Lebanese dollar since I came” (Abu 
Nidal, Syrian refugee in Beirut, personal interview, 2016) with this statement Abu Nidal rejected the fact 
that he is a refugee, revealing how the term is synonymous with the need for humanitarian aid, 
and almost devoid of its larger socio political aspects.  
Another label used to refer to the Syrians is El-Soureh (the Syrian) that reflects the 
nationality and could refer in some situations to a job cluster, mainly concierge and construction 
worker. Since 2011, it is also used to refer to refugees. In Lebanon it is in fact not uncommon to 
refer to a job cluster by a nationality. For example house maids are often referred to as Sirilankieh 
(Sri Lankan) regardless of her215 actual nationality. The nationality becomes therefore a 
stereotype, for example “the generic term Sirilankieh commonly refers to a domestic 
worker”216(Dahdah, 2015, p. 107).  
After positioning the refugees on the spatial and the social map, which has served to 
address the Syrian refugees in Lebanon as a specific social group within the country, and after 
delineating demographic tendencies and echoing a particular political situation at both the 
national and regional levels, I will turn in the following chapter to another scale. In it I will not 
only refer to the refugees as individuals, but I will detail their daily lives, addressing the processes 
of access to shelter/housing, work and to the public urban space specifically. While each refugee 
has an individual path taken to access the resources of the city, I will first draw on some general 
figures built on my empirical corpus, prolonging them with extracts of personal narratives and 
selected commented photographs, in a bid to express the main issues and restitute specific 
situations as well.  
                                                 
214 Abu Nidal insisted on the fact that all the work he has done in Lebanon has been with or for international NGOs or 
individuals, and he considers that his revenues have never been from a local Lebanese individual or company.  
215 House maids, or the domestic help, are predominantly female. 
216 Original citation: “Le terme générique de sirlankiyeh (Sri Lankaise, en arabe) désigne d’ailleurs communément une 
domestique”. 
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7. Chapter 6. Daily life 
conditions of a 
Syrian refugee in 
cities in Lebanon 
 
 
Figure  7-1: Garages as shelters for Syrian refugees, Tebbeneh 
Sketch: Ziad Moutran, 2019, Couleur: Raphaëlle Cottereau 
 
Over the course of my fieldwork for this dissertation I conducted thirty-three formal 
interviews with Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Eight of those were commented walks in which the 
conversation we were having would be complemented with notes on places, streets, and other 
urban experiences. I was able to record forty percent of the conversations due either to bad 
sound conditions or to reluctance from my interviewee. I also complemented these formal 
interviews with numerous informal chats that served mainly to validate or raise doubts on some 
of my notes. My findings fall into four themes that encompass the conditions of settlement for 
Syrian refugees’ in the country. Those are housing, conditions of settlement, economic 
opportunities and to some more detail, access to public space. 
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6.1 Access to shelter 
Of the refugees I met, fifteen lived with their immediate family in apartments of varying 
standards (including concierge rooms on the roof or at the entrance of a building); nine shared 
their apartments with one or more related families (usually siblings or cousins); four lived in 
garages or a storage room of a building, and five refugees did not disclose their shelter 
conditions. These types of shetler match four of six types of accommodation identified by the 
UNHCR in 2014. Based on a phone survey with 6,000 refugees, the organisation listed built 
apartments or houses, unfinished or substandard buildings, garages or shops, one room 
structures, collective shelters, and informal settlements as types of accommodation, and a seventh 
type listed as “other”, in which sixteen percent of the refugees resided (Fawaz et al., 2014, p. 33). 
A glimpse of the poor condition of housing  
For all my interviewees, the shelter they could afford was sometimes in need of minor, 
but mostly major repairs, ranging from plumbing to serious structural problems. One of the 
families in Tebbeneh lived in the old and fragile building structure shown in Figure  7-2. “Before 
2011, a couple of Syrian men resided on that first floor, but since then it’s an entire family with 
kids, I’d say seven or eight people”, told me a neighbour from a nearby building in an informal 
chat.  
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Figure  7-2: A Syrian refugee family lives in a building with degrading structure 
Tebbeneh. October 2018 
In fact, a vulnerability assessment carried out by the World Food Programme (WFP) with 
4,966 households in 2017217 found that “four percent of shelters are in dangerous conditions, 
severely damaged and/or at risk of collapse, while 28 percent have other urgent repair needs, 
such as unsealed windows, leaking roofs/walls, or damaged plumbing, latrines, bathing facilities 
or electricity” (Saiid, Elzuhairi, & Papavero, 2017, p. 22). Even in the cases where repairs have 
been undertaken, the results remain substandard. In Figure  7-3, a Syrian refugee family in 
Tebbeneh  (Dahr el Moghr area specifically) explained to me the upgrades to their apartment that 
had just been finalised by “the UN” as they stated it, but were not sure of the exact organisation. 
In my notebook that day I wrote:   
Today I took a walk with Em Tarek, a 42 year old Lebanese resident of Tebbeneh 
and maternal grandmother to two girls whom she financially cared for because her 
daughter is divorced and unemployed. She explained that Syrian families had 
recently been leaving the street where we were walking as rent was becoming too 
                                                 
217 Precision on the methodology of the survey: “a two-stage cluster sampling methodology was utilized in 2017. A total of 
4,966 UNHCR-registered Syrian refugee households were surveyed.1 The interviewed households were comprised of 
24,415 individuals, out of which 4,839 were children aged five and under” (Saiid, Elzuhairi, & Papavero, 2017 p.7) 
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much of a burden, they were moving to a cheaper area a few streets above. Only a 
few apartments rented to Syrians remained on the stretch of Nasr Street where we 
were walking. At one point she stopped and with an eager tone said: “Let’s see if Em 
Omar is at home, I want to show you, come on, they’ve just had the place done, it 
was a fund from the UN218, the owner and tenant are very happy”, she said. (Em 
Tarek, Lebanese dweller in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2018) 
               
 
 
 
Figure  7-3: Upgrades in a Tebbeneh apartment  
Upgrades by unknown organization include sealing windows, and inserting a door to the 
bedroom. October 2018 
As the family showed me around the 40m2 apartment lodging their family of seven, they 
repeated their gratitude and relief for the upgrades. The apartment was still substandard, with the 
most serious issue I witnessed being the very damp and degrading walls. The process that led to 
these upgrades is interesting. According to Em Tarek, some UN people were walking around the 
                                                 
218 She was not sure which organisation it was exactly, it could have been the UN, the ICRC or any other international 
organisation.  
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area a while back, and she approached them to see what they were looking for. They were 
offering upgrades for apartments where Syrian refugees resided, and Em Tarek brought them to 
this family. No formal agreements were made with the owner, to the best of Em Tarek’s 
knowledge, but the UN surveyed the apartment and sent three workers within a week to fix it up. 
They installed two wooden doors, one to the patio and the other to the bedroom, they sealed up 
four small windows, and installed new bathroom and kitchen accessories. Em Tarek commented 
on how the situation was a win-win, for the organisation that needed to work, for the Syrian 
tenants and for the Lebanese landlord as well. Em Omar and her family have been in Lebanon 
since 2011, some of the “very first people who came here”, and paid $300 (€260) in rent. 
Before this intervention, the apartment owner had made no upgrades and the Syrian 
family had made no such request, even though the amount of rent paid is considered significant, 
and significantly superior to the rent rates from before the crisis. According to Em Tarek, the 
place would not have been rented for more than €150 before 2011. “Maximum, maximum, she 
said. Who could afford more? Don’t forget the Syrians have aid, that’s how they pay this much” 
(Em Tarek, Lebanese dweller in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2016). The owner therefore benefited 
twice from the space, making almost double the amount of rent the apartment is worth for over 
many years, and receiving upgrades at no cost because he was renting out to Syrians. In spite of 
the family’s long term presence and their seemingly stable situation in the apartment, they still 
had no assurances. There was no rent contract and no legal residency documents219, which meant 
they were exposed to eviction at any time with no recourse whatsoever to legal support. When I 
asked about this issue the mother said to me: “No our landlord is very good with us, he wouldn’t 
do that… it’s been almost seven years and we are never late to pay, and we don’t give him any 
trouble” (Em Omar, refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2018).  
In the cases where refugees rented garages to reside in, such as the four garages in Figure 
 7-4 they faced many challenges, mostly in terms of sanitation. With no toilets or showers, 
refugees would usually cope by sharing a bathroom with another family living in an upstairs 
apartment in the same building. The fact that there are no windows and no partitions also 
exacerbates the difficult living conditions in such spaces.  
                                                 
219 Conditions of residency are discussed in more detail in the next section 
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Figure  7-4: Syrian refugees renting garages in Tebbeneh, June 2015 
 
The situation in both El-Nab’a and Bourj el-Barajneh compares in terms of dire shelter 
conditions. Figure  7-5 from the EL-Nab’a neighbourhood shows the rooftop room housing a 
Syrian family of five, who use giant banners in lieu of a roof. It also shows the facade of an 
apartment housing two Syrian refugee families just below. When their windows are not used to 
hang laundry, they are closed with makeshift aluminum or cardboard panels. The frontage also 
reflects the poor status of the walls and structure. In Figure  7-6the entrances to two different 
apartment buildings that housed Syrian refugees show extreme degradation, one in better 
condition that still reflects the existence of various electric systems - both formal and informal - 
(which explains the important number of wires) and the degraded walls and staircase. It was 
unclear to me whether the former tenants were Lebanese or other migrants, the Syrian families 
residing there did not know or did not say. Figure  7-7 shows the entrance to an electrical 
appliances workshop which harbored a Syrian refugee family for a while. They were not living 
there anymore at the time I took the photo, but Hala, my Lebanese interviewee on a commented 
walk that day said: “a family of five used the back room as shelter for several months between 
2012 and 2013, and paid rent against it” (Hala, Lebanese resident in El-Nab’a, personal interview, 2015). 
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Figure  7-5: : Facade of a building where Syrian refugees live, El Nab’a, February 2015 
 
 
 
Figure  7-6: Electrical appliance workshop in which a Syrian refugee family resides, 2015 
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Figure  7-7: Entrances to apartment buildings  
Examples of three entrances to buildings where Syrian refugees reside, El Nab’a. February 2015 
 
Housing conditions in Bourj el-Barajneh are the most challenging. To say shelter for an 
estimated 40,000 in almost 0.3 square kilometers, built informally over decades has produced a 
dangerously dire situation is not an exaggeration. The camp is, for an outsider, a maze of narrow 
streets of less than a meter wide at some points, full of critically low electrical cables, mostly 
placed close to water cables220 (Figure  7-8). It has grown vertically and quickly since 2012 without 
proper structural considerations. In the building to the left in Figure  7-9 the top five stories were 
built between 2012 and 2017, intentionally to be rented out to Syrians, just like the top three 
stories in the building in the center of the photo. The high-rise in Figure  7-10 was “almost all 
built for the Syrians” (Mahmoud, Palestinian refugee in Lebanon, personal interview, 2018). Already 
overcrowded before 2011, the camp would not have been able to almost double in population 
size were it not for these new constructions. The residents, Palestinian refugees who already 
struggled with securing livelihood, saw renting their apartments to Syrians as a worthy 
investment. Like the Lebanese hosts, they saw in Syrians a sure monthly rent, because the latter 
“get help with their rent, and they always pay on time” (Setti Em Mohammad, Palestinian refugee in 
Lebanon, personal interview, 2018). Em Mohammad, a grandmother who has lived in the camp since 
her birth in the 1950s, said she preferred to rent out to the Syrians than to the Palestinians. Living 
on the ground floor of her three story apartment, built by her family decades ago, she said they 
were acceptable neighbours, they gave her no trouble. Her main complaint about the Syrians 
though was that they were getting more aid than the Palestinians, an issue I will develop in 
chapter 7.   
                                                 
220 Although no official count exists, it is widely reported that at least a dozen deaths occur from electrical shocks per year in 
the camps.  
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Granted that housing conditions in a number of neighbourhoods in Lebanon have 
common features with the ones currently inhabited by refugees, seeing that a significant number 
of citizens in the country are poor, and that most of the urban setting is lacking or suffers from 
highly inadequate infrastructure, the question of rent value provides further explanation on the 
ways that refugees could also be considered a target to increase revenue in the housing sector. 
 
Figure  7-8: Entrances to apartment buildings where Syrian refugees reside, El Nab’a 
February 2015 
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Figure  7-9: Vertical growth 
Five new stories between 2012 and 2018 in the building to the left, and three new stories in the 
building in the center. February 2018 
 
Figure  7-10: Figure 6.9: “That tall building didn’t exist in 2012”. February 2018 
8 
CHAPTER 6  256 
 
Monetizing vulnerability 
To the question of rent values the migrants interviewed had to pay monthly for getting a 
place to live in, the answers mentioned strong differences from one site to the other. The rates I 
was given ranged between $200-400 in Tebbeneh, $150-350 in Bourj el-Barajneh and $200-500 in 
El-Nab’a. Paying rent was one of the most pressing factors of stress for all the refugees I spoke 
with. While twelve of my interviewees reported receiving between “shouai (some)” of their rent 
value at some point from the UNHCR, they all reported having difficulties securing the rest, and 
most said the aid, when received, was insignificant. Rent was the factor that mostly influenced the 
choice of shelter for refugees (Fawaz et al., 2014, p. 34) Those who did not have any support 
coped by (1) sending their children to work, (2) by sharing housing, (3) by moving to more 
affordable shelter, or by a combination of these strategies, like in the following example.  
Yassin, a Syrian refugee in Bourj el-Barajneh since 2015, resorted to all three coping 
mechanisms to make ends meet. “We were staying at a place near Cola, but I couldn’t pay the 
$400 … we moved here to the camp in 2015, with my brother and his family, Here we are paying 
less than $200. I secure around $200 a month, and my sons [ages 11 and 13] now bring in another 
$150, we are doing ok” (Yassin, Syrian refugee in Bourj el Barajneh, personal interview, 2018). Effectively, 
Yassin had to move to a more affordable area, he had to send both his children to work, and he 
opted to share shelter, to make ends meet. In a commented walk in the Tebbeneh, my Lebanese 
guide explained how most of the Syrians who lived on Nasr street had moved during the 
previous year. “They moved a couple of streets above - they’re now just anywhere, in storage 
rooms or rooms under staircases… t’attaro (they’ve been dealt a bad hand)” (Em Tarek, Lebanese 
dweller in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2016).  
Rental agreements are predominantly private, informal and not registered, between 
private dwellers: Syrian refugees and Lebanese in the cases of Tebbeneh and el-Nab’a, or 
Palestinians in the case of Bourj el-Barajneh. Importantly, of the twenty-four refugees I met with 
who live in apartments (not garages or storage rooms) share the buildings with Lebanese 
dwellers. In the example in Figure  7-11, a Lebanese dweller drew me a sketch of her building 
explaining where the Syrians were. The apartment facing her is exactly the same size 
(approximately 80m2). It is split in two and shared by two Syrian refugee families (nine people in 
all), who pay $500 in rent per month. They pay $100 more than the Syrian family of five on the 
top floor because they are overcrowding the apartment, and their landlord221 deemed it more 
fitting that they should pay more in total because they pay less per family.  
                                                 
221 The two apartments occupied by Syrians are owned by two different Lebanese landlords.  
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I asked Mirvat, my Lebanese interviewee, if she knew her Syrian neighbours next door. 
“Not really, no… we don’t talk much. They are two families that share the apartment, it’s very 
crowded - they’ve placed a separation in the entrance, it’s not very practical but they are ok with 
it”. Mirvat then asked if I wanted to see the neighbour’s apartment and knocked at their door. A 
surprised woman opened, and I could see four children playing in the background. Mirvat 
greeted the woman and asked her if I could look around the apartment - a request which clearly 
made the tenant uncomfortable. After a brief moment I apologised for the intrusion and we went 
back into Mirvat’s apartment. “Of course they wouldn’t want you to see… when a person is 
proud of their place they let you in… you’ve been welcome in my house, because I’m proud of 
it”. 
Abusive practices: brokers, evictions, arbitrary rent increases 
In 2019, a refugee in El-Nab’a told me via whatsapp that they had moved. I pressed to 
find out why, because the last time I saw her she seemed satisfied with the apartment they were 
renting. “What do you want me to say ya Dima?” (Maryam, Syrian refugee in El-Nab’a, personal 
interview, 2016) she said in a voice note. Their broker asked them to vacate in one week maximum, 
because he found someone that would pay $50 more for it. When they tried to negotiate, he said 
he could reconsider if they matched the amount, which was an impossibility. For the price they 
were paying, he offered them another place still in El-Nab’a, it had been their third move since 
2016, and the last two managed by the same broker.  
Maryam’s story is not unique, in fact in El-Nab’a the “broker” phenomenon is 
widespread. Many apartment owners have left the management of their places to individual 
brokers or even small brokerage firms that have significant power in the process. In fact, “the 
rental market in Naba’a clearly favors landlords and those with strong social networks. Rental 
arrangements are informal, and landlords or their middle-men are able to charge higher rents, 
increase them more often, and enforce evictions more readily” (Fawaz et al., 2014, p. 61).  
In contrast, the phenomenon does not exist at all in Bourj el-Barajneh, and in very limited 
scope in Tebbeneh. This is probably due to the fact that residential mobility is present to a larger 
degree in El-Nab’a than in the other two sites, and also to the fact that there is a larger mix of 
nationalities, ethnicities and religious groups, as described in chapter four. The nature of the 
populations in the other two sites is more conservative, and there is a dominant presence of one 
religious group, within which the dwellers are more familiar with each other.   
Evictions are a common occurrence across the three sites. They are enforced at varying 
degrees of violence, ranging from a friendly “request” to move out, to a threat of police 
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intervention; and varying degrees of authority, ranging from the landlord to the neighbours to the 
local authorities. Based on the information I gathered in my interviews as direct experiences, and 
indirect experiences (where my interviewees knew of someone who was evicted), I was able to 
identify three types of evictions (Table 6.1). The first type is at the landlord - tenant level and 
mainly takes place when the refugees are not able to make rent on time. This type of eviction is 
mainly enforced through dialogue, that can range between a civil conversation to a violent one. 
While in most cases a conversation happens before the eviction, refugees expect them to the 
extent that they will sometimes leave an apartment or shelter before being asked, when they 
know they cannot pay as was the case of Maysaa’s family. In 2017, she had been residing in 
Tebbeneh for around six months when I met her. Her family of five had been living in closer to 
the center of Tripoli but had been struggling with rent for a year before moving.  
We had always found a way to pay on time, we paid $300 for a nice apartment, we 
were comfortable. I sold most of my jewelry, my husband worked on anything and 
everything. It was ok for the first year, but it started to get harder with time. Around 
[June 2016] we were really struggling, and we started to borrow money from our 
friends. That was a big mistake… by the end of last year, we knew we couldn’t pay 
the rent anymore. In December my husband had hardly worked four or five days in 
all and we were already in debt. My husband’s cousin suggested we move in with 
them and share rent… but I did not accept… no no no… I told my husband we 
would find anything else, even a single room but have our privacy… before the end 
of December we had found this place, and moved. I told [my husband] let’s just do it 
before [the landlord] kicks us out… We are still in debt but it’s already less stressful 
at the end of the month. (Maysaa, Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 
2017) 
The second type of eviction is carried out by the authorities, and are usually mass 
evictions that have become more frequent since January 2015 The date when new residency 
requirements were elaborated, as discussed in section 6.2. These are violently carried out by 
municipal police. The case explained in chapter 1, Encadré 1-4 serves as an example of this type 
of eviction. In that case, around 100 Syrians were woken after midnight and forced to leave under 
police surveillance, in public view.  In another example, all Syrians within the boundaries of the 
municipality of Ehden were asked to vacate their shelter within a certain timeframe. This was 
done by public announcement via banners placed in the municipality (Figure  7-12). The message 
on these banners was vague, though, and literally reads “It is requested of all Syrian workers 
present within the boundaries of Ehden to leave before 31/10/2016”. It was unclear whether it 
was only the workers who were asked to leave or the entire families, and equally unclear whether 
the banners were meant to evict the workers from their residences or only from their work 
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activity. I showed this banner to fifteen Syrian refugees whom I interviewed, and their unanimous 
understanding of the message was that all Syrians in the area were being evicted. Had they been 
residing in Ehden, all fifteen said that they would make arrangements to leave.  
The third type of evictions is the hardest to describe, because it comes in the form of 
social pressure. All thirty three of my refugee interviewees expressed in some way feeling 
unwelcome at some point during their residence, but three refugees clearly and specifically felt 
socially pressured to move, when the reason was not related to rent. One such case happened 
with Mansour, a refugee residing in Tebbeneh. He used the words “we were thrown out” from 
Abu Samra, a central neighbourhood in Tripoli. I initially understood that they were not able to 
pay rent, but when he explained it was not that, I wanted to know more. I noted this as one of 
the very tense conversations I had during my field investigations, because Mansour was getting 
very agitated as he explained.  
No nobody asked us to leave but how can I tell you? I just knew I had to get my 
family out of there. [I pressed to know more]. You know… How can I say it… For 
example our upstairs neighbours threw water at our balcony every day. Whenever 
we passed any Lebanese neighbours they would whisper profanities, but just loud 
enough so we could hear them. My wife would not let my children play outside, she 
was afraid all the time… and we were the only Syrians in the building, there were six 
or seven other families, all Lebanese. There was this one man, from a couple of 
floors up… his look made me feel dirty… he almost scared me. He would have done 
something bad. We just couldn’t stay, do you understand now? (Mansour, Syrian 
refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2017) 
Another example of this type of social pressure can be seen in public banners and 
graffitti. In Figure  7-13 the banner reads: “the day will come when we tell the Syrian: pack up 
your things and everything you stole and leave”. This quotation from a former, assassinated, 
political leader222 was used during the parliamentary election campaign of 2018, and reflects the 
spatially represented social pressure against Syrian refugees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
222 Bachir Gemayel, former leader of the Lebanese Forces who was assassinated shortly after being elected as President of 
the republic. The figure of Gemayel is very significant as a representation of the maronite christian right 
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Table 6.1: Three types of evictions 
Type of eviction Reason Enforcement 
Evictions at the tenant-
landlord level 
Mainly inability to pay rent Dialogue, ranging from 
friendly to violent 
Evictions by authorities Non adherence to 
municipality rules, no 
residency permits  
Public demand, army or 
police raids 
Socially enforced evictions Different and numerous acts 
of daily rejection 
Social pressure 
 
The story of Rami: a struggle for dignity 
May God never try anyone [as he has tried me]... I am so afraid all the time. I don’t want 
to end up in a camp with my wife and children, people are freezing there. I am making enough 
right now. I bring in $300, sometimes $350 or a bit more! I am lucky, the bosses know I am 
serious and good at what I do. I pay the $250 for rent, but then we struggle for the food and 
heat. At least we’re in a proper apartment. I wouldn’t accept the camp, abadan, abadan (never 
ever). I wouldn’t. I would die first… If it gets to that I will sell my kidney, I know where to go to 
do that. (Rami, personal interview, El-Nab’a, 2016). 
 Rami, a gypsum board worker was living in El-Nab’a in 2016 with his wife, four children, 
and his mother-in-law in a one bedroom apartment. He was reluctant to take me to see it all the 
while insisting his family was much better off than most families he knew. He had already moved 
twice in three years - because of the rent rate. This type of housing mobility is experienced by at 
least 10-20 percent of the refugee population as detailed in Encadré 6.1.  
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Figure  7-11: Sketch by Lebanese dweller of her apartment building in Tebbeneh, and the 
street showing the building to the right. 2017 
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Figure  7-12: Public banner in Ehden requesting all Syrian workers to leave the municipality 
boundaries. Source: The Campaign in support of Syrians against racism, Facebook page, 
2014 
 
 
 
Figure  7-13: Public banner in Ashrafieh reads: “the day will come when we tell the Syrian: 
pack up your things and everything you stole and leave 
The figure of Gemayel is very significant as a representation of the maronite christian right. 
Source: Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018 
 
DAILY LIFE CONDITIONS OF REFUGEES  263 
 
Encadré  7-1: Excerpt from vulnerability assessment 
In a vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon in 2017, the World Food Programme 
surveyed 4,966 households. Twelve per cent of those said they had changed accommodations during 
the previous six months, while 10 percent were planning to move in the following six months, with a 
higher prevalence in Tripoli (20 percent).  
Eviction is increasingly the main reason cited by households for either a recent or planned move. 
Other major reasons for past or expected mobility were unaffordable rent expenses and 
unacceptable housing conditions. For those households that moved in the previous six months, 38 
percent left because of eviction, 20 percent due to unaffordable rents, and 9 percent due to 
unacceptable housing conditions. Of those households planning on moving within the following six 
months, 45 percent cited eviction (compared to only 25 percent last year), while 22 percent specified 
unaffordable rents, and 7 percent named unacceptable housing conditions. Security threats or 
tension with the community were mentioned by 5 percent of households who had recently moved, 
as compared to 2 percent in 2016. (Saiid et al., 2017, p. 28). 
 
 
 
6.2 The strenuous road to residency  
Since 2015 the conditions of residency of Syrian refugees in Lebanon have been very 
complicated. After historically being a matter of formality for both Lebanese and Syrians to cross 
the borders, it is now a costly, lengthy, and difficult process to go through. In fact, the conditions 
of residency can be divided into four phases (Encadré  7-2) that saw their legal status and social 
standing deteriorate in Lebanon (El-Khouri Tannous, Bautès, & Bergel, 2018)  
In the first few months of the influx, Syrian refugees entered Lebanon without significant 
administrative processes. In that sense, their settlement did not differ much from other economic 
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migrants coming to cities in Lebanon. In February of 2013, the number of refugees reached 
188,000. Those first arrivals constituted mainly of the families and extended families of Syrians 
already in Lebanon, and therefore arrived directly to their networks’ places of residence. In that 
sense they had little socio-political or urban effects. Other than the almost immediate set up of 
the UNHCR as the primary governing body of the crisis223, and the few but loud warnings from 
various political leaders, administrative processes remained unchanged. During this first phase, 
some local authorities reacted immediately by increasing security patrols and placing illegal 
curfews, but otherwise on the national level no major decision or action was take.   
With the conflict in Syria clearly escalating, the protracted nature of the presence of the 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon became clearer. The influx continued and increased, and in February 
of 2013 alone, 160,000 new refugees were registered by the UNHCR. The rate continued at 
60,000 refugees per month for the next fourteen months, when the one millionth refugee was 
registered. During this phase, social tensions were on the rise. The open border policy remained 
unchanged and Syrian refugees were still arriving at a rate of “more than a refugee per minute” 
(DW, 2014).  
When they first came we welcomed them, I’m telling you from personal experience. 
We provided housing, immediately provided materials. I gave them mattresses from 
my own house, and pots, and basic household needs. But quickly their presence 
reflected negatively on us! The rent went crazy high, they were getting help and we 
were getting nothing… (Em Tarek, Lebanese dweller in Tebbeneh, personal 
interview, 2016)    
International aid during this second phase was already limited “current humanitarian aid 
appeal for Lebanon was only 13 percent funded” (DW, 2014) and it was being directed towards 
Syrian refugees exclusively. Even though it was hardly sufficient to support the large Syrian 
refugee population, it still aroused resentment from vulnerable Lebanese communities. A year 
after that, a Lebanese construction worker in el-Nab’a told me “we can’t buy new shoes for our 
children, we struggle to send them to school, and Syrians are getting all this support for free! Of 
course they will keep coming!” (M’allem Jamil, Lebanese dweller in El-Nab’a, personal interview, 2015). 
This discourse, born from the first two years of international aid being directed to Syrians, has 
lingered even till 2018. At a community event organised in Tebbeneh by a UN agency, one 
Lebanese organiser told me: “It’s a good thing to help refugees, we all know that. But what about 
the Lebanese? I know people who are much worse off than the Syrians. Do you think Tebbeneh 
did not need this kind of project before they came? Now, they are looking at us - but there has to 
                                                 
223 Further to the dissociation policy adopted by the Lebanese government 
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be Syrians as well for us to be considered for aid, I’m telling you that’s the way it is” (Em Tarek, 
Lebanese dweller in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2016). Em Tarek words reflect the fact that while 
Syrian refugees have been dominated by certain Lebanese, they have at the same time aroused the 
latter’s resentment, who in some cases feel forgotten or less visible as nationals, but equally 
vulnerable. The domination of Syrian refugees is as such also an accusation, doubled and 
contradictory.  
During this second phase, the refugees who were in majority settled in the cities started to 
weigh heavily on the frail urban infrastructure. In some municipalities refugees outnumbered 
Lebanese dwellers. Starting mid-2014, the government came under large popular pressure to act 
as tensions rose to high limits in the second half of 2014, and during this third phase the 
government prepared for drastic changes to the entire process of Syrian refugees’ entry and 
residency in Lebanon. The fourth phase began with the government assuming the lead over the 
management of the refugees instead of the UNHCR and the international aid community 
(Boustani, Carpi, Gebara, & Mourad, 2016, p. 15). 
 
Encadré  7-2: Syrian presence in Lebanon, four phases of changing conditions. 
  Condition of 
entry 
Conditions of 
residence 
Approximate 
number of 
refugees 
Sociopolitical context 
Phase 1 : 
March 2011- 
February 
2013 
Free access with 
passport or ID 
card. 
  
Verification at 
the border. 
  
Six-months visa 
automatically 
granted. 
Renewable Six-
months residency  
upon personal visit 
to the General 
Security Offices, 
symbolic fees. 
188,000 Short lived support 
from Lebanese 
communities. 
  
Syrians socially 
considered refugees 
with restricted mobility 
in some municipalities. 
Phase 2 : 
March 2013- 
April 2014 
1,045,000 200, 000 refugees 
registered between 
February and March 
2013. 
The one millionth 
refugee mark resonates 
nationally and 
internationally. 
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Phase 3 : 
May 2014-
December 
2014 
1,170,000 Tensions rise right 
after the Syrian 
presidential elections 
that the Syrians in 
Lebanon heavily 
participate in.   
 
Government places 
new restrictive 
conditions on entry 
and residence of 
Syrians in Lebanon. 
  
The number of entries 
starts to decrease. 
Phase 4 : 
January 
2015-
December 
2016 
Restricted access.  
A few categories 
of refugees are 
more accepted 
than others 
including 
educated youth, 
artists, the rich, 
and Christians in 
some areas. 
Renewable one 
year residency 
under very 
restrictive 
conditions. 
  
A fee of $200 per 
person for 
residency renewal 
is enforced. 
1,033,000 Restrictions on 
mobility and residency, 
and the kafala system 
applied to Syrians. 
  
Syrians placed under 
personal responsibility 
of a Lebanese 
guardian. Number of 
registered refugees 
begins to decrease. 
Phase 5 : 
December 
2016-present 
 Majority of 
refugees dwell 
without legal 
residency 
944,613 Continued decrease in 
number of refugees 
Source: (El-Khouri Tannous et al., 2018, p. 43) 
 
To secure residency under the kafala system224 is one of the most stressful and challenging 
                                                 
224 For details, see Chapter 1 Section 1.2; and Chapter 3 Section 2.1 
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issues for refugees. And the  
situation was further exacerbated by the informality through which the kafala 
regulation was/has been enforced: regulations change, access to information is 
difficult, and enforcement flaky at best. In consequence, the kafala reinforced 
Syrians’ dependence and vulnerability vis-à-vis the local population (El-Khouri, 2018 
p.102) 
The kafala facilitated the exploitation of refugees, and for it to be successful it highly 
depended on the personal relationship a Syrian refugee would have with his or her kafeel. Every 
Syrian refugee I spoke to, whether it be the thirty-three formal interviews, informal chats, or even 
references made to other Syrians in their network, everyone spoke worriedly of the challenge of 
kafala. The nine people who had it and were ‘legal’ worried about the cost of renewing it, or 
about the losing  of their kafeel for whatever reason. The remaining majority worried about being 
stopped on the streets and interrogated, their papers being taken from them, or being deported. 
While most Syrian refugees tended to worry equally about shelter and kafala, it is the latter that 
caused them the most stress. I believe it is because the consequences of not having legal papers 
go beyond their control and are almost entirely in someone else’s hands.  
Mohammad, a refugee in his mid twenties living in el-Nab’a told me that he came to 
Lebanon to escape army drafting. 
I was told there’s a man who would be willing to be my kafeel and do all the papers 
but that he would charge $400, and I had to send him the money in advance. Of 
course I did, I had no choice... I never heard from him again! His line was always 
closed… I was in real trouble, then a friend of mine spoke with his kafeel and 
connected me with another Lebanese man who became my kafeel for free. He lives 
not far from here, I clean his car three times a week and run errands when he needs 
me - I do it happily, I would be in the army if it weren’t for him! And he really doesn’t 
overdo it. I know Syrians who practically work full time for their kafeel without a 
dime… I was really lucky but it was a personal connection. (Mohammad, personal 
interview, 2016)  
These favors against being someone’s kafeel are very recurrent, and except in extreme 
cases they are seen as fair game on both sides, as mentioned to me by over 90 percent of the 
Syrians who had a guarantor. The Syrians are grateful to their guarantor, and the latter sees the 
exchange as a form of fair barter. In many cases as well, the Syrian under kafala would work full 
time for the guarantor at a reduced rate - mostly as building concierges. This is perhaps one of 
the more direct forms of negotiating space between refugees and hosts in Lebanon: a clear barter, 
service for residence. It has far reaching implications, as sponsors exert significant control over 
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the person they guarantee. Abuses my interviewees have directly been subject to, or that they 
have heard about include being asked for small favors (cleaning a car, or painting a wall or a 
post), significant work (work part time or even full time), sexual favors (ranging from flirtation to 
not clear what the barter is in this case, who is the woman, Syrian or Lebanese and marrying 
who?). The Syrian’s contribution to the barter, to the negotiation, varies considerably, against an 
unchanging contribution from the Lebanese side: allowing the refugee to legally dwell in 
Lebanon.    
While being a kafeel should in theory be free, 15 percent of my interviewees mentioned 
the phenomenon of Syrian kafala brokers that has emerged since 2015. In a role similar to the 
one Mohammad’s friend played to secure him a kafeel, a Syrian kafala broker who has a network 
would link Syrian refugees with a potential kafeel against a varying fee - which could be between 
10 percent and 30 percent of what the kafeel would charge (the rates mentioned ranged from $200 
to $1,000 per year for the kafeel). The whole process being informal means that the Syrian refugee 
seeking a kafeel risks wasting time and money with no guarantee of success. The steps of the 
process are reflected in Encadré  7-3  
.  
Encadré  7-3: Process undertaken by Syrian refugees to secure a kafeel. 2019 
Step Option Process Most probable result  Risks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1- Find an individual 
who would accept 
to be the kafeel 
Personal network  Friendly 
relationship, best 
case scenario 
 
Work connection 
(the boss is the 
kafeel) 
 Double exploitation 
/ reduced wages, 
increased working 
hours and tasks 
 
 
 
 
Secure a paid kafeel 
Contact a kafeel 
directly 
pay a high fee, risk 
losing the money 
with no follow up 
Be asked to work 
for the kafeel for free 
Contact a kafeel 
broker 
pay a high fee, 
calculated risk 
Be asked to work 
for the kafeel for free 
 
 
2- Get information 
Ask NGOs or 
network 
 Receive basic 
information 
 
Call General 
Security Offices 
make two or more 
calls to check 
process 
 
Risk receiving conflicting information, need 
to start over 
3- Prepare 
documentation 
Notarise various 
documents 
Visit different 
authorities  
Change 
documentation , pay 
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fees twice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4- Apply at GSO of 
the place of 
residence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No option 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arrive as early as 
possible and wait in 
line 
Wait outside for 
hours with no 
information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Humiliation, spend 
another day waiting, 
give up the process 
and reside without 
documentation. 
Be turned away after 
several hours of 
waiting 
Be asked for 
different 
documents, or 
minor changes in 
provided documents 
Figure  7-14: 
Statement of 
responsibility 
Wait between 1-3 
months for 
processing 
 
 
  
Figure  7-14: Statement of responsibility 
Notarised “Statement of Guarantee of Responsibility”, or kafala, provided by a Lebanese kafeel 
for a Syrian refugee. The document was rejected the first time on April 2, 2015 because of a 
missing phrase, which necessitated the duplication of the process of producing the document and 
its cost. (Jad, Syrian refugee, personal interview, 2016)  
 
In Figure  7-14: Statement of responsibility and within a week’s time, the refugee and his 
kafeel were obliged to reproduce a document due to a missing phrase. While on April 2, 2015 the 
guarantor signed an attestation accepting legal responsibility over the refugee, she had to add the 
phrase “knowing that I am not the guarantor of any other refugee”, after being turned down by 
the GSO. The informality of the residency secured via the kafala system does not stop at the 
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process. The actual residency permit is not entirely official. Jad, a Syrian refugee residing in Beirut 
told me in 2016 
I just discovered that it’s not really an official residency (Figure  7-15: Two sample 
kafala residency cards) and I am not officially a resident. I only have the 
authorisation of my kafeel to reside in Lebanon. I discovered this because I couldn’t 
apply for a three-day tourist visa to Cyprus to attend my friend’s wedding - the 
embassy did not accept my file, because they said it’s not legal.. And yet I 
supposedly have the residency that cost me $200 (180€) per year. And I had to pay 
it retroactively to cover for 2014… They did not give me any receipt but I don’t 
suspect foul play, there’s a system and everybody pays. This system is in place to 
limit the number of Syrians in Lebanon. (Jad, Syrian refugee, personal interview, 
2016). 
 
  
Figure  7-15: Two sample kafala residency cards 
 
Just shy of thirty per cent of the refugees I interviewed did have legal residency and a 
kafeel, but none of them was from the Bourj el-Barajneh camp. My interviewees in the camp, 
both Palestinians and Syrians concurred that it was unlikely that any Syrian in the camp had a 
legal residency. “Who would check?” was an answer I got in 90 percent of the cases. They also 
concurred that the Syrians in the camp would only need to worry about the legality of their 
residency once they decide to leave the country and need to regularize their residency or “pay the 
fines”.   
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6.3 The decisive question of accessing a job  
 
“I don’t have the right to work, but when I announce that I don’t work, no GSO agent 
believes me” (Jad, Syrian refugee, personal interview, 2016). Indeed, the informality within which 
Syrian refugees work in Lebanon is implicitly acknowledged and publicly rejected at the same 
time.  Less than twenty percent of the refugees I interviewed said they were not able to secure 
work at all. Sixty percent were able to work on an irregular basis, with no assurances of securing 
jobs from day to day.  
Only fifteen percent, or five of the refugees I interviewed had what they referred to as 
secure jobs, though none of them had signed a contract, or had any sort of benefits. Three of 
those individuals were shop vendors (one female and two males), and two were waiters (both 
males). They have little choices other than accepting informal, precarious working conditions 
because legally they are not allowed to work. It places them in an unavoidably exploitable 
situation, and they risk legal repercussions if they are caught working. “My brother was arrested 
and beaten because he was caught working at a café in Tripoli” (Mansour, Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh, 
personal interview, 2017). Indeed, Syrian refugees in my interviews all reported knowing someone in 
their immediate family who was physically assaulted at the workplace.  
The prevalent opportunities for Syrian refugees to work lie in the construction, 
agriculture and low-skill service sector (waiters, delivery-men, petrol station attendees,  
supermarket baggers), not much different than the case had been before 2011. The most 
comprehensive assessment of the employment profile of Syrian refugees in Lebanon was 
conducted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 2013, with 400 households in the 
North (Akkar, Tripoli), the Bekaa, and South Lebanon, and the survey was complemented with 
various qualitative interviews  (Masri & Srour, 2013). Clearly “the sample size and design is too 
small to make reliable generalisations about the entire population of Syrian refugees; the data 
provides for a basic situation analysis only” (Masri & Srour, 2013, p. 11), and moreover it does 
not include any households in Beirut. It found that 47 percent are active, and of those 30 percent 
are completely unemployed. Employment includes monthly and part time employment, 
predominantly in the informal sector. While it varies largely from one area to another, “Syrian 
refugees have an average monthly income of $277”225, and the “lowest average monthly incomes 
were found in Akkar and Tripoli - respectively $238 and $245” (Masri & Srour, 2013 p. 28). In 
my findings, Syrian refugees who were able to secure some sort of work (including the five I 
                                                 
225 The minimum wage in Lebanon is $450 
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interviewed and the information they gave me on some of their family members who found 
work) gained between $100 and $350 per month, numbers that are comparable to the findings of 
the survey.  
While these statistics suggest the broad nature of the economic situation of the refugees, 
what is more relevant in this thesis are the relations that have ensued between the different 
groups further to the increased competition over work that was mentioned by every person in my 
interviews, Lebanese, Syrians and Palestinians alike. The competition comes at two levels, first at 
a micro enterprise or small shop level, and second at the low skill job level - specifically waiters 
and delivery men. There is also competition at the skilled construction work level. From what I 
have seen, competition at jobs that require advanced education, such as banking, engineering, 
teaching etc. is minimal if existent.     
Among and beyond the Syrian refugees: the recurrence of competition 
In 2018, I met a Lebanese bakery owner in El-Nab’a, Farahat Bakery, who had operated 
for around 11 years (Figure 6.17).  
Last year, I made the mistake of my life. I hired a Syrian to help me out in this shop. 
I paid him well, $250 per month, and I taught him everything. He learned, and he 
met all my clients, and six months later, he quit the job without notice and without 
explanations - I never heard from him again. Then a month ago, a client of mine 
came by and asked my why my man’ousheh (traditional Lebanese thyme breakfast) 
were not as good in the other place! I was shocked, I didn’t understand what he 
meant. It turns out the Syrian I had hired opened his own bakery just down the road 
[Al-Malek] (Figure  7-16: Position of Farahat bakery, the competition, and a 
commercial street in El-Nab’a)… and he is telling everyone it’s a new branch of my 
shop!  
The shop down the road which he indicated was also a bakery and run by a Syrian who 
did not accept to speak to me. In a commercial street in the same site, out of nine shops, seven 
were managed by Syrians, and two of those said they were the owners of the business, but rented 
the shop from a Lebanese person. All the shops were small, mostly selling clothing items.  
DAILY LIFE CONDITIONS OF REFUGEES  273 
 
 
 
 
Figure  7-16: Position of Farahat bakery, the competition, and a commercial street in El-
Nab’a 
 
While in some areas micro enterprises such as these have been targeted by the authorities 
with  immediate notices of closure given to the shop owners or managers, application is not 
nationwide and in El-Nab’a for example, no serious action against them has taken place.  
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In Bourj el-Barajneh, such competition is also very visible. In the main street at the 
entrance of the camp, 60  percent of the shops are owned and run by Syrians. “My main problem 
with them is that they only benefit each other. Us Palestinians, we don’t mind benefiting a Syrian 
shop - but they only work with each other”(Mahmoud, Palestinian refugee in Lebanon, personal interview, 
2018). It is actually a complaint I heard over and over in the camp. Ihsan, who had been running 
an orange juice kiosk during the holy month of Ramadan (Figure  7-17: Palestinian and Syrian 
shopsFigure  7-17) told me the same thing: “they wouldn’t at all buy juice from me, I know it. I 
only count on the Palestinians, but even the Palestinians buy from them when it is cheaper, my 
mom buys her lentils from the Syrian next door, it’s cheaper” (Ihsan, Palestinian refugee in Bourj El-
Barajneh, personal interview, 2017).  
 
 
 
Figure  7-17: Palestinian and Syrian shops 
Formerly one big shop, the Palestinian owner split the space into three and rented two shops to 
Syrians at the entrance of Bourj el-Barajneh, while he ran the pharmacy (to the right of the 
photo). 
 
Ihsan’s account touched on the specific situation of the Palestinians. While the difficulties 
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resulting from competition and the presence of refugees parallel those of the Lebanese dwellers 
in other cities, the reality of the Palestinian identity added to the complexity in this case.  
Assimilation as a coping mechanism to access work 
In Figure  7-18: Do you know what a Lebanised Syrian is?, a Lebanese asks on social 
media: “Do you know what a Lebanised Syrian is?”. The reply below reflects several aspects of 
the widespread phenomenon of assimilation that Syrians have used as a coping mechanism.  
Silly but sometimes funny: you are at one of the Lebanese restaurants and the poor 
waiter who’s been instructed by his employer to address the clients with a Lebanese 
accent in order to prevent the clients from boycotting his place!! It’s sometimes 
hilarious when he/she desperately tries, and the cherry on top: he introduces a 
couple of French words like Meeeercieee (Merci, thank you) and siltouplai (s’il te 
plait, please) 
First to note is the fact that Lebanese restaurants opt to hire Syrians rather than Lebanese 
because it is more profitable, and prefer it if their clients did not notice, knowing that this would 
cause, in the least, private complaints to the owner, and in more extreme cases official complaints 
to authorities - which could imply legal problems. This confirms the second aspect, that Syrians 
indeed compete with Lebanese at this level, and in this job specifically, which Syrians before 2011 
did not work in. Lastly, the reply well reflects the efforts of Syrians to assimilate to the Lebanese 
culture, not only by learning the accent, but also the nuances including using more than one 
language in a phrase - in this case French, with stress on the wrong pronunciation - to insist that 
a Lebanised Syrian can still be recognised. This also confirms what 90 percent of the refugees I 
spoke with told me, that they find it necessary to fake a Lebanese accent to be able to access 
basic services, or to avoid trouble, in the cities.    
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Figure  7-18: Do you know what a Lebanised Syrian is? 
 
Syrians have grown accustomed to the Lebanese ways and accent, and have become able 
in many cases to pass for Lebanese as a coping mechanism226. They often employ this specific 
mechanism to avoid tensions. Widad, a Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh since 2012, shared a story:  
The other day, a woman came into the clothes shop where my daughter works as a 
salesperson and was obviously agitated. When my daughter asked her the reason, 
the woman asked her if she was Lebanese or Syrian. My daughter replied that she 
was Lebanese, which was not true. The woman then angrily says: “All the 
salespeople are Syrians! I’ve had enough! they’ve taken our jobs and our children! I 
can’t stand to shop anymore” And my daughter replied to her “ I hope we get rid of 
them very soon ya hajjeh”. Just like that I’m telling you!  
While the story serves as a joke in the home of Widad, the reality is that her daughter was 
in a position where she felt she had to betray her origins to avoid a potentially conflictual 
situation  
                                                 
226 See section 3 below for details on coping mechanisms.  
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6.4 Access to public space: constraints and tactics of invisibility 
The only Lebanese official authorities dealing directly with the Syrian refugees between 
their arrival in 2011 and 2014 were the municipalities. This was the direct effect of the national 
government’s dissociation with the Syrian crisis. No national strategy or framework to govern 
and organise their conditions of dwelling. Between March 2011 and December 2014, 
municipalities were left to deal with the Syrians as each deemed fit. Coupled with two factors, 
first that municipalities reflect the religious and political divides of the land (and the families 
originating from the municipality227), and second that many municipalities are underfunded and 
under-resourced, the way the different municipalities dealt with the issue varied significantly. For 
example a municipality of a right wing Christian area would favor the Christian Syrian refugees 
who are min melletna (like us) and “facilitate their movement” (Tanios Ghanem, Head of Municipality 
of Baskinta,  personal interview, 2015)228 while holding Sunni Syrian strictly to the curfew. A 
municipality of a Shiite majority area would favor Shiite and Alawi Syrians and provide them with 
support in their quest for work, as one taxi driver in Dahieh pointed out to me “hadol minna ou 
fina (they are our brothers)” (Taxi driver, personal informal interview, 2015). The religious and political 
affiliations of the refugees themselves was also a factor in the degree of rights they were given as 
dwellers. Negotiation and confrontation between the Lebanese and the Syrians is as such 
concentrated at the local levels. In consequence, it is not surprising that the question of use of 
public space is a central one.   
Curfews as regulators of the use of public space 
One security measure that was adopted by municipalities across the country is the 
enforcement of curfews on Syrian dwellers. Sometimes formally and sometimes informally, the 
mobility of Syrians was restricted especially during the hours of the night. Officials have stated 
that the foremost reason for these curfews is to insure security. In reality, the curfews appeased 
the tensions amongst Lebanese dwellers who felt empowered, and increased tensions amongst 
Syrian dwellers who felt frustrated.  
Towards the end of 2014, Human Rights Watch “identified at least 45 municipalities 
across the country that [had imposed] curfews” (Human Rights Watch, 2014). These highly 
“restrictive measures prohibited [Syrians] from the use of public spaces and reinforced the 
mistrust between Lebanese and Syrians, giving rise to negative coping mechanisms including 
avoidance practices, reactions of intolerance or even acts of violence” (El-Khouri Tannous et al., 
                                                 
227 See Part 1 Chapter 2, Governance of cities in Lebanon 
228 A town in the Keserwan district of Mount Lebanon, comprised mainly of Maronite Christians 
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2018, p. 37). They furthermore contributed “to an increasingly hostile environment for Syrian 
refugees in the country” (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Indeed, “soon after the outbreak of the 
refugee crisis in Lebanon, hostility to the presence of forced migrants began to visibly 
materialize” (El-Khouri, 2018, p. 101). The curfews are most commonly communicated through 
large banners hanging over main streets and detailing the specific curfew details, with the implicit 
or explicit support of municipal authorities. Some banners seem more official than others, due to 
size, placement, presence of a municipality name or logo etc. These restrictions on mobility 
placed Syrians in a second class status: not only did they fear being stopped and interrogated by 
municipal police or authorities, but local civilian groups became empowered to apply the curfew 
by means of violent behavior. Human Rights Watch reported an incident when “municipal police 
prevented [a Syrian refugee] from getting medicine for his sick child from a pharmacy next to his 
house at 8:45 p.m.” (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In other more telling examples of how curfews 
are being enforced 
[refugees] did however report instances of violent acts committed by Lebanese 
civilians. One refugee was beaten by two Lebanese residents who saw him walking 
on the streets during curfew times. Another woman stated that her husband’s car 
was stopped by a group of Lebanese civilians while he was on his way to a work-
related emergency at a construction site. Armed with sticks, the men forced her 
husband and his colleagues to stand against a wall, while they searched the car and 
threw away the working tools. They verbally insulted them and seized their 
passports. As they were about to beat them up, the municipal police patrol showed 
up and put an end to the attack. The civilian men justified their actions on the 
grounds that the Syrians were in breach of the curfew. However, the police told them 
that they were responsible for enforcing the curfew, and not the residents 
themselves. Yet, the police proceeded with scolding the Syrians for breaking the 
curfew before letting them go (El Helou, 2014, p. 3). 
While none of my interviewees had direct encounters with curfew enforcement, almost 
half of them told me they knew someone who did. The stories range from mild incidents to 
violent ones, not very different from the above example. Curfews are technically illegal in 
Lebanon as a former minister of Interior confirmed (Sharq al Awsat, 2013). Municipalities are 
moreover not authorized to enforce a curfew which is the jurisdiction of national security and are 
only to be used during a state of emergency. I asked municipality officials in Tripoli, Mount 
Lebanon and in Beirut how they might approach a person if they were not sure of his or her 
nationality. In all instances, and mirroring the answer I continually got from Lebanese dwellers 
throughout this research, the answer was: “we know them. From their clothes, from their 
slippers, from their walk. You could not mistake a Lebanese for a Syrian”.  
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Community expressions countering the violence of the curfews is present but spatially 
and temporally limited (Figure  7-19). For example, in 2016 a demonstration of around one 
hundred youth229 took place in Beirut, calling out curfews as racist actions and also calling for 
more rights for the Syrian refugees. While vocal and bold in the slogans, the demonstration 
remained limited both in its number of demonstrators and its impact, that did not exceed a 
newspaper announcement during the course of the week following it.   
 
 
Figure  7-19: A demonstration in Beirut against curfews, July 2016 
 
A factor that largely limits refugees’ access to public space, even outside curfew times, is 
the risk they run of being caught in conflict with Lebanese dwellers. It is a significant risk, 
because it could entail several serious consequences including verbal or physical assault, and 
arrest. This conflict is a daily occurence in all three sites of this study, what follows are some 
examples.  
 
 
                                                 
229 In general the demonstrators were university students  
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Conflict in public spaces of El-Nab’a 
According to a Lebanese coffee vendor at a kiosk in the neighbourhood, “most of the 
conflict [in El-Nab’a] is because of cohabitation [sharing urban services] with Syrians, and girls. 
Those Syrians allow themselves to harass230 our girls. Would I harass a Syrian girl if I was a 
refugee in Damascus? No, I wouldn’t”. He added “if we’re not able to live with each other, how 
can we live with the Syrians? Hayda yalli kein na’es (that’s just what we needed). It’s very difficult, 
believe me”. Actually verbal harassment of women is often cited as a trigger for street violence, 
and not only in El-Nab'a. While gender based violence is a national problem in Lebanon 
regardless and preceding the refugee crisis231, it seems to have come to the forefront of the 
micro-level tensions between Syrian and Lebanese communities. As social conduct relative to 
cross gender relations especially in public spaces is subjective. it is relatively easy to assume or 
accuse men of harassing women. A mere look or smile, or the most minimal gesture, can be 
viewed and acted upon as an intentional provocation. A phrase such as “he smiled at my sister” 
can in certain situations instigate verbal conflict that may quickly escalate into violent street 
fights. 
A rapid escalation of violence  
In May 2014 a highly mediated conflict culminated in a Syrian throwing a gas cylinder 
from the balcony of the first floor in the neighbourhood of El-Nab’a, seriously injuring a 
Lebanese resident (Figure  7-20). There were different stories of how the conflict started, 
(argument over parking space, argument over rent due) but the root cause seems to have been 
the verbal harassment of a Lebanese woman by a Kurd. While everyone agrees that the cause of 
the fighting was mundane and happens on a regular basis, the escalation of anger and the media 
coverage it received, was not.  
A few young men quarrelled after one man lattash (verbally harassed) the fiancé of 
                                                 
230 I gathered he meant verbal harassment (talteesh), shouting out vulgar compliments or invitations to women  
231 Gender based violence in Lebanon is a longstanding national problem. There are several civil society organisations that 
are working towards raising awareness on the issue and on the amelioration of laws protecting women, the most prominent 
of which is KAFA (https://www.kafa.org.lb/ar). Still, there is a lack of laws (and application of laws) on domestic violence and 
early marriage. Women are subject to religious family laws that predominantly discriminate against them to the benefit of 
men in the areas of divorce, custody and inheritance among others. Furthemore, women in Lebanon are socially bound by 
discriminatory and sexist cultural rules that place them ipso facto in a lower category than their male counterparts - and that 
affects all aspects of their lives including their freedoms in the urban environment.  
While gender based violence varies in reach and degree across the different religious groups, all women are still 
discriminated against by religious courts, as a study by Human Rights Watch shows “a clear pattern of women from all sects 
being treated worse than men when it comes to accessing divorce and primary care for their children” (Geagea, Fakih, & 
Makhlouf, 2015, p. 1). The report presents findings to prove the “systemic discrimination against women under personal 
status laws in Lebanon” (Ibid, p. 9) 
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another man. The quarrell escalated to the extent that one of the men threw a gas 
cylinder from his balcony and hit a man in the street. It happened in the presence of 
internal security forces that did not make an effort to intervene as can be seen in the 
recorded video [that was widely viewed on TV stations and social media]. The news 
went viral and and Lebanese media became more enthusiastic when it was 
announced that some of the men involved in the quarrell were Kurds . For the media 
then, the plot was complete! It was the “others” then, again [...]. (Wansa, 2014) 
Figure  7-20: Incident of the gas cylinder 
(left) gas cylinder being thrown from balcony, El-Nab’a (right) crowd disperses and a man injured 
lays on the ground. Source: LBCI Local television station. “A conflict in Bourj Hammoud ends with 
a gas cylinder thrown on a person’s head”. News. Date: May 18, 2014 
In the immediate aftermath of this incident the streets of El-Nab'a grew quiet with 
tension and the neighbourhood was under a national microscope. In June 2014 the Bourj 
Hammoud municipality declared a curfew between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. on Syrians (Figure  7-21, 
Figure  7-22). While practically not applicable due to the number of Syrians and other foreign 
residents of the area, the announcement appeased the anger within the Lebanese community in 
the short term, but angered Syrian dwellers. In June 2015, I asked Georges Krikorian, the Vice 
President of the Bourj Hammoud Municipality about the curfew:  
During the last year an urgent security situation arose in the area. There were 
conflicts between some232 of the locals and some of the displaced. Unfortunately at 
the time the media portrayed these in an exaggerated manner. I will explain: the 
number of Lebanese and Syrians who were involved in these violent conflicts, and I 
mean fist fights with no weapons involved, did not exceed one hundred in all. This in 
an area in which our Moẖtars now report a population of 200,000. The media 
buzzed with “conflict in Bourj Hammoud” and “clashes in the area between 
                                                 
232 He insisted on the words “some” 
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Figure  7-21: Official municipality curfew banners 
Official municipality banners detailing curfew details in the towns of Kanafar (Bekaa), Bshamoun 
(Mount Lebanon), Qrayyeh (Mount Lebanon) Source: (J. Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018); (“Campagne 
en faveur des syriens face au racisme $458*ا-$56ا7*ا -01%ر.34* -,-./-$ّ%&'()*ا ,” n.d.).  
 
Figure  7-22: Curfew banner in Bourj Hammoud 
Banner visibly placed in a main street in Bourj Hammoud in June 2014 reads: “The Bourj 
Hammoud Municipality declares that all foreigners (Syrians) are prohibited from circulating 
between  8 p.m. and 6 a.m.” Source: Photograph broadly disseminated on social media. Date: 
September, 2018 
A window into the daily life of Syrians in Lebanon 
During a focus group conducted in Tebbeneh in 2015 with Syrian refugees, I met Salma, 
a married woman in her forties, and Molham, a sixteen year-old, who accepted to stay in for a 
more detailed discussion. Below is an excerpt  from their daily life routines in Lebanon - it 
touches on several of the aspects discussed in this chapter.    
Salma: I spend my days at home… I don’t go anywhere usually. My husband goes 
to get groceries in the morning and I spend my time around the house.. I don’t visit 
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any of my neighbours, they don’t like Syrians. I have one Syrian neighbour and the 
rest are Lebanese…  We greet each other, they say hello and even say tfaddaleh 
(come in) but they do it downstairs, they don’t mean it, you feel that it’s not 
authentic. In my block we’re the only Syrians. My husband says it’s better this way. 
When Syrians become too many in a building or block they risk raids and other 
things… better to stay at a distance. I have boys, it’s better to keep them out of 
trouble’s way. There have been several raids where there is a certain density of 
Syrians.  
Molham: Yes, three days ago, no a week ago, there was a raid in my block, they 
took several men… I was walking by and I saw it happening and changed my 
direction - they would have taken me for sure.  
DK: Where are they taken to? When do they come back? 
Salma, Molham: to one of the prisons, no one knows when they come back…  
Molham: I worked at a bakery for six months, then another bakery for a couple of 
months, now I’m looking for a job. I spend my days with my upstairs [Syrian] 
neighbour, and I play football with a team here. We are two Syrians and the rest are 
Lebanese, but I only hang out with the Syrian. When I need to go into the city 
[Tripoli] I walk. I know all the side roads - if [the army, the police] see me I’d be taken 
to prison. I don’t have residency.  
Salma: All our boys are at risk, most Syrians don’t have legal papers. My son is right 
now at the GSO offices. He was imprisoned for four days - we need to find a 
kafeel… we would pay the $200, but we need a kafeel… there are no alternatives. 
We can’t go back to Syria, I fled with my children to protect them from the war, how 
would I go back?  
Molham: There’s a place I can work at in Beb el Haddadine, but I can’t take the job - 
there are too many checkpoints at night. I cannot risk it.  
Salma: a couple of weeks ago my other son, Mohammad, disappeared! I looked 
everywhere for him for three days… in the end a man called me from the police 
station and told me to collect my son…  
DK: have there been curfews in the area?  
Salma, Molham: No, there aren’t curfews here. 
Salma: But it’s not very safe to move around. My son was mugged two times - a 
phone like the one you’re holding. It was a Lebanese man who took it last time. 
Each time the phone cost $150. They hide in the alleys at night… My son decided to 
carry a knife to protect himself if it happened a third time - and that’s when the army 
caught him and imprisoned him… [she laughs]. 
DK: Would you recognise a Syrian from a Lebanese?  
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Salma, Molham: Yes of course. From their clothes, their looks. You feel the Syrian is 
m’attar (impoverished)... you feel the Lebanese is at ease, it’s his country. We can 
tell even before we hear them speak.  
Molham: They know me as well, they can tell I’m Syrian… from my clothes, the way 
I walk…  
DK: You never pass for Lebanese? 
Molham: Now I’m starting to get the accent. I’m learning it on purpose to protect 
myself. The other day my friend got into a quarrel and when he spoke Syrian a 
whole group came at him… I need to pass for a Lebanese. (Salma, Molham, Syrian 
refugees in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2015) 
 
As expressed by this interviewee, the lack of confidence in the immediate living 
environment, illustrated by the distant relations, the silent mistrust, threats and intimidations that 
characterize the everyday relations between hosts and refugees, is enhanced by a more structural 
fear towards possible repressions exerted by police and government. The fact that they are 
migrants not only obliges them to accept inferior positions both in housing and in work; 
additionally, the fact that they are not legal residents compels most of refugees to step aside, 
adopt negative coping mechanisms for protection and invisibility purposes, accept lesser and 
unstable positions, all in order to avoid facing the dramatic and definitive consequence of being 
evicted, from their shelter, from a public space, or from the country. As such, getting a place to 
live and to work is just a first step in a process which could any time provoke unexpected chain 
failure. 
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8. Chapter 7. The 
representations of 
Syrians for Lebanese 
dwellers 
 
Figure  8-1: Syrian laundry, El-Nab’a, Beirut.  
Sketch: Ziad Moutran, 2019, Colour: Raphaëlle Cottereau. 
 
The first time I heard about Syrian laundry was in the Bourj el-Barajneh camp. On a 
commented walk with a Palestinian refugee, and in response to my question on how he could tell 
a Syrian from a Palestinian in the camp, my guide started to point out physical aspects that made 
him believe a person was a Syrian. At one point, he ushered me to look at a line of laundry that 
was dripping. “A Palestinian would never hang their laundry before squeezing it, that’s a Syrian 
apartment”, he said. This Figure depicts Syrian laundry in El-Nab’a, also pointed out by my guide 
as she said: “those colors…” 
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7.1  “Invaders of public space” 
 Terms like “yfaltouwon”, “sha’b mbahdal”, “just like goats” “ze’ran” (disobedient, 
vulgar) and other such terms have highly negative connotations, and they were recurrent in my 
interviews with host communities. Especially the term “yfaltouwon” which translates to ‘let them 
loose’ is something I noted numerous times233. “Mfalteenon (they let them roam) in so and so 
place” my interviewees would say, or “falatein add ma baddek (as much chaos as you can imagine)”. 
Different uses of the same term, host communities often expressed dismay or frustration at the 
Syrian refugees being let loose in the city, not being under control.   
As perceived invaders of the cities in Lebanon, the presence of Syrian refugees has often 
altered the way the Lebanese use public spaces. During a commented walk around the area of El-
Nab'a in 2015, with Hala - an active Lebanese resident - I asked to see where families would take 
children to play. She brought me to a public garden in Bourj Hammoud, not far from El-Nab'a. 
It was midday and the garden was not crowded, a dozen people in all were inside. A group of 
men sat in a closed circle on the floor (Figure  8-2), even though benches were available around 
them. I asked Hala if she knew them: “No, those are Syrians, you see. That’s how they gather. It’s 
not the same anymore” she said. It is clear that today in El-Nab'a, the Syrian figure represents the 
unwanted other. This was not always the case, as Tania al Alam notes in her thesis on El-Nab'a 
based on research undertaken between 2010 and 2014.  
In 2010, long-time Lebanese residents of Nabaa told me that they were much 
happier in previous years when the population was more homogeneous. They 
perceived the "invasions" of African and Arab migrant workers as a drastic change 
to their everyday life. Until 2011 and according to residents, the foreign population in 
Nabaa was mostly constituted of Sri Lankan, Eritrean, Indian and Filipino domestic 
workers as well as Syrian and Egyptian male construction workers. However, Syrian 
refugees have been coming in large numbers since 2011 and have become the 
majority of foreign nationalities in Nabaa. Lebanese residents have since changed 
their discourse. They say that they were actually quite satisfied with life in Nabaa 
until 2011 and did not think that non-Lebanese bothered them then. They say that it 
is only now that they feel outnumbered. Clearly, this is contradictory with what I had 
heard in 2010. Their memories of what their perceived reality was a few years ago 
has changed and they now talk about a happier past. (El Alam, 2014, p. 59) 
My interviews confirm El Alam’s accounts of how Lebanese dwellers view El-Nab’a, not 
without a certain - and rather common - sense of nostalgia of a recreated past. Approaching El-
                                                 
233 See Table 7.1 in section 7.4 
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Nab’a differently, El Alam looked beyond the generally mediated image of the neighbourhood 
and delved into the complexities of the social relations between the different ethnic and religious 
groups. In this highly mixed neighbourhood, it seems, the newest influx of foreigners seems to 
always be the most dangerous according to its dwellers. Since the Syrian influx is by far the most 
significant influx in terms of large quantity and short timeframe since the arrival of Armenians in 
the early 20th century, it is not surprising that the tensions with this specific community are the 
highest.   
 In the Tebbeneh neighbourhood, Wael, a Syrian refugee in his twenties told me he didn’t 
go to the public garden anymore. “There are always fights, usually over girls. I don’t go 
anymore”. In public spaces in Tripoli people are careful who they are around and are weary of 
strangers.  Figure  8-3 shows families who have appropriated a large empty parking lot to picnic in 
on Sundays. A few of the families were Syrian but mainly Lebanese families were picnicking, 
grouped - with the exception of one family - at one end of the parking lot.          
 
 
 
Figure  8-2: Group of Syrians sitting in a public garden in proximity of El-Nab'a. Date: June 
2015 
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Figure  8-3: Families appropriate a large parking lot to picnic in on Sundays. Photo: DK Date: 
February 2018 
 
At another focus group with the Lebanese dwellers of the same area I met Mohammad, a 
twenty something year old new groom. Before 2011 he said, the favorite outing for him and his 
bride was a walk along Corniche el Mina (Figure  8-4). He  shared with me that he stopped taking 
his new bride to the Mina because it was “Out of the question… Syrians are everywhere”. 
Mohammad said that the Syrian society was very conservative, and that the “way they looked at 
Lebanese women is provocative”. Others in the focus group nodded in agreement as Mohammad 
spoke of his couple’s recent experiences in public spaces. Especially because his bride is not 
veiled, they now feel they are restricted in the outings. For Mohammad and his bride the Mina 
Corniche is not a destination anymore. “Not one Lebanese [would you find], it’s as if you were in 
Homs or Hama”. Another person in the focus group interjected: “Tartous, you mean”234.  
 
                                                 
234 Homs, Hama and Tartous are all Syrian cities. Tartous is coastal, less than a 2-hr ride from Tripoli. 
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Figure  8-4: Corniche el Mina, Tripoli. Photo: DK. Date: 
 
 
7.2  “Robbers of jobs” 
 
The economic role of Syrians in Lebanon was one of the reasons for the choice of 
Lebanon as a place of refuge. In the early months of the Syrian crisis, it was the immediate 
families of Syrian workers already residing in Lebanon who joined the ranks of those fleeing 
violence. Economic competition is also at the core of the hostility of Lebanese hosts towards 
Syrian refugees whereby it is widely perceived that Syrians are taking the jobs of the Lebanese 
especially in the unskilled and low skilled labour markets. This is debatable as Lebanon has 
hosted important numbers of Syrian workers since the 1950s and even before (Balanche, 2005; 
Bonnet, 2013; Chalcraft, 2009; Corm, 2009).  
The Syrians who came to Lebanon in 2011 were refugees by nature, but economic 
migrants as per their residence status. Avoiding the pejorative “refugees” label was one of the 
reasons many Syrians were attracted to Lebanon, as they would have a chance to make it their 
own way. In fact, “only 8 percent of all Syrian refugees [in the entire region including  Syria] live 
in camps. [...] Around 90 percent of Syrian refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)s are 
concentrated in urban centers within Syria and its neighbouring countries, searching for better 
access to economic opportunities and social services” (Yassin, 2018 p. 36). Upon arrival to 
Lebanon, they filled the classic job clusters they had always filled: concierge, construction worker, 
agriculture field worker (Figure 7.3). These classically Syrian jobs were less visible in nature. 
There would be little contact between a construction worker and passers-by, as no contact was 
necessary. Since 2011, Syrians have continued seeking and filling new low-skill jobs, but this time 
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those jobs had a more visible nature: waiter, salesperson, delivery driver etc. It was not a given 
for a Syrian to apply for a cashier’s job before 2011, to the extent that an employer in El-Nab'a 
felt the need to specify the nationality of his required employee further to several Syrian job-
seekers coming forward (Figure 7.3). Some Syrians have higher skills-requiring jobs, especially in 
linguistic skills, but the Syrian population remains unable to compete with the Lebanese 
workforce. While the lack of statistics makes it difficult to find out to what degree Syrian refugees 
have really taken the jobs of the hosts, the situation is evoked by the latter continually. In every 
interview I had with a host, be it Lebanese or Palestinian dweller, the issue of economic 
competition came up. “My uncle used to get a paint job for an apartment at $1,000, now he’s 
lucky if he gets a job for $500!” (Ihsan, Palestinian refugee in Bourj El-Barajneh, personal interview, 2017).  
It is not any different for Mirvat’s husband, Majed, in Tebbeneh who’s an artisan carpenter. “I 
always got the best jobs, there are a few architects who always requested my work because they 
know how good I am at my craft. But even they have recently been forcing me to reduce my 
price… it’s my work, my pride… but what can I do? I have to shut up and do it, or a Syrian will. 
I have turned down many jobs since they came - and you will see, the owners will regret it with 
time, but for now it’s me who’s in a bind” (Majed, Lebanese carpenter in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 
2018).  
In 2015 I asked the assistant to the Head of Municipality in Baskinta, Mount Lebanon 
about any positive aspects due to the presence of refugees and he replied: “Well, when you need 
a worker, you can get one for a cheap rate” (Assistant to the Head of Municipality, Baskinta, personal 
interview, 2015). The demand in Lebanon for the work of a Syrian is high and informal. One 
classic scenario for work-seeking Syrian males is to gather early in the morning, at an urban 
reference point (such as the Saloumeh roundabout in proximity to El-Nab'a) and wait to get 
picked up. Usually, a pickup would pass by and choose a number of men as needed for the work 
of the day and they would hop on. Word of mouth and personal connections are also strong 
ways of securing jobs. It is clear from my interviews that the vast majority of able Syrian men, 
and a significant percentage of able women actively seek any sort of work in Lebanon. It is 
therefore crucial for them to live in the city. 
Yet, the Lebanese government issues a work permit only if the Syrian refugee has a 
residency permit. Residency permits, on the other hand, have not been easy to 
acquire due to the obstacles that Syrians continue to face throughout the process, 
particularly for those who fall outside of the fee waiver categories. The vulnerability 
assessment of Syrian refugees in 2017 has found that only 26 percent of Syrian 
refugees over 15 years of age have legal residency. All these complications have 
made it difficult for employers to submit work permit applications for their employees. 
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By 2017, applications have only been submitted for 0.5 percent of the working age 
refugee population in Lebanon (Yassin, 2018, p. 53). 
While it is true that submitting a work permit application is complicated, Lebanese 
employers do not actively seek to apply for it. This has been true since before the crisis, as 
Syrians have worked informally in Lebanon for decades, and “did not benefit from labour 
protection and were often left with very little recourse if they suffered abuse by employers” 
(Bobseine, 2016, p. 22). It is possible to acquire an official work permit for a Syrian, and since 
2015 the individual or company for which the Syrian works is considered the kafeel235. However, 
in order to secure a completely legal work permit for a Syrian, the procedure is costly and very 
complicated. Even long before 2011, business in Lebanon  
relied on a cheap, manipulable and disposable labour force, and so stood opposed 
to the potential “hassles” of written work permits–through which workers might lay 
claim to protection and even social insurance [...] workers were required on the 
cheap, to be easily hired and fired, and to work long and variable hours at variable 
times and intensities in greatly variable numbers (Chalcraft, 2006b, p. 90) 
Since 2015 the “hassles” of obtaining such a permit have increased, and furthermore 
because of the cost incurred and the rights of a worker associated with a work permit (such as 
minimum wage), especially in terms of benefits to the workers236, only a small fraction of legal 
work permits for Syrians are issued every year. In theory, should a Syrian be caught working 
illegally, the employer and the Syrian should face legal troubles. In practice, however, it is rare 
that Syrians doing low-skill labour jobs would be interrogated, and if they are, it is even more rare 
that the employer faces serious, if any, legal repercussions.   
It is indeed much more practical to hire Syrians informally because it would mean more 
flexibility for the employer. From my interviews, none of the five refugees who had regular 
monthly work had a contract or a work permit, and were subject to abuses due to this fact. “I try 
to keep a very low profile at work, I cannot afford to anger the clients or the boss, I would 
immediately lose my job” (Refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2016). This issue is also reflected in 
the example of the manager of a vegetable stall in Hadath, as detailed in the conclusion to Part 2, 
who had hired a young Syrian boy in a clearly informal framework. The stark difference that 
arose after 2011 is that Syrians could no longer return to Syria should they be unsatisfied with 
                                                 
235 On the GSO website, under “Entry by Pledge of Responsibility”, Syrians may enter /reside with a kafala (with 300,000 
LBP/$200 deposit) for entry in order to obtain a one year residency submitted by the persons or institutions or companies 
pledging to seek work permit from the Ministry of Labor in accordance with applicable procedures. See Annex: “Organizing 
entry of Syrian Nationals and their residency in Lebanon” 
236 With a legal work permit, any migrant would be eligible and obligated to register with National Social Security Fund, which 
would insure health and retirement benefits to the worker but would incur heavy costs to the company.  
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their working conditions.  
Another aspect that is in direct relation to the nature of the long term residence of the 
refugees (in contrast to their seasonal migration before 2011) is the fact that many started to 
reason in terms of short or longer term entrepreneurial ventures as well. With a prolonged stay, it 
was possible to think of opening a shop or a kiosk as one refugee from Tebbeneh told me: “I was 
tired of working at a different place everyday and I was being treated really badly. Back in Syria I 
had a vegetable place, so I know the trade. I rented this stand last month and even though I don’t 
make enough, I don’t have to wake up not knowing what I’ll be doing today. Somedays are better 
than others” (Rami , refugee running a vegetable kart in Tripoli, personal interview, 2016).  
As I have already mentioned, in El-Nab'a most shops are managed by Syrians, but owned 
by Lebanese; or rented by Syrians from Lebanese. Specifically after 2015, Syrians were no longer 
allowed to set up businesses without a Lebanese partner. One Syrian salesperson from Aleppo 
told me: “Comfortable? who’s comfortable? I’m just like everyone else - at least I have this job. 
Most of the people here today [Ghilan street] are Syrians” (Interview with Syrian refugee, El-Nab'a, 
2018). 
In the Bourj el-Barajneh camp, Syrians have also opened innumerable shops. Notably, 
one Syrian has set up three large textile shops at the entrance of the camp. “I don’t know how 
they function” Mahmoud, a twenty-four year-old resident of the camp since birth, said to me in 
2017. “They seem to have so many employees, and a lot of material, but I never see any clients in 
their shops!”. Mahmoud said they get their products from Syria, that the borders are “ooohhh, of 
course open” for this kind of trade. His friend, Iḥsan, was preparing orange juice for the Iftar of 
that night. 
What happened was that Syrians came and they had a lot of money237. I don’t know 
where they got their money. They buy material in large quantities, we cannot afford 
that, we cannot compete. You see? Here in the camp, there are so many Syrians… 
they rent shops, they rent apartments. My parents used to rent an apartment for 
$100, now the owner says you either pay $300 OK !! or I’ll rent it to a Syrian. You 
see? 22 of them could live in that apartment, with their kids! Look there’s a Syrian. 
(Iḥsan calls out to a passer-by) ‘what would you accept for a day’s work?’ (Without 
waiting for an answer he continued) He’d accept anything, he wouldn’t care because 
of the aid he’s receiving. Plus, Syrians like to take, they don’t like to give. they only 
work with each other. In their case what is mostly different is that they have a 
                                                 
237 In this case as in many others, I would sometimes feel a bit conflicted towards discourse that I could interpret as rumours, 
and, as such, use with uncertainty, but that could also affect my empathy or confidence in the discourse of my interviewees. 
This aspect is very central in sensitive and personal narratives, and represents a hidden part of qualitative data. 
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country to go back to. They are displaced, they are not refugees. We are the 
refugees. where would we go back? Of course, God help them they are refugees as 
well but… (Ihsan, Palestinian refugee in Bourj El-Barajneh, personal interview, 
2017). 
A statement stands out in Ihsan’s talk: “They are displaced, they are not refugees. We are 
the refugees”. It sums up the main self perceived, and real, difference between the Palestinians 
and the Lebanese as hosts of Syrian refugees in Lebanon’s cities. The Palestinians have faced the 
same issues and have reacted in the same ways to the Lebanese hosts, as reflected in my 
interviews. They have the same concerns for economic competition, and rent rate inflation, and 
uses of public space. Even more so, because Palestinians are already excluded from a large 
segment of dweller rights. The situation inside the camp may be described as a heightened reality 
of the Syrian refugee influx. First because of the identity struggles, Palestinians today -  even third 
and fourth generation refugees - do not feel like fully entitled dwellers. They are in the end 
refugees themselves, with their own struggles vis-à-vis the Lebanese authorities. And second, the 
social, urban, and political informality in the camp - as detailed in Chapter 4, is heightened in 
comparison to the other neighbourhoods and cities in this study and in Lebanon in general. 
Also, Ihsan spoke of money that Syrians brought with them. The idea that Syrians who 
came to Lebanon had resources was mentioned in other interviews as well. Lebanese dwellers 
have told me how Syrian women wear gold bracelets, how they have lands and homes back in 
Syria, and that their stay in Lebanon is profitable for them. These claims are utterly refuted by all 
the refugees I spoke with. While twelve refugees said they did indeed have limited resources at 
their arrival, in the form of cash and gold, they all insisted that they have depleted all their savings 
and sold off most of their valuables to be able to pay rent.  
One last element to consider is that different Syrian working classes feel different 
treatment from the Lebanese. Many of them (in all its classes and regions) tend to accept the 
wealthy and, to some extent, contribute to criminalizing the poor. As it is the case in many other 
countries, one could observe that a richer Syrian who starts up a high-end enterprise, be it a 
butcher, vegetable market or even a veterinarian may find a relatively safe haven in Lebanon. In 
contrast, not unexpectedly, the poor often find it difficult to cope and find a place within the 
landscape of political divides in Lebanon, their presence being “measured through sectarian 
lenses that [...] make [some of them] more “desirable” than others” (El-Khouri, 2018 p.101). As 
one Syrian veterinarian voiced it:   
[Lebanon] isn't treating me, it treats my money. Because of the nature of my job I'm 
dealing with middle upper class Lebanese who only make their judgments based on 
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money. They see that I'm here spending, and they see that I too come from the 
middle classes so they don't show as much bigotry as it is normally the sentiment 
against us in Lebanon (Chit & Nayel, 2013 p.1). 
A few ventures of Syrian refugees that started small have grown to become medium 
enterprises. Abo Abdo’s vegetable market is one such example. Around 2012, Abu Abdo started 
selling vegetables off an open vegetable kiosk on the main mansourieh road. Eventually, he 
gained enough clients and capital to grow his business, and is considered today a high end 
vegetable shop, with mainly Lebanese clients  It is not clear whether Abu Abdo used financial 
resources from before 2012 or whether he grew his business solely in Lebanon (Figure  8-6). 
 
Figure  8-5: “Needed female cashier” “Needed Syrian or Lebanese concierge” 
(left)  Mount Lebanon, 2015. (Right) El-Nab'a, 2016. 
 
 
Figure  8-6: Abu Abdo, high-end grocery shop and restaurant owned by a Syrian refugee.  
Photo: Marc Ghaoüi, Google Maps. Date: February 2018 
CHAPTER 7  298 
 
7.3  “Abusers of aid” 
 
In 2011 at the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the United Nations and a number of local 
and international aid organisations quickly responded by setting up, or growing their operations 
in Lebanon. The refugee influx was dubbed a humanitarian crisis and aid was abundant for the 
Syrians. Both in-kind and cash support was provided for those fleeing the violence. In addition to 
external aid, there was an initial short-lived positive, or extremely positive, reaction of host 
communities who welcomed refugees in their homes and shared their own resources to support 
them238.  
In the year 2012 the UNHCR reported an approximate $4.3 million deficit: (their budget 
requirements amounted to $49.3 million, while funds available were at $45 million “meeting 91 
per cent of the overall needs” (UNHCR, 2012a), which meant that the outcome of the aid was 
satisfactory. Indeed, Syrian refugees present in Lebanon at the time were supported in cash and 
in kind - and they numbered less than 250,000 individuals at the time.  In 2017, for the $464 
million that the UNHCR budgeted, they reported receiving $326 million, marking a deficit of 
over $120 million dollars with only 70 percent of the needed budget covered (Figure  8-7). This 
explains the various aid cuts that Syrian refugees have faced throughout the years, as an example 
in 2014 the Financial Times reported panic amongst refugees amid a “funding crisis” of 
international organisations (Solomon, 2014). Consequently, for Syrian refugees to abuse aid 
seems unlikely, as the total they had been receiving has been on the decrease since 2012.  In fact, 
while there were almost 830,000 refugees who received $27 / month in food vouchers in 2016, 
refugees’ expenditure per capita during that year was over $100 / month in Lebanon. Indeed, 
monthly income for the majority of refugees is not sufficient to cover monthly 
expenditures. 76 percent of Syrian refugee households are living below the poverty 
line, while 58 percent are living below the extreme poverty line. Syrian refugee 
families often struggle to sustain their living. For instance, the average monthly rent 
in 2017 was $183, while the average monthly income was $193, making the cost of 
rent a significant burden for many households (Yassin, 2018 p.94) 
While at the level of the individual Syrian refugee aid was not enough, and while it was 
significantly less than the budget required, it has to be noted that hundreds of millions of dollars 
have been injected yearly into Lebanon’s economy because of the Syrian refugee crisis. For 
example, the total amount injected into the Lebanese economy since 2012, for the sole purpose 
                                                 
238 See Chapter 3 section 1.1 
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of food assistance239 is just under 1 billion dollars; “Providing this type of assistance not only 
delivers essential aid to vulnerable communities, but also encourages the Lebanese economy. As 
such, refugees can be valuable consumers and can contribute to the local economy” (Yassin, 2018 
p.97).  
 
 
Figure  8-7: Budget and expenditures for Lebanon, 2012-2018  
Source: UNHCR data portal 
The UNHCR are not the only organisation that received international aid directly 
targeting the Syrian refugee crisis, but they are the largest receiver and donor. They are also the 
only organisation that was registering refugees in an official capacity until 2015. This data is 
therefore telling of the shortage of funding, and in consequence the support, that international 
aid provided Syrian refugees throughout the years.  
Table 5: Estimated UNHCR expenditures per refugee per year (in US Dollars) 
 
                                                 
239 Electronic vouchers worth $27 each that can only be used in selected stores in Lebanon 
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Estimated UNHCR expenditures per refugee per year (in US Dollars) Source: Based on UNHCR 
Financial reports 2012-2017  
Table 5 details the nature of expenditures for the year 2012 and 2017240. Expenditures for 
“basic needs and essential services” decreased from $330 in 2012 to $250 in 2017. These needs 
include shelter, health, education, domestic items and water. Similarly, expenditures going 
towards “security from violence and exploitation” decreased from $17 in 2012 to $13 in 2017. 
These include protection from sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) as well as child 
protection. Most budget lines decreased with the overall budget shortage, but two areas of 
expenditure saw an increase. For example, the average support for refugees in “basic needs and 
essential services” decreased from $330 to $250 per year, which again makes abuses of aid seem 
unlikely considering the limited amount of aid. The areas that saw an increase in expenditure are 
the areas that included the Lebanese communities. First, “community empowerment and self 
reliance” which in the detailed financial report includes “coexistence with local communities” 
increased from 2 percent to 5 percent (UNHCR, 2012-2017). Also, “favorable protection 
environment” which includes “public attitudes towards persons of concern” increased from 1 
percent to 3 percent (UNHCR, 2012-2017). 
Indeed, between 2011 and 2013 most registered refugees received cash and in-kind 
support in the form of mattresses, rent support, children’s nutrition, women’s hygiene products 
etc, and most of their basic needs were covered. They even had a surplus of in-kind support as 
per numerous accounts by refugees, host communities and NGO representatives alike. While the 
funding deficit increased and the NGO support with it, the generalisation that refugees were 
well-off persevered in the collective discourse of host communities. In 2015, a Lebanese resident 
in the Tebbeneh neighbourhood told me “They sold the material they got from the UN, I’m 
telling you they made fortunes [...] How can we survive? Who’s helping us? They get their rent, 
food, medicine for free! Of course they can work for less than me. I cannot compete”. But the 
UN has reported a consistent shortage in funding since 2012. As early as the spring of 2013, the 
UNHCR began “cutting basic aid programs to over 400,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon because 
of lack of funding” (Dockery, 2013). And while “secondary health care coverage is usually one of 
the first areas of aid which is affected by funding shortage, “The food assistance program, which 
helps most refugees in the country prepare meals [...] and other programs [including] housing aid 
and education tuition payment” are also affected” (Dockery, 2013). Shortages in funding 
continued and  
                                                 
240 Detailed expenditures for the year 2018 were not available online at the time of writing. 
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In 2015 the World Food Programme received only one fifth of its projected budget 
for food assistance to Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan and was forced to 
reduce the food aid it could provide. Today, a Syrian refugee living in Lebanon 
receives only $21.60 (£15; €20) a month for food—about 20 percent less than the 
intended food ration. Last year, the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), an 
interagency partnership intended to meet refugee needs while supporting 
socioeconomic recovery and strengthening institutions in host countries, faced a 
funding gap of almost $3.5 billion—77 percent of its target (Murphy, Woodman, 
Roberts, & McKee, 2016). 
Other reports reveal an even smaller amount of aid for refugees in 2015. Amnesty 
International reported that “funding shortages mean that the most vulnerable Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon receive just $13.50 per month or less than half a dollar a day for food assistance” 
(Amnesty International, 2015).  The trend continued and the United Nations began developing 
difficult selection criteria by categorizing refugees who almost all lived under poverty line. In the 
summer of 2017, they “halted cash assistance to 20,000 Syrian families in Lebanon due to a 
shortage of international aid” and shifted that assistance to “some 20,000 “more needy” Syrian 
families” (Houssari, 2017). The situation still continues and in 2018 the United Nations 
foreshadowed that a “critical gap in funding for Syrian refugees and host communities this year 
could lead to cuts in vital services, threatening social stability in host countries and refugees’ 
futures” (Barrington, 2018).  
Even though aid decreased at significant rates for the Syrian refugees, the Lebanese 
populations in the low socio-economic classes had formed an idea that Syrians easily received all 
their needs. To a certain extent, even the least amounts of aid seemed unfair to Lebanese families 
with economic challenges. Unemployment rates exceeded the 28.5 percent of 2011, especially 
among youth, and many struggle to make ends meet. Aid therefore created tensions, and the 
tensions in turn affected aid policies and directed them to the support of all vulnerable 
communities in Lebanon rather than the refugee population. But even with these policy changes 
and increased expenditures of the UNHCR on community coexistence and public attitudes, anger 
resides within the Lebanese communities to the extent that refugees have since 2014 
continuously reported fear from physical attacks in public spaces after dark.   
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7.4 “Vulgar, discernible” 
“They treat us like we are, like, dirty - I don’t know how to say it… like they don’t want 
to touch us” (Rahaf, Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2016) were the first words that 
Rahaf, a Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh, said to me when I asked for her experience with Lebanese 
hosts.  
Indeed, phrases like “They live like cattle”, “they would eat anything”, “they don’t send 
their kids to school”, “they dress badly”, and “they smell” have come out verbatim from my field 
notebook, during interviews with Lebanese dwellers in El-Nab’a and Tebbeneh, and with 
Palestinian dwellers in Bourj El-Barajneh. And while not all phrases were stressed in the three 
sites of this study in the same degree, the comment on clothing was mentioned every time I 
spoke with Lebanese or Palestinian hosts alike. Overcrowdedness was also a notion that most of 
the host interviewees mentioned, and resented it because it caused rent inflation.  
 
Table 6: Expressions mentioned in field interviews when qualifying refugees 
Expression/verbatim or 
synonym 
El Nab’a / 10 Tebbeneh / 10 Bourj el-Barajneh / 
9 
"feltenin” 7 6 2 
"they smell" 5 3 0 
"they dress badly" 10 10 9 
"accept 
overcrowdedness" 
8 6 9 
"they are dirty" 7 4 3 
"lack etiquette" 5 5 6 
"not educated" 7 2 4 
"they are only used to 
dictatorship - cannot 
function otherwise" 
6 8 3 
sarcasm over certain 
words "Mou?", and 
nuances (extended 
vowels etc) 
6 7 0 
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Of these expressions, there were two that I specifically sought to better understand. I 
wanted to know how the Syrians were feltenin (loose), and how they lacked etiquette. The latter 
was easier for my interviewees to explain. While on a commented walk in Bourj el-Barajneh, 
Mahmoud told me: “Did you just see how she slapped her boy? did you get it on camera? We 
don’t do such things, at least in public” (Mahmoud, Palestinian refugee in Lebanon, personal interview, 
2018). “You know, you see them sitting in public with their legs wide open, you could almost see 
their private parts, excuse me - that’s something a Palestinian would never do…”. As we walked 
on, I stopped to take a photo of a building entrance and Mahmoud smiled and told me to look 
up. There was a line of laundry hanging, and dripping water. “A Palestinian woman would never 
hang the laundry without at least squeezing the water out first” Figure  8-8). During that same 
walk, Mahmoud pointed out several other balconies with Syrian laundry, and when we climbed to 
a fifth floor balcony of his friend’s house for a global view of the camp, he also showed me what 
he clearly recognised as Syrian laundry (Figure  8-8). “Right Fatmeh?” he asked his friend at that 
point, and Fatmeh replied jokingly “Right, in any case we don’t wear these ‘abaya and these sorts 
of color, they are in technicolor 
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Figure  8-8: Syrian laundry in Bourj al-Barajneh 
Laundry dripping water in Bourj el-Barajneh (left), and in “technicolor” at the window (right) 
 
I found the discussion on laundry more interesting because in fact, in El-Nab’a my 
attention was turned by my guide to the same issue (Figure 7.8). I had been invited by a Lebanese 
community leader from El-Nab’a to attend a celebration of the opening of a community center 
Markaz al Hayat (The Center of Life), on what is popularly known as the Hayat street. The center 
was built over what was one of the rare open children play areas in the neighbourhood (Figure 
 8-9, Figure  8-10). Hala, one of my regular contacts in El-Nab’a, told me that an organisation had 
funded the project and that the organising committee was a group of Lebanese and Syrian 
women working together. One of the objectives of the project is to enhance relations between 
the communities.  
 
 
 
Figure  8-9: Share’ el-Hayat (Street of Life) in 2015 
Showing public garden built by scouts and the Red Cross (Fakhreddine, 2015). Wall graffiti reads 
Street of Life 
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Figure  8-10: Center of life, replacing public space 
Share’ el-Hayat (Street of Life) in 2018 showing the “Center of Life” replacing the public garden, 
and new wall graffiti reads: Women to reach justice 
The center was set up to serve all the neighbourhood dwellers as a common meeting 
place for all sorts of activities. The people in attendance of the opening were almost exclusively 
Syrian women and children. As the event unfolded inside the center, I approached a group of 
women who were standing outside and chatting, clearly organisers as per their name tags. I asked 
why the invitees were all Syrian. Renée was quick to answer: “there’s food, they came to take the 
food”, daring me to look inside the window and witness how the Syrian women were “surely 
placing” the buffet items in their bags to take back to their homes. “The Lebanese wouldn’t 
come, they know how it will be and who the majority will be - we invited everyone”, she said. It 
became clear that these women were the Lebanese on the organising committee. I briefly 
explained my presence and research interest, and this prompted one of the women, Renée to 
immediately react  
Look, we have been forgotten. There is no longer any support for us vulnerable 
Lebanese. A while back there were some resources being distributed by the 
shou’oun (the Ministry of Social Affairs) and they were in line before us. We had a lot 
of trouble with them, a lot - we do not get along. There are 80 percent Syrians today! 
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If we are to get support, Syrians have to be getting it as well. No fund whatsoever 
comes to us directly. I’ve learnt this. If you want to support us, support them first! 
Anyway just look around you, you don’t need even ask, it’s evident... Just look at the 
balconies and you’ll know where they are. (Renée, Lebanese dweller, El-Nab’a, 
personal interview, 2018) 
As she spoke the rest were nodding adding a word or two in approval.  She touched on 
the sensitivities surrounding international aid. Indeed, as explained in section 7.3, the initial aid 
that arrived for the direct support of Syrian refugees in the early years of the crisis was diverted to 
supporting all vulnerable communities in Lebanon after social tensions rose. What this meant was 
that funding would reach Syrian refugees under a condition that it supported, directly or 
indirectly, other Lebanese vulnerable families241. Aid for the Lebanese became conditioned by the 
aid for Syrians, and vice-versa. I her discourse, Renée was referring to the way they hung their 
laundry, and to the sarami (slippers) in front of their doors. “Come”, she told me, “do you want 
to see? do you want to take pictures? just look at the place”. She took me around the block and 
continued to point to different balconies and entrances (Figure  8-12) asking me to take pictures, 
as though to document them. “All this street, do you see the laundry? Look, there’s a Lebanese, 
do you see those jeans? Take the picture, do you see the difference?” (Figure  8-12) I was able to 
discern a difference in the quality of clothes, the colors and the way in which the laundry was 
hung between the two balconies she pointed out. For Renée, the shabbier looking, less organised 
laundry was the Syrian laundry 
 
 
.    
                                                 
241 Palestinian refugees are not supported by the UNHCR but by the UNRWA and are not therefore concerned with this 
condition 
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Figure  8-11: Entrances to buildings where "mostly Syrians" live 
On a commented walk in El-Nab’a, a Lebanese host pointed to what she described as Syrian 
residences 
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Figure  8-12: Syrian laundry in El-Nab’a 
Some of the balconies René pointed out with visible “Syrian” laundry, with the exception of the 
upper left picture, the “Lebanese” laundry. Date: February 2018 
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“Can you tell a Lebanese from a Syrian at a distance?” is a question I repeated to every 
person I interviewed, Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian. The answer without fail was “yes”.  “You 
know them, comon, you can tell very quickly!” (Chadi, Lebanese resident in Tripoli, personal interview, 
2015). As he was driving me from the center of Tripoli towards Tebbeneh, he started to point 
out to people and tried to explain how he knew. “That’s a Syrian, and there a Lebanese. The one 
of the motorbike is Syrian, and that one behind the cart, clearly… ” it continued as such for 
almost five minutes, in which Chadi pointed out at least twenty Syrians and an equal number of 
Lebanese.  
In Bourj el-Barajneh, while walking with Mahmoud, I asked him to point out Syrians 
when he saw them. He said to me: “No that would be complicated, everyone you see is Syrian. 
I’ll point out a Palestinian when I see one, how about that?” he said jokingly. It was during this 
same walk that he had pointed out the woman slapping her son in the example I mentioned 
above. It was in Bourj el-Barajneh as well that I met Abu Talal who, also jokingly, told me: “I 
know them from their model, the way they’re fabricated” (Abu Talal, Palestinian refugee in Lebanon, 
personal interview, 2017). It was equally clear to dwellers in El-Nab’a who was Syrian. “From the 
way they walk, soubhan allah (as God saw to it)” (Hala, Lebanese resident in El-Nab’a, personal interview, 
2015), Hala told me in 2015, as we walked down the busy street one day, she dared me to test it. I 
would point out a random person from afar, and she would guess, then I would go speak with 
them to check. It was the only such experiment I did, and we tried it on eight people - five times 
Hala guessed correctly.  
Frustrations of a servees driver in Tebbeneh 
On a rainy day in 2018, I hailed a servees from Tebbeneh to take me back to Tripoli. 
The usually short drive was clearly taking longer than usual with traffic. During what 
ended up being a thirty-minute ride, the driver’s chatter served as a barometer for 
the typically generic “refugee talk” on the Lebanese street. He depicted the situation 
as a “‘host community’ [being] ‘invaded’ by a ‘wave of refugees” that threatens its 
livelihood, coherence, work, health, way of life [...]” (Fawaz, Gharbieh, Harb, & 
Salamé, 2018 p.4). While they may sound harsh and inconsistent, the words of my 
driver echoed the content of the reactions I heard throughout my fieldwork when 
speaking to host communities. His chat touched on several generalisations 
discussed in this chapter. From social relations, to housing, to perceptions, to 
patriarchy... this kind of monologue could easily represent a truthful account, very 
unrehearsed and natural, of the generalisations expressed by Lebanese towards 
Syrian refugees. For the driver it did not seem to matter much that I was in the 
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car242. An excerpt from my field notes of that day further illustrates such common 
forms of expressions Lebanese tend to address. Five of them tend to dominate the 
general representations.  
He touched on the undesired presence of Syrians in public space: 
It’s a school day and I got into the back of a servees243 in Tebbeneh at around 2PM - 
just as the first school shift was ending, and traffic was heavy. The driver was 
anxious to get out of the traffic and tried several short cuts, mostly taking the wrong 
direction in narrow streets and maneuvering his way around other angry drivers. I 
asked if he knew which schools offered the second shift for the Syrian refugee 
children, and what time it started. “Yeyyy, I’m so fed up with that! I live facing one of 
those schools… if you could just see at 5 or 5:15 pm when they yfalltowon (let them 
loose) to the streets... they climb on cars and get on pickups, I feel like taking 
pictures and posting them on facebook I swear”. He was getting more agitated due 
to traffic. “It’s not only the schools… all of Lebanon has become full of traffic. Look at 
that, just look”.   
He also spoke of economic competition 
“It’s always been crowded in these parts of Tripoli”, I said. “No wallah (by God) it’s 
never been like this. If you wanted to buy something before the azmeh (crisis), you 
would find one or two shops on a street, now there are shops everywhere [those 
create traffic], even in their [Syrians’] houses you’ll find shops. In my neighbourhood 
[Nef’a], there are maybe six Syrian chicken shops, and two butchers! I swear to God 
I never saw this much traffic here, except on special occasions.” Without interjection 
form me, he continued. “The Lebanese ya haram (pity) can’t find work anymore. 
They get cars and work as taxi drivers. In the vegetable market, all the vendors are 
Syrian.  
Also, he raised the question of the paradox of the relations between the Lebanese and 
Syrians - while the latter are undesired in public space they are still preferred as tenants 
and workers, like in the example of the young Syrian worker in the vegetable shop 
mentioned in the conclusion to Part 1.  
“Let me tell you, I have a building in the Nef’a244, ok? I rent out four apartments and 
a shop to Syrians, and one apartment to a Lebanese woman. The Lebanese tenant 
m’awfetni allah (is very difficult)”. I asked if he had rented to Lebanese before the 
crisis. “Yes but they didn’t pay, it’s better to rent out to Syrians. The Lebanese tenant 
is a hassle. It’s already the 12th of the month today, and she hasn’t yet paid me this 
month’s rent. She doesn’t answer me on her phone. Syrians pay on time, maybe two 
                                                 
242 I wondered if his attitude would have been different had I been a male passenger, because his demeanor and discourse 
was in general quite patriarchal, and he didn’t seem to care much for my reactions. 
243 Private collective taxis very commonly used in Lebanon 
244 A neighbourhood in the peripheries of Tripoli 
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days late. You know, what they do is they borrow money from anyone to pay their 
rent on time, and if they can’t they will tell you and they will leave with no hassle. 
They would stay with other families... they huddle up. And you know they would live 
anywhere! The shop I’m telling you I rent out, it’s used as a home, for a newly wed 
couple!” he let out a short laugh.  
He confirmed that the Syrians would accept any precarious working conditions, and that 
they are vulgar 
“You know what? They do anything. They’d work for LBP 20,000 [10-11€/day]. Their 
food is different than ours. It’s different… we eat proper food, they just… just a fried 
egg would work for a Syrian, just to fill up his stomach… a potato. Just anything. 
You know I have an olive land up there, when I go I swear to you I sometimes see 
200 Syrian women I swear on the Qoran245, just like goats picking herbs... I don’t 
even know these herbs, and it’s my land! Like hindbeh (dandelion), I wouldn’t 
recognize the herb… would you eat that?”. “Yes actually, I like hindbeh” I said. “I 
mean would you have that for a proper lunch? You know, [a Syrian] would take it to 
work to eat it! They’d bring vine leaves to the construction site to eat them… I would 
go get myself a man’ousheh246 or two… they would eat anything. Sha’b mbahdal (A 
messy people). Even our poorest Lebanese people live better than they do.  
 
And finally he insisted on their discernible features 
After a short silence I asked: “Can you tell them apart from a distance?” “Yes, of 
course. And I dare you to go check.” He rolled his window farther down and pointed 
his hand at three or four individuals indicating they were Syrian. “They are 
everywhere I swear on the Holy Qoran. Pick up a cardboard off the street, you’d find 
a Syrian under it. I once tripped on a man sleeping on the floor in the park, it was 
dark, and he was holding a child... I asked him what he was doing there and he said 
that he didn’t expect anyone to pass by at this time. I mean he didn’t even know how 
to sleep in the right direction! I asked if he was ok, and he told me he’s been 
sleeping here since even before the crisis.”    
 
Such general views on refugees are widely spread among the various social classes that 
form the Lebanese society, even though they are more pronounced amongst the most vulnerable. 
The latter are directly affected by the presence of the Syrian refugees, who tend to benefit more 
of the help and assistance from NGOs, as their cause is generally more visible and represents a 
major political and diplomatic issue.  
                                                 
245 The holy book of Islam 
246 A Lebanese sort of pizza with different toppings that may include cheese, herbs and other. In the area of Tebbeneh a 
man’ousheh costs 1-2€ depending on the toppings and the shop.  
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As such, refugees are not only struggling for their lives, housing, work and presence in 
the public sphere, but also forced to face, prevent or thwart attempts to label them as “criminal” 
or “dangerous” classes. Paradoxically, they are also considered preferable as tenants and 
employees by Lebanese, because they accept more precarity with less hassle. It is within these 
contradictory issues that Syrians are able to “sneak” into the interstices of the city. They negotiate 
the best place they can considering the differing expectations of their host dwellers. This result 
they achieve allows them an inferior place in a difficult setting - the price to pay to escape the 
Syrian chaos. Because they face such contradictions at the different scales of their presence, from 
the very specific nation and state building to the micro-local in their everyday lives, insight into 
the processes by which they access Lebanon’s cities through different negotiation practices is 
useful, as it provides grounds for further discussion on the role played by these refugees in the 
country as a whole. As such, I will avoid categorical analyses that describes them solely as victims 
in all their forms of political systems, economic forces and social norms. Instead, in the following 
and last Chapter, I propose a discussion on how these refugees - as representatives of many other 
marginal groups - not only deploy practices, tactics  and sometimes strategies of negotiating their 
very presence, legitimacy in the public urban sphere, but how they tend to play a specific role at 
both national and local levels, as an economic workforce, but also as political subjects.  
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The problematic settlement conditions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon’s cities today are 
further complicated by the historical context in which refugees have arrived. This leads me to 
claim it is virtually impossible for Syrian refugees and host communities today to develop a 
healthy space sharing situation in Lebanon (El-Khouri, 2018 p.99).  
Negotiation, as “a relation of power” (Rougier, 2014, p. 86), can yield positive outcomes 
when the negotiating parties each have bargaining capital. In the General Introduction to this 
dissertation, I proposed three types of negotiating space based on Rougier’s reasoning: (1) 
negotiating space on the regional level, creating a space sharing social process, (2) negotiating 
space at the national level, accompanying a space sharing social situation, and (3) the continuous 
cycle of negotiating space at the local level, largely blocking a social process. The third type is 
mainly linked with the urban lens used in direct field investigation and in the analysis framework 
it allowed me to elaborate. In the first two I will discuss negotiations on space on the national 
and international scales, for which the geopolitical and social approaches have been mobilised in 
the analysis.    
 
8.1 At the international scale - setting the stage 
This type of negotiation is concerned with the international relations between Lebanon 
and Syria, not only since the 2011 crisis but since the very creation of the two nation states in 
1920. Deciding on the borders of the countries was a first international negotiation for an 
independent state in Lebanon. In his seminal “A House of Many Mansions”, Kamal Salibi 
describes the moment: 
While France had strong sympathies for the maronites, the French government did 
not support their demands without reserve. In Mount Lebanon, the Maronites had 
formed a clear majority of the population. In a ‘Greater Lebanon’, they were bound to 
be outnumbered by the Muslims of the coastal towns and their hinterlands, and by 
those of the Bekaa valley; and all the Christian communities together, in a ‘Greater 
Lebanon’, could at best amount to a bare majority. The Maronites, however, were 
insistent in their demands. Their secular and clerical leaders had pressed for them 
during the war years is any other word missing here? the Allied powers, not 
excluding the United States. After the war, the same leaders, headed by the 
Maronite patriarch Elias Hoyek in person, pursued this course at the Paris Peace 
Conference; and in the end the French yielded (Salibi, 1988, p. 26) 
They did yield, but the specific borders as they were drawn can be considered arbitrary. 
Not only for Lebanon, but for Syria as well. Had the Allied powers decided on more than two 
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states, the current geopolitical situation would have been different, maybe more problematic. 
Nation states were created without real consideration of the question of nationality - for instance, 
the Tripoli coastal Region was primarily part of  Syria but further included into the new Lebanese 
Republic in 1926. As a matter of consequence, Syria’s Mediterranean outlet was reduced, fuelling 
the demands of Syrian authorities, which led them to occupy this region from 1976. This 
integrated nation and state building between Lebanon and Syria explains the relationships 
between the two populations that are both intense and confrontational today. Christians, then, 
secured a place within the region - however problematic it was. While the geopolitical relations 
with both its neighbours, Syria, and Israëli occupied Palestine, have been turbulent, and while 
there are direct and indirect effects stemming from each of these relations on each other, it is the 
Syria-Lebanon relations that have most significance for this dissertation. More specifically, it is 
the successive events since the independence of Lebanon that time have continued to define, 
redefine and transform the place of Syrians in Lebanon a relationship to the present day that I am 
concerned with, seemingly far removed from the urban question, are  events that directly affect 
the conditions within which Syrians have continued to reside in Lebanon, therefore affecting  the 
spaces they could hope to fit in.  
More recently, an important trend was the economic bilateral agreement of 1991247 and its 
consequences. Through this agreement, Syrians were invited to work in Lebanon within 
conditions that did not foster long term settlement. On the one hand, they were given significant 
flexibility in entering Lebanon and working in it with little or no administrative procedures 
required - a prospect attractive for many, due to Lebanon’s more liberal economy that insured 
Syrians higher wages than they would hope for back home. On the other hand, the absence of 
administrative procedures also meant the absence of a work contract and the benefits that would 
come with it. Workers were guaranteed neither the minimum wage, nor health insurance, nor a 
limitation on the number of working hours, etc. and most importantly, their invisibility as 
workers248 denied them recourse to legal aid or justice should any complaint arise. These 
conditions made their trips to Lebanon limited in time and scope, they mainly came as seasonal 
agricultural workers, and construction workers. This context allowed for seasonal labour 
migration, particularly in the Bekaa. It also established a negative balance of power for Syrian 
workers, a legacy that refugees suffer from today. They consentented to their condition of 
coercement in return for economic opportunities they had little access to otherwise. This was 
authorised and encouraged at the political level by the governments. Through the open border 
                                                 
247 The “Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination signed between Syria and Lebanon” 
248 No work contract, no formal rent agreements, and most importantly no formal tracking of their entry-exist trends.  
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policy, the Lebanese government provided cheap and disposable labour to its constituents in the 
form of a migration pattern that was unique in it protractedness. John Chalcraft describes it as 
“prolonged unsettlement” (2009, p.20), and explains it due to the fact that:  
emerging communities that were thwarted and truncated, partly by recurrent hostility 
and violence, but above all by high social costs (rents, utilities, health, education, 
transportation, and food) in Lebanon, where there was virtually no government or 
non-governmental social assistance.  
These challenges that Syrians faced to access and settle in Lebanon’s cities, along with the 
subsidized costs in Syria under the regime made it viable for them to continue their circular 
migration, without the need for further intervention from the Lebanese government. The latter, 
through bilateral agreements, had insured an easy enough process for Syrians to find quasi-legal 
interstices within the informal economy in which they could fit, all the while leaving the 
“unsettlement” climate to the difficult conditions of access to the cities. This would indeed 
explain why “Syrian migrants spawned no second generation in Lebanon, even after around half 
a century of mass migration” (Chalcraft, 2009 p.21) even though, before 2015, Lebanon had 
never “pursued policies to prevent settlement or encourage [the] return” (Chalcraft 2009, p.20) of 
Syrians.  
This trend, then, made for a temporally limited precarious space for the Syrians in 
Lebanon until 2011. While the agreement was still in place until 2015, some of its core elements 
changed. Now, Syrians did have access to social assistance from non-governmental sources, even 
though it was hardly sufficient. They also had a good enough reason to want to settle: fleeing 
violence. What the Syrian refugee crisis brought to the negotiation table is the new found need 
for Syrians to settle long term, and to provide social benefits for their families. It is in this 
twofold change that causes the existence of the declared hostility of the Lebanese towards the 
Syrians since 2011, such as they repeatedly appeared during the interviews. The new geopolitical 
situation introduced by the Syrian war also contributed to explain the paradox. Syrians are 
undesired by Lebanese citizens and Palestinian refugees, but the latter two prefer renting their 
houses to Syrians, and the Lebanese prefer hiring Syrians in many industries.  
Aside from the political implications of the dissociation policy that the government 
adopted vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict, and for the better part of the first four years of the crisis, the 
Lebanese government struggled to maintain the existing status quo of the Syrian worker. By 
refusing the refugee label and the construction of camps, it insured that Syrians would continue 
to be regarded and treated as economic migrants within an informal context - the only space it 
had ever allowed them. Paradoxically, it was this same dissociation and denial that imposed itself 
CHAPTER 8  318 
 
as a new and significant element in the negotiation. Syrians in Lebanon in 2015 had formed a 
large enough population that absorbing them was no longer a possibility; dealing with their 
presence had become a political, social and a largely urban challenge. 
Quick fixes and emergency solutions (such as those used during the garbage crisis or 
electricity crisis) to the issue were beyond the government’s reach. The Syrian refugees became 
scapegoats, the root cause for all the problems in Lebanon.  
The discourse of Lebanese politicians towards Syrian refugees changed drastically 
in 2016 and in the lead up to the 2018 parliamentary elections, fueling rising 
tensions between refugees and some host communities, framing refugees as the 
cause of unemployment, instability, and diseases. Emboldened by World Bank 
estimates that the economy had incurred losses up to $13 billion, Lebanese 
politicians, foremost Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, began calling for the immediate 
return of refugees to Syria. (Geha & Talhouk, 2018, p. 2) 
But with no real guarantees for safety upon return to Syria, the international community 
represented by the International NGOs categorically refused the Lebanese bid for refoulement, and 
re-settlement efforts to other countries is a long and difficult road, and largely out of the hands of 
the government. The reaction, then, was to pass the ball on to the hands of local authorities, to 
“take any measures to reduce the number of Syrians” (PCM, 2014) in their municipalities. It was 
now up to the municipalities, supported by the Lebanese General Security to take control of the 
situation. In the meantime, the calls for the return of the Syrians strongly continue on the 
Lebanese side (Khodr, 2019; Vohra, 2019; Wintour, 2019).  
The negotiations over the space that Syrians occupy in Lebanon cannot be dissociated 
from the geopolitical position of the country mainly with respect to Syria. The ongoing migration 
dynamics of Syrians in Lebanon are a part of a long history that has not been disrupted at any 
point, only transformed, and continues to do so. The most recent episode of this migration is the 
refugee crisis - that as I have discussed, is different in some ways but similar in others. 
8.2 At the national scale: providing a cadre 
Overlapping and anchoring in many ways the major issues observed at the international 
scale, the place for Syrians in Lebanon and especially in its cities account for another scale 
revealing the very sensitivity of the question. This very presence of Syrians between the days of 
independence and 2011 had already largely been agreed upon before they arrived. A temporary 
place, marked by menial labour and precarity, but widely acknowledged and clear. This section 
discusses the heavy influence that the changing national regulations has had on the situation.  
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As the arrivals of Syrian refugees in Lebanon grew and developed between 2011 and 
2015, the initial understanding and place that the country - i.e. its government in all its 
representations - as well as its national citizens -  had afforded to this population was being 
surpassed - Syrian refugees were not  settling on a temporary basis, and they had clearly gone 
beyond their allotted spaces. They had begun to integrate entire job sectors beyond the traditional 
labour on construction and agriculture, they had brought in their families and were no longer a 
group of single males - all signs for potential longer term settlement, not in tune with the 
accepted status quo. To reframe the place, at the national level and at the municipal one, the 
General Security and the municipalities, empowered by the municipal decision of October 2014, 
officially launched and rapidly implemented the kafala system. It was clearly not enough to 
radically reduce the number of Syrians, but the effect it had at the same time on the 
representations of the Syrians and on Lebanese people, as well as on their spaces in the city was 
indeed radical.  
Jad, a Syrian refugee in his late twenties has been one of the more fortunate  in regards to 
the kafala rules. A young recording artist, Jad had been in Lebanon since 2012, when he left Syria 
for fear of circumscription. Belonging to the middle class, and having been to Lebanon before, 
he already had some connections in the artistic milieu in Beirut. He stayed with friends for a short 
while before moving in with a roommate and securing a comfortable setting for himself. Between 
2012 and  2015, Jad was relatively sheltered from the refugee crisis. He frequented Syrian and 
Lebanese friends, usually in his industry, and became a regular in some restaurants and pubs of 
the capital. When the kafala system was announced, Jad had little trouble securing a kafeel who 
was also a friend, Nayla, and they went through the required steps, provided all the necessary 
documentation and paid the yearly fee of $200249. In 2016, he was brutally confronted with the 
fact that outside his circle and comfort zone, Lebanon did not afford him the space he thought it 
did. “I had a very sweet encounter with the law” he sarcastically told me.  
My sister had come to visit from the States250, I was overjoyed to see her. I took her 
to a place in Gemmayze251 to have a drink. We asked the bartender where we could 
smoke and he signaled a table on the sidewalk right outside. Shortly after, a police 
patrol vehicle parked near us, and the officers came out and asked for our 
identification cards. While my sister and I were taking those out, I asked him what 
                                                 
249 He was required to provide his own identity documents and those of his kafeel, a certificate of residence, a certified 
statement indicating that he will not work in Lebanon, a lease or a document proving that his kafeel owns his principal 
residence, and a certified guarantee from the kafeel stating that he takes full legal responsibility over Jad’s presence in 
Lebanon 
250Jad’s entire family had applied for resettlement in the USA, but only the females in the family were granted visas. Jad and 
his father stayed behind in Lebanon  
251 A neighbourhood in Beirut known for its active night scene 
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the trouble was, and he said: ‘you are smoking’. I told him the bartender was aware 
and agreed we could smoke, but by this time he had heard and seen that I was 
Syrian… He held on to our IDs and moved a bit further, clearly agitated. A half an 
hour later, I dared252 to get out of my chair and take one step out, and ask: “is there 
something we are waiting for?”. He told me to get back into the pub - and I told him I 
couldn’t run away because he had my ID. “Get back inside!” he shouted, along with 
some other words, I don’t remember - so I started laughing. This provoked him… he 
pulled me by the arm to the side and started shouting profanities “yel’an rabbak 
(your God be cursed)” and other things, and wanted to handcuff me, but I refused - 
why would he handcuff me? For smoking? So he kicked me and continued to hit me 
violently. I could not hit him back… it’s a police officer - all I could think of was to 
shout out to my sister min ta7t el anqad (from under the rubble253) to use her phone 
and film what was happening. When he heard that he got even more angry, 
snatched her mobile… it was very violent, he was actually hitting me with the chairs. 
Eventually he did handcuff me, and they took me to the station, and called upon my 
kafeel. 
Nayla arrived at the station and after a few calls and a few hours, Jad was coerced into 
signing a declaration stating that he had not been assaulted and that he was detained because he 
refused to respond to the requests of a public security officer. He was informed that this the only 
way to avoid an overnight stay at the station. The declaration he signed exposed him to legal 
pursuit. Having officially acknowledged disobeying an officer, Jad was subject to legal 
prosecution, and sentenced in a military court to ten days imprisonment or a fine of $200 - which 
he paid.  
In this example, a negotiation took place at the national level between a dweller and the 
government. Symbolically, it represents the government placing Syrians back in their place, once 
they have shown some comfort, or settlement tendencies, in the city. Jad is the embodiment of 
the Syrian that does not fit in the “soureh” boxes described in Chapter 5, or agreements that had 
until now been in place. He represents the Syrian who does not fall into the prominent norm, but 
has, like his compatriots, turned into a refugee. In the case study sites, Syrian refugees felt the 
weight of the refugee turn. In the end, Jad was tried and convicted for assaulting a Lebanese 
officer, and the initial smoking accusation was forgotten. His pursuit was conditioned by his 
nationality not his alleged crime, feeding again into the continuous cycle of negotiation between 
the groups, and the social status of dwellers.   
Fifteen years old Wael, a Syrian residing in Tebbeneh in 2015 told me that he stopped 
                                                 
252 Spoken in an exaggerated manner, to portray how the policeman saw Jad’s action 
253 An expression to portray that he was on the floor, being assaulted from above 
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going to the public garden. I had met Wael during a focus group I conducted with Syrian 
refugees in Tebbeneh and he volunteered to take me on a commented walk of the area. He kept 
his eyes down most of the time, and was nervous about my camera - frequently asking me not to 
take a picture or to hide it (Figure  0-1). He arrived to Lebanon in 2012 he said. At first, he felt at 
ease moving around and made some friends especially when he joined a neighbourhood football 
team. Now, however “I wouldn’t go to the public garden” he said, with a smile as if surprised at 
the question. “Every day there’s a fight. Problems over women, over anything… I risk being 
beaten at any moment. I have no papers254” (Wael, Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2015). 
Fist fights are almost a daily occurrence in Tebbeneh. Like many other refugees, Wael was biding 
his time until he could find a way out of Lebanon and even confided at the end of our time 
together that he came to the focus group just in case I was someone “who could help” or who 
knew someone who would. He told me he was almost decided on “booking a journey”255, but 
was trying a better option because of all the stories he had heard about the dangerous crossing.  
 
Figure  0-1: Teenage Syrian refugee walks with his eyes down for the quasi-totality of a 45-
minutes commented walk, 2015 
 
In the example of Wael, the indirect implications of the application of the kafala system 
to the Syrian refugees is clear. Deemed “illegal” like the majority of the refugee population, 
Wael’s living space in the city - while available - became restricted after 2015 because any 
altercation in the public space potentially has grave consequences, given its irregular situation in 
regards to residency. It has altered the way he dwells - not only his route, but also his 
apprehension of everything around him. He feels and fears the risk of being caught, for being a 
Syrian, and the unknown consequences that situation may hold for him. It is this cadre that the 
                                                 
254 Meaning that he does not have a kafeel or legal residency 
255 While he did not develop on this issue, he was referring to the informal passages out of Lebanon to Turkey, or Cyprus, en 
route to Europe 
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local authorities allowed for the refugees - one in which they will only stay if all other options are 
exhausted. As such “the government's directives to restrict and decrease the number of Syrians is 
as such succeeding - indeed, it is only the most disenfranchised who are compelled to stay” (El-
Khouri, 2018 p.103). This cadre has also brought about negotiations at a finer scale, that of the 
street or the block between dwellers, which I will discuss in the below section.     
8.3 At the local scale: a large space for injustice within restricted boundaries 
The streets of El-Nab’a 
I will start this section with a focus on the El-Nab’a neighbourhood, and specifically a 
follow up of a situation I described in Section 7.4. Renée, a Lebanese dweller in El-Nab’a 
described her frustration at being put aside, forgotten, as a vulnerable community. She had 
expressed her dismay at the need to be part of a project that included Syrian refugees to be 
considered for international aid and support. Renée was part of an active Lebanese group of 
women who frequently coordinate with organisations to implement various projects in the 
neighbourhood, and is therefore well placed to know when and to whom funds or aid arrive to 
El-Nab’a. This group is headed by Hala, another active Lebanese dweller from the area.  As we 
made our way through the neighbourhood, we came across the Hayat street (Figure  8-9). I 
exclaimed that it was a real shame for the children that they replaced the playground with a 
closed space, I wondered if Renee knew why.   
You know? It was me who had the key to that playground! We [the Lebanese 
organisers of the children’s event] had decided to open it for three or four hours a 
day in the afternoon. I would come to open and find that the [Syrian] kids had 
climbed the fence and gone inside. They don’t respect anything, nothing suits them. 
It was better to close it down. Nawar256, what can I tell you - ma byelba’lon shi (they 
don’t deserve anything). (Renée, Lebanese dweller, El-Nab’a, personal interview, 
2018). 
Hala, the community leader, gave a different explanation. When I asked her why the 
public garden was closed down, she told me that ‘an organisation’ had “commissioned a study 
that found that the garden was not useful because it received only two hours of sunshine per 
day” (Hala, Lebanese resident in El-Nab’a, personal interview, 2015-2018), and that it was necessary to 
have a collective community center in the neighbourhood. Hala said that the center was 
consequently funded by that organisation in partnership with the municipality, and its 
                                                 
256 The term nawar refers to a nomad people (sometimes translated as gypsies) who come from several countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa. It is used in the common Lebanese lingo in a pejorative manner to describe poor/dirty 
communities.  
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management was handed over to the Lebanese organising group, and as such, Hala hosted the 
opening ceremony described in Section 7.4.  
Here, the negotiation was at the finest level, between dwellers for a very specific space. 
As one group was not satisfied with the use of the space, the latter’s utility was changed. The 
users of the garden, the Syrian children as per Renée’s description, were obviously not part of the 
negotiation nor did they have a say in what it would become.       
In 2016, I observed another conflict concerning the sharing of public space. While on a 
commented walk with a Lebanese dweller257 I witnessed a street fight between two pre-teen boys. 
They were physically attacking each other and one of them was visibly bruised and crying. They 
said something about a bicycle which the smaller boy was holding on to and they argued about 
whom it belonged to. We gathered that the argument was not new, it had been going on for a 
while and the boys were trying to finish it. A crowd was beginning to form and it included several 
adults residing in the street. Rania reacted quickly, coming up to the boys and physically pulling 
the smaller one away from the grip of the older boy. The boys were very vocal and their anger 
was escalating, I made out the accent of the smaller boy to be Syrian. One of the adults from 
streets sided with the bigger boy and said to Rania: “don’t bother with that [the smaller] one, God 
knows what he’s up to”. The boys backed off for a minute, visibly waiting for us to leave to get 
back to their quarrel. Indeed, the minute we started to walk away the quarrel started again and 
Rania stepped in, threatening to call the policemen who were close-by. By this time the smaller 
one was crying uncontrollably. He said the others teased him about his home and swore the 
bicycle was his. In our background, the bigger boy backed by several adults were saying: “go back 
under the bridge where your family is, stop with your false tears”. When we chatted with the 
adults after the boys had disappeared, they explained that he was a Syrian and the family were 
living in a shed under the bridge. They said the smaller boy was always stirring trouble, along with 
his entire family, and that the bicycle was “surely stolen”. Here again, while the cause for the 
violent expression of anger was mundane and literally childish, there was a clear readiness for an 
escalation of physical violence amongst the children and the adults alike. The readiness for 
physical expressions of anger seems present at all times. While Lebanese and Syrian communities 
in El-Nab’a share their spaces in careful peace, and have each drawn their boundaries as to the 
lines they allow each other to cross. 
Accepting to sharing spaces within an implicit social contract 
                                                 
257 Lteif, R. . Formal and informal interviews and commented walks with Rania Lteif between 2014 and 2018. 
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In El-Nab’a today, the Lebanese and the Syrians seem to accept they will have to co-live 
for a protracted period and they have implicitly implied and accepted certain limitations. Syrian 
children could play in a public garden but only when the Lebanese guardian unlocks the door. 
Syrian women could be part of certain volunteering or organising efforts, but it’s the Lebanese 
that are in charge. A Syrian family could live under the bridge, but the children cannot own or use 
bicycles. Syrians may use public spaces at certain times only. Syrians, while to a large extent 
disenfranchised in regards to legal rights as dwellers258, have understood the boundaries and are 
continuously negotiating them. Out of necessity, urgency, or a need to find normalcy, Syrians 
face their present living space in Lebanon head on. The children will climb the fence to play in 
the garden before the guardian unlocks the door, the women will join the organising committee 
even as inferiors, and the boy living under the bridge will ride his bicycle in the street. Theirs is a 
process of quiet encroachment, a 
noncollective but prolonged direct actions of dispersed individuals and families to 
acquire the basic necessities of their lives (land for shelter, urban collective 
consumption or urban services, informal work, business opportunities, and public 
space) in a quiet and unassuming illegal fashion (Bayat, 2010, p. 45). 
El-Nab’a is an interesting field in terms of the coliving of the Lebanese and Syrians after 
2011. The fact that the neighbourhood was ipso-facto mixed pre Syrian crisis highlights the fact 
that dwellers of El-Nab’a have faced coliving scenarios for decades. They share the 
neighbourhood amongst Lebanese religious groups, amongst Lebanese and poor migrant 
workers from many countries, and since 2011 amongst Lebanese and Syrians. This last 
population is the most significant in recent history in terms of their impact on the 
neighbourhood. While El-Nab’a dwellers may have had learned to appreciate that “peaceful 
coexistence has to go through the tolerance of the visual culture of the "other"” (El-Alam, 2014, 
p. 119) before 2010, their expressions tell a different story since the beginning of the Syrian 
refugee crisis. Any visible expression related to the presence of the Syrian in the urban space 
seems not tolerated, being graffitis, icons, domestic objects as the very simple practice - not 
specific to Syrian - of drying clothes on windows259. As I have shown in the different examples in 
the last three chapters, Lebanese dwellers notice, and disapprove of the Syrians. They are 
frustrated with their numbers, as well as with the implications of their socio urban space 
presence.   
                                                 
258See Chapter 1 section 1.1: Refugees’ legal status; Chapter 3 section 1.2: Legal restrictions increase segregation; Chapter 
3 section 2: The Policy Paper of October 2014 
259 Such expression of a visible expression which disturbs because it reminds of the very presence of “the other” is common 
in many contexts where migrants or poor urban dwellers are considered as a nuisance. The case has largely been publicized 
in both metropolises of the global South and in the North. 
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Streets of Tebbeneh 
More than in any other area where I spent time, the Lebanese and Syrians of Tebbeneh 
seem disappointed in each other, though their expectations have been shattered. One graffiti in 
the Nasr Street of the Tebbeneh neighbourhood (Figure  0-2) dated October 23, 2017 reads: “We 
did not forsake anyone but an ingrate260 is an ingrate. It struck me because I had heard sentiments 
along those lines during my interviews especially with the Lebanese dwellers. I had little doubt 
that it was written about the situation of Syrian refugees, although I could not confirm it. 
Lebanese interviewees more often than not expressed feelings of dismay as though the Syrian to 
whom they had opened their doors to, had let them down.  
 
Figure  0-2: Graffiti on Nasr Street 
Graffiti on the Nasr street - Dahr el Moghr, Tebbeneh neighbourhood reads “We did not forsake 
anyone but an ingrate is an ingrate” 23/10/2017. Date: February 2018 
 
Their disappointment tends to be mainly due to the fact that the hosts were ‘very 
                                                 
260 The literal translation of the graffiti is “an animal is an animal”. Referring to someone as an animal is a lighter form of a 
curse; its connotation is usually “asshole”. I used the word “ingrate” in the text as it is in line with the general meaning of the 
phrase.  
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welcoming’ in the beginning261. Every Lebanese dweller mentioned this, and so did the Syrian 
refugees in the neighbourhoods. Here, in a highly conservative, informal and poor 
neighbourhood, the tensions rose acutely when the refugees “stayed”. No official curfews were 
placed in Tebbeneh, but this did not mean the Syrian refugees felt empowered enough to move 
freely during certain hours. Like in the example of Wael in Section 8.2, Syrians are forced to use 
negative coping mechanisms to cope in Tebbeneh. In this poor infamously neighbourhood, 
poured a lot of international aid during the first two years of the crisis, and it was highly felt by 
the hosts. I spent some time with an elected member of the Tripoli municipality in 2017, he 
shared the chronology of the arrival of refugees as he saw it. 
In 2011, when the Syrian crisis started, the majority of the Lebanese in Tripoli 
supported the "revolt", because they were against the Syrian regime - thinking it was 
to be for a short time. Alawis came to Jabal Mohsen, the others to other parts of 
Tebbeneh. 
The Syrians overstepped in many places - they acted as if they ruled the country, 
just like the Palestinians acted when Abu Ammar262 was here [1980s]. The 
government did not act at all at this point, neither the central government nor the 
municipalities - they stood completely on the side.The tensions grew, the Lebanese 
started to get angry, feelings of frustration and inequality especially in terms of 
international funding going to the Syrians.  
It was not until 2015 that the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) forced international 
organizations to shift funding from support to refugees to support to the vulnerable 
communities, including the Lebanese. At that time for example, the UN was fixing 
apartments occupied by Syrians so the Lebanese would find themselves living in 
less maintained housing than the Syrians who now had better kitchens and 
bathrooms etc. Don't forget we're in a city where there is 60 percent unemployment 
rate amongst youth and 43 percent under poverty line, a very difficult social and 
economic reality. It has continued till today: there's a very tense feeling in the city. I 
think this issue [international aid] created this hatred, not hatred I think - jealousy 
you could say, from the Lebanese towards the Syrians. Today the main Lebanese 
argument is for the Syrians to go back to the safe areas in Syria, "why are they still 
here?" is a common question these days. Even when President Aoun spoke on the 
Syrian file263 [encouraging them to leave by any means], the Sunnis supported him 
to the surprise of many, they didn't empathize with Sunnis of Syria. Even the Sunnis 
today are against the presence of the Syrians in Lebanon, especially since it's not a 
                                                 
261 The majority of Tebbeneh, and Tripoli, residents are Sunni Muslims, as such are in general opposers to the Syrian 
regime, and initially supported the refugees as a symbol of support to the uprisings.  
262 A nickname for the Palestinian leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat. 
263 President Aoun, in line with the Free Patriotic Movement’s discourse, spoke openly in Lebanon and internationally about 
the need to send Syrians back to safe zones in Syria. See Chapter 1 for details 
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governmentally organized presence. It seems to me there is a political consensus to 
keep things under wrap. Every time tensions rise to the brink of explosion something 
is done to alleviate the potential violence, a speech, a big fund, something to 
appease the people. But in general there is no support for the presence of Syrians in 
Tripoli; it has been the same since 3 or 4 years. (Chadi, elected member of the 
Tripoli Municipality, personal interview, 2017).  
This interview shows some of the main paradoxes of the Lebanese reaction to the arrival 
of Syrians. At first, Syrians were favourably received because they embodied the resistance to the 
neighbouring regime, the Syrian border being only 10 km north of the city. But soon after, with 
the prolongation of the Syrian refugee settlement and its effects, the reactions of the host 
dwellers in the cities changed. In addition to these geopolitical questions, the competition for 
international aid, exacerbated the reactions of the vulnerable Lebanese dwellers. 
My fieldwork in Tebbeneh strongly confirms these views. In fact, more than any of the 
three case study sites, the hosts in Tebbeneh wanted the Syrians to leave, and disliked sharing 
public space with them. Wael, the young refugee I introduced in Section 8.2 took me to meet the 
football coach at a coffee shop. The coach was with four other Lebanese players, and Wael 
introduced me and how we met (Figure  0-3). The coach, Abu Bilal, proceeded to tell me about 
how he has welcomed the two Syrian boys into the team. “I always tell the boys, sports are 
sports, it’s not about politics”, he said. I noted this statement and asked him what he meant, what 
politics had to do with it, but he only laughed and changed the subject. I then invited the 
Lebanese players to talk some more after my walk with Wael, and asked them to share more 
about their experience. They explained to me that the Syrians were alright on the field, they 
played well, but that they didn’t have much else in common. None of the boys imagined 
developing a social relationship with Wael. 
The above conversations with the football team touch on three subjects. Abu Bilal, while 
including the Syrians and indeed providing them the opportunity to play on the team, very clearly 
saw their presence in a political light. On the field they represented the refugee crisis and it was a 
political statement to integrate them. Because he “always tells the boys”, it is also clearly an 
engrained issue within the team. They have collectively made the choice to include Wael and his 
Syrian teammate. The line though, ends abruptly there, it is in the second point that the 
conversation touches on the limits of the space afforded to the refugees. On the field they are 
part of the team, but off the field they return to their place as subaltern individualities in the city. 
The third thing the conversation shows is how the negotiation for space has blocked a social 
process. By clearly defining the limits of where the boys are together and where they are not, all 
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the actors in this situation have contributed to the negotiation - and framed a situation difficult to 
overcome.  
 
 
 
Figure  0-3: Football coach Abu Bilal and three of the players including Wael, 2017 
 
Restricted real and symbolic living space  
I met one Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh in 2017. After several days of informal chats and 
exchanges over the phone, this man of just under 50 years invited me to his home to meet his 
family. Their story, not especially unique, reflects the limited dimensions of the space they can 
access in Lebanon. It is a space restricted in size, due to various factors not the least of which is 
affordability, and it is also restricted symbolically, as they are closely bound to the whim of other 
dwellers. The family was compelled to move three times in three years, everytime to a smaller, 
less private residence. They were also confined to work under difficult employment conditions, 
and in harsh surroundings that did not allow them the smallest of luxuries.  
Abu Mahmoud had three young children and was living in a two-bedroom substandard 
apartment which his family shared with his wife’s cousin, her husband and two children. He 
didn’t want me to take pictures, “You’ll take pictures of my real house one day, back home 
inshalla”, he said, “we will not stay here forever”. His wife made coffee and brought out juice and 
sweets, insisting I have one of each. It was mainly his wife who spoke, Em Mahmoud. She told 
me of their arrival and settlement, how they moved into three apartments since they had arrived. 
They first stayed in Tripoli, in Abu Samra, but moved after only a couple of months - it was too 
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expensive as they paid $350 for the place, which was as big as the one they were currently 
residing in, and for which they pay $300 for, and share. They then moved to a building in the city, 
where Abu Mohammad was hired as a concierge. They occupied the ground floor rooms meant 
for the concierge, and they stayed there for another eight or ten months. “Walla ya habibti (I swear 
by God, my dear) they promised him to fix our papers, and his salary was to be $150. I thought 
insatarna (we had found safety). One of the building’s residents said he would take care of it and 
we moved in”. Then the services required of them as a family began to increase. At first, Abu 
Muhammad was expected to wash no less than five cars every day, and Em Mohammad was 
expected to clean the common staircase and entrance (with no extra salary). The children were 
not allowed to be seen in the entrance, they would have to be out in the street or in their closed 
room. Then, Em Muhammad started to be called into homes to support with the cleaning. Still, 
her work was not remunerated, but for some “tips and gifts” from some of the women. Abu 
Muhammad was asked to run errands continuously, park the cars, and clean the larger windows 
in the building. All the while, the residency of the family was still not taken care of. Every week, 
the resident who had promised would come up with an excuse, and would be annoyed with Abu 
Muhammad for asking. Eventually, Abu Muhammad understood that the kafala would not be 
taken care of, and he and Em Muhammad were getting physically tired of the workload. One 
week before they left, Abu Muhammad complained to his main employer about the situation, and 
was told to either stay on, or leave, but not to bring it up again. That’s when they finally moved 
to Tebbeneh, into the apartment they shared with their extended family.          
She also spoke of the humiliation at the United Nations offices, how she would stand for 
hours waiting for a turn and often not be admitted. Her accounts were more or less 
representative of the accounts I had been hearing from refugees in the last few years. An hour or 
so into the conversation, Abu Mahmoud paused suddenly and profoundly, looking into a void. 
As though taking the time to talk as we if had given him insight and courage. It seemed like a 
long pause, then he said 
I can't wait to get out of Lebanon. On the day I get my visa I'm going to spit on every 
Lebanese resident in this street. They think they are better than us, why? my 
children are just as good as theirs. The other day my wife couldn't stop crying: our 
neighbour cursed at our daughter because she was carrying a new school bag [that 
was given to her by the UN]. She asked my child where she got the money for a new 
school bag. Are we not allowed to live with dignity? Are our children not allowed the 
smallest of joys in this country? We are refugees but we are people! 
In the alleys of Bourj el-Barajneh 
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In Bourj el-Barajneh, and in relation to the other two sites of this study, the negotiation 
for space was largely heightened and somewhat diluted at the same time. On one hand the 
extreme density of the camp and the scarcity of open and public spaces make for a spatially 
challenging setting that is already heavy with infrastructure challenges, that has been stretched to 
dangerous limits since 2011. Moreover, the social position of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
is precarious to a large extent, and the group is already excluded from a significant part of the 
Lebanon’s social and economic sectors, and faces exclusion and hostility. To add to that, third 
and fourth generation refugees in the camp have a profound crisis of belonging, they are 
prohibited from seeking roots in Lebanon, and they have come too far from Palestine to have 
even symbolic roots in the country, like the first and second generations perhaps had. These 
three factors heightened the effects of the arrival of the influx of refugees, that only decreased 
what already was restricted social and physical space available for the dwellers of the camp.   
On the other hand, the nature of the Palestinian refugees residency in Lebanon places 
them in the best position to empathise with the new Syrian arrivals. No one understands, more 
than the Palestinian refugees, the difficulties of being undesired dwellers in Lebanon’s cities. It is 
not easy to compete with the challenges they had and have to access the city, and even though 
throughout the years they have developed various mechanisms to cope, and have succeeded to 
create linkages with their Lebanese surroundings, they still represent the figure of the unwanted 
dweller par excellence. In this sense, the weight of the influx was more accepted, tolerated in the 
camp than other sites.  
But, paradoxically, in the camp I saw many of the same trends vis-à-vis the Syrian refugee 
crisis that I saw in the other two sites. It was in the camp that my attention was first turned to the 
different way that laundry was hung by Syrians, for example. I also heard the same complaints 
about vulgarity, how the (new) refugees did not have the same manners. The two most 
pronounced issues that I heard about in the camp, though, like in the other two sites, concerned 
first economic competition, and second, a competition over their refugee identity (access to aid, 
and identity). It is the latter that I will discuss here, below this excerpt from my field notebook 
relating an interview with a palestinian family.  
 
It didn’t take long after I met Setti xxx in her living room with her niece and grandson 
for her to start telling me about the problem. Ya setti battalo el omam shayfinna (the 
UN don’t see us anymore). She proceeded to bring and hold up a bag of medicine, 
and started to take one box after the other: “this one costs $30 per forty tablets and I 
take a tablet a day, this one costs $35 and I need two boxes per month…”. For a 
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moment I felt very uncomfortable and feared I had misrepresented myself. I 
addressed this quickly with her and everyone in the room - that I was not surveying 
the situation nor was I in a position to offer support. The niece relieved me by saying 
it was clear, but that the grandmother was explaining what had changed since the 
arrival of the Syrians to the camp. With the arrival of the Syrians, she said, the 
priorities of aid shifted. There was confusion early on, between what the UNRWA 
offered and to whom, and what the UNHCR offered, and to whom - especially in the 
case of the Palestinian refugees who came from Syria since 2011. This was clarified 
with time, but the feeling among the Palestinian refugees was that their access to 
UN resources had been significantly affected by the presence of the Syrians.  
As the conversation progressed, it came back to some of my principal line of inquiries  
including differences in habits, culture and economic competition. It also came to another issue 
that I had observed  in the other two sites. Setti was renting out the two apartments above her, 
which her family had built in the 50s, to Syrians. She has preferred them to Palestinian refugees, 
because they paid more, and on time, and therefore the dominant-dominated dialectic was also 
present in the camp. For the Palestinians, aid is a valid income resource to which they feel 
entitled. This differed from the case surveyed in the other two sites, where aid was also a 
problematic point, but it was viewed as supplementary income.         
Five of the nine the Palestinian refugees I interviewed said the following in one form or 
another: “at least the Syrians have a passport”, “at least they have a country they may hope to 
return to”. It is perhaps the greatest paradox of all: refugees hosting refugees, on borrowed land 
that neither hosts, nor rejects them. The Palestinians stuck in spaces of exception, the Syrians 
seeking a place within that exception.   The Bourj el-Barajneh camp is the only site were 
negotiation started with an equality of inequality. While the refugee hosts do have an upper hand 
on the management of their apartments and their alleys to a certain extent - they, too, like the 
Syrians, remain highly blocked in a negotiation on all levels. On the local level with Lebanese 
dwellers, with the Syrian refugees and with the Lebanese authorities; but most of all, they remain 
the heirs of a legacy of negotiating space that has been blocked far beyond their reach, at the 
international level, for their physical space since 1948 and for their identity ever since. 
 
Conclusion to Part 3:  
In light of the tangible and intangible elements shared by Syrian refugees which I have 
here tried to discuss from both a distant approach and through the depiction of some case 
studies, it seems that injustice in Lebanon’s city is random. No reference points seems to exist 
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with respect to which dwellers could pragmatically and consciously position themselves. In regard 
to both its norms and its representations, injustice in Lebanon’s city appears to be capricious, 
touching all of its dwellers, even though in different ways and intensities. Mostly, injustice in 
Lebanon’s city has created processes by which it pits its dwellers against each other, and by so 
doing produced patterns of injustice that repeat and trickle through its layers from the local to the 
national to the regional. What can be analysed is the varying degrees in which injustice touches 
the different groups of dwellers, and how they reproduce this injustice amongst each other. 
In this part I used selected interviews and observations that highlight some ways in which 
random situations of conflict have ingrained spatial injustice in the city - using the situation of the 
Syrian refugees in my three case study sites as the focal point. Through their struggles to find a 
space in the three neighbourhoods, the effects of random injustice is clear. In the above 
examples, the Syrian refugees expressed in one way or another the fear of unforeseen events that 
could have serious consequences on their safety and residency. This randomness has generated 
for the Syrian refugees a prominent sense of fear that has pushed them to invisibility. 
The constant negotiations for space are a reality of each group of dwellers. At the 
beginning of the crisis, Syrian refugees’ concerns centered on finding shelter and insuring their 
livelihood. As can perhaps be expected of any migrant moving to a new country, they attempted 
to access the city in as fast and effectively as they could - by taking advantage of every 
opportunity they could. If they could receive aid, they would stand in line for hours to get it. If 
they could insure a job, for whatever salary, they did. If they needed to share an apartment to get 
by, they did. Due to their significant number, this approach was viewed as aggressive by the host 
communities, who struggled to keep up. The Syrian refugees were forcing other vulnerable 
communities to renegotiate their own spaces, mainly to the decline. In what was already a dire 
economic situation in the three case studies, the arrival of Syrian refugees heightened the weight. 
Host communities resisted the restrictions on their own spaces. They abhorred the fact that 
Syrians accepted less for their own jobs, and paid more for their apartments. 
The 2015 regulations imposed by the government tipped the balance back towards the 
hosts. In it was an opportunity to gain back their space, by restricting that of the Syrians, and 
benefiting from the latter’s presence when and where they could. Here lie the most pronounced 
instances of injustice that have been mentioned in the above chapters. While in Chapter 6, I 
described the daily struggles of the refugees in accessing shelter - substandard in most cases, 
Chapter 7 attempts a description of how these struggles were viewed by the hosts, in the 
generalisations than has become the basis of the general discourse. 
NEGOTIATING SPACE  333 
 
Chapter 8 presented a detailed analysis of the different negotiations on space and their 
expressions from the largest to the finest scale explaining how each level of negotiations tend to 
overlap and influence the other. At the urban scale, from the city in itself to the neighbourhood, 
the dweller-dweller negotiations are continuous, and to a certain extent silent and discrete. Syrians 
are in pursuit of interstices to slide into and get access to  a minimal degree of stability, while 
hosts are, on the contrary, in the pursuit of preserving their own individual and collective spaces, 
an objective for which they need to restrict and decrease those interstices as much as possible. 
Figure 0.1 that opened this dissertation depicts a moment in a successive flow of servees 
cars and vans dropping off workers on the sidewalk across from the Bourj el-Barajneh camp’s 
main entrance on the Old Airport road. My interviewee who pointed out the daily event to me 
was a Palestinian refugee from Bourj el-Barajneh and we were walking past the bridge around five 
in the afternoon. He stopped me and said: “Look Dima, look. You will understand what I’ve 
been telling you. Everyday… by the hundreds, just look and count, let’s wait for five minutes, 
you will see”. Ramzi had been having trouble finding work since the arrival of the refugees. He 
had been struggling with rent, and was seriously thinking of leaving the country, “mish ‘aref kif (I 
don’t know how)” he said. “If I were Lebanese, I mean, the Lebanese government should do 
something”. 
The Bourj el-Barajneh case study also shows that issues analysed in part 3 are not strictly 
delimited by a confrontation between a host society and an abroad refugee influx.  A superficial 
look at these events could lead one to read them as a crisis mitigated by the extraordinary 
plasticity of Lebanese society, forged in a structurally chaotic history since the independence of 
1943. The inclusion of Bourj el Barajneh in the case study shows a more complex situation 
where, paradoxically, inequalities that exclude are also the driving force for the inclusion of Syrian 
refugees. 
Recomposing urban settlements, spatial practices, social relations, the driving force of 
such injustice paradoxically reinforces the overall cohesion of Lebanese society, including its 
deepest and, certainly, most traumatic fractures. In a historically fragmented society and cities, 
yesterday’s refugees align themselves with the same representation as the dominant groups when 
it comes to looking at “the other” Syrian. In practical terms, this unity of view is fuelled by the 
benefits that both sides hope to derive from the dominated situation in which they find 
themselves.  
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On the research approach  
I have organised this dissertation over three parts and eight chapters. In the first part, I 
presented a picture of Lebanon’s cities in the wake of the arrival of the Syrian refugees, tracing 
the history of the creation of the two nation-states since the early 1900s. After an elabouration on 
the sociopolitical climate, and insistence on the fact that the Syrian migration is not a recent 
phenomenon, but it is in fact as old as the country’s independence. This old migration is not 
without its tensions, and those are highlighted in order to present a background on the  
Lebanese-Syrian individual relations over the decades. The second chapter, which concludes the 
first part, describes the delicately formed political structure and discusses how the dwellers fit 
into the governance of the cities, with a focus on the relationship between Lebanese and low-
skilled migrants. The second part poses the analytical framework of the study and delivers a 
detailed account of the methodology used to gather the data for this dissertation, it also clearly 
lays out the researchers position with respect to the object. Importantly, this part presents the 
three neighbourhoods selected for fieldwork and justifies the choice. The third and last part 
centers on empirical observations and discussions. After a chapter describing the spatial itinerary 
of the refugees upon crossing the borders into Lebanon, two chapters expose selected field 
examples from different points of view - that of the Syrian refugees first, then that of the hosts, 
in the form of generalisations placed upon refugees. The dissertation ends on a discussion 
chapter, framing the situations within the notion of negotiating space, as proposed in the very 
title of the dissertation.  
In the general introduction to this dissertation, I proposed an investigation as to how a 
perceived impossibility of a country taking in a quarter of its population in a short period of time 
came to be in Lebanon. Throughout, I have tried to show that the injustices pre-dating the 
massive influx of the Syrian refugees are, in reality, the key to the answer. Lebanon’s cities are 
difficult to access for all their dwellers, regardless of their nationality, origins, or their collective or 
individual histories. 
Timing of the research, timing of the event  
In fact, after a paroxysmal period that accompanied the first years of the refugee crisis, 
when the unity of Lebanon and civil peace seemed to be in question, the situation appears to be 
stabilizing. In parallel, the influx of new refugees has severely decreased, and the departure of 
refugees that had come to Lebanon between 2011 and 2015 is slow, but ongoing.  Those who 
still dwell in Lebanon are being forced into invisibility and the silent acceptance of the unjust fate 
they are being subjected to in Lebanon’s cities. Just outside the borders, the Syrian war seems to 
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be on the verge of closure, even though the situation is still extremely uncertain as the writing of 
this thesis comes to its completion in May 2019. 
 This thesis has been in development roughly in parallel with the timeline of the Syrian 
conflict, with my field research starting around the time when social and political tensions were 
soaring and the number of refugees reached its highest point. The temporal coincidence between 
the time of the thesis and the time of what is designated in Lebanon as the “refugee crisis” has 
enabled this “total social fact” (Mauss, 1989) to be documented as closely as possible to the 
expressions of the processes, by collecting empirical material based on testimonies and 
documented discourse. At the same time, this coincidence also developed into a constraint. 
Forcing scientific elabouration to be mixed with current events, it delayed the problematic 
elabouration of the first part and, above all, complicated the interpretation and objectivation of 
the field data. 
As this thesis is being finalised, the situation seems to be slightly stabilizing, while the 
Syrians in Lebanon remain in a subordinate position in Lebanon’s cities. The relative decrease in 
tensions, however, is not accompanied by a significant decrease in the number of refugees. Even 
if it is to be assumed that the Syrian refugees will go back to Syria eventually, it is not likely that 
they do so in the same temporal trend in which they came. More likely, a certain proportion will 
stay on in the long term - as their return to Syria is not a simple equation related only to the 
cessation of armed violence. How will the future of this urban co-living look like? Of course, this 
question remains far beyond the framework assigned to this thesis. 
 
Three Lenses to understand the “fait social total” represented by the Syrian influx in Lebanon 
With this work, I have attempted to contribute to the socio-urban understanding of cities 
in Lebanon, combining approaches from the field of urban and migration studies, and 
furthermore bringing geopolitics into the urban sphere as a factor that cannot be dissociated 
from the former two. I have applied three lenses to propose a framework of analysis which could 
help in the understanding of how conflict has materialized in these cities.  
I conducted field research using a socio-urban lens, looking at specific situations related 
to sharing spaces in the city. My observations and interviews were undertaken in a largely 
qualitative, ethnographic spirit, and I drew on them  to emphasize the similarities and differences, 
that is, not through systematic comparison - site to site, or process to process - but rather with 
the ambition to put in perspective, in different contexts, how a similar question could provide a 
system of understanding the conflicts and more largely, the relationships tied up in the everyday 
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lived spaces Syrians refugees and Lebanese are conducted to share.  
I investigated at this scale of the processes trying to articulate observed situations within 
the national level, looking at the policies and strategies that have - directly or not - influenced the 
relation between these dwellers. At their level, governmental and non-governmental actors and 
institutions involved have to be also observed with a second lens, from a geopolitical perspective, 
to try and find the specific dynamic that was in play in the field. Their role is of heightened 
significance, as they were the first official hosts to the Syrian refugees in Lebanon, thus 
representing the latter first, and sometimes only access to livelihood and other resources. In 
addition, their initial strategy to solely support Syrian refugees and the subsequent shift towards 
supporting all vulnerable communities also had an effect on the views that dwellers held of each 
other.  
Lastly, I used a regional lens, geopolitical but historical as well - as the common history of 
the two countries has profound effects, perhaps the most pertinent ones, on the mundane details 
of the unremarkable co-living situation between all groups of dwellers. As such, I was able to link 
the observations in the street with the direct influences of the neighbourhood and the nation, and 
the direct and indirect influences of the region. 
Confronting three study sites: crossing perspectives  
Furthermore, the multiplicity of geopolitical configurations that are identifiable in each of 
the three case studies renders it difficult to describe the situation from a broad  point of view. 
Such bias also justifies the thesis being an urban geography thesis. Challenges in addressing issues 
relating to urban refugees are far from specific to Lebanon. In fact, this phenomenon is of rising 
importance in the world, now that most of us live in urban settings, and that refugees are more 
than ever before opting to settle in urban spaces rather than classical camps, due to the 
opportunities that cities provide them. 
What makes the case in Lebanon peculiar are two factors: first the brutal nature with 
which the influx occurred, including its size and shortness of time span, especially compared with 
the total population in Lebanon before 2011 and also compared with the small size of the 
country and its high urban density, which could not allow Syrians to settle in places where they 
would not have been visible to the Lebanese. Second, and adding  to these concrete conditions, is  
the particular relationship that different Lebanese religious groups maintain with their spaces 
making it  also an important determinant in the reactions to the arrival of the Syrian refugees. 
The place that Syrians can hope to occupy in the Lebanese society is necessarily 
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restricted. It can only be so in a fragmented country in which regional micro-spaces are 
controlled, normalised, and marked by clan-like communities that hold significant political weight 
and in some instances have access to arms. 
Cities in Lebanon, despite their diversity, have a common potential to reveal social 
phenomena of the same nature. In them, the current tensions between refugees and their hosts 
are but extensions - new expressions - of old ones that had drawn from longstanding 
disagreements on identity, nationality, and allegiance. In this fabric, Syrian refugees have become 
political subjects at the national and local scales. Their presence and the way they are dealt with in 
the different case studies are not dissociable from what they demographically represent as 
diplomatic and religious objects. 
 
How to negotiate a place ? The dialectics of inequalities and injustices  
The situation of pronounced inequalities in the Lebanese society, as well as the quasi-
absence of public regulation on all levels paradoxically allowed the refugees to take a place in the 
interstices with a certain degree of effectiveness, in spite of their significant numbers. In terms of 
shelter, they rented garages and stayed under bridges. In terms of work, they took menial jobs 
even when they were overqualified, and accepted exploitation and non-regulated conditions. In 
terms of legal residency, they sought guarantors and paid high fees, or used negative coping 
mechanisms to avoid exposure.  
Rendered highly vulnerable due to the informality and lack of regulation, it is 
paradoxically in this way that Syrians were able to negotiate a place in the Lebanese society and 
urban space with regard to the three most important elements: securing residency, finding shelter, 
and securing livelihood. In the three case studies, the negotiations are conducted under very 
unfavorable conditions, in which the Syrians are in the dominated and subordinate position that 
is further aggravated after their settlement. And for this settlement, Syrians are expected to pay 
higher rent than the average while simultaneously accepting lower wages than the average.  In 
terms of the other aspects of everyday life, the situation is even worse. Their presence in public 
spaces invites hostility from the “established” city dwellers, and this translates in verbal or 
physical assault and other forms of violence. There is little hope for police protection, who as 
seen in many of the examples, remain passive, or systematically accuse the refugees. Furthemore, 
co-living spaces are very limited: a community activity or a football team. But in these situations 
of co-living, Lebanese dwellers, and Palestinian dwellers to a certain extent, regardless of their 
social or religious group of origin, keep a distance that limits the encounter to its most formal 
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aspects. In spite of the accumulation of these injustices, negotiation is still in place - within which 
the hosting dwellers have, despite their hostility and resistance, granted a place to the hundreds of 
thousands of Syrians installed since 2011. 
 Negotiation is a notion which started to take shape with the advancement of my field 
investigations. I started to notice that most of the situations I was observing were related to the 
Syrian refugee's acceptable space, both physical and social and that most conflicts arose when the 
latter gained or attempted to gain more space. When the Syrian refugee was in the already 
accepted role of concierge or construction worker, there were no major issues. But when the 
Syrian refugee became a waiter or a salesperson, it was only acceptable where exploitable. Thus, 
the Syrian refugee could negotiate a waiter’s job as long as the wages were less than those of a 
Lebanese waiter. It is more or less the same story in other areas, whether it be access to aid, or 
housing, or public space. For the latter, the negotiation was not between dwellers, but between 
the dweller and the authorities: public space would only be accessible at certain times for the 
Syrian refugees, either in an informal and integrated way by the Syrians, or more formally through 
official municipality authorised curfew announcements. Most significantly, for the Syrian to 
reside legally in Lebanon, which was the only possibility that they had considering they were 
already in the country, they would have to accept a legally inferior status and the guardianship of 
a Lebanese.    
Through their agency, their network and the gaps they have filled, Syrian refugees have 
transformed cities in Lebanon - in spite of their difficult journey to access the city, and however 
challenging their daily lives continue to be. I submit this dissertation as a small contribution to 
efforts being undertaken towards a better understanding of the challenges that cities face in their 
endeavours to take in urban refugees.   
Resilience or socio-spatial injustice?  
In an urban setting where public regulation is virtually non-existent and key 
denominational links as well as the market economy are explicitly oriented towards the ultra-
liberal, groups with strong cultural, political, or financial endowments who are expectedly well 
positioned to compete for access to comfortable urban life, fuelling growing inequalities with 
inferior groups. It remains, however, that the construction of an urban wellbeing in Lebanon 
requires the deployment of strategies and the mobilization of financial resources that are out of 
proportion with respect to what we know, for example, in Western Europe. The urban 
settlement of Syrian refugees since 2011 is part of this particular relationship that Lebanese 
society maintains with its spaces: although specific, the latter needs to be linked to broader and 
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more structural trends in order to be understood in all its complexity.  
In these pages, I have sought to show how, since 2011, Syrians, often familiar with 
Lebanese society and its cities through temporary labour migration or family ties, have 
symbolically turned into refugees rather than arrived as refugees, and how they have been coping 
to address the challenges that cities have presented them with. I have suggested that socio-spatial 
gaps - interstices - exist in the cities in Lebanon, by and because of the existing complexities of 
socio-politically and culturally fragmented cities. The multiple and unstable urban systems in the 
latter are what has allowed Syrians to find a place in the interstices of urban life. The reactions of 
the hosts to the Syrian refugees has not tipped the balance towards a state of equilibrium, on the 
contrary it has added to the increase of these imbalances. As such, the Syrian influx has 
aggravated the disequilibrium equally for both groups of dwellers.  
More than the notion of resilience, which would imply the ability of the Lebanese society 
and its spaces to regain an initial state at the end of a geopolitical and migratory crisis, it is the 
core notion of socio-political inequality that seems to be more suitable to utilise as a means of 
accounting for the urban situations empirically analysed over the course of the field research 
carried out during this thesis. From a social geography perspective, this thesis poses, as a result, 
that it is the dynamics of inequality that fuel the process of settlement of Syrians in the city, 
forcing them to negotiate their place in a power relation that is largely unfavourable to them, 
especially since the introduction of kafala in 2015. 
Perspectives 
Due to time and to the inherent limitations of elabourating a framework that would fit 
within the objectives of this thesis, this work did not touch on every aspect of the social fabric 
that plays into affecting public opinion, nor did it study and analyse in all its subtlety and 
complexity every aspect of the phenomenon. In what follows I will present three, out of several 
other, aspects that may be considered for further research. 
While there have been various excerpts from local newspapers and other journalistic 
resources mobilised in this work, the role of the media has not been included and analysed as a 
separate actor. This is an area that deserves and necessitates further study. Like other 
infrastructure in Lebanon, media outlets are in the vast majority private organisations, and most 
belong to the prominent families who are already represented in the political structure. Such 
examples include MTV (of the Murr family), NBN (Nabih Berri Network), OTV (the station of 
the Free Patriotic Movement), LBC (initially set up as the station for the Lebanese Forces) etc. 
There is only one national television station, Télé Liban, that has very limited budget and reach. 
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The effect of the media on the evolution of the refugee crisis and its consequences on the socio-
urban fabric in Lebanon is significant. What follows in an example of a television report on the 
situation in El-Nab’a since 2011.A news report on MTV264 Lebanon in 2011 titled “East Beirut is 
in Danger” stated: “As a first impression when passing through the street between Daoura and 
Bourj Hammoud, you imagine that you are not in Lebanon but in Sudan or a country that brings 
together the Kurds, or some country in Asia. The residents of this area for over 70 years feel that 
they are strangers and they, unfortunately, live in a state of constant fear of being robbed or 
sexually assaulted and all sorts of perversion you can think of, that non-Lebanese youth are 
carrying out [...] in the area which they visit to pick up Asian girls or to spend time in coffee 
shops ...”    
The report which is loaded with racial speech in its basic messages, not just towards one 
ethnic group, but towards any “other” in El-Nab’a, is ultimately biased news reporting. It is 
politicised media that contributes to the fueling of the mass rhetoric that has become 
synonymous with the word refugee or outsider. The role played by the media in Lebanon, be it in 
favor of or against the refugee is notable and the role it has in influencing social relations is worth 
further investigation.   
In Chapter 4, I included a section on informal settlements, from a mostly quantitative 
point of view. While it is true that the majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are urban refugees, 
the population in the camps represents a quarter of a million people. Those live in tented 
settlements on privately rented land, and have experienced very specific social trends. For 
example, it would be worthy to investigate the ways in which the Syrian refugees have chosen 
specific settlements to join, including looking into the role of a “Shawish”: usually a Syrian who 
has pre-crisis connections with the Lebanese land owners. These shaweesh become the de facto 
rulers of the camps and hold significant social and political power in how the camps are run. 
Moreover, a trend used by authorities vis-à-vis the most informal tented settlements includes 
random evictions. A group of tents would be asked to move, sometimes a mere kilometer away, 
with no reason given. This strategy has apparently been used to block any signs of prolonged 
settlement, and to prohibit tent residents from trying to place any sort of fixed shelter. Mostly 
located in the Bekaa and Akkar, these settlements present a plethora of humanitarian difficulties, 
in addition to the social difficulties related to the refugee status.  
As mentioned in this dissertation, most refugees who have the means and the 
                                                 
264 MTV or Murr Television has operated since 1991 and is owned by the Murr family. The CEO of the station is Gabriel el 
Murr, a vocal protagonist against the Syrian regime. The Murr family including his brother and their children collectively run 
over 15 media outlets ranging from music radio stations to political newspapers and MTV. 
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opportunity  will seek to apply for long term resettlement in the west. Throughout my field 
research, I have come across several intriguing situations where families have either been partially 
selected, or rejected for asylum, for vague reasons. In the case mentioned in Chapter 8, section 
8.2, only Jad’s female family members were granted long term visas to the USA, when the family 
had applied as a unit. In another case, Widad, the refugee from Tebbeneh was the last member in 
her immediate family to be in Lebanon. Her two brothers and their own families had been 
resettled to France and Sweden. When I met her brother, Mahmoud, in France, I gathered that 
they were selected due to a medical condition that his son had. The boy, Noureddine, was being 
treated by the French government. I also gathered, while in the field, that “Embassy scouts”, 
would roam the streets arbitrarily in search for potential recruits for resettlement, and that NGOs 
also sometimes took on the role of these recruiters. I was unfortunately mistaken for one of these 
scouts on more than one occasion - and understood after having spoken to refugees that they 
had actually accepted to speak to  me thinking I might be recruiting for some Embassy. It is 
therefore worthy to look into these trends of selection for resettlement, to understand the 
intricacies that come into play between dweller-Embassy-NGO.  
I wish to end this dissertation by going back to the position of the researcher in a third 
space. I wrote earlier that “when we conduct research in fields of pronounced inequality, the very 
act of reflecting and writing about it is subjective because we have seen the field with our 
personal, ideological filter. Our interest in understanding certain social events does not stem from 
a place of neutrality, and if it does our human nature and curiosity do not leave us untouched”. In 
2012, when I braved into the GSO offices in Beirut to register my marriage certificate to my 
Palestinian husband, the officer said to me: “so you didn’t find a Lebanese man to marry? why 
have you complicated your life so much?”. While I had always been half-Palestinian, this was the 
first time I came face to face with the difficult reality of what being a non-Lebanese arab in 
Lebanon meant. With that statement, it quickly became very clear to me that my space in 
Lebanon with my chosen family had decreased. And I am one of the privileged ones. In in many 
ways, some of which are yet to be understood, the work undertaken throughout these years, as a 
whole, and leading up to this manuscript, has not left me untouched. 
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Titre: Négocier l’espace: les villes du Liban devant l’afflux des réfugiés syriens (2011-2018). 
Études de cas à Tripoli (quartier de Tebbeneh) et à Beyrouth (quartier de El-Nab’a et  camp de 
Bourj El-Barajneh). 
 
L’augmentation d’un quart de sa population sur trois ans représente un défi majeur 
pour toute société. Cette thèse étudie comment un tel fait, à priori improbable, est devenu 
une réalité dans les villes du Liban. Dans les espaces urbains où les réfugiés se sont 
concentrés en quelques années, comment les citadins, quelque soit leur nationalité,  les 
agences étatiques et l’ensemble de la société civile ont-ils relevé un tel défi ? Avec 173 réfugiés 
pour 1 000 habitants, le Liban abrite en 2018 la plus forte densité de réfugiés au monde, suivi 
par la Jordanie avec un taux de 89 pour 1 000. Pour prendre la mesure d’un tel phénomène, il 
faut imaginer près de dix-sept millions de réfugiés arrivant en France dans un intervalle de  
quelques années. 
 
L'objectif de cette thèse est d’exposer les manifestations de ce processus afin d’en 
comprendre les tenants à la fois spatiaux, socio-économiques et politiques, qui diffèrent selon 
les lieux et les configurations d’acteurs concernés à différents titres. Aux échelles les plus 
fines, réfugiés et  “citadins-hôtes” se font face, confrontés à l'obligation de partager et de 
négocier un espace urbain identique. Dès 2011, les réfugiés syriens arrivant au Liban se sont 
principalement installés dans les villes, à l'instar d'autres migrants. Jusqu’en 2015, ils ont eu la 
possibilité d’occuper des logements de fortune ce qui, en dépit de conditions matérielles très 
difficiles, leur a permis de gagner une place dans l’espaces et dans la société urbaine libanaise. 
Contraints de partager des infrastructures et des services le plus souvent déficients, voire 
dégradés, un tel afflux a cependant accru l’hostilité des populations libanaises, multiplié les 
conflits et exacerbé les tensions. 
À une échelle supérieure, apparaissent les enjeux concernant la politique intérieure où 
différents acteurs institutionnels et individuels, forts de responsabilités politiques et de 
compétences institutionnelles, sont chargés de gérer la situation. Or, la structure politique du 
Liban depuis son accession à l’indépendance a eu pour résultat de diviser le pouvoir entre 
dix-huit groupes religieux. Un système électoral complexe a consacré la domination de ces 
groupes dans leurs régions d’ancrage respectives. Organisés de façon clanique, ces différents 
groupes se sont partagé les mandats électifs locaux et nationaux ainsi que la gestion des 
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services publics, ce qui leur a permis d’asseoir leur influence sur les espaces et les populations 
correspondant au périmètre de leur pouvoir.  
 
Une troisième échelle concerne quant à elle les enjeux politiques à l’échelle du Moyen-
Orient. Dès le début de son existence, la République libanaise a sollicité diverses puissances 
étrangères afin de garantir l’autonomie politique de ses différents groupes religieux vis-à-vis 
de communautés régionales de plus grande ampleur. Ces équilibres précaires ont été rompus 
plus d’une fois : les tensions entre chrétiens et musulmans qui traversent l’ensemble du 
Moyen-Orient sont ainsi à l'origine d'une guerre civile de quinze ans qui a déchiré la société 
libanaise entre 1975 et 1990 et qui, depuis, n’a fait qu’exacerber les tensions. De même, les 
oppositions régionales entre musulmans qui se revendiquent de divers courants de l’Islam se 
reflètent dans les villes du Liban, notamment à Tripoli, où Alawites et Sunnites se sont 
opposés par les armes, exportant au Liban le conflit syrien entre le régime Alawite et la 
majorité sunnite de la population. À partir de la fin des années 1970, l’occupation israélienne 
du sud du Liban a également eu des incidences sur la stabilité politique du pays. Deux actions 
militaires majeures de l’armée israélienne en 1982 et en 2006 ont gravement endommagé les 
infrastructures et provoqué le déplacement de centaines de milliers de personnes, contribuant 
à des changements démographiques qui créent toujours des tensions dans certaines régions. 
Dans l'introduction de la thèse, je pose l’ensemble des facteurs qui influent sur l’analyse des 
relations entre Syriens et Libanais. Dès le titre, je prend en compte l’extrême diversité des 
situations urbaines en retenant la désignation “villes du Liban”, plutôt que “villes libanaises”. 
En effet, selon les régions, les villes diffèrent par la manière dont les droits civils sont 
appliqués, du fait de l’absence de lois communes à l’ensemble du pays. L’argumentation 
s’attache en outre à interroger la pertinence des notions de“résilience urbaine” et de “justice 
spatiale”.  Cette exploration me conduit à opter pour la notion de justice spatiale, plus 
pertinente selon mon point de vue. Dans l’introduction, je questionne également la façon 
dont les Syriens sont désignés au Liban. Qualifiés  de “migrants”, de “déplacés” ou de 
“réfugiés”, ils subissent des traitements plus ou moins défavorables selon les endroits où ils 
s’installent. Pour ma part, je propose de retenir le seul terme de “réfugié”, qui semble le 
mieux à même pour désigner la population syrienne vivant aujourd’hui au Liban.  
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J’analyse ensuite les significations associées aux pratiques de négociation de l’espace. 
En référence à Bernard Rougier, trois formes de négociation entre Syriens et Libanais sont 
abordées aux trois échelles internationales, nationales et locales. Les enquêtes de terrain 
effectuées dans le cadre de cette thèse montrent que les réfugiés syriens ont trouvé une place 
dans les villes libanaises, au sein desquelles ils jouent souvent un rôle actif. Cependant, 
compte tenu de leur position très subalterne, les négociations dans lesquels ils s’engagent 
produisent des effets qui leur sont majoritairement défavorables.  
 
Cette thèse articule une approche de géographie socio-urbaine et des champs d’étude 
relevant des sciences politiques, des études migratoires et des études sur les réfugiés. L’analyse 
met l'accent sur la description des relations urbaines et sociales dans la ville à partir d’une 
recherche ethnographique. L’approche ethnographique est privilégiée en raison de la diversité 
extrême des situations urbaines au Liban. En outre, elle est la seule possible dans un pays qui 
souffre de fortes carences en matière d’informations statistiques.  
 
Comprendre les logiques d’installation des Syriens dans les villes libanaises suppose de 
traiter plus largement de la question des inégalités. La vie dans les villes libanaises est difficile 
pour l’ensemble des citadins, quelles que soient leurs nationalités, leurs origines, leurs 
histoires collectives ou individuelles. Dans des villes où l’ensemble des services est 
partiellement ou complètement privé, y compris les plus vitaux, où les transports publics sont 
inexistants, ou le travail est dérégulé, le bien-être urbain ne concerne que la fraction la plus 
aisée et la mieux dotée de la population, la majorité vivant quant à elle dans des conditions 
difficiles, voire très précaires. Au plus bas dans la hiérarchie socio-économique, récemment 
arrivés, les Syriens subissent plus que d’autres les difficultés. Cependant, leur situation s’insère 
dans un mécanisme global, produisant et reproduisant des inégalités et des injustices qui 
concernent l’ensemble des populations citadines.  
 
Trois perspectives sont utilisées pour structurer l’analyse des données de terrain. 
Premièrement, une perspective micro-urbaine, qui cherche à comprendre les relations de 
pouvoir complexes qui s’établissent, à échelle fine, entre les différents groupes sociaux et les 
différentes communautés. Cette perspective s’appuie sur une observation rapprochée des 
pratiques sociales, des contestations urbaines ou des relations de voisinage, qui mène à une 
analyse des jeux d’acteurs et des relations de pouvoirs. En second lieu, est mobilisée une 
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perspective sociale à l'échelle nationale, centrée sur l’étude des facteurs qui affectent 
directement ou indirectement les situations observées à l'échelle micro-urbaine. Ces facteurs 
incluent l’héritage des relations syro-libanaises, la terrible réalité économique et la 
structuration ethno-religieuse de la société libanaise. La troisième perspective, quant à elle, est 
d’ordre géopolitique. Elle concerne des éléments plus globaux affectant la société libanaise : 
enracinements à la fois orientaux et occidentaux, allégeances aux dirigeants de groupes 
politico-religieux, conséquences de  l’aide internationale, etc.  
 
Résumé de la première partie : 
Les villes au Liban à la veille d'un afflux rapide des réfugiés syriens 
 
Le Liban est un pays jeune. Il est né d'un désir d'indépendance vis-à-vis des multiples 
influences régionales, prenant pour prétexte la protection de groupes religieux minoritaires, 
principalement chrétiens (Maronites). Depuis plusieurs décennies, le fragile équilibre libanais 
est paralysé, tant à l’extérieur qu’à l’intérieur des frontières de la république. Issues des 
principaux groupes religieux, les élites qui se partagent l’exercice du pouvoir ont gagné en 
influence et en autorité au fil des décennies. Largement bénéficiaires d’un système sans avenir 
pour la majorité de la population, elles bloquent toutes perspectives de réforme.  
 
Un tel blocage est bien antérieur à l’arrivée des réfugiés syriens. Depuis la fin de la 
guerre civile, les citadins vivant au  Liban sont imprégnés des souvenirs de la guerre et de la 
violence, cette dernière ayant particulièrement touchée les espaces urbains. Ils ont également 
le souvenir des conditions économiques désastreuses qui ont accompagné cette guerre, ainsi 
que de la perte de crédit international dont le pays souffre depuis.  Dans les deux chapitres 
qui constituent cette partie, je fournis les éléments d’un contexte de longue durée qui affecte 
la présence actuelle des Syriens au Liban. La structure fragmentée des villes comme la 
diversité des communautés religieuses qui y cohabitent constituent le fondement de relations 
complexes avec “l’autre”, surtout lorsque la proximité n’est pas souhaitée. Si “l’autre” est un 
réfugié, comme c’est le cas des Syriens, peuvent se mettre en place des mécanismes 
incontrôlés d’identification entre Syriens et réfugiés palestiniens arrivés au Liban à partir de 
1948, ces derniers ayant contribué par leur présence à déclencher la guerre civile libanaise. 
SYNTHÈSE FRANÇAIS  351 
 
Concernant les Syriens, ce premier faisceau de représentation est complété par un second, 
également négatif : l’identification du Syrien-réfugié avec le Syrien-soldat ayant occupé le pays 
durant trois décennies. Rabattues sur le précédent palestinien, les représentations associées 
aux réfugiés sont de ce fait extrêmement négatives. Pour de nombreux groupes libanais, les 
Palestiniens ont provoqué la guerre civile et l'occupation syrienne qui a suivi. Une telle façon 
d’écrire l’histoire ne tient compte ni des tensions préexistantes au sein des différentes 
communautés libanaises, ni des profondes différences dans la manière dont les différents 
groupes religieux envisagent le pays et son avenir.  Autant réels que fantasmés, ces groupes, 
imprègnent les sociétés urbaines libanaises : saisonniers agricoles syriens, soldats syriens, 
factions palestiniennes, réfugiés palestiniens. L'arrivée des réfugiés syriens en 2011 doit donc 
être considérée en fonction de ce maelström de représentations contradictoires qui travaillent 
la société libanaise depuis de nombreuses années. De ce fait, et en dépit de son caractère 
massif et inédit, il est nécessaire d’envisager un tel afflux en continuité avec la présence 
historique des Syriens au Liban, même si cette dernière est perçue différemment au fil des 
années. Leur afflux massif et rapide pèse toutefois lourdement sur le fragile tissu politique et 
urbain libanais. Les inégalités socio-spatiales présentées dans cette thèse s’écartent donc du 
modèle explicatif classique du “droit à la ville”, qui met principalement en évidence les 
inégalités sociale, sans nécessairement prendre en compte les identités nationales, politiques 
ou culturelles.  
 
Paralysé par l’absence de stratégie à l’égard des réfugiés syriens, le gouvernement 
libanais est faible et soumis à de multiples intérêts claniques ou privés. Ni le gouvernement 
central ni les autorités locales ne proposent un environnement sécurisé ou une infrastructure 
urbaine de base aux citadins, que ces derniers soient Libanais ou non. La seule position 
officielle prise pendant les sept années de crise a été de réglementer la résidence des réfugiés 
syriens. Pour ce faire, le gouvernement central a obligé le HCR à cesser leur enregistrement à 
partir de 2015. Au même moment, il a décidé d'appliquer le système de la kafala, déclaré 
illégal en 2018. Incapable de prendre position vis-à-vis du conflit syrien ou peu disposé à le 
faire, hanté par l'expérience tragique des camps de réfugiés palestiniens, le gouvernement 
libanais a laissé le soin aux organisations internationales, aux autorités locales et à la société 
civile libanaise de faire face à l'afflux des réfugiés, sans qu’aucune règle ne soit édictée au 
niveau étatique, ni aucun moyen affecté à cette tâche. En l'absence de stratégie ou de plan 
d'action national, des réactions localisées ont commencé à se manifester à partir de 2012 et se 
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sont intensifiées jusqu’en 2015, élargissant la diversité de traitement dont les Syriens faisaient 
l’objet et ajoutant à la fragmentation des villes libanaises. Précarisant la situation des réfugiés, 
l’incapacité politique à tous les niveaux du pouvoir a toutefois créé des lacunes juridiques, 
politique, sociales et surtout urbaines dans lesquelles les réfugiés syriens ont pu se glisser.  
Négociant leur place dans des conditions très défavorables, les réfugiés syriens sont devenus 
des boucs émissaires. Rendus prétendument responsables de tous les maux de la société 
libanaise, ils ont servi de prétexte aux chefs politiques et religieux pour s’exonérer de leur 
impuissance. 
  
Résumé de la deuxième partie : 
Positionnement de la thèse : stabiliser un cadre analytique dans un 
paysage en évolution rapide 
 
Après une première partie qui présente le contexte des villes libanaises avant l'afflux 
de réfugiés syriens en 2011, cette deuxième partie présente le cadre analytique, la 
méthodologie et les outils utilisés, avant de présenter et de justifier les études de cas 
sélectionnées. Après avoir discuté les hypothèses, sont exposés les mécanismes de l’enquête 
sur le terrain. Sont également abordés les types d'interaction urbaine observée, ce qui a 
conduit à inclure un camp de réfugiés palestiniens dans les études de cas, considérant la 
situation des réfugiés comme un continuum dans l'histoire des migrations au Liban plutôt que 
comme un événement en isolé. Le contexte récent est en outre brièvement rappelé, en 
insistant sur les années  2014 et 2015, période qui a eu des effets importants sur la situation 
des réfugiés et, par conséquent, sur le développement des recherches de terrain. 
 
Les analyses développées dans cette thèse reposent sur l’observation et l’analyse des 
relations entre des personnes vivant dans un espace urbain commun. Une façon d'étudier 
cette dimension spatiale des sociétés consiste à examiner les différents acteurs d'un lieu ainsi 
que leurs relations, leurs pratiques et leurs expériences. Celles-ci sont souvent régies par les 
hiérarchies  socio-économiques, les politiques mises en oeuvre, le respect des normes d'égalité 
sociale et l'accès au lieu.  
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Dans cette partie, un accent particulier est mis sur la position du chercheur vis-à-vis 
de son étude et sur la relation préexistante entre le chercheur et le domaine concerné. Ceci 
pour «[rendre objectif] le rapport subjectif à l'objet qui, loin de conduire à un subjectivisme 
relativiste et plus ou moins anti-scientifique, est l'une des conditions d'une véritable 
objectivité scientifique» (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 282). Dans les sciences sociales, y 
compris la géographie, la position et la place du chercheur vis-à-vis du sujet ont suscité un 
regain d'intérêt ces dernières années. À ce moment du développement, j’explique que je n'ai 
pas abordé mon sujet avec la certitude préalable que ce dernier serait politique ou engagé,  
proche d’un travail militant ou même soucieux de produire une recherche engagée, plaçant ce 
travail dans le champ des études critiques ou radicales. Mon intérêt pour la compréhension 
des événements observés sur le terrain et relatés dans cette thèse ne m’a pas pour autant 
conduit à la neutralité. Suivant Paul Routledge, je propose «un tiers-lieu», entre les sphères 
académiques et militantes, pour rendre compte d’un chercheur détaché mais simultanément 
impliqué dans l'action sociale : «Le troisième lieu implique des rencontres inattendues entre le 
monde universitaire et le militantisme ; là où ni le lieu, ni le rôle, ni la représentation ne 
prévalent, où les uns subvertissent continuellement l’interprétation des autres 265» (Routledge, 
1996, p. 400). Je suis convaincue que juxtaposer recherche et militantisme peut poser 
question, ainsi que le soulignent certains auteurs qui pensent que la posture conduisant à être 
“à la fois intellectuellement scientifiquement productif et transmetteur socialement 
responsable, semble difficile à concilier”  (Bautès & Chirot, 2012). 
 
Le chapitre quatre est principalement consacré aux trois terrains plus spécifiquement  
étudiés. Il présente un aperçu de leur spécificité géographique, suivi de leurs principales 
caractéristiques socio-démographiques et politiques. Il se termine par un développement 
concernant les campements informels de réfugiés. Bien que cette étude se concentre sur la 
situation des réfugiés qui investissent la ville existante, il a semblé important de souligner les 
spécificités des camps de réfugiés afin d’expliquer pourquoi il a finalement été décidé de les 
exclure du champ de l’étude. 
 
                                                 
265
 Citation originelle: “The third space implies inappropriate(d) encounters between academia and activism 
where neither site, role, or representation holds sway, where one continually subverts the meaning of the other” 
(Routledge, 1996 p.400) 
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Les trois études de cas sélectionnées présentent un éventail  très large d'inégalités. 
Deux des trois sites étudiés se situent à la périphérie de la capitale, Beyrouth, le troisième 
étant localisé à la périphérie de la deuxième plus grande ville du Liban, Tripoli. À l’est de 
Beyrouth, El-Nab’a présente une longue histoire migratoire qui a générée une forte diversité 
des populations résidentes. Plusieurs vagues de migrants pauvres arrivées de divers pays 
étrangers  à partir des années 1920, ont choisi ce quartier comme lieu de résidence, en raison 
de la proximité avec Beyrouth et des opportunités économiques qui y étaient liées. El-Nab’a 
s'est ainsi développé de manière très informelle, sans aucun effort de planification publique. 
El-Nab’a est également connu pour la juxtaposition de nombreux groupes ethniques et 
religieux, avec une présence dominante de travailleurs migrants non arabes, de Libanais 
originaires d’Arménie, de chrétiens, de chiites et de sunnites, particulièrement depuis l’arrivée 
des réfugiés syriens. L’une des rues du quartier est par exemple surnommée “rue Ethiopie” en 
raison du nombre important d’employées de maison qui y résident et qui, d’ailleurs, ne sont 
pas exclusivement de nationalité  éthiopienne. 
 
Le camp palestinien de Bourj el-Barajneh présente également une longue histoire 
migratoire. Ce quartier informel a été créé en 1948 pour constituer un camp de fortune 
destiné aux réfugiés palestiniens. Ce qui apparaît aujourd’hui comme une véritable ville abrite 
des dizaines de milliers de migrants forcés, confrontés à une exploitation et à une exclusion 
systématiques. Ces derniers appartiennent à trois catégories : les réfugiés palestiniens du 
Liban arrivés lors de la première vague migratoire en 1948, les réfugiés palestiniens installés 
en Syrie après 1948 et ayant fuit la guerre civile à partir de 2011 ; enfin, les réfugiés syriens 
non palestiniens. Les deux groupes de réfugiés palestiniens sont confrontés à une crise 
d'identité profonde et n'ont pratiquement aucun espoir de retourner dans leur pays d’origine, 
qu’ils ont parfois quitté depuis trois génération. Les réfugiés syriens non-palestiniens sont les 
seuls qui peuvent espérer retourner dans leur patrie, même si la probabilité semble faible. De 
ce fait, pour les réfugiés palestiniens, accueillir un nouveau réfugié constitue un défi urbain et 
logistique mais aussi un défi intellectuel et émotionnel.  
Parmi les trois sites, Tebbeneh (Tripoli) est celui où la présence libanaise est la plus forte. Les 
relations socio-culturelles y sont dans une large mesure patriarcales, conservatrices et tribales . 
Dans ce quartier, peu de de recherches en sciences sociales ont été effectuées jusqu’ici, ce qui 
m’a permis de bénéficier d’une forte coopération de la part des personnes interrogées. Le 
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conflit entre sunnites et alaouites s’ancre  dans des rapports de force noués à l’échelle de tout 
le Moyen-Orient. Il constitue le principale facteur de fragmentation  à Tripoli.  
 
Si les trois sites ont des caractéristiques communes, ils présentent aussi des spécificités 
en termes de diversité sociale. Les signes de violence y sont partout explicites, principalement 
à Bourj el-Barajneh, tandis qu’ils apparaissent principalement dans le discours des habitants à 
Tebbeneh. À El-Nab’a, le sentiment dominant est celui d’un optimisme prudent, au fur et à 
mesure qu’un règlement de la guerre semble s’ébaucher en Syrie. L'absence presque complète 
de données quantitatives sur les trois sites a rendu l'approche qualitative inévitable, même si 
cette dernière est difficile, certaines des informations qui m’ont été fournies n’ayant jamais pu 
être vérifiées. Dans cette deuxième partie, je discute en conséquence de ma propre 
subjectivité ainsi que des défis et des avantages qui en découlent. J'ai été absente du Liban 
pendant dix-huit mois avant d’entamer la première phase de ma recherche de terrain. C'était 
la première fois que je quittais le Liban aussi longtemps sans y revenir, même pour quelques 
jours. De ce fait, j’ai fortement ressenti une position d’extériorité, n’étant plus strictement une 
“Libanaise de l’intérieur”. Il m’a donc fallu un certain temps d’adaptation avant de formaliser 
la façon dont j’allais aborder un tel sujet de recherche en sciences sociales, dont j’allais 
m’accommoder des  effets de position et de la manière dont ils affectent l'analyse.  
 
Résumé de la troisième partie : 
Le “refugee turn”, quelle(s)frontière(s) ? 
 
La troisième partie analyse la manière dont les réfugiés avec lesquels j'ai dialogué dans 
chacun des sites de l’étude trace son propre chemin pour accéder aux villes du Liban, trouver 
un emploi, faire face aux exigences administratives et à la résistance de la société d'accueil. 
Pour aborder les différents aspects de ces itinéraires migratoires et résidentiels qui concernent 
le fragment libanais de la vie des réfugiés, cette partie situe ces derniers dans les villes, où ils 
ont tendance à être concentrés dans les quartiers les plus pauvres et, à une échelle plus intime, 
dans leurs lieux d'habitation, qu'il s'agisse d'un appartement ou d'une chambre en colocation.  
Cette partie aborde également les relations des réfugiés syriens avec la société d'accueil, les 
citoyens libanais qui sont leurs employeurs, leurs voisins ou, plus simplement, les personnes 
qu'ils rencontrent dans la rue. Dans les cas où la relation est faite d'indifférence, l'absence de 
réaction de la part des Libanais n'est guère anodine et elle doit être interprétée en tant que 
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telle. À l’autre extrémité, les relations peuvent déboucher sur des séquences de violences 
allant parfois jusqu’à l’affrontement physique. Entre ces deux bornes extrêmes, la recherche 
empirique révèle des échelles emboîtées de co-présence et d'interactions entre Syriens et 
Libanais qui matérialisent des  situations complexe où la méfiance, voire l’hostilité, 
n’interdisent pas un minimum de relations. La troisième partie de cette thèse tente donc 
démêler la complexité des situations en s’appuyant sur une analyse empirique fondée sur la 
recherche de terrain et illustrée par une sélection de récits considérés comme les plus 
représentatifs. 
 
Les chapitres 5, 6 et 7 sont consacrés aux résultats directs et aux analyses des enquêtes 
de terrain. Leur exposition conduit à la discussion proposée au chapitre 8, qui clôt la thèse. Le 
chapitre 5 décrit le parcours des Syriens à partir de leur arrivée et la façon dont ils deviennent 
réfugiés en s'installant au Liban. Il décrit également leurs localisations résidentielles 
privilégiées, ainsi que la façon dont ils y sont arrivés. Au delà de la stricte localisation 
géographique, ce chapitre expose en outre la façon dont les Syriens se situent dans la 
mosaïque sociale libanaise. 
 
Les chapitres 6 et 7 analysent les entretiens menés dans les trois sites d’étude, ainsi 
que dans d’autres lieux à Beyrouth ou à Tripoli.  Le chapitre 6 restitue la vie quotidiennes des 
réfugiés. Il détaille les problèmes de logement, les difficultés liées à la recherche d'un travail et 
à la satisfaction des besoins quotidiens. Il détaille aussi leurs déplacements dans la ville, leur 
accès aux espaces publics contraints par le cadre juridique restrictif défini par les autorités 
libanaises à partir de 2015. Le chapitre 7 détaille quant à lui les représentations que les 
populations libanaises hôtes se font des réfugiés syriens. Les entretiens menés auprès de 
Libanais de différentes origines, religions, appartenances sociales ou culturelles développent 
invariablement quatre figures négatives. Les Syriens volent les emplois ; ils vivent dans des 
conditions précaires et inacceptables ; ils ont envahi l’espace public et il faut s’en méfier 
lorsqu’on les croise ; ils accaparent l’aide internationale au détriment des Libanais pauvres qui, 
eux, ne peuvent prétendre à aucun soutien. En croisant ces points de vue, le chapitre aborde 
la question des inégalités perçues par des Libanais quotidiennement confrontés à la 
cohabitation avec les Syriens. 
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Dans son dernier chapitre, cette partie se termine par une discussion sur l'espace de la 
négociation entre Syriens et Libanais à partir des premiers jalons posés dans l'introduction 
générale de la thèse. Le chapitre explique comment l'espace a été utilisé comme un outil de 
cooptation et d'exploitation aux niveaux local, national ou régional. Il expose également 
comment chaque niveau de négociation tend à chevaucher et à influencer l'autre. À l'échelle 
urbaine, de la ville au quartier, les négociations entre habitants sont continues et, dans une 
certaine mesure, ordinaires et discrètes. Les Syriens sont à la recherche d'interstices dans 
lesquels ils pourraient se glisser en vue d’accéder à un minimum de stabilité, tandis que les 
hôtes cherchent au contraire à préserver leurs propres espaces. Ces espaces de la négociation 
ne doivent pas être considérés à partir d’une relation binaire entre réfugiés et communautés 
d’accueil. Plus généralement, il doivent être vus comme un mécanisme produisant et 
reproduisant un jeu subtil d’inégalités entrecroisées d’ordre social, économique, culturel, 
religieux, etc. Ces inégalités sont subies par la majorité des citadins, que ces derniers soient 
Syriens, Libanais, Palestiniens, étrangers ou nationaux originaires de pays divers. Les seuls 
épargnés sont ceux qui concourent activement à la production de ces inégalités et qui en 
bénéficient au premier chef. Ces privilégiés ne sont pas plus de quelques dizaines de milliers 
au Liban. Ils constituent l’élite politico-économique qui domine le pays et concentre 
l’écrasante majorité des richesses.  
 
À la lumière des divers éléments tirés des enquêtes de terrain , il apparaît que les 
injustices qui séparent les citadins n’obéissent pas à des critères simples et permanents. Selon 
les lieux, les moments, les acteurs, les mécanismes de production des inégalités sont différents 
et frappent de façon aléatoire. L’injustice dans les villes du Liban semble capricieuse. Elle 
touche une majorité de citadins selon des modalités et des intensités différentes qui les 
opposent à toutes les échelles : du local au national, en passant par le niveau régional. Dans 
cette partie, j’exploite les sources issues de mon travail de terrain pour décrire des situations 
de conflits qui enracinent l'injustice dans l’espace des villes libanaises, utilisant comme point 
central la situation des réfugiés syriens dans les trois sites de l’étude. Dans les exemples 
développés, les réfugiés syriens expriment d'une manière ou d'une autre l’anxiété qu’ils 
éprouvent continuellement, craignant des événements imprévus ou des changement de règles 
juridiques susceptibles d’avoir des conséquences graves sur leur sécurité et leur résidence. 
Cette anxiété diffuse les incite à limiter leurs déplacements et leurs usages de l’espace public. 
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Cantonné dans un logement souvent inconfortable, ils renoncent à la ville et deviennent 
invisibles aux yeux des Libanais.  
 
Dans les premières années de leur arrivée, la condition des réfugiés syriens pouvait 
sembler moins difficile. À partir de 2011, ils ont eu pour principale préoccupation de trouver 
un abri et d’assurer la satisfaction de leurs besoins de base. Comme on peut l’attendre de 
n’importe quel migrant s'installant dans un pays étranger, ils ont tenté d'accéder à la ville aussi 
efficacement que possible, tirant parti de toutes les opportunités. S'ils espéraient recevoir une 
aide, ils n’hésitaient pas à faire  la queue durant des heures en vue de l'obtenir. S'ils se voyait 
proposer un emploi, quel que soit sa rémunération, ils n’hésitaient pas à l’accepter. S'ils 
avaient besoin de partager un appartement, ils acceptaient également. Quelque soit le 
montant du loyer. En raison du nombre élevé de Syriens arrivés en quelques années, ces 
initiatives ont été bien vite considérées  négativement par les communautés hôtes. Par une 
sorte d’effet domino, le volontarisme des réfugiés syriens a contraint d’autres groupes 
vulnérables à renégocier leur place dans la ville et dans les rapports sociaux, notamment du 
point de vue des salaires. En position inférieures, les Syriens n’ont pas hésité à accepter des 
rémunérations inférieures, notamment pour les emplois peu qualifiés sur lesquels ils étaient 
en concurrence avec les Libanais les plus modestes. Dans une situation économique déjà 
désastreuse, l’arrivée de réfugiés syriens dans les trois sites d’étude a donc accru les difficultés 
des populations pauvres et vulnérables, aggravant la misère générale.  
 
Par une réglementation datant de 2015, le gouvernement a imposé le système de la 
kafala, qui a notablement aggravé la situation des réfugiés syriens, les transformant en citadins 
de seconde zone. Cette mesure injuste a cependant rééquilibré les choses en faveur des 
Libanais les plus pauvres. L’instauration de la kafala leur a en effet permis de regagner des 
positions sur les marchés de l’emploi et du logement. Dans l’espace urbain, ils ont bénéficié 
de la quasi-disparition des Syriens, cantonnés à leurs domiciles ou dans des lieux très 
restreints. La vulnérabilité juridique accrue des Syriens a en outre conduit à une aggravation 
de leurs conditions d’exploitation et à un élargissement des potentiels bénéficiaires de cette 
dernière. Outre le kafeel ou les employeurs les plus solvables, l’instauration de la kafala a ainsi 
permis à des employeurs très modestes, voire pauvres, de bénéficier également de la force de 
travail des Syriens pour un salaire très faible, donc acceptable pour eux.  
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Le cas Bourj el-Barajneh présente l’intérêt de montrer que les questions analysées dans 
cette troisième partie ne sont pas strictement limitées à une confrontation entre une société 
d’accueil homogène et un afflux de réfugiés venus de l’étranger. Un regard superficiel pourrait 
en effet donner à penser que la crise des réfugiés a activé un mécanisme de résilience au sein 
d’une société libanaise structurellement plastique, car forgée dans une histoire chaotique. Le 
principal résultat de cette thèse est au contraire de démontrer que c’est plutôt la 
recomposition permanente des espaces urbains, des pratiques spatiales et des relations 
sociales qui constitue  le principal moteur des injustices socio-spatiales au Liban. Pour être 
compris de façon pertinente, le sort injuste fait aux Syriens doit donc être inséré donc dans 
des mécanismes plus globaux de production des inégalités, ces derniers concernant 
l’ensemble des populations vulnérables résidant dans les villes du Liban. Profitant de la 
position inférieure des Syriens, chacun essaie d’en tirer un profit matériel, exploitant une 
force de travail devenue quasi-gratuite depuis l’instauration de la kafala. La présence des 
Syriens permet également à certains groupes inférieurs de tirer un profit symbolique visant à 
réduire la domination dont ils sont par ailleurs l’objet, à l’image des Palestiniens de Bourj el 
Barajneh. Réfugiés d’hier, citadins de seconde zone à la liberté restreinte, les Palestiniens se 
rapprochent des Libanais en s’essayant eux aussi à l’exploitation de la misère des Syriens et en 
mobilisant des représentations identiques lorsqu’ils les regardent en tant qu’«autre». 
Paradoxalement, l’arrivée des réfugiés syriens semble avoir  renforcé la cohésion générale de 
la société libanaise, réduisant les fractures les plus profondes et les plus traumatiques, 
notamment celles qui ont été produites par  la guerre civile des années 1970-1980.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Après une période de crise paroxystique dans les premières années de l’arrivée des 
réfugiés, à un moment où l'unité du Liban et la paix civile semblaient être mises en cause, la 
situation semble s’être stabilisée depuis 2015. Simultanément, l'afflux des réfugiés a fortement 
diminué et le départ de migrants arrivés entre 2011 et 2015 est en cours, même s’il est lent. 
Les Syriens qui résident encore dans les villes du Liban sont contraints à l’invisibilité et 
acceptent silencieusement le sort injuste auquel ils sont soumis. À quelques dizaines de 
kilomètres au nord et à l’est, de l’autre côté des frontières libano-syriennes, la guerre civile 
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semble sur le point de se terminer, même si la situation est encore extrêmement incertaine au 
moment où cette thèse s'achève (mai 2019). 
 
Commencée par un mémoire de Master 2 en 2013, cette thèse a été construite dans 
des temporalités identiques à celles du conflit syrien et de l’arrivée des réfugiés au Liban. Mes 
recherches sur le terrain ont débuté en 2014, à un moment où le nombre de réfugiés atteignait 
son apogée et où s’aggravaient les tensions sociales et politiques. La coïncidence temporelle 
entre le moment de la thèse et ce qu’on nomme au Liban la « crise des réfugiés » a permis de 
documenter ce «fait social total» au plus près des événements en collectant des données 
empiriques basées sur des entretiens et sur des sources documentaires abondantes, car liées à 
une actualité “chaude”. Cependant, cette coïncidence est également devenue une contrainte. 
Forçant l’élaboration scientifique à se mêler à l’actualité, elle a retardé l’élaboration 
problématique de la première partie et a surtout compliqué l’objectivation puis l’interprétation 
des données de terrain. 
 
Alors que cette thèse se clôt, les tensions dans les villes libanaises semblent s’apaiser, 
quoique les réfugiés Syriens demeurent assignés à  une position de totale subordination. 
Toutefois, la diminution des tensions ne s’accompagne pas d’une diminution significative du 
nombre des réfugiés. Même si on peut supposer qu’une bonne partie d’entre eux retournera 
un jour en Syrie, il est peu probable que ces retours se feront dans un délai aussi court que 
celui des arrivées. Plus probablement, une certaine proportion des Syriens installés au Liban 
restera sur place car leur éventuel retour dans le pays d’origine n'est pas uniquement lié à un 
arrêt de la violence armée. À quoi ressemblera l'avenir de la cohabitation urbaine entre 
Libanais et Syriens ? Cette question excède le cadre de la thèse, y répondre obligera à mener 
de nouvelles investigations de terrain dans les prochaines années.  
 
Compte tenu de la durée de la thèse et des contraintes inhérentes à son élaboration, ce 
travail n’a pas abordé tous les aspects de la cohabitation urbaine entre Libanais et Syriens. Je 
présente donc dans cette conclusion trois aspects me semblant important à prendre en 
compte dans le cadre de recherches ultérieures. 
1- Bien que divers extraits de journaux et d’autres ressources journalistiques aient été 
mobilisés dans la recherche, ce type de sources n’a été que marginalement intégré dans le 
corpus documentaire et, surtout, il n’a pas fait l’objet d’une analyse en tant que tel. Compte 
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tenu des caractéristiques socio-politiques du pays, les entreprises de médias et de 
communication sont dans leur grande majorité détenues par les familles et les clans 
appartenant aux groupes dominants qui, au Liban, concentrent la majorité des instruments de 
pouvoirs. De ce fait, une lecture systématique des manières dont la presse rend compte de la 
présence syrienne présenterait un intérêt majeur pour la compréhension du phénomène, 
particulièrement pour documenter les représentations que les populations libanaises ont 
progressivement produites à l’égard des réfugiés. 
 
2- S'il est vrai que la majorité des réfugiés au Liban vit dans des villes, la population syrienne 
installée dans des camps représente tout de même un quart de million de personnes. Ces 
réfugiés sont tant bien que mal installés dans des tentes implantées sur des terres louées par 
des particuliers. Dans une thèse centrée sur les conditions de vie urbaine des réfugiés syriens, 
le choix a été fait de ne pas inclure les camps dans le champ de l’étude. Dans une recherche 
ultérieure, il serait toutefois utile d’enquêter sur ce thème. Il serait par exemple pertinent de 
documenter la manière dont les réfugiés syriens ont choisi de s’établir dans tel ou tel camp, 
notamment en examinant le rôle du « Shawish », généralement Syrien, qui présente l’intérêt 
d’avoir tissé des liens avec des propriétaires fonciers libanais antérieurement à la crise. Une 
fois la localisation des camps convenue avec le propriétaire du sol, ces Shawish deviennent de 
facto les chefs de camps. En conséquence, ils détiennent un pouvoir déterminant qui leur 
permettent d’orienter la manière dont les camps seront administrés. 
 
3- La plupart des réfugiés qui en avaient les moyens ou la possibilité ont tenté de s’installer 
dans le Liban littoral à l’ouest du pays, à leurs yeux plus propice à un départ ultérieur vers 
l’Europe ou l’Amérique du Nord. Au cours de mes enquêtes j'ai été plusieurs fois interpellé à 
par des Syriens m’interrogeant sur les mérites comparés de tel ou tel pays européen en 
matière d’accueil et d’installation des réfugiés. De manière plus anecdotique, on m’a aussi 
demandé pour quelle ambassade je ‘recrutais’ de potentiels migrants, afin de me proposer une 
candidature à transmettre aux services intéressés... Il convient donc de pousser plus avant les 
investigations dans ce domaine afin de mieux comprendre les emboîtements entre les 
différentes échelles de la migration, une telle façon d’envisager les circulations migratoires 
étant d’ores et déjà documentée sur différents terrains d’investigation. Ces migrations par 
étapes et d’échelles emboîtées engagent des dynamiques entre réfugiés, des structurations de 
réseaux familiaux ou amicaux , des négociations avec des administrations consulaires ou des 
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ONG, ceci afin de trouver le compromis optimum entre les attentes des réfugiés et les 
critères de délivrance des visas imposés par les législations des pays prêts à les accueillir.  
 
Pour terminer, j’aborde le débat concernant la position du chercheur lorsqu’il est 
confronté aux phénomènes extrêmes de l’exil, du déracinement, de la violence armée. 
Immergé dans une actualité « chaude » et tragique, il lui est forcément difficile de rester 
insensible à la misère visible autour de lui. Pour autant, et au-delà d’une posture classique de  
“recherche-action”, il se doit de maintenir une distance suffisante en vue d’engager 
l’indispensable démarche d’objectivation requise par un travail de thèse. Coincé entre une 
objectivation toujours imparfaite et des sollicitations permanentes incitant à quitter la position 
du spectateur pour celle de l’acteur engagé, j’ai choisi de positionner ma rechercher dans un 
“tiers espace” tentant de maintenir un équilibre fragile entre ces deux extrêmes. 
 
Libanaise de nationalité, appartenant au groupe minoritaire des Grecs orthodoxes, née 
en région parisienne, de mère palestinienne et de père syrien, maintenir cette position 
médiane nécessite toutefois un effort de tous les instants. En 2012, après avoir fait le siège 
des bureaux de la Sécurité Générale à Beyrouth, je suis parvenu à triompher de l’inertie de la 
bureaucratie. À force d’entêtement, j’ai pu faire enregistrer le certificat attestant de mon 
mariage avec un Palestinien. Au moment d’enregistrer l’acte, le fonctionnaire en charge de la 
procédure m’a pris à parti avec les arguments suivants : “En somme, vous n’avez pas réussi à 
épouser un Libanais ? Pourquoi vous êtes-vous tellement compliqué la vie ?” Ayant passé 
mon enfance et mon adolescence au Liban, c'était la première fois que j’étais confrontée à 
cette réalité à la fois brutale et inattendue : être considérée comme une citoyenne libanaise de 
seconde zone. Appartenant à un milieu social favorisé, ce genre d’injustice ordinaire et 
gratuite n’a pas directement affecté ma vie quotidienne. En revanche, il est possible que cet 
épisode ait contribué à renforcer mes dispositions à enquêter sur les injustices socio-spatiales 
et sur la négociation dissymétrique pour les espaces.  
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ANNEX 1 - Detailed list of banners and threats targetting Syrian refugees, Lebanon, 2014 (Figure 2.5) 
  Locality Kadaa Incident Banner 
Religious 
Majority 
Source 
1 Abadiyeh Baabda Curfew banner Syrian brothers are asked not to circulate between 8pm and 6am. All non conforming 
motorcycles are banned under personal accountability and financial fines 
Christian/ 
Druze 
Data gathered personally via social 
media outlets 
2 
Abey, Ain 
Darafil 
Chouf 
Curfew 
announcement 
Informing all Syrian brothers that they are prohibited from circulating after 8pm and 
before 5am. Subject to liability. Druze 
Data gathered personally via social 
media outlets 
3 
Abou Samra, 
Tripoli 
North 
Call for non-
competition 
My Syrian brother... we support you but don't act against us... We already have a lot 
to deal with - The gathering of mobile shop owners in Abi Samra Sunni (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
4 
Ain El 
Remmaneh 
Baabda Curfew banner We ask Syrian brothers not to circulate after 9pm in the interest of public safety Christian  
Data gathered personally via social 
media outlets 
5 Ain El Saydeh Aley Curfew banner We ask Syrian brothers not to circulate after 9pm in the interest of public safety 
Christian 
Maronite 
(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
6 
Annaya, Kfar 
Baal 
Byblos Curfew banner Foreign workers are prohibited from circulating between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. within 
Municipality boundaries. Subject to liability. 
Christian 
Maronite 
The Campaign in support of Syrians 
against racism, Facebook page, 2014 
7 Araiya Baabda Curfew banner 
Announcement: In line with the municipality council decision number 52B dated 
15/5/2013, it is strictly prohibited for foreign and Syrian dwellers and workers to 
circulate within municipality boundaries between 8:30pm and 6am. Subject to liability 
and arrest, and fines. 
Christian  
The Campaign in support of Syrians 
against racism, Facebook page, 2014 
8 
Achrafieh 
Sassine 
Square 
Beirut 
Threatening 
announcement 
"The day will come when we say to the Syrian: gather your things and everything you 
have stolen, and leave" - Bachir Christian  (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
9 Baalchmay Alay Curfew banner 
Our Syrian brothers are prohibited from circulating within the boundaries of 
Baalhsamiyeh Municipality between 8pm and 6am and are also required to obtain 
personal ID cards from the municipality. Subject to liability. 
Druze (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
10 
Babliyeh 
municipality 
Sidon 
Municipality 
official 
statement 
Foreign and Arab dwellers are prohibited from circulating in the municipality after 7:30 
pm under penalty of legal prosecution, and should a dweller be given more than one 
warning, his or her kafeel will be pursued by relevant departments and made to pay a 
fine. 
Shiite 
Data gathered personally via social 
media outlets 
11 
Boutchay, 
Merdacheh 
Baabda Curfew banner The municipality announces the prohibition of circulation of all foreigners within its 
boundaries between 8:30pm and 5:30am. 
Christian  
The Campaign in support of Syrians 
against racism, Facebook page, 2014 
12 
Beit El Chaar, 
Mazraat El 
Hdaira  
Matn Curfew banner 
The Beit Al-Sha'ar and Al-Hadira Municipality hereby announces the imposition of a 
curfew on all foreign workers living within the municipal boundaries between 9pm and 
5:30am 
Christian  (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
13 
Beit Chama, 
El Akidiyyeh 
Baalbek Curfew banner 
To all Syrian brothers living within the municipality, we inform you that starting today 
circulation is prohibited between 8pm and 6am for any reason to preserve your safety 
and security 
Shiite 
Data gathered personally via social 
media outlets 
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  Locality Kadaa Incident Banner 
Religious 
Majority 
Source 
14 Bhamdoun Alay 
Curfew 
announcement 
To Syrian workers: we ask all Syrian workers not to circulate within municipality 
boundaries between 8pm and 6am and those who break the curfew will be held 
accountable. 
Christian/ 
Druze 
Data gathered personally via social 
media outlets 
15 Blat Byblos Curfew banner Foreign workers are prohibited from circulating between 8:30p.m. and 5 a.m. within 
Municipality boundaries. Subject to liability. 
Christian  
Data gathered personally via social 
media outlets 
16 
Bourj 
Hammoud 
Beirut Curfew banner Bourj Hammoud Municipality hereby warns all foreign (Syrian) residents that they are 
prohibited from circulating between 8pm and 6am. 
Christian  (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
17 Bchamoun Chouf Curfew banner Motorbikes and non-Lebanese workers residing in Bchamoun are prohibited from 
circulating between 9pm and 6am. Subject to liability. 
Druze (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
18 Chanay Alay Curfew banner It is strictly prohibited for Syrians to circulate after 10pm. Druze (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
19 
Dbayeh, Zouq 
El Kharab, 
Haret El 
Bellan, 
Aoukar 
Matn Curfew banner The municipality announces the prohibition of circulation of all foreigners within its 
boundaries between 8pm and 5:30am. 
Christian  
The Campaign in support of Syrians 
against racism, Facebook page, 2014 
20 Deir El Qamar Chouf Curfew banner 
Announcement: For their own safety, Syrians and foreigners are requested not to circulate within 
the municipality boundaries between 9pm and 5am. Subject to liability.(With the exception of 
restaurant workers who have been issued municipal permits) 
Christian 
Maronite 
(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
21 Ebrine Batroun 
under the 
radar curfew 
No, my town is not, like other places, hiding behind the shroud of “foreigners” when they mean 
one thing and one thing alone. There are no fliers being posted around the place. There are no 
banners to welcome you with the news. It’s all under the radar, hoping it would go unnoticed [...] 
I didn’t want to write about this issue until I made sure it wasn’t simply townspeople gossip. I 
went to the municipality and asked. They confirmed. Their explanation? We got an order from 
the ministry of interior affairs recently to organize the Syrians inside our town and to have them 
listed – as per orders of Lebanon’s intelligence. They didn’t say anything about a curfew but, 
believing I was worried about the Syrians in my town, they went on further: “you don’t have to 
worry. A curfew was enforced on Syrians. The policeman is also patrolling the streets from 8 pm 
till 12 am. The town will stay safe.” 
Christian 
Maronite 
(Fares, 2013) 
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  Locality Kadaa Incident Banner 
Religious 
Majority 
Source 
22 
Falougha-
Khalouat 
Baabda Curfew banner Displaced persons and workers are prohibited form circulating between 9pm and 6am. Subject to liability. 
Christian 
Orthodox 
(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
23 Ghaboun Alay Curfew banner Foreign workers are prohibited from circulating between 8pm and 6 am. Subject to 
liability. 
Druze / 
Christian  
Data gathered personally via social 
media outlets 
24 Ghaziyeh Sidon Curfew banner All Syrian brothers are requested not to circulate after 8pm and 6am to preserve their 
safety and security. Subject to liability. 
Shiite 
The Campaign in support of Syrians 
against racism, Facebook page, 2014 
25 Halba Akkar Curfew banner Syrian are prohibited from circulating after 8pm Orthodox (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
26 Hammana Baabda Curfew banner 
For their own safety, foreigners and Syrians are prohibited from circulating within the 
boundaries of the municipality between 8pm and 6am and they must obtain official 
personal ID cards from the municipality. Subject to liability. 
Druze (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
27 Hemlaya Matn Curfew banner 
Hamlaya Municipality hereby announces that under penalty of law and heavy fines: - 
Travelling scrap vendors are prohibited from entering the town of Hamlaya - Foreign 
workers are prohibited from circulating between 8pm and 5am 
Christian  (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
28 Hemlaya Matn Curfew banner 
The Hemlaya municipality announces under personal accountability and fines: foreign 
workers are prohibited from circulating within municipality boundaries between 8pm 
and 5am 
Christian  
The Campaign in support of Syrians 
against racism, Facebook page, 2014 
29 Ehden Zgharta 
Collective 
eviction notice 
All Syrian workers within the boundaries of Ehden municipality are requested to leave 
before 31/10/2016 
Christian 
Maronite 
Data gathered personally via social 
media outlets 
30 Jaj Byblos Curfew banner Workers and foreigners are strictly prohibited from circulating in Jaj Municipality 
between 7pm and 6:30am. Subject to liability. 
Christian  (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
31 
Jdeideh, 
Bouchriyeh, 
Sad 
Bouchriyeh  
Matn Curfew banner To preserve the safety of the displaced Syrian brothers, you are asked not to circulate 
between 8pm and 6am. 
Christian  (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
32 Jeita Keserwan Curfew banner Foreign and Syrian workers, and motorcycles and ATV are prohibited from circulating after 7:30pm 
Christian 
Maronite 
Data gathered personally via social 
media outlets 
33 Jiyeh Chouf Curfew banner All non-Lebanese are prohibited from circulating between 9pm to 6am, especially 
motorbike users. 
Christian  (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
ANNEXES        367 
 
  Locality Kadaa Incident Banner 
Religious 
Majority 
Source 
34 Jounieh Keserwan Curfew banner Foreign workers are prohibited form circulating between 8 pm and 6 am to preserve public safety. 
Christian 
Maronite 
The Campaign in support of Syrians 
against racism, Facebook page, 2014 
35 Kahaleh Baabda  Curfew banner 
It is strictly prohibited for foreign workers to gather or circulate within the boundaries 
of the municipality between 8pm and 6am, just as the use of bicycles and motorbikes 
is strictly prohibited. Subject to liability. 
Christian  (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
36 Karm Saddeh Zgharta Curfew banner Karm Saddeh hereby announces a curfew on all foreigners between 8pm and 5am. 
Subject to liability. 
Christian  
Traboulsi, J., & Adnan, H. (2018). 
Banners in Dialogue. Refugees as City 
Makers, 82-89. 
37 Lehfed Byblos Curfew banner Foreign workers are prohibited from circulating after 6pm. Subject to liability. 
Christian 
Maronite 
(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
38 
Mansourieh, 
Mkalles, 
Daychouniyeh 
Matn Curfew banner 
Announcement: all displaced Syrians residing within the boundaries of the 
municipality are requested to present themselves at the municipality within a month to 
register, and they are prohibited from circulating after 8pm for their safety and 
security. 
Christian 
Maronite 
The Campaign in support of Syrians 
against racism, Facebook page, 2014 
39 
Mar Chaaya, 
Mzaki 
Matn Curfew banner Motorbikes and foreigners are prohibited from circulating between 8pm and 6am. Christian  (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
40 
Miyeh w 
Miyeh 
Sidon Curfew banner Syrians are prohibited from circulating between 8pm and 6:30am Christian  (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
41 Monsef Byblos Curfew banner Foreign workers are prohibited from circulating on motorbikes, in cars, or on foot between 8:30pm and 6am. Subject to liability. Christian  (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
42 Qraiyeh Sidon Curfew banner Syrians and foreign nationals are prohibited from circulating between 8pm and 6am. 
Subject to liability. 
Christian (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
43 Sahel Alma Keserwan 
Threatening 
announcement 
We have warned and the time has come to enforce. No circulation for foreign workers 
on the streets of Sahel Alma after 7pm 
Christian 
Maronite 
Data gathered personally via social 
media outlets 
44 Salima Baabda  Curfew banner 
In the interest of your safety: Foreigners and Syrians are prohibited from circulating 
within the boundaries of the municipality, especially on motorbikes, between 8pm and 
6am, Subject to liability. 
Christian  (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
45 Chouaifet Alay 
Municipality 
official 
statement 
To all foreigners residing in Shoueifat. Starting May 29, 2013 you are prohibited from 
circulating within the boundaries of the municipality for security reasons. Subject to 
liability and legal action. 
Druze 
The Campaign in support of Syrians 
against racism, Facebook page, 2014 
46 Sin el Fil Matn Curfew banner 
All foreign workers residing within the boundaries of the municipality are required to 
present themselves at the municipality before June 10,2013 to register and they are 
prohibited from circulating between 9pm and 6am. Subject to liability 
Christian 
Maronite 
The Campaign in support of Syrians 
against racism, Facebook page, 2014 
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47 
Wadi 
Chahrour 
Baabda  Curfew banner 
Wadi Shahrour Municipality announces a curfew effective Saturday, February 9, 
2013, applicable to all foreigners residing within the town, between of 8:30pm and 
5:30am. All motorbikes that have not obtained a permit from the municipality are 
prohibited from circulation 
Christian 
Orthodox 
(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
48 
Zahlé-
Maalaqah and 
Taanayel 
Zahlé Curfew banner 
Zahleh-Mu’allaqa and Ta'anayel Municipality hereby announces that all our Syrian 
brothers are prohibited from circulating, both on motorbikes and on foot, within 
municipality boundaries between 8pm and 6am. Subject to liability. 
Christian  (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
49 Zouk Mosbeh Keserwan Curfew banner Zouk Mosbeh municipality request that Syrian and foreign residents not circulate between 8pm and 6 am. And not to use motorcycles. Subject to liability. 
Christian 
Maronite 
(San Lucas, 2014) 
50 
Somewhere 
in Beirut 
Beirut 
Burial 
restriction 
It is strictly prohibited to bury any Syrian regardless of age, under strict personal 
accountability and perusal by the designated committee. Unknown (De Stone & Suber, 2018) 
51 Unknown Zahlé 
Threatening 
announcement 
No Syrians allowed. Subject to liability. Christian  (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
52 Unknown Unknown Curfew banner 
Syrians are permitted to circulate between 6:30am and 7pm. Peddlers are prohibited 
within the boundaries of the municipality. All unregistered motorbikes and cars, or 
vehicles whose drivers are not in possession of a Lebanese license, will be seized 
and towed” 
Unknown (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
53 Unknown Unknown 
Negative 
announcement 
My Syrian Brother, I apologize but I have more right to work in this country than you 
do. Rabih Barbour 
Unknown (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
54 Unknown Unknown Curfew banner Syrians workers must remain indoors and motorbikes are prohibited from circulating 
after 8:30pm. Subject to liability. 
Unknown (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
55 Unknown Unknown 
Threatening 
announcement 
“Listen, Syrian: if you threaten our livelihoods we will cut off your hands. The workers 
of the town” 
Unknown (Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018) 
56 unknown Unknown 
Call for 
refoulement 
We will not wait to become minorities in our cities and villages. Join us in raising a 
common voice during the popular gathering to ask for the return of the displaced 
Syrians to their country 
Unknown 
Data gathered personally via social 
media outlets 
57 
Zahlé-
Maalaqah 
Zahlé 
Banner 
announcing 
law 
Decision nb 319 by the Zahlé-Mu'allaqa municipality: Group gatherings in public 
places are prohibited for foreign workers between 7pm and 5am. Please uphold the 
content of this note to preserve public safety 
Christian  (Nayel, 2014) 
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ANNEX 2 – Banner placed at Masna’ border crossing between Lebanon and Syria, October 2018 
 
Required Document for entry of Syrians to Lebanon (Schedule 
No. -2-) 
 
For departure via 
airport or sea port 
- Passport 
- Non-refundable travel ticket 
- Proof of visa to country of departure 
Granted 48 hrs entry 
  
For medical treatment 
- Passport or valid ID 
- Medical Report from a Lebanese Doctor or Hospital  
Granted 72 hrs entry 
Husband or minor 
children holding 
yearly, permanent, or 
courtesy Residency 
- Passport or Valid ID 
- Residency card of father or mother or husband  
- Family booklet (should the family be accompanying) 
Granted entry permit of seven days during which a 
residency card must be acquired from the GSO if the 
person has that right 
 
Husband or children 
of a Lebanese 
[woman] – wife of a 
Lebanese [man] – 
wife of a Palestinian 
refugee in Lebanon 
- Passport or Valid ID 
- Proof of familian relationship (marriage certificate, family 
booklet…) 
Granted six months temporary residency  
Taxi driver, or van or 
truck driver 
- Passport or Valid ID 
- Vehicle registration and insurance 
- Ownership or driving authorisation 
Truck driver granted one month residency, taxi driver 
granted 72hr residency 
Driver accompanying 
(religious figure, 
business man, officer, 
banker) 
- Passport or Valid ID 
Granted residency or entry equal to accompanying 
employer 
Domestic worker 
accompanying Syrian 
guarantor (kafeel) 
- Passport or Valid ID 
- Proof of employment and guarantee (kafala) 
Granted title equal to guarantor (kafeel) 
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ANNEX 3 – Unions of Municipalities in Lebanon - Overview and Statistics 
Prepared by the UN-Habitat, 2014.  
 
27 January 2015 Prepared by UN-Habitat. Contact: Synne Bergby, synne.bergby@unhabitat,org
Union coverage
Total  number of Unions: 53
936 out of 1558 cadastre, including Municipal ities, are linked to a Unions (60%). 
Approximately 800 out of 1015 Municipal ities are members of a Union (79 %)
Country Unions 
242 most vulnerable localities: 242 197 81 %
MOSA Social Development Centers (SDCs): 191 146 76 %
Average number of cadastre per Union: 17,5
Average number of 242 localities per Union: 3,7
Average number of SDCs per Union: 2,75
Population in Unions compared to total
Lebanese 4 032 535 3 056 762 76 %
tot syr 1 116 969 858 208 77 %
Lebanese <4$ 1 136 904 946 955 83 %
Summary Unions figures: 
# of 
Cadastre:
# of SDCs
# of 242 
localities
Lebanese 
Population 
2004
Lebanese< 
4$
Syrian 
refugees 
23-10-
2014
Total 
population 
Leb+Syr
Total 
population 
in 242 
localities
Percentag
e Syrian / 
total
Percentag
e Leb < 4$ 
/ Leb tot
Population in 
242 localities / 
total population
Total all Unions 936 146 197 3 056 762 946 955 858 208 3 914 970 2 776 569 22% 31% 71%
Top 20 most vulnerable 280 43 83 1 112 715 312 992 240 134 1 352 849 944 708 18% 28% 70%
Top 10 most vulnerable 105 13 58 1 092 011 390 413 452 604 1 544 615 1 406 110 29% 36% 91%
Top 20 ex. the largest cities / metropolitan areas 296 44 103 920 831 319 619 458 098 1 378 929 1 086 164 33% 35% 79%
* Note: As Union of Sour includes some 63 Municipalities and cover the whole caza this is not excluded. 
* Note: Given the nature and mandate of the Unions, cadastre outside any Municipality will normally not be formally part of a Union. The 
Union may however, extend it's functions and services to localities in the same region outside the formal Union.  
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ANNEX 3 (continued) – Unions of Municipalities in Lebanon - Overview and Statistics 
Unions of Municipalities ranked from least to most vulnerable 
UoM MOH_NA1 
# of 242 
localities 
Lebanese 
Population 
2004 
Lebanese< 
4$ 
Syrian 
refugees 
23-10-
2014 
Total 
population 
Leb+Syr 
Total 
population 
in 242 
localities 
Percentage 
Syrian / 
total 
Percentage 
Leb < 4$ / 
Leb tot 
Population 
in 242 
localities / 
total 
population 
Rank 
total 
UoM Jabal El Rihane South 0 3735 1701 598 4333 0 14% 46% 0% 0 
UoM El Chouf El Aaala Mount Lebanon 0 14925 3389 965 15890 0 6% 23% 0% 1 
UoM Iqlim El Kharroub El 
Janoubi Mount Lebanon 0 6254 1425 1382 7636 0 18% 23% 0% 2 
UoM El Hasbani Nabatiye 1 15773 4055 883 16656 8276 5% 26% 50% 3 
UoM Iqlim El Touffah Nabatiye 0 17128 1945 2868 19996 0 14% 11% 0% 4 
UoM Caza Bcharreh North 0 21029 5201 2862 23891 0 12% 25% 0% 5 
UoM Jabal Aamel Nabatiye 0 27780 7086 2415 30195 0 8% 26% 0% 6 
UoM Caza Jezzine South 1 12392 5643 1756 14148 6068 12% 46% 43% 8 
UoM El Qalaa Nabatiye 1 18646 4757 3066 21712 3661 14% 26% 17% 9 
UoM El Dreib El Gharby North 1 3432 2162 1080 4512 2284 24% 63% 51% 10 
UoM El Maten El Aaala Mount Lebanon 1 31972 7970 3979 35951 3870 11% 25% 11% 11 
UoM Bint Jbeil Nabatiye 2 31354 8001 3729 35083 15141 11% 26% 43% 12 
UoM El Challal Bekaa 1 8028 2613 1831 9859 7468 19% 33% 76% 13 
UoM El Souayjani Mount Lebanon 2 23544 5361 3846 27390 14842 14% 23% 54% 14 
UoM El Jord El Aaala 
Bhamdoun Mount Lebanon 
0 
13026 2966 4970 17996 0 28% 23% 0% 15 
UoM Mintaqat Deir El Ahmar Bekaa 1 10721 3241 3178 13899 7389 23% 30% 53% 16 
UoM Ghareb El Aaala 
Oua Chahhar Mount Lebanon 
1 
22279 5214 5057 27336 7931 18% 23% 29% 17 
UoM Caza Jbeil Mount Lebanon 2 57664 8788 4311 61975 28810 7% 15% 46% 18 
UoM El Arqoub Nabatiye 1 12096 3087 4369 16465 8603 27% 26% 52% 19 
UoM Jabal El Sheikh Bekaa 2 18978 5684 5029 24007 10323 21% 30% 43% 20 
UoM Naher El Istiwan North 0 9563 6022 4932 14495 0 34% 63% 0% 21 
UoM Qala'a El Estiqlal Bekaa 2 11115 3858 5880 16995 7344 35% 35% 43% 22 
UoM Charqi Baalbeck Bekaa 2 18130 5900 4422 22552 16357 20% 33% 73% 23 
UoM Mintaqat El Batroun North 2 28665 7092 10961 39626 14987 28% 25% 38% 24 
UoM Jord El Qaytaa North 4 38248 24092 5061 43309 24867 12% 63% 57% 25 
UoM Kesrouane El Ftouh Mount Lebanon 5 162816 25405 14737 177553 70593 8% 16% 40% 26 
UoM El Koura North 5 48236 13279 11962 60198 25243 20% 28% 42% 27 
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UoM MOH_NA1 
# of 242 
localities 
Lebanese 
Population 
2004 
Lebanese< 
4$ 
Syrian 
refugees 
23-10-
2014 
Total 
population 
Leb+Syr 
Total 
population 
in 242 
localities 
Percentage 
Syrian / 
total 
Percentage 
Leb < 4$ / 
Leb tot 
Population 
in 242 
localities / 
total 
population 
Rank 
total 
UoM Chamal Baalbeck Bekaa 3 26117 8499 6486 32603 23451 20% 33% 72% 28 
UoM Caza Zgharta North 3 46258 11387 11348 57606 30994 20% 25% 54% 29 
UoM Sahel Akkar North 4 17265 10874 8524 25789 11964 33% 63% 46% 30 
UoM Mintaqat El Joumeh 
Akkar North 
4 
30867 19440 6095 36962 24554 16% 63% 66% 31 
UoM El Hermel Bekaa 1 33826 11007 5947 39773 36579 15% 33% 92% 32 
UoM El Dreid El Aousat North 4 10174 6406 10941 21115 14152 52% 63% 67% 33 
UoM El Chqif Nabatiye 9 109298 13040 25990 135288 76144 19% 12% 56% 34 
UoM Charq Zahleh Bekaa 5 31518 6897 24034 55552 45542 43% 22% 82% 35 
UoM Gharbi Baalbeck Bekaa 8 38097 12395 13499 51596 49281 26% 33% 96% 36 
UoM El Bouhayra Bekaa 6 37283 11167 17386 54669 41258 32% 30% 75% 37 
UoM Sahil El Zahrani South 8 64139 29208 16606 80745 55814 21% 46% 69% 38 
UoM El Chafat North 3 24580 15480 13947 38527 26985 36% 63% 70% 39 
UoM Saida El Zahrani South 9 170310 77557 28564 198874 120439 14% 46% 61% 40 
UoM El Maten El Chamali 
El Sahili El Aousat Mount Lebanon 
11 
388620 43445 50201 438821 322612 11% 11% 74% 41 
UoM El Daneih North 7 49668 31278 18289 67957 40337 27% 63% 59% 42 
UoM Caza Sour South 17 199202 72525 31618 230820 166296 14% 36% 72% 43 
UoM El Sahel Bekaa 7 26274 7868 48211 74485 66832 65% 30% 90% 44 
UoM Iqlim El Kharroub El 
Chamali Mount Lebanon 
8 
61454 13991 30488 91942 69448 33% 23% 76% 45 
UoM El Dahia El Janoubiya Mount Lebanon 4 197263 48330 31242 228505 228505 14% 25% 100% 46 
UoM Oussat oua Sahil El 
Qaytaa North 
5 
58247 36683 22040 80287 72854 27% 63% 91% 47 
UoM Baalbeck Bekaa 4 67889 22091 31237 99126 90742 32% 33% 92% 48 
UoM El Menieh North 3 32791 20652 25248 58039 55592 44% 63% 96% 49 
UoM Sahil El Maten El 
Janoubi 
Mount Lebanon 4 268710 65834 53488 322198 322198 17% 25% 100% 50 
UoM Caza Zahleh Bekaa 8 77460 16950 57424 134884 108438 43% 22% 80% 51 
UoM El Beqaa El Aousat Bekaa 5 42931 9394 82081 125012 120601 66% 22% 96% 52 
UoM El Fayhaa North 10 258992 148620 71145 330137 270900 22% 57% 82% 53 
  TOTAL 197 3 053 027 945 254 857 610 3 910 637 2 776 569 22% 31% 71%   
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ANNEX 4 – Regularising the entry and residence of Syrians in Lebanon 
Excerpts from the official General Security requirements applied onto Syrian dwellers in Lebanon as of January 1, 2015 
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ANNEX 4 (continued) – Regularising the entry and residence of Syrians in Lebanon 
Excerpts from the official General Security requirements applied onto Syrian dwellers in Lebanon as of January 1, 2015 
 
  
 
 
ANNEXES     
 
ANNEX 5 – Excerpt from the minutes of meeting of the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers – October 23, 2014 
Elements relevant to the policy paper concerning the residency of Syrian refugees, translated in 
Encadré  4-2: Excerpt from the Council of Ministers’ minutes of meeting on October 23, 2014 
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NEGOCIER L’ESPACE : les villes du Liban devant l’afflux des réfugiés syriens (2011-2018). Études de cas à Tripoli (quartier 
de Tebbeneh) et à Beyrouth (quartier de El-Nab’a et camp Palestinien de Bourj El-Barajneh). 
 
Recevoir en trois ans un afflux de migrants correspondant à un quart de sa population constitue un défi majeur pour n’importe quelle 
nation. Cette recherche  tente de comprendre comment un tel phénomène, à priori inconcevable, a pu advenir dans les villes du Liban, qui 
ont accueilli plus d’un million de réfugiés depuis 2011. Partant de ce phénomène brutal, elle examine les facteurs qui ont permis à ces 
réfugiés urbains de s'installer tant bien que mal dans des espaces marqués par des processus extrêmes d'injustices socio-spatiales. 
La thèse aborde cette question à trois niveaux : (1) à l’échelle urbaine locale,  où citadins et réfugiés vivent un cycle continu de 
négociations dissymétriques concernant l’occupation et l’appropriation de  leurs espaces respectifs, reflété dans des situations 
quotidiennes de tension et de conflit ; (2) au niveau national, dans lequel la géopolitique interne à la société libanaise et les effets de 
l’action publique du gouvernement, des collectivités territoriales et des ONG prennent un rôle direct, influençant l’accès des réfugiés à la 
ville ; (3) à l’échelle géopolitique internationale enfin, qui aborde la situation du Moyen-Orient. À cette échelle, l’analyse s’attache aux effets 
des relations historiques entre le Liban et la Syrie dans l’installation actuelle des réfugiés. Cependant, l’espace de négociation n’est pas 
exclusivement perçu comme le résultat d’une relation binaire entre réfugiés et société d’accueil. Plus largement, la thèse démontre 
comment cette relation s’insère dans des mécanismes qui produisent et reproduisent des inégalités exprimées à des échelles multiples et 
qui opèrent sur l’ensemble des populations citadines, que ces dernières soient d’origines syriennes, palestiniennes, qu’elles appartiennent 
aux différentes communautés religieuses libanaises ou qu’elles  soient originaires de pays étrangers. 
L’étude repose sur une approche ethnographique qualitative faisant appel à diverses méthodes, particulièrement des entretiens 
approfondis auprès d’échantillons de population très divers. Ceux-ci sont accompagnés d’observations systématiques menées dans trois 
quartiers urbains : Tebbeneh à Tripoli, El-Nab’a et le camp palestinien de Bourj el-Barajneh à Beyrouthe 
Mots clés : négocier l’espace, inégalités socio-spatiales, réfugiés urbains, villes du Liban 
 
 
NEGOTIATING SPACE: Cities in Lebanon and the challenge of the Syrian refugee influx (2011-2018) Case studies in Tripoli 
(Tebbeneh) and Beirut (El-Nab’a, and the Bourj el-Barajneh Palestinian refugee camp) 
 
It is a major challenge for any nation to accommodate an influx of migrants corresponding to a quarter of its population in three years. This 
research seeks to understand how such a phenomenon, inconceivable at first glance, could have taken place in cities in Lebanon that 
have hosted over a million refugees from Syria since 2011. With this brutal phenomenon as a starting point, the thesis examines the 
factors that have made it possible for the urban refugees to settle in places marked by extreme processes of socio-spatial injustice. 
The thesis addresses this issue at three levels: (1) at the local urban scale, within which urban dwellers and refugees live a continuous 
cycle of dissymmetrical negotiations on the occupation and appropriation of their respective spaces, reflected in daily situations of tension 
and conflict; (2) at the national level, within which the internal geopolitics and the effects of government, local authority, and NGO actions 
play a direct role in influencing the access of refugees to the city; (3) finally at the international geopolitical scale which addresses the 
situation of the Middle East. At this scale, the analysis focuses on the effects of historical relations between Lebanon and Syria in the 
current settlement of refugees. Negotiating space is not seen as the result of an exclusively binary relationship between refugees and the 
host society. Rather, the thesis demonstrates how this relationship fits into mechanisms that produce and reproduce inequalities expressed 
on multiple scales, and touch all urban dwellers - whether they are originally Syrian, Palestinian, Lebanese from different religious groups, 
or even from a foreign country. 
The study is based on a qualitative ethnographic approach using a variety of methods, particularly in-depth interviews with diverse 
population samples. These are accompanied by systematic observations in three urban neighborhoods: Tebbeneh in Tripoli, El-Nab'a and 
the Palestinian camp of Bourj el-Barajneh in Beirut 
Keywords: negotiating space, socio-spatial inequality, urban refugees, cities in Lebanon 
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